Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 4:83–93.

GÉZA JESZENSZKY

Hungary’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas

Looking at the eleven centuries of Hungarian history in the Carpathian Basin, can one say that misfortunes inflicted upon us from above, form outside were an almost constant, or at least a decisive feature? Or is it more pertinent to point out the multitude of our own mistakes, misjudgements, often induced by false prophets? This is a question I frequently put to myself when I was still delving into the documents of our history at my desk in an alcove by the window, behind the catalogue cabinets of the old National Széchényi Library building in Múzeum körút.

When I thought of Ranke’s theory on the supremacy of foreign policy, the obvious answer seemed to be that the fate of smaller nations depends fundamentally on their outside environment, above all on the interests and wishes of the great powers. This theory certainly seems to be supported by an examination of the last two centuries: though this nation of ours was not really passive or apathetic, though it often set about overcoming the backwardness arising out of its inherited situation and resisted the great powers and alliances that bound its hand and foot, it can easily be said not merely about the ”Magyar Messiahs”, but also about the millions of ordinary Hungarians, to quote the great poet, Endre Ady, that ”They, alas, could do nothing”. Is this really the case, or just a comforting way of reassuring ourselves?

In connection with a lecture I gave at Indiana University, I discussed this subject – the untravelable road that Hungarian foreign policy had faced in the 20th century – with Aladár Szegedy-Maszák, in Washington in the summer of 1985. He was the Hungarian envoy in Washington who resigned in 1947 in order to protest at the first signs of misrule, when the non-communist Prime Minister of the country was forced into exile. Szegedy-Maszák warned against illusions that he, too, considered typical of us: let us not imagine that our tragedies are simply the work of Fate, let us not excuse ourselves lightly. Remembering the admonitions of Széchényi, I accept his advice. Let us seek the causes of the tragedies in our history in a combination of misfortune and misjudgement, above all if we accept the old-fashioned assumption – neither supported nor refuted by events – that there are lessons to be drawn from history.

As a university lecturer, I have shared my ideas on this topic with my students since 1977, and as a practicing politician I have tried, since 1990, to assist in preventing misfortune from returning, and to use foreign policy in promoting the rebirth of Hungary and its integration into the new post-communist Europe without the impediment of misjudgements.

It was not the Antall-government that first described Hungarian foreign policy as one of the most successful branches of the administration. But regardless of when and to what extent the description is true, the baneful influence of the stars on our history clearly seemed to change for the better at the end of the 1980s, when history at last gave Hungary a chance. The turn of events is especially conspicuous when compared with the previous decades, for Hungarian foreign policy in the 20^th century (and Hungary’s whole history) can certainly not be called a success story. Some people have likened it to a crime story, but I do not think the comparison can be substantiated as a reproach to us. If a literary form is needed to describe the history of Hungarian foreign policy, I would prefer to call it a drama or, more specifically, a tragedy. The classical definition of tragedy is a dramatic work that portrays a deep human struggle and most frequently ends with the death of the hero. Aristotle goes on to say that the fall of a tragic hero is not brought on by his sins or wickedness, but by his decisions, his misjudgements of the situation. The drama of Hungarian history is made greater because the debacles were so often preceded by major successes. Before the fatal Battle of Mohács against the Ottoman Empire in 1526, there had been the glorious reign of the 15^th century King Matthias. Before the capitulation to the Habsburg-Russian allied forces at Világos in 1849, there had been a victorious spring campaign liberating the whole country from foreign invaders. Before the collapse at the end of the Great War, the Hungarians had been an increasingly influential factor in an economically and culturally prosperous great power. Prior to the Hungarian Holocaust, in March 1944, when Nazi Germany invaded and occupied Hungary and brought about the deportations, the reign of mob terror and the destruction of the country by war, ending in Soviet occupation in 1945, Hungary between 1938 and 1941 saw the recovery of a third of the territories she had lost under the 1920 Peace Treaty, and furthermore had just about managed to prove to the world her fidelity to her humanist traditions by giving refuge to almost a million Jews, to Poles and also to POWs escaping from Germany, in the midst of an inhuman Hitlerite world. Similarly, the Soviet intervention on November 4, 1956 occurred at a time when the majority of the nation already believed that a free, democratic Hungary had been born again. The Hungarian public was always caught unaware by its defeats, and the greater the height from which it fell, the greater the paralysis it suffered by the fall.

Ever since the adoption of Christianity, the Hungarians have followed a Western alignment, in the knowledge that this is the only path to survival and progress. Within this alignment, they were able and obliged to seek a balance, initially within the triangle of the Eastern and Western Empires and the Papacy, and later on the perimeter of the ambitions of the European great powers, and at times on the line of intersection between them. Independently of the extent to which the sympathy and respect of the Hungarians for particular European peoples was requited, regardless of the fact that a counterweight or support had to be sought from time to time in the South or the East, Hungarian politicians who thought in terms of the nation’s prospects never believed that ex Oriente lux.

There were choices open to Hungarian foreign policy primarily in the first part of the period stretching from 1849 to 1920, from the surrender at Világos to the Peace Treaty of Trianon. The argument that the Compromise of 1867 was responsible for the collapse taking place fifty years later is scarcely defensible. Without partners and allies, and turned by the afflictions of history into a minority in the country named after them, the Hungarians did not have much chance of retaining their historical territory in whole. The alternatives in theory were a confederation with the neighbouring small nations – the national minorities of Hungary and their relatives beyond the borders – or a compromise with the Habsburg Empire, but neither the international situation nor the behaviour of our neighbours left them a real choice. Where I see the responsibility of the Hungarians lie is in the fact that they made no attempts between 1859 and 1867, and still more when they had attained a position of power after 1867, to forge a multilingual, multicultural Hungaria and, simultaneously, to arrive at a sincere, generous reconciliation with the other Danubian peoples. Since there are few similar instances in world history, it merits special attention that such reconciliation was urged by László Teleki in 1849 and by Kossuth in exile. The 1868 Law on Minorities pointed in the same direction, but Eötvös did not receive sufficient support from the political public to carry it out faithfully in practice, and Lajos Mocsáry himself felt that he was a rare exception to be working along these lines. In the same context, the governments after the 1867 Compromise were unable and unwilling to keep the country plainly on the liberal, enlightened and democratic political course which had gained attention and admiration from most of the world in 1849.

The oft-quoted argument that the Hungarians had no say in the foreign policy worked out at the Ballhausplatz in Vienna (or the Hofburg, i.e. is by the sovereign) is false and too convenient. The Hungarian Prime Minister had a statutory right to influence the conduct of foreign affairs. The common foreign minister had to report regularly on his activities to the delegations of the Parliaments, and the Hungarians, through their aristocracy, were strongly represented on the diplomatic staff. Nor is it worth pleading that the people themselves had no say in foreign policy, as the same could be said of practically every state at the time, and there is precious little sign in the incidentally quite free press of the day that Hungarian society was notably opposed to the common foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Moreover, the rare alternative proposals put forward by the opposition, the Independence Party, hardly offered a better course, and their rhetoric turned the neighbouring peoples even more firmly against the Hungarians.

Although it was Gyula Andrássy, a Hungarian, who concluded the Dual Alliance with Germany, his real purpose was to create a “liberal alliance” with the West (England and France) against the Russian autocracy which had suppressed Polish, Hungarian and Romanian liberty. However, this was frustrated in 1878 and 1884 by the conservative forces in Austria. By the end of the century France was committed to supporting Russia, and England had given up trying to keep its Russian rival out of the Balkans and the Straits. But all Hungarians considered it advantageous when the Triple Alliance was formed with the addition of liberal Italy, the country which had granted Kossuth a home and long remained grateful for the significant Hungarian assistance given to her struggle for unification. Indeed, the Triple Alliance secured for the Hungarians a good thirty years of peace and, thereby, the chance of economic prosperity.

From the point of view of Hungarian foreign policy interests, which it was certainly possible to assert within the frames of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the 20^th century, the trouble was caused not by the Dual and Triple Alliance, but by the Anglo-German discord that broke out at the beginning of the century and the consequent division of Europe into two blocs of allies. Despite the conscious Anglophilia of the Hungarian political elite (ever so sensitive to foreign affairs) and the spontaneous Francophilia of the intellectual elite, Hungary simply had no chance of either staying out of the conflict that was brewing or taking the side of the Entente. This predicament was termed “manifest destiny” by one wise observer, Esmé Howard, the British Consul-General in Budapest. The essence of the Western messages coming to Budapest in various forms was that the Monarchy should stay together, that it should stick by the German alliance but try to curb Germany’s ambitions. Apart from that, the Hungarians were expected to remain the most stable part of the Monarchy, act as a counterweight to the “Cis-Leithanian”, i.e. Austrian, conservative and ultramontane trends, and reach agreement with Hungary’s non-Hungarian minorities without sacrificing the country’s integrity.

It would take a long line of argument, and so I will merely state the proposition, that all the great powers bear responsibility, to differing degrees, for the outbreak of the First World War, and that the most the Hungarian government could have done would have been to veto the declaration of war.

During the war, or at least during its initial stage, all the belligerents directed their resources and diplomacy at attaining victory, and there were no essential differences between parties in this respect. As for the failure of the efforts to conclude a separate peace, which gained momentum when Emperor-King Charles ascended to the throne, it cannot be blamed either on the sovereign or on the Hungarians. Nor was it a result of Hungarian foreign or domestic policy that Hungary featured in the Entente’s peace plans simply as spoils to be thrown to the lesser allies or the prospective member-states of the grand alliance against Germany planned for the post-war period.

In the autumn of 1918 and in 1919, Hungary’s foreign policy options were purely theoretical and practically non-existing. To a decisive extent it can be ascribed to the short-term political interests of the victors that the Western great powers, in the spring of 1918, abandoned their age-old doctrine of the need for a great power in Central Europe, offering the peoples living there the chance of independence, and some of them the chance of joining the winning side. It can be described as a misfortune that no such choice was open to the Hungarians, and still more that, despite the many arguments in favour of establishing a multinational democratic federation in Central Europe, the concept of a “United States of the Danube”, devised by Oszkár Jászi, including the idea of a Swiss type Hungary formed out of autonomous cantons, in the event excited very little response from our neighbours, who had been given a chance of making easy territorial conquests. So the birthday of national independence in Central Europe also became the date on which the internecine quarrels of the peoples living there started to become very serious.

