Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:228–230.

GÁBOR GÖRGEY

Kultusminister (2002-2003)

In wie weit betrachteten, bzw. betrachten Sie die Bewahrung der Minderheiten als Aufgabe der staatlichen Kulturpolitik, und welche Mittel standen Ihnen zu diesem Zweck zur Verfügung?

Die Aufrechterhaltung der kleinen Nationen liegt sowohl im Interesse der Mehrheit wie im Interesse der Minderheit. Auf dieser Weise kann die Mehrheit die