It was a misjudgement on Hungary’s part or, rather, a fatuous illusion, to imagine that President Wilson’s entry onto the international stage would replace power politics with the rule of law and justice. That error was committed by Mihály Károlyi, a well-intentioned man, but inferior in his ideas and talents to the contemporary Hungarian political establishment, and quite unsuited to playing the particularly difficult role of leader in one of the most critical periods of the history of Hungary. He wanted to prove his good intentions by refraining for months from using military force to try and block the patent intentions of the neighbouring states to make conquests. It may be that the country, exhausted after four and a half years of war, and weak in terms of social cohesion (in the first place due to etatism), really had no strength to do so at the very time when the state was collapsing. But the policy of passive protest was a total failure against the policy of fait accompli pursued by the voracious neighbours. The rude awakening came too late. It was largely despair that led to the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and an Eastern alignment that proved even more illusory than the previous hopes placed on the West. It had no chance either militarily or politically, but it was a gift to the nationalism of the neighbouring countries and turned the victorious great powers even more against the Hungarians. Yet it is not true to say that the Treaty of Trianon was a punishment inflicted on Hungary for the experiment with Bolshevism. The borders would have been drawn even more disadvantageously if the peace conference had fulfilled the maximum demands of the neighbouring countries.

The three years between 1918 and 1921 were a period of misfortune and of misjudgement, of successive humiliations and of blunders and extremist sentiments that reinforced each other. It is seemingly inevitable that the Hungarians, really struggling “against a whole world” (as Károlyi put it), should not have been dealt even one winning card. The occupation, followed by the hopeless “peace talks” in Paris, were compounded by a dictated peace. In which Hungary lost two thirds of her territory, the regions which were emotionally and economically most important. Even after the treaty was signed, the constant outside intervention persisted, extending even to interference in the form of government. The peace gave rise to the irredentist foreign policy of the implacable Hungarians, but Trianon had tragic consequences not only for the losers, but also for the winners, bringing them misfortune as well, as later events showed.

So was there an alternative, after the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, to a programme of promoting peaceful territorial revision? In view of the indisputable fact that the borders were drawn with extreme partiality and that highly intolerant policies were pursued against Hungarian minorities of three and a half million, it must be apparent that it would scarcely have been conceivable for any Hungarian Parliament to support a government which proclaimed any other programme. But if the borders had been drawn more fairly and a mutually tolerant policy had been pursued towards the minorities that inevitably would have remained on either side of the borders, there might then have been a good chance of a reconciliation of the kind reached, for instance, in this century by the peoples of Scandinavia, who have likewise clashed with each other several times in their history.

However disillusioned Hungarian society was after 1920 with the victorious powers (all of which they had learnt to identify as supporters of the cause of Hungarian liberty in and after 1849), Hungary’s foreign policy, when it came to its senses, looked to the West once again. An attempt was made in 1920 to persuade France to take a leading, organizing role in Central Europe and build this upon Hungary, which was centrally placed strategically as well. Admiral Horthy, who in 1920 was elected Regent, would have liked both on political and sentimental grounds, to rest the new Hungarian foreign policy on the great maritime powers. Prime Minister Bethlen, as a realist, knew this was not directly possible, but through the League of Nations he managed to stabilize the economy by raising substantial Western loans. His sole intention with the Italian alignment, established in 1927, was to break out of the isolation and find a path towards France and Britain. Only the most desperate adventurers in the 1920s thought there should be an alliance with the extremist, nationalist circles in Europe, primarily in Germany, in order to pursue a revanchist policy.

The generation of Hungarian diplomats raised in the school of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy perhaps tended to look down on the diplomacy of the Little Entente, but they did not underestimate it. They were aware of the real power relations and the sixteen-fold military supremacy on the other side, and they sought a way of escaping from the chains that bound Hungary. This led first of all to feeble isolated attempts to reach agreement with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Benes, and the Romanian King Ferdinand, and after Horthy’s speech at Mohács in 1926, to a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In the early 1930s it was mainly Hungarian business and the friendship society run by Elemér Hantos that attempted to lessen the political tensions with our neighbours through closer economic cooperation and some kind of customs union.

The consequences of the peace settlement based on blind nationalism proved more serious than the most pessimistic forecasters could have predicted. As Hugh Seton-Watson wrote, “In each of the new states there prevailed a narrow official nationalism”, and the oppressive policy pursued against the national, religious and political minorities led to internal and external tensions and conflicts. “This state of generalized and mutual hostility provided opportunities for any great power intent on disturbing the peace.” Instead of the new Central European countries, which Hinsley, the Cambridge professor, termed “small, unstable caricatures of modern states”, waking up to their community of interests, they chased after great-power support for their endeavours to sustain or overthrow the new order. After two decades of existence, the new Central Europe, created by British and American initiatives, and then by the ideas and decision of the French, collapsed as a consequence of the brutal intervention by Nazi Germany and abandonment by its Western patrons.

Not even under the shadow of a German expansion that threatened all the peoples of Central Europe could Hungary come to any material agreement with the Little Entente, as the governments of the neighbouring countries were unwilling to fulfil Hungary’s one condition of substance: an end to the policy of discrimination against the Hungarian minorities. The agreement reached at Bled in August 1938 contained too little and came too late. Nonetheless, it played a part in the still insufficiently appreciated gesture by Horthy and his Foreign Minister Kánya, when they firmly rejected Hitler’s proposal that Hungary should attack Czechoslovakia. The last attempts to save Central Europe included the “horizontal” Warsaw-Budapest-Belgrade-Rome axis, suggested at the end of 1937. Although this was not specifically anti-German it was designed to halt the expansion of both German and Soviet influence. Hungarian diplomatic attempts at the end of the 1930s received no kind of assistance whatever from the Western democracies. In fact these democracies gave no real support even to their own allies, Poland and the Little Entente. The explanation for this was not some kind of cynicism or hypocrisy, but the so-called Realpolitik, resulting from their limited resources and lack of direct interests in Central Europe. All that compelled Britain and France to pursue a policy of appeasing Hitler and refraining even from condemning him verbally, despite all the sincere sentiments of outrage over his actions.

I will refrain here from dealing with the foreign policy of the Teleki government and the foreign-policy attempts made by Hungary during the Second World War. The subject is intricate, it requires much space. (The historian György Ránki, during the last few years of his life, produced some truly lasting work on this subject, and I would gladly see in print his American lectures, which aroused no little argument.) It can no longer be disputed that Hungary really was an unwilling ally. The real conundrum faced by Hungarian foreign policy in this tragic period was what George Kennan described as the oldest and toughest dilemma facing mankind: How far is it permissible to connive with evil in order to mitigate its harmful effects? When must it be opposed, even if that means the strongest resisters will be weakened or even annihilated in the process?

The absence of options facing Hungarian foreign policy after 1945 was not initially apparent, but it was quite plain by 1947. The line of domestic and foreign policy that the Hungarian nation wished to pursue was perfectly clear from the results of the 1945 general elections. Regrettably it proved impossible even to adopt a Finnish type of stance that involved a conscious limitation of sovereignty and far-reaching regard for Soviet endeavours in order to salvage broad domestic and more limited foreign political room for manoeuvre.

When I delivered a lecture at Indiana University in 1985, entitled “The Untravelable Road”, I ended my line of argument on the one hand by saying that the absence of options was no excuse either for omitting to seize the faint opportunities or for the grave mistakes clearly committed in domestic policy, whose evasion or redress would certainly have strengthened the country and at least improved our reputation abroad. My other concluding remark was that everyone, particularly the new generation that would succeed us, should be prepared for a period when Hungary would again have a chance to pursue an active foreign policy and be free to weigh the alternatives. That chance came sooner than anyone imagined.

The government programme, elaborated after the free elections of 1990, outlined the main foreign-policy objectives of a democratic Hungary: resumption of relations with the Western democracies and development of a relationship of trust with them, involvement in the institutions of European integration, and a negotiated termination of the Warsaw Pact, or if that could not be accomplished, a unilateral withdrawal from it by Hungary. We declared a policy of extending the hand of friendship to our neighbours, in the hope that we could establish amicable cooperation with all of them on the basis of the common suffering under the dictatorships, the common acceptance of the Western system of values, and the obvious community of interests.

It can hardly be disputed that my government’s achievements in foreign policy – in the knowledge that it had the agreement and support of the entire nation – were greater and faster than anyone at home or abroad could have imagined in the spring of 1990. Apart from our decisions based upon our interests, the course of history, with the internal erosion and subsequent collapse of the Soviet system, has been of great assistance in this. But I do not think my job now is to sum up our achievements. That can await the election campaign or, rather, the historians.

I do not think that Hungarian foreign policy has to weigh up any kind of choices on basic issues in the radically new historical situation. But there are plenty of dilemmas and questions to decide.

Luckily we need not face earlier dilemmas such as whether to follow a German, British, French, or possibly American, alignment. NATO and the European Communities continue to bind together the Western world, which faces a new assignment since the end of the Soviet threat: to extend the frontiers of freedom, democracy and prosperity eastward, unless it wants to remain a kind of Neo-Carolingian Empire, leaving the greater part of Eurasia to its fate.

Nor do we need to choose between the European Communities and the United States, because the Atlantic concept has also survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hungary was the first country in the region to come out in favour of it, and it did so in the most decided way. The future Prime Minister, József Antall, while still in opposition in January 1990, surprised the Americans themselves. After all the truculence from the Western Europeans, there came such determined statements on the subject from the potential leader of a country that was only just freeing itself from communism. From the summer of 1990 onwards, Poland also moved steadily in the same direction, followed by Czecho-Slovakia. This is what led up to the development of cooperation among the Visegrád Group, not outside encouragement of some kind.

Nor is it a problem for us to decide which of our neighbours to make friends with or to what extent. We are open to all who reciprocate, and believe in regional cooperation, European integration, the steady dismantling of frontiers, and the democratic system of values.

There is no question, however, of making friends over the heads of the Hungarian minorities of three and a half million, let alone at their expense. Nowadays it can hardly be considered an antiquated idea any more to view the settlement of the situation of the minority ethnic groups as one of the key questions of European stability. Hungary’s special attention to this issue might have seemed like a Hungarian obsession until the recent past, but the Yugoslav crisis and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Trans-Dniester region have shown the question is deadly earnest. This was expressed very clearly by József Eötvös in his Dominant Ideas in the Nineteenth Century (1853) and in another work, written in 1865, where he points out that “the national-minority movement is not the consequence of artificially induced agitation or a battle against theoretical principles or imagined insults, but a needful outcome of our whole development so far... Such a movement cannot be suppressed by force, nor can it be assuaged by making concessions, but only by satisfying the needs for which it has emerged.”

So this policy is not dictated by selfishness, still less by ulterior motives, and not simply by the responsibility felt (and laid down in our Constitution) for our fellow Hungarians divided from us by our borders. The existence of peaceful and harmonious cohabitation among the peoples living side by side, overlapping and mixed with one another, or in ethnic enclaves, throughout the Central and Eastern half of Europe, is one of the basic requisites for European peace and security. In the light of this, there can be no doubt that we must try to explain to the world by every means at our disposal, and above all convince our European partners, that the demands of the minorities and individual ethnic groups to organize, govern and administer themselves is not a destabilizing factor at all, but a way of reducing tensions and preventing explosions. Oszkár Jászi’s thesis that ”the national-minority question is democracy’s centre of gravity” remains valid today, but this is not primarily our dilemma, but our neighbours’. Ours is merely to decide how to promote a situation in which the minorities no longer see flight from their native land as their only way out. Since ethnically homogeneous states could only be created in this part of Europe only by forcible deportation and re-settlement or mass murder, there is no other choice but to create the conditions and institutions that can secure the future of all Central and Eastern European peoples, even those who live in ethnic enclaves or as dispersed communities. This entails reviving in a modernized form the international mechanism already established once in 1919 to guarantee this. That is the only means of achieving lasting peace and stability in the new Europe. Even after the tragic ethnic conflicts of the recent past, it remains a hard task to gain international acceptance for this argument, but not an insoluble one, so long as all Hungarian citizens, the Hungarian communities living in Western democratic societies, and as many politicians and citizens as possible, cooperate on it with the requisite sense of responsibility and recognition of the sensitivities of others.

So the real question is not which of our neighbours we conclude agreements with or when we do so, nor what form we should use to express the undertakings we made in the 1947 peace treaty, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. It concerns when and which of our neighbours recognize the need to abandon the policy of oppressing and applying petty restrictions on Hungarian and non-Hungarian minorities and of trying to create homogeneous nation-states (which is a kind of “ethnic cleansing”), because it contravenes the spirit and letter of European integration and constitutional statehood, and because they cannot win by such a policy in the long term, so that it basically conflicts with their own national interests as well.

Since integration into Europe is the fundamental objective of Hungarian foreign policy, it determines our relations with the various European groupings. Our entry into the European Union will resolve the question of our relations with NATO and the West European Union. In fact the closest relations with the latter two organizations could develop before Hungary gains full EU membership. I do not view either the Visegrád grouping or the Central European Initiative as an alternative to such integration. They are not rivals to each other; both are complementary to the building up of our relations with the European Union. I also consider as initiatives promoting European integration such cooperation between border regions as the Alps-Adriatic grouping, or the Carpathian Euro-Region just formed through local initiative. The latter has drawn some critical reactions from certain countries, but in my view for exclusively domestic reasons.

There is, however, a genuine dilemma about what Hungary can do to prevent the severing of the eastern half of Europe, to stop new economic, human-rights and possibly political dividing line developing, or becoming more pronounced east of our borders, which would also segregate certain Hungarian minorities not only from us, but from European integration. The key to averting this danger is not in our hands, but with our opinions, advice and actions we can be of assistance to the West in developing the appropriate response.

There is no question about the road Hungarian foreign policy should take. It is of course the Hungarian road, “the famed road of Verecke” (Ady) that led from our ancestral home to the Western Empire and the Bible, the road that took our students to the universities of Oxford, Paris and Italy and brought here the Renaissance, Humanism, the Reformation, Enlightenment, and Liberalism – all the stems that bore fruit having a special flavour when grafted onto the Hungarian tree. On this road as the novelist Sándor Márai puts it, “the power of intellect and solidarity is mightier than the terror of instincts”. For anyone in the region to stray onto another road evokes the danger of the Bosnian atrocities being repeated. On this road we are accompanied by all Hungarians, by all who follow Széchenyi, Kossuth, Deák, Eötvös, the Telekis, and the Tiszas and Bethlen as well, and by all who follow Bibó and the many ordinary Hungarians.

No alignment dilemmas face Hungarian foreign policy today. The question is simply what means we can use to achieve our objectives, how to overcome or avoid the traps laid by opponents, rivals, the narrow-minded, and the obstacles erected by our own defeatism and impatience. It looks as if the present one will be a difficult year, and there are further years of human trials ahead of us, but our great men of the past urge us to act “steadfastly”, and, as Endre Ady wrote:

Brace yourself,

Fate, Life and Time are free,

The richest now is he who waits, who bides his time.

To know when and how long to bide one’s time and when to act is the eternal dilemma of politics, and whether we can respond to it well depends on whether the remaining decade of this century and the new millennium before us will bring happier times for us and our descendants.

* Read as the annual “József Eötvös Memorial Lecture” at the Europa Institut Budapest in 1993.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 4:119–127.

MÁRIA HEGYESSY

Friedrich Schlegel und seine Zeitschrift „Europa”

I.

Einer der größten Denker der Frühromantik in Deutschland, Friedrich Schlegel, war Schriftsteller, Philologe, Philosoph, Historiker, Dichter und Herausgeber von mehreren Zeitschriften zugleich; in der zweiten Hälfte seines Lebens befasste er sich auch mit Politik. Er lebte von 1772 bis 1829, war Zeitgenosse von Goethe und Hauptpersönlichkeit der frühromantischen Bewegung in Deutschland, um die herum sich der sogenannte Jenaer Kreis der Frühromantiker herausbildete. Dazu gehörten außer Friedrich, dem Philosophen, sein Bruder August Wilhelm Schlegel, Philologe und Kritiker, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Moralist und Theologe, Ludwig Tieck, der populäre Erzähler, Novalis, der esoterische Mystiker, weiterhin Schelling, der junge Philosoph, zum Teil auch Fichte aus der älteren Generation und eine wichtige Rolle spielten auch die Frauen, Caroline, die Frau von A. W. Schlegel und Dorothea Veit, die spätere Frau von Fr. Schlegel, die übrigens die Tochter des großen Humanisten, Moses Mendelssohn war. Ihr Ziel war es, unter dem Stichwort Symphilosophie und Sympoesie gemeinschaftliche Werke zu bilden, da sie meinten: „Philosophieren heißt, die Allwissenheit gemeinschaftlich suchen”. (Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 344.)

Eben diese frühe Schaffungsperiode von Fr. Schlegel, zur Zeit des Jenaer Kreises, wird heute im Allgemeinen als die interessanteste und bedeutendste in seiner ganzen Tätigkeit eingeschätzt. In diesen Jahren schrieb er seine berühmten Fragmentsammlungen (Kritische Fragmente 1797, Athenäumsfragmente 1798, Ideen 1800) und andere poetisch-philosophische Werke (Gespräch über die Poesie 1800, Über die Philosophie. An Dorothea 1799, Über die Unverständlichkeit 1800), in denen seine grundlegenden Gedanken über Poesie, Philosophie, Verstehen und seine Reflexionen über die Möglichkeit der poetischen, philosophischen Mitteilung überhaupt zum Ausdruck kommen.

Die Bedeutung der frühen schöpferischen Tätigkeit von Fr. Schlegel besteht darin, dass er zu den ersten Denkern gehört, die die philosophische Wahrheit nicht mehr in Form von geschlossenen philosophischen Systemen, und die poetische Wahrheit nicht mehr in fest umgrenzten, geschlossenen poetischen Formen, Gattungen suchten. Vor allem in seinen Fragmentsammlungen bildet sich eine neue Mitteilungsform heraus, die die Gedanken in ihrem Entstehungs- zustand darstellt und die Poesie und Philosophie in unendlicher Potenzierung vereinigen will. Dieser Gedanke der unendlichen Potenzierung ist ein Grundgedanke der deutschen frühromantischen Bewegung, deren wahrer Theoretiker eigentlich Fr. Schlegel selbst war. Das Offenhalten der Gedankenrichtung Zukunft, der Prozesscharakter des künstlerischen Schaffens und des philosophischen Denkens ist deshalb bedeutend, weil sich darin zum ersten Mal nach der Aufklärung und dem deutschen Idealismus eine historische Auffassung realisiert, die die poetische und auch die philosophische Wahrheit historisch relativiert. Sowohl in weltgeschichtlichen Dimensionen, als auch innerhalb der Geschichte eines Individuums. Diese beiden Seiten offenbaren sich auch im Leben von Fr. Schlegel, da er einerseits viele historische, literaturhistorische Werke schrieb, wie z. B. Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer (1798), Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur (1814), Über die neuere Geschichte (1810), viele Vorträge hielt, wie z. B. die Pariser Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der europäischen Literatur von den Griechen bis zur Gegenwart (1803–04), oder die Kölner Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Literatur, über Entwicklung der Philosophie, über Universalgeschichte, über Deutsche Sprache und Literatur (1804–07) usw., ferner die späten Vorlesungen in Wien über Philosophie des Lebens, Philosophie der Geschichte und Philosophie der Sprache und des Wortes (1827). Auf der anderen Seite führte er sein ganzes Leben lang ein Tagebuch, das als „Philosophische Hefte” erschienen ist, das heißt, er hörte nie auf an seinen eigenen sogenannten „Philosophischen Lehrjahren” zu arbeiten, die er mit seinen eigenen Worten „Geschichte meiner Bildung, inneres Symphilosophieren”¹ nannte. Daher kann man auch die Wichtigkeit eines seiner zentralen Begriffe, der Bildung verstehen, der im Leben des Menschen nie ein Ende gesetzt werden dürfte.

Wilhelm Dilthey sagte über ihn: „er erfasste den geistigen Grundvorgang, auf welchem die geschichtlichen Wissenschaften beruhen, wenn er ... auf die Natur des Verstehens und des Nachkonstruierens zurückging...”² und Ernst Behler, einer der größten Schlegel-Forscher schreibt über das Verhältnis von Theorie und Geschichte bei Schlegel, nämlich, dass in der Geschichte von Zeit zu Zeit die Realisierung einer Theorie, eines Systems zu beobachten sei, welche Theorie, welche Wesenhaftigkeit sich ständig hinter der Geschichte ziehe. Dass „die Geschichte von selbst zur Theorie umschlage, während die Theorie umgekehrt der einzige Schlüssel der Geschichte sei”.³ Er schreibt also vom „Wechselbezug zwischen Geschichte und System, Historie und Theorie”.⁴

Diese historische Auffassung verbindet sich bei Schlegel somit einerseits mit der Notwendigkeit der Bildung, des ständigen Sich-Selbst-Bildens, andererseits mit der Notwendigkeit der Popularisierung der Philosophie durch die neuen poetischen Mitteilungsformen. Er bezeichnete nämlich die „Philosophie eines Menschen” in den Pariser Vorlesungen ganz platonisch, als „die Geschichte, das Werden, Fortschreiten seines Geistes, das allmähliche Bilden und Entwickeln seiner Gedanken”.⁵ Damit vertrat und verkündete er eine neue Denkweise, laut deren Philosophie, d.h. Denken jedem gehört, betonte also die Universalität der Philosophie, Poesie und Kultur.

Die wichtigsten Punkte in dieser frühen Periode seines Denkens sind also die Erkennung der historischen Relativiertheit der philosophischen und poetischen Wahrheiten, (eigentlich aller Wahrheiten, Äußerungen und Urteile, die einen sprachlichen Charakter haben) ebenso, wie die Betonung der zeitlichen, d.h. geschichtlichen Relativiertheit des Verstehens (Die Interpretationsmöglichkeiten eines Kunstwerks sind unendlich.) – in seiner kritischen Tätigkeit, weiterhin sein Universalitätsanspruch der Philosophie und der Poesie, der in der Vorstellung der Progressivität und unendlicher Potenzierung dieser Vorgänge erschien.

Im Hintergrund seines historischen Bewusstseins liegt aber eine besondere Zeitauffassung, die alles, was in der Zeit geschieht – sowohl das Denken, als auch den künstlerischen Schaffensprozess oder den Verstehensprozess – als einen nie beendbaren, sich immer potenzierenden Vorgang darstellt. Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, dass für ihn die historische Relativität der Wahrheit nicht bedeutet, dass es überhaupt keine Wahrheiten oder keine allgemeingültigen Werte gäbe. Er vertritt gewisse Werte in seinen Werken, aber sein Herangehen, seine ganze Haltung unterscheidet sich von der der systementwickelnden Denker. Für ihn ist es am wichtigsten, die richtige Fragen stellen zu können, statt eindeutige Antworten zu geben, und dass die fortwährende philosophische, poetische Selbstreflexion immer die nötige Distanz zu den eigenen Gedanken und Werken schafft.

Meiner Meinung nach ist seine Zeitauffassung weder eine lineare, die einen eindeutig positiven Entwicklungsglauben und am Ende eine selige Lösung impliziert, noch eine einfach zyklische, die zwar unendlich ist, aber immer wieder in einem Kreis zu den gleichen Punkten zurückkehrt, so sich unverändert und erstarrt um den Wahrheitspunkt dreht, sondern er verbindet diese zwei Zeitauffassungen zu einer spiralähnlichen, in der sich oberflächliche Linearität der Zeit und zyklische Bewegung vereinigen. Diese Art von Denken kehrt zwar immer wieder zu sich selbst zurück und fließt dann weiter, aber immer erst nach einer kleinen Modifikation, immer ein wenig anders, auf einer nächsten Stufe, und doch in jedem Moment nach einem unsichtbaren Mittelpunkt gerichtet.

All das steckt also hinter seinem Gedanken der Progressivität, die als Form der Universalität des menschlichen Geistes fungiert, (siehe seine berühmte Wendung „progressive Universalpoesie” im Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 116.) dessen Bestimmung es ist, in einem fortwährenden Bildungsprozess sich selbst immer wieder einzuschränken, zu vernichten, um sich dann auf einer nächsten Stufe wieder zu erschaffen, sich wieder zu schöpfen. („Vernichten und schaffen, eins und alles, und so schwebe der ewige Geist ewig auf dem ewigen Weltstrome der Zeit und des Lebens...” ⁶)

II.

Die Idee der Zeitschrift Europa begegnet diesem Gedanken in den Punkten Universalitätsanspruch und Popularität der Kultur. Es war ein Experiment, ein Versuch, nach dem Zusammenbruch der romantischen Schule, Schlegels frühere Ideale und Pläne eines universalen Bildungsgeistes der europäischen Kultur und Kunst zu realisieren.

Die Zeitschrift war von 1803 bis 1805 in Frankfurt, bei dem Verleger Friedrich Wilmans erschienen. Ihr Herausgeber und Redakteur war Friedrich Schlegel, der damals in Paris lebte und der die meisten und wichtigsten Beiträge selbst schrieb. Es sind insgesamt 4 Hefte herausgekommen, aber zuletzt trugen mehrere Ursachen dazu bei, dass die Zeitschrift eingestellt wurde. Die Idee stammte von Fr. Schlegel selbst und er wollte viele seiner Freunde – ausgezeichnete Schriftsteller und Denker – dazu gewinnen, an der Europa mitzuwirken, was ihm viele von ihnen auch versprachen. Man kann hier Namen nennen, wie Tieck, Bernhardi, Schleiermacher, Fichte, F. A. Wolf, Hülsen, Steffens, Ritter und natürlich der Bruder von Friedrich, August Wilhelm Schlegel. Nachdem sie aber einige Beiträge wirklich gesendet hatten, ließen sie schließlich Fr. Schlegel einer nach dem anderen im Stich und er musste selbst alles verfassen. Außerdem tat der Verleger auch nicht alles, um die Zeitschrift erfolgreich zu machen, er konnte insgesamt nur etwa 320–400 Exemplare absetzen, und es gehört auch zur Wahrheit, dass für Europa schließlich doch kein so großer Publikumskreis gewonnen werden konnte, wie es Fr. Schlegel erhoffte.

Trotz allem finden sich unter den Beiträgen bedeutende und später sehr wirksame Arbeiten, die vor allem von Fr. Schlegel stammen: literarische Aufsätze und Beschreibungen von Gemälden der altitalienischen, altdeutschen und altniederländischen Malerei.

In der Vorrede der Zeitschrift heißt es bei der Formulierung der Ziele: „an allem Anteil zu nehmen, was die Ausbildung des menschlichen Geistes am nächsten angeht, und das Licht der Schönheit und Wahrheit so weit als möglich zu verbreiten”. Sie solle die „mannigfaltigste Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände” aufzeigen, es seien „neue Ideen oder nützliche Nachrichten mitzuteilen und allgemein zu verbreiten”, ein weiteres Ziel ist es, „nur so zu schreiben, wie man sprechen würde, wenn es nur deutlich ist”.

Der Begriff Europa bedeutete für Friedrich Schlegel „ein Programm: der Inbegriff dessen, was er im Kulturellen zu verwirklichen strebte”.⁸ Der „Kosmopolitismus der europäischen Kultur” und die „unendliche Fülle des Bildungsgeistes von Europa”⁹ begeisterten ihn. Er gehörte zu den Denkern, die die Verschmelzung der geistigen, kulturellen Schätze von Deutschland und Frankreich wünschten und versuchte deshalb, das deutsche Publikum von den Pariser Neuigkeiten zu informieren, ihnen das geistige und kulturelle Leben Frankreichs bekannt zu machen. Den kulturphilosophischen Betrachtungen über Osten und Westen, Asien und Europa, den literaturwissenschaftlichen Studien über die Literatur verschiedener europäischer Völker und den bahnbrechenden Aufsätzen über Malerei der Renaissance und über altdeutsche-altniederländische Malerei dienen die modernsten Bedenken und Fragestellungen als Grundlage: wie es Schlegel selbst formulierte: „Die große Frage ist: sollen die Europäer ein Volk werden (alles verschmolzen), oder jede Nation nur ganz sie selber sein? – Vielleicht beides wie es im Mittelalter war.”¹⁰ Diese, auf die Gesamtheit der Kultur, der Künste und Wissenschaften gerichtete geschichtsphilosophische Europa-Idee kann demnach vielleicht als die frühromantische Wurzel der heutigen Europa-Bewegung betrachtet werden, die mit ihrem kulturellen und geistesbildenden Charakter die heutigen, in erster Linie wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gesichtspunkte komplementär ergänzt. Darin mag also die höchste Bedeutsamkeit der Zeitschrift Europa bestehen, wie es auch Ernst Behler meint.

Die bedeutendsten und wirkungsvollsten Beiträge der Europa sind Fr. Schlegels Schriften über alte Malerei. In den Pariser Aufsätzen (1802–03) Nachricht von den Gemälden in Paris, Vom Raffael und Nachtrag italienischer Gemälde berichtet er über „von der französischen Armee aus Italien und den Niederlanden entführte Kunstschätze”¹¹, die in den nach den Napoleonischen Kriegen wieder eröffneten Pariser Kunstsammlungen ausgestellt waren. In seinen Kölner Aufsätzen (1804) Zweiter Nachtrag alter Gemälde und Dritter Nachtrag alter Gemälde beschreibt er unter anderem altdeutsche Gemälde aus dem 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, die er während seiner Reise in den Niederlanden und den Rheingegenden gesehen hatte, als er an der Sammlertätigkeit der Brüder Boisserrée teilnahm.

Friedrich Schlegel gehörte zu den ersten Kunstschriftstellern der Zeit, die auf die altdeutsche, altniederländische (flämische) und auf die altitalienische Malerei aufmerksam machten, und dadurch, daß er die altdeutsche und altniederländische Malerschule für eine einheitliche Tradition hielt, wies er auf das gemeinsame Kulturgut Europas hin. In seiner Zeit war es allgemeingültig, im Sinne der ästhetischen Ideale der Klassik und der Aufklärung, die Meister der Hochrenaissance und vor allem natürlich die italienischen Meister am höchsten zu schätzen und ein altgriechisches, plastisches Schönheits- und Kunstideal zu verehren. Mit der Neuentdeckung der altniederländischen, altdeutschen und altitalienischen Primitiven zeigte Schlegel den jungen Malern seiner Zeit als erster neue Vorbilder statt des Nachahmungsideals der Hochrenaissance. Mit diesen Aufsätzen spielte er eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Entwicklung der modernen Kunstkritik und Kunstgeschichtsschreibung in Deutschland. Seine Interpretationen alter Gemälde trugen auch zur Herausbildung der Bilderbeschreibung als literarische Gattung bei. Damals gab es natürlich noch keine Reproduktionen, nur mit Hilfe von Kupferstichen konnte ein Gemälde dem Großpublikum vorgestellt werden. Die Bilderbeschreibung als literarische Gattung hatte also noch eine andere Bedeutung, als heute, da jedermann die Möglichkeit hat, die Kunstwerke der großen Meister mit Hilfe von Reproduktionen kennenzulernen und Bild und Beschreibung, als Darstellung desselben künstlerischen Inhalts mittels zwei verschiedener ästhetischer (visueller und verbaler) Medien zu vergleichen. (Viele große Denker der Zeit befassten sich neben Ästhetik des Wortes auch mit Ästhetik des Bildes, es genügt die Namen von August Wilhelm Schlegel, dem Bruder von Friedrich, Schelling, Goethe, Tieck, Wackenroder oder Novalis zu nennen.)

Seine Gemäldebeschreibungen „sind aber »Charakteristiken« von Kunstwerken, in denen, wie das Schlegel in seiner Theorie der Charakteristik fordert, der Eindruck dargestellt wird, den die Bilder auf einen aufmerksamen und wohl vorbereiteten Beobachter machen.”¹² Sie enthalten außer Beschreibung auch Kritik und Deutung, also eine „absolute ästhetische Würdigung”.¹³ Sein Ziel war: was man mit der Sprache ausrichten kann, den „Geist eines Werkes der bildenden Kunst lebendig zu fassen und darzustellen”.¹⁴ Diese hohe Zielsetzung verleiht dem ganzen Thema auch Bedeutsamkeit, denn darin findet ein Grundprinzip der deutschen Frühromantik seine konkrete Realisierung, das auch später stark auf die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts wirkte (z. B. auf Heidegger, Gadamer), nämlich das Prinzip, laut dessen die Kunst im Gegensatz zu den methodenorientierten Wissenschaften und philosophischen Systemen zum höchsten erkenntnistheoretischen Medium wurde. Dass die Kunst – im Gegensatz zu den begrifflichen Darstellungsversuchen – die Einzige wäre, die zur intersubjektiven Mitteilbarkeit, Darstellbarkeit des Absoluten fähig wäre, in der sich also das Absolute auf indirekte Weise manifestieren könnte. Daher stamme die Unendlichkeit, die Nie-Beendbarkeit des Kunstwerks und seiner Interpretationsmöglichkeiten. In dieser Auffassung spiegelt sich die historische Denkweise von Fr. Schlegel wieder und durch dieses Grundprinzip kann vielleicht auch seine ästhetische Theorie der Malerei besser verstanden werden, die er aufgrund seiner Charakteristiken von alten Kunstwerken entwickelte.

Er spricht für die „religiöse Bestimmung der Malerei”, deren Aufgabe wäre, „die Religion zu verherrlichen und die Geheimnisse derselben noch schöner und deutlicher zu offenbaren, als es durch Worte geschehen kann”.¹⁵ Er behauptet, „symbolische Gemälde” seien die „einzige wahre Gattung der Malerei”, und fordert für die Malerei „religiöse Themen”, oder „Themen, die einer symbolischen Behandlung fähig sind”. Der Zweck der Malerei sei also nicht „Reiz und Schönheit”, sondern „das Bedeutende”, die „hohe, ja göttliche Bedeutung”.¹⁶

An diesem Punkt ist es üblich, Schlegel eine didaktische Zielsetzung der Malerei vorzuwerfen und auf seine Konversion zur katholischen Kirche (1808) hinzuweisen, als angebliche Erklärung. Die Frage ist aber nicht so einfach. Die religiöse Einstellung war in ihren Wurzeln auch in seiner frühen Schaffungsperiode schon da, die drei Fragmentsammlungen führen schließlich bei ihm zu einem ganz neuen, nicht-dogmatischen und modernen Religionsbegriff, wie es das folgende Zitat aus seinem Werk Über die Philosophie. An Dorothea zeigt:

„Obgleich mir aber auch das, was man gewöhnlich Religion nennt, eins der wunderbarsten, größten Phänomene zu sein scheint, so kann ich doch im strengen Sinne nur das für Religion gelten lassen, wenn man göttlich denkt und dichtet und lebt, wenn man voll von Gott ist, wenn ein Hauch von Andacht und Begeisterung über unser ganzes Sein ausgegossen ist, wenn man nichts mehr um der Pflicht, sondern alles aus Liebe tut, bloß weil man es will, und wenn man es nur darum will, weil es Gott sagt, nämlich Gott in uns.”¹⁷

Dieser innere Gott ist also der Grund seines religiösen Gefühls und mit der späteren Erkennung dessen, dass eine neue Mythologie nötig wäre als Grund für die moderne Philosophie und Poesie, kam er allmählich dazu, dass er in der christlichen Mythologie zu finden glaubte, was er gesucht hatte. Bei seiner religiösen Bestimmung der Malerei kann also sein Übertritt zum Katholizismus nicht einfach als Ursache, und seine Erschütterung vor den christlichen Gemälden nicht einfach als Folge betrachtet werden. Es ist auch umgekehrt wahr, er glaubte nämlich wirklich an die Wirkung von Gemälden, von Malerei: „sein Grunderlebnis” war, dass „die Malerei eins der wirksamsten Mittel ist, ... sich mit dem Göttlichen zu verbinden, und sich der Gottheit zu nähern”.¹⁸ Weiterhin stellte Schlegel die einfache, malerische Schönheit dem plastischen Schönheitsideal der Winckelmannschen Kunstauffassung entgegen und sprach für eine lokale, nationale Malerei, indem er sagte, dass die „ignorierte deutsche Malerschule”¹⁹ für die Deutschen wichtiger, als die italienische sei. Er verwarf alle Arten der Nachahmung²⁰, auch die der Hochrenaissance und schätzte die Maler vor Raffael am höchsten. Raffael, Tizian, Coreggio, Julio Romano und Michelangelo waren „die letzten Maler” für ihn, er meinte, von ihnen „ist das Verderben der Kunst abzuleiten”. Die „fromme Innigkeit und fromme Liebe”²¹ des jungen Raffael setzte er zum Beispiel dem reifen Meister entgegen und eben diese Einfachheit und Klarheit schätzte er auch in den altdeutschen und flämischen Primitiven, wie bei den Gebrüdern van Eyck, bei Hans Memling, Gerard David, Barendt van Orley, Hugo van der Goes, Jan van Hemessen, Stephan Lochner, bei dem Monogrammisten von Braunschweig, dem Meister von Frankfurt, dem Meister des Bartholomäus-Altars und dem Meister des Lebens Maria. Wie schon erwähnt, hielt er die altdeutsche und altniederländische Malerschule für eine einheitliche Tradition und es ist interessant, wie er die Konstruktion dieser Tradition aufgrund der Charakteristiken von drei Malern vorstellt. Er sagt, Jan van Eyck, Dürer und Holbein seien die epochemachenden Meister in der Geschichte der sog. „deutschen Schule”: „die älteste, und erste Stufe der Kunstentwicklung..., die verständlichste und deutlichste” wäre van Eyck. Für Holbein sei typisch eine „bis zur äußern Glätte und Weichheit vollendet ausgebildete Genauigkeit und Richtigkeit. Eyck und Holbein wären die „zwei entgegengesetzten Äußersten” in deren Mitte Dürer stehe, denn in der Mitte „pflegt das Geheimnisvollste zu wohnen, der Unergründlichste und verwickeltste Tiefsinn.”²²

Dieser romantische Umschwung in der Beurteilung der Malerei – der nicht nur von Schlegel rausging, sondern auch von Tieck, Wackenroder, oder Ph. O. Runge – übte eine nachhaltige Wirkung in Deutschland aus, vor allem auf die junge Malergeneration der Nazarener, und bestimmte den deutschen Kunstgeschmack für eine lange Zeit. Schlegel war der „größte literarische Anreger der religiösen Malerei seiner Zeit”, der als erster „eine zusammenhängende theoretische Grundlage der neuen Kunst” gegen die klassizistische Kunstauffassung von Goethes Zeitschrift, der Propyläen in Deutschland „geschaffen hat”.²³

Anmerkungen

1

Ernst Behler, Friedrich Schlegel, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1988, S.140

2

W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers, 1870, S. 354–356, zitiert von E. Behler, wie oben, S. 60

3

E. Behler, wie oben, S. 35

4

Ebd.

5

Ebd. S.140

6

Fr. Schlegel, Lucinde, in: Friedrich Schlegel, Werke in zwei Bänden, Aufbau-Verlag Berlin und Weimar 1980, Bd. 2, S. 24

7

Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (KA), München-Paderborn-Wien, Verlag F. Schöningh, Thomas Verlag Zürich, Bd. 3.: Charakteristiken und Kritiken II. (1802– 1829), S. 329

8

E. Behler, wie oben, S. 89

9

Ebd. S. 88

10

Ebd.

11

KA Bd. IV, S. XIX

12

KA Bd. IV, S. XXII

13

Ebd.

14

Ebd.

15

KA Bd. IV, S. XXIII

16

Ebd.

17

Fr. Schlegel, Werke in zwei Bänden, Bd. 2, S.112

18

KA Bd. IV, s. XXIII

19

Ebd. s. XXIV

20

Siehe dazu: Das Nachwort von Hans Eichner zu: Friedrich Schlegel, Gemälde alter Meister, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, S. 214:

„Wie Schlegel in der Literatur ein historisches Phänomen erkannte, das sich zu verschiedenen Zeiten und bei verschiedenen Völkern anders ausprägt, so sah er auch die bildende Kunst. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die Nachahmung der Antike widernatürlich und unproduktiv ist, zumal diese unter einem anderen Gesetz steht als die Moderne: Die Kunst der Alten (sowohl die Poesie als auch die bildende Kunst) ist eine Kunst des Endlichen, die der Neueren des Unendlichen, und da sich das Unendliche nicht direkt darstellen lässt, muss die Kunst der Neueren – bildende Kunst wie Literatur – symbolisch sein. Anders gesagt: Die Kunst der Alten ist in ihrer Grundtendenz plastisch, denn die Plastik stellt jeweils einen begrenzten Gegenstand im vollen Glanz seiner Gegenwart dar. Die Kunst der Neueren aber ist in ihrer Grundtendenz malerisch, denn die Malerei kann den Ausblick ins Unendliche eröffnen und zwischen der Vergangenheit und der Vorahnung der Zukunft schweben. Und daraus folgt, dass die Malerei überhaupt, vor allem aber die der Neueren, malerisch zu sein hat.”

21

KA Bd. IV, S. XXIII

22

Ebd. S. 45

23

Ebd. S. XXV–XXVII

Literatur

Ernst Behler: Friedrich Schlegel. Rowohlt, Hamburg 1988

Friedrich Schlegel: Werke in zwei Bänden. Aufbau-Verlag Berlin und Weimar, 1980

Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Hrsg. von E. Behler unter Mitwirkung von Jean-Jacques Anstett und Hans Eichner, München-Paderbom-Wien, Verlag F. Schöningh, Thomas Verlag Zürich

August Wilhelm és Friedrich Schlegel: Válogatott esztétikai írások, Budapest, Gondolat 1980

Friedrich Schlegel: Gemälde alter Meister, Mit Kommentar und Nachwort von Hans Eichner und Norma Lelless: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt

Ernst Behler: Friedrich Schlegels Theorie des Verstehens: Hermeneutik oder Dekonstruktion? in: Die Aktualität der Frühromantik, Hrsg. Jochen Hörisch und Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn-München-Zürich, 1987

Manfred Frank: Einführung in die frühromantische Aesthetik, Suhrkamp 1989

WiIly Michel: Ästhetische Hermeneutik und frühromantische Kritik, Vandenboeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982

Überarbeiteter Text des im Januar 1995 im Europa Institut Budapest gehaltenen Vortrag.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 4:9–10.

ÁRPÁD GÖNCZ

Small Nations*

Talking about small nations, I think the first thing to do is to define just what a small nation is. My experience has been that when I am travelling in the West, visiting, for instance, Holland, Belgium, or other small countries similar in that respect to Hungary and I speak about small nations, the locals look at me rather blankly.

There is considerable agreement in thinking that calling a nation small or large – and especially “little” or “big” – does not depend on the size of its territory or the number of its population. In fact the concept is by no means widely used; the usage “small nation” as against “large nation” seems to be fashionable primarily in Central and Eastern Europe. The things seem to be inherent in the application of the two phrases: on the one hand, we consider ourselves small (with a latent inferiority complex at work in this attitude); and on the other hand, we try to compensate for this sense of littleness in some way, as a matter of fact regarding ourselves as being much more significant than we actually are. I think we should not really allow this idea – whether we are small or large, little or big – to occupy so much attention in our minds. We would probably be better off if we felt the same way as do the Danes. In Denmark I never heard the term “small nation”, but they often said that they were happy and building the country for them. And it is quite apparent that the size of their country suits them and is in perfect accord with their character. They don’t want to be larger and they don’t want to be smaller.

I think two possibilities are open to us. We can either observe ourselves with sound scepticism preserving the right to sustain certain reservations. Let us have doubts about ourselves, and, above all, let us have reservations about just how right we are. I think there is good reason for us to have doubts in regard to our prejudices, I almost said in regard to our national delusions, our national paranoia. Once we overcome this feeling, we shall, it is to be hoped, no longer feel that our neighbours are a threat to us, and the adjoining countries will not feel either that we are a threat to them. If we look at each other with the proper reservations about our original impressions, these threats will generally prove unrealistic. The alternative possibility is to preserve the freedom of our thinking, not allowing a feeling of littleness – or even of greatness – overcome us because both are unreasonable.

Should I seek the prerequisites to real national largeness, I would use two key terms: “the right to reservations” and “freedom of thinking”. Freedom of thinking means that we recognize the freedom of others to stand by their own ideas. It surely wouldn’t hurt if we allowed others also the possibility to size us up, just as we often measure ourselves. This way, we might find that others take us with the same unbiased autonomous good will as we appraise ourselves. I believe that in that case we shall be happier in our existence as a “small nation”.

* Introduction to the first ”József Eötvös Memorial Lecture” at the Europa Institut Budapest, 4 March 1992.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 4:57–76.

FERENC GLATZ

Trianon – Past and Present

The area of ethnic settlement and the territory of the state as an administrative unit have never coincided in the East-Central European region. This discrepancy between the borders of states and ethnic settlement is one of the major causes of conflicts in this region, leading to wars and to spiteful attitudes towards the neighbouring countries in all spheres. I have repeated this statement over and over again in various studies and papers in the past decade. It has also been established more than once that the political elites and the middle classes of these nations have been unable to find a proper arrangement to resolve this contradiction over the past hundred and fifty years.

Similarly, the diagnosis of this Central European disease has been repeatedly presented in the hope that the conclusions drawn from it will rivet the attention of politicians who shape our present and future framework of territorial administration at the regional level. It is also hoped that these fact will be taken into notice by the hardworking public servants, intellectuals, craftsmen and peasants who all are to “arrange” the everyday life of people. From all this, it is expected that these people will to give up their national ill-feelings towards the neighbouring nations or towards the ethnic groups who live in the same state, and with whom they must work together to reproduce the material and intellectual goods of the given society. It is also hoped that they will accept the conclusions which can be drawn from all this for the future: if the hostilities and conflicts among the small nations of the region will not be brought to an end, each nation of the region will inevitably lag behind in the global competition at the turn of the millennium. (Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians and so forth. Capital will not flow to the theatre of wars and social conflicts, moreover armed and social conflicts break the creative force, both material and intellectual, of the local societies. As a result, they all will lag behind in the mentioned global competition. We all: Central Europeans.) Our main goal is to evade this lag.

We resort to history in order to disclose the causes of the contemporary conflicts, and to find feasible alternatives for the future. This statement is also meant to give food for thinking.

Great Powers – Small Nations

Historically, the middle classes of the region – we maintain – failed to find a sound solution to terminate the national-ethnic conflicts mainly because their way of thinking was influenced by the notion of the national state (also referred to as “nation-state”) and the related principles. They failed to recognize that it was impossible in this region to base a unit of territorial administration, i. e. a state, on the supremacy of the majority nation. Therefore and thereafter – and this was another erroneous conclusion of the middle classes – they tended to resort to the West-European Great Powers rather than to try to come to an agreement with each other. They competed with each other for the favour of the Great Powers. Consequently, the interests of the Great Powers have always played a decisive role in the region’s history ever since 1848. It was this game of the Great Powers that led to the creation of the region’s first bourgeois state formation, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867). The resultant of the particular viewpoints of the Great Powers, which led to the major transformation of the Habsburg Monarchy (1867), is also seen more clearly today. It was the same political game that helped the Hungarians restore the territorial integrity of the historical Hungarian state after three centuries of disintegration. The general public, however, is not inclined to recognize this decisive role of the Great Powers. The general public – either Hungarian or non-Hungarian – prefers to believe in a kind of “historical” or “divine” justice, or in the will of fate. It clamours for justice when the prospects are good, and speaks of ill-fate when losing is in sight. This has ever been so since 1867 up to now.

Before Trianon (1867–1918)

It was not a sort of predestined justice which prevailed when, in 1867, the Hungarians recovered the whole territory of the historical Hungarian state which had been disintegrated soon after the Battle of Mohács lost to the Turks (1526). (This is not accepted by a good part of the Hungarian intellectuals, instead they insist on the principle that the justice of the “historical right” must prevail.)

The fact is that the Catholic Habsburgs, who in 1866 had been finally defeated in their struggle for unifying the German-speaking lands by the Protestant Prussia, had no choice but to make a compromise between their hereditary provinces and the Hungarian Kingdom, within this, between the leading Austrian and Hungarian political elites.

The Compromise of 1867 was based on mutual concessions by the political elite of the Hungarian Kingdom and the Habsburg ruler. As is widely known, the historical Hungarian state disintegrated into three parts after 1541. The first, the central part of the country, included territories occupied and then ruled by the Turks for a long time; the second was Transylvania, the formally independent eastern part, while the rest (the northern and western territories) formed the Hungarian Kingdom. After the expulsion of the Turks (1718) the Hungarian Estates urged their ruler – the Habsburgs were on the Hungarian throne at that time – on the re-unification of the lands belonging to St. Stephen’s Crown. However, the Habsburgs as Hungarian kings retained the special status of Transylvania even after 1718, governing it quite separately in the same way as they governed the former southern provinces which they treated as a buffer zone against the Turkish Empire still present in the South-East. This traditional southern military border zone was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Diet and also from that of the Hungarian landowners. It was on those vast territories that the Serbs (and partly the Romanians) developed their particular territorial autonomy which ensured them a relative independence in their local administration and in practising and maintaining their ethnic and religious customs. They were granted collective rights in exchange for their collective military service.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the Habsburg kings were forced to ask the Hungarian Estates for help in defending the dynasty in wars first on Prussia (1740, 1756–63), then against Napoleon (1805–15), in exchange for their military services, they immediately demanded the “territorial re-unification” and later, in the 1800s, made claim to the right to use the mother tongue. The King only gradually relegated again the administration of the southern provinces to the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Diet during the 18th century. As is also known, the re-unification process was concluded by the Acts of April 1848, and Transylvania was simultaneously re-united with Hungary. The armed conflict of 1848–49 between the “only partly Hungarian King” and the nation ended in the failure of the Hungarian War of Independence. Under the circumstances, the actual re-unification took place only as late as 1867. At a time when – as has been seen – the common Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Dynasty lost its campaign for a Central European German hegemony to Prussia.

At the same time, the Compromise of 1867 and the restoration of the integrity of the historical Hungarian state ensured a Hungarian supremacy within the state. However, the non-Hungarian peoples of the country opposed both the territorial centralization and the country’s transformation into a Hungarian national state.

The proportion of the non-Hungarian peoples on the territory of Hungary kept increasing in the periods following 1541. The Turkish devastation stroke mainly the central part of the country where the majority of the Hungarian ethnics were living. Thus between 1541 and 1718 there was a marked decrease in the number of Hungarians. At the same time, Serb inhabitants in large masses moved from the Turks-occupied territories of the Balkans to the Hungarian Kingdom. Then, following the expulsion of the Turks, popular masses came to settle in the deserted areas from the German Empire, also Romanian and Slovak settlers came from the country’s eastern and northern ends, respectively. The number of non-Hungarian peoples increased within the one-time Hungarian state, while the Hungarian ethnics were reduced to a state of minority. Increasing the weight of non-Hungarians was that in the period of the East-European expansion of the industrial revolution (after the period 1840–1867) a considerable number of Czech-, Moravian- and German-born officials, intellectuals and engineers came to Hungary from the German Empire and mainly from the hereditary provinces of the Habsburg Dynasty.

When the struggle for power between the Hungarians and the Dynasty broke out in 1848, the non-Hungarian peoples took sides with the ruler. They refused to accept that after 300 years, the state would be subjected again to a Hungarian control, based on the principle of “might goes before right” and by virtue of the historical right, especially if this control would be exercised on a national basis taken in the modern sense. The Vienna Court readily used these Serb, Croatian, Romanian and Slovak endeavours to attain their national self-organization in its efforts to suppress the Hungarian War of Independence, but when it came that Vienna was forced in 1867 to share its power with the strongest nation, it was just as ready to ignore these minor nations. However, the conflict between the Hungarians and non-Hungarians persisted within the new state, the Hungarian Kingdom. The national wars of 1848–49 furnished an emotional basis for mutual conflicts which have made their effects felt on the thinking of the region’s nationalities up to now. And these emotional conflicts have been fostered “carefully” and even instigated by the national middle-classes up today.

The Omnipotence of the State

In the nineteenth century, when the modern states of Europe were formed, the leading political elite of Europe lived under the spell of the state. Understandably enough, since it was the organization of the state which provided the institutional and administrative framework of the emerging Industrial Revolution, ensured legal and public security, and supplied public services necessary to creating normal living conditions for citizens (elementary schooling, basic health care, and the protection of the arable land, and so forth). It is, then, also understandable that in respect of the relationship between the individual and the community, loyalty to the state was considered as a decisive factor in the political thinking of the age. Other spheres like ideological, religious, social affiliations or ties to the community were all deemed personal affairs. National affiliation was also considered as an individual, personal affair: at the individual level, all citizens should be free and should in no way be subjected to any collective discrimination on account of their ethnic origin or social status. The consequent deliberation and observation of these noble liberal principles led the Hungarian political leaders to treat all kinds of “collective rights”, including the national collective rights, as privileges. In other words: they dismissed these rights. On the same grounds, they did not deem the various ethnic-territorial autonomies formed within the Hungarian State acceptable either.

Starting from the same “fundamental principle” they had demanded the elimination of the south-eastern military border zone which was actually carried through after 1867. Other ethnic-territorial autonomies as the autonomy of the Transylvanian Saxons of six-century standing and that of the Jazygian-Cumanian [Jászkun] ethnics of three-century standing were also eliminated.) The state-centred liberalism of the Hungarian political elite was combined with the principle of national supremacy. To be sure, they were by no means led by anti-Slav, anti-Romanian or anti-German sentiments when they put an end to the centuries-old autonomies in Hungary; they only followed the European norms of that age. They tried to lessen the difference between the official state borders and the borders of the respective national dwellings by guaranteeing the “minority rights” of non-Hungarians living on the territory of Hungary under a special Act.

Act on the Nationalities (1868–1918)

It may well be stated that the Hungarian liberal political elite performed a work which was up-to-date and unique even by European standards, by creating an Act on the Nationalities in 1868 (enacted as Act 44 of 1868). This Act provided nationality rights on the level of the individual extending them, however, to cultural organization as well. Only the hereditary provinces of Austria had a constitution of similar nature. (This “meritorious deed” of the Hungarian political elite has never been appreciated by the intellectual strata of our neighbouring countries, what they welcome is nothing but our own criticism of the “historical right” and of the Hungarian political elite.)

The turn of the century gave rise to new tensions. At that time, the non-Hungarian peoples of Hungary as collectives made claim to special rights. Encountering these claims, the practice of liberal legislation already proved obsolete.

What explains these new collective national claims? What new economic and cultural phenomena called forth these movements? (Formally, these appeared as demands on recovering the ancient rights, i.e. in a historicizing fashion. In reality, however, all this was more than that.)

The modern, bourgeois-type patterns of industrial production, administration, commerce, transport, and communication enrich the daily communication among the individuals. The ever enlarging body of managerial and professional knowledge requires a better linguistic and conceptual proficiency. Only such people can acquire an up-to-date professional or managerial knowledge (physicians, lawyers, engineers) that are highly educated in their respective mother tongue. In the early years of this century, the young non-Hungarian and non-German intellectuals of the Monarchy clearly saw that the basic conditions of the revival of their respective nation include instruction in the vernacular and the extension of their national institutions. They wanted to be recognized as national collectives. It was these everyday driving forces of history which broke up the Hungarian state’s policy towards nationalities. (It is quite another question: why could the denationalization of the national minorities be carried through in Western Europe, and why could the nationalities survive in Hungary? Hungary is the country of minorities.)

Peace Settlement and Cold War

The contradiction between the national dwellings and the official territorial-administrative units (the state) could not be solved by the politicians of the early twentieth century. This was one of the main reasons for the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1918–1919).

Nor was it solved by the peace treaties of 1919–20. Trianon saw the dissection of the territory of the historical Hungarian state. Transylvania was given to Romania, North-Hungary was detached to form part of the new Czechoslovakian State, and South-Hungary was annexed to the new Yugoslavia. (Here we remind again of a negligence of the former Hungarian historiography which tended to interpret the Monarchy’s disintegration as if the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920 had made only a decision on matters concerning the conflicts between Hungarians and non-Hungarian. Or as though it had been simply a decision on the winners and losers of World War I. In our opinion it was more than that: it concerned the adoption of the fundamental principles of a continental peace settlement.)

In 1919–1920, the two empires occupying the zone from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, i.e., the Habsburg and the Turkish Empires, were divided on the basis of the same fundamental principles. The victorious Great Powers created “nation-states” on the territory of the two multinational empires which they considered as “outdated” ones. Even those ethnic groups and tribes were annexed to a so-called “national state” territory in the semi-desert region stretching down to Palestine, of which more than one had never heard of “national state border” or of the institutional and legal system of a state. It was this fundamental principle that came into prominence in decision-making on the dissection of the historical Hungarian state. The new European state system, in this case too, formed part of a global plan of the Great Powers.

Taking a glance at the map, it is easy to perceive that all the major European conflicts in the second half of the 20th century arose in this region. Included in these conflicts are World War II (1939–1945), then the South-Slav War (from 1992 up to now), let alone the Hungarian-Slovak and the Hungarian-Romanian conflicts, though the latter have not escalated into civil wars. This raises the question of whether the series of the near-eastern armed conflicts (from 1956 to our days) are not rooted in the fundamental principles of the 1920 peace treaties.

In our present opinion: it was again the Great Powers that had made a series of erroneous decisions in 1920 which had a far-reaching effect not only on East-Central Europe but also on world history for the rest of the twentieth century.

Not only the recent destructive conflicts between these “nation-states” in this region, but also the wars in the Near East, seem to go back to the erroneous principles of the peace-makers. Indeed, the problem is rooted in the fact that Western European principles of the national state were imposed upon societies organized along quite different lines both from ethnic and from social aspects. The same happened to the peoples of the former Habsburg Monarchy. The newly created national states were nothing but newer multinational states with the only difference that the natives of former “leading nations”, Austria and Hungary as war losers, turned into national minorities.

The Trianon Peace Treaty – as is widely known – formed part of this peace settlement. It forced 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians to live as a minority nation in the neighbouring countries. (The intellectuals of those countries that benefited from the peace treaties of 1919–20, of course, do not welcome criticism concerning not only some details, but also the principles underlying the peace treaties. The Czech, the Slovak, the Romanian, the Croatian, the Serb, and the Polish historians consider the peace treaties closing World War I as untouchable ones. The Poles have nothing to say of the fact that 30 per cent of their country’s population, people who had not been Poles in 1920, were assimilated and virtually lost their original national character in a few decades between 1920 and 1968.)

So these peace treaties gave rise to tensions between Hungary and Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, just as well as between the renewed Poland and its neighbours (Germany and Russia), Czechoslovakia and its neighbours (Hungary, Austria, Germany, and Romania), Yugoslavia and its neighbours (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy), and Romania and its neighbours (Russia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia). (Let us not deal with the series of conflicts in the Near East and Asia Minor this time.) Instead of peace these peace treaties created an incessant cold war on the territories of the former Habsburg and Ottoman Turkish Empires.

This is how the Central European peace treaties, including the Trianon Peace treaty, are fitting into the general trends in international politics.

The “Triumph of the Ethnic Principle” (1938–41)

Attempts the Hungarian made at the revision of the peace treaties are well known both to the Hungarian historiography and to the historically interested public. These resulted in some corrections of the country borders between 1938 and 1941, but these, again, followed from changes in the international political power relations. (The Hungarian public is not too impressed by this fact. Namely, speaking of 1920, the intellectuals of the neighbouring countries try to explain their public that 1920 was but the fulfilment of a long-expected “national justice”, while the Hungarians tend to blame the great powers for their short-sightedness in this respect. As regards the judgement of events in 1938-41, it is the other way round: Hungary’s neighbours blamed “fascist Germany” for the Hungarian territorial revision, while the Hungarian public would interpret it as a partial victory of justice. Only partial, since Hungary “got back” only part of the territory it had lost in 1918–20.)

The Hungarian territorial revisions in 1938–41 really fitted well into the series of territorial revisions devised by the Soviets and the Germans. In the mentioned period, not only did the Germans annex Austria and the Sudeten, but they also recovered their former and some additional territories in Poland they had lost in 1919 (totalling several millions of ethnic German inhabitants). These readjustments of the country borders follow the ethnic principle in its German version, in contrast with the (French-contrived) principle of the national states having been followed in 1919–20. Exercising pressure from the east, the Soviet Union recovered Bessarabia from Romania. It also agreed with Germany on occupying the Baltic, along with the eastern territories of Poland.

The redrawing of country borders in the Carpathian Basin in 1938–41 were the most effective steps towards making the ethnic borders more consistent with the political ones until then. (This statement is, of course, unwelcome in the neighbouring countries.) However, to the present generation of historians fell the uncongenial task to warn both the politicians and the public that the revision of country borders is not a sound solution. The revisions of 1938–41 made Hungary a multinational state again. The contemporary historiography and politics could do nothing but promise a tolerant policy towards the nationalities in the spirit of King St. Stephen, the founder of the Hungarian state. However, the middle classes just as well as the workers’ parties at that time were unable to go beyond the principles of the national state. It was only the radical right wing that spoke of the possibility of creating autonomies. (This idea was still less accepted, in fact, rejected in Hungary. But all this is not meant simply to criticize our old middle class or those of our neighbours.)

What we mean is to call the attention to the fact that no settlement could have been achieved on the basis of principles followed either in 1919–20 or in 1938. Neither of them could have resulted in a really sound solution. The societies of the region were so much mixed ethnically that the repeated redrawing of country borders could in no way relieve the deep-seated tensions. In fact, it created new tensions even in those countries that had profited by the changes. In other words: the years 1920 and 1938–41 made it clear that it was impossible to draw “ethnic borders” between these ethnically mixed societies.

“Nation-states” and the Soviet Regime (1945–89)

World War II had, from the outset, prevented Hungary and its neighbours from realizing all this. There were only few who came to realize the possibility of confederations. Thus the peace treaties closing the war returned to the principles adopted in 1919–20. If only because those nations which had come badly out of the border revisions after 1938, were now among the victorious nations (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, South-Slavs, and also Romania which had changed sides just in time). Once more, it was the sheer interests of the Great Powers which really counted. Interests in their own power, security, strategy, and economy.

Thus the old contradiction between the national dwellings and the official political state borders persisted. However, a new “recipe” for settling the problems proposed, namely the resettlement of national minorities. Once the states of the region are ethnically so much mixed, and the redrawing of country borders is of no help – so the peace-makers philosophized – attempts have to be made to create “homogeneous nation-states” by some other means. With this, the resettlement of national minorities to their respective countries, where they represented the majority, began. These people were given a few hours to pack up a few things they were allowed to take along. Hungarians were removed from Slovakia and Yugoslavia, and Germans from Hungary and Bohemia. They were forcibly conveyed to the other side of the respective country border, thus expelling them from their centuries-old communities. (The fate of the ousted Hungarians fell in line with that of other ethnic groups which were cruelly resettled or forced to migrate elsewhere in Europe. More Turks were removed from Bulgaria than Hungarians and Slovaks from Slovakia and Hungary, respectively, in an “official” form [157,000 altogether]. To say nothing of ten million Germans who were expelled from various countries. This was then followed by the “voluntary” escapes from the native land: Germans, Hungarians, Poles [2 million], Russians, Ukrainians, and many Jews who survived the Holocaust [450,000].)

The Soviet regime came next: this political system was introduced in the zone occupied by the Soviet Union during World War II. It was a specific Soviet interpretation of the internationalism of the proletariat. It was unable to tolerate either the national or ethnic considerations or any kind of autonomy including the local autonomies of minor communities. There were endless ideological debates on the role of “class and nation” in history, but the real sources of conflict, the annoying fact of the depressing Soviet presence, or problems as assimilation (the lack of the citizen’s freedom to choose his/her identity), and the Trianon and Paris peace treaties (1920, 1946) were all carefully concealed. Political statements were made concerning common socialist interests of the region’s peoples, while the perennial conflicts were ignored. But tensions cannot be relieved by insincerity. This explains that each shake of the Soviet political system (1956, 1868, 1980), then the collapse of system in 1989-92 brought the national tensions to the surface.

These all lay even more heavily on the whole Soviet system. The unsolved state of national conflicts was one major factor leading to the collapse of that system.

In the Emerging New Democracies (after 1989)

It is well known to the presently active generations how these tensions came abruptly to the surface immediately after the institutional framework of the dictatorship of the proletariat has irreversibly collapsed, censorship and restrictions of travelling abroad have been abolished, and the multi-party system has been instituted. The demonstration by candlelight in 1988 in support of Hungarians in Transylvania revealed how strongly the Hungarian society would still react on the trauma caused by Trianon. The anti-Hungarian atrocities at Marosvásárhely [Tirgu Mures] and Pozsony [Bratislava] showed that similar feelings were harboured by the majority societies of the neighbouring countries. (Of course, in the latter case against the Hungarians.)

Then came a partial revision of the 1919–20 peace treaties along ethnic lines. (Many people thought that the spirit of 1938 was to return. And some went even so far as to speak of a new “German threat”.) Yugoslavia disintegrated, Croatia and Slovenia became independent once again, and a bitter struggle began for the territory of Bosnia with its mixed population. Another invention of the peace settlement of 191920, Czechoslovakia, also disintegrated. In the meantime the Soviet Union that had expanded after World War II also fell apart. No one should, therefore, search for any “reactionary” conviction or approach – in social terms – behind the deliberation of citizens who demand that the situation of the largest minority of the region, the three million Hungarians, should be improved.

The present responsibility of both historians and politicians is to stop sticking ideological labels like “nationalist” or “cosmopolitan”. Instead, they should draw the lessons from the grievances on all sides and patiently seek after solutions together with Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, South-Slavs, Germans, as well as with the Gipsies and Jews (who do not identify themselves as a nationality). One has to understand that the nationality question is more than the problem of Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary. It is the general problem of our region. It is a domestic policy issue in Hungary, but it also has marked foreign policy relevance as to the Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries.

One thing is certain: the intellectuals of the region and the political elites are facing the most difficult task they have had in the past century and a half. This is the first time that they can decide on the forms of coexistence, including the local systems of administration without external pressure from any Great Power. It is now, if ever, that these political elites have the chance to surmount their selfish interests. They should not exploit the national grievances for gaining votes at the elections, for attaining high publicity through the mass media or for being celebrated at political meetings. Instead, the elite are supposed to think about the future. To think about the future also means that one understands the arguments and grievances of others. It is no use pursuing the favour of the Great Powers and seeking support in New York, London, Paris, Bonn, or even in Moscow. It would be much wiser to travel to Bratislava, Bucharest, Zagreb, and Belgrade.

It is to be established once more: all methods which have so far been tried to relieve the contradiction between national dwellings and the administrative state borders have to be discarded. Forced assimilation, the principle of the national state, the revising of country borders, and the resettlement of ethnic groups proved equally useless. What remains is nothing but democracy: to grant various rights, both individual and collective, to the national minorities, including political, cultural, or even territorial autonomy.

Though the contradictions of the ethnic and the administrative-political state borders could not be resolved over six generations, we have to make further efforts to resolve it on a brand-new foundation. This is the lesson the Hungarians and their neighbours have to draw from Trianon.

Historians are not supposed to make out prescriptions for how this or that should be done. However, they have all qualifications to warn the nations and the political elites not to choose ways and means which have proved to be failures in the past; they are also expected to recommend more feasible approaches both to the politicians and the public that consists of tax-payers who sustain them.

Federation of Nations

All majority nations have to understand that they cannot consider the state as their “private property”. The state does not cover the majority nation only, but it extends to all citizens who keep the institutions going, produce and manufacture goods, and pay taxes. (This applies to every state, be it Hungarian, Serb, Slovak, Romanian or Croatian.) Ethnic majorities and minorities are all state-creating peoples. Hungarian historians should also think the consequences of this principle over, especially now on the seventy-fifth anniversary of Trianon. What the Hungarians lost under that treaty was not the “state of their own”, but 3.2 millions of their fellow-countrymen. These 3.2 million people need our help today to be able to maintain their Hungarian identity and culture...

The Hungarian elite of the historical Hungary failed to understand this principle, so the territorial and administrative unit they had created inevitably declined and disintegrated. The majority nation has to ensure the minorities the conditions they need for their self-fulfilment and development not as a gift but as a civil right. The minority right consists in the right to have equal chances with the majority nation. Just as the Romanian, Slovak, and Serb intellectuals rightfully demanded equal rights for education and culture for the children of these minorities at the turn of this century, the Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries also rightfully demand the same rights and chances for themselves nowadays.

A historian should not make out recipes; he should refrain from doing so even in his hours of solitude. He must, however, make the public acquainted with the history of the world and with the development of regions which are in a way similar to ours, but are ahead of us in the relieving of similar tensions. The historian views the efforts of countries to the east of Hungary to recreate their state and administration with respect, just as the Western European and overseas countries that have reached a high level of economic and military development and created high living standards for their citizens. However, to gain experiences and to draw the relevant lessons, the historian had better refer his disciples to those countries which have already solved their similar conflicts. He should advise them to study, for example, the history of the minor nations in North-West Europe, the Benelux states, and the Scandinavian peoples where the various nations have found their proper place within the states and the citizens are free to choose their identity. They are free to exercise their religion, to give expression to their nationality, and organize their religious, social, national and other communities and autonomies.

The Central European peoples should give up repeating their hysterical demand for a “national compensation. These peoples – Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks and Serbs alike – should not consider themselves as victims with reference to the “evils” of history. A new “victimology” has recently developed in the Central European region. Peoples in the region try to support their arguments with historical, statistical, and cartographic data and prove the grievances they had to suffer from the others. And they all expect “compensation” from one or another neighbour.

The general public, either Hungarian or non-Hungarian, is reluctant to take into notice the data series presented by the historians, according to which the peace treaties of 1919–20 were equally detrimental to Hungary and to its neighbours. Though, these treaties were partly advantageous to the Slovaks, the Romanians and the Serbs as they were given every opportunity to develop their culture and education in their mother tongue and to rise from all respects. But by creating several minor national states in the region, these treaties brought equally low living standards for all these nations. The new system (from 1920 on) divided the former economic and productive unity of the region, which had enjoyed all advantages of an economic “large area”, into seven customs districts and several separate monetary and economic units. Consequently, Central Europe became a region which the really substantial western investors will surely avert. Direct foreign investments decreased not only after 1920, but in the aggregate, they have not shown a dramatically growing tendency after 1990, either. In 1910 the living standards of handicraftsmen, peasants, and civil servants were more comparable to those of their counterparts living in the more developed societies at that time than are today, in 1995 – in the period of the questionable triumph of the idea of the national state – around the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Trianon Peace Treaty.

Introductory paper read at the conference “Trianon and the European Peace Settlement” organized by the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Europe Institut Budapest on 29 May 1955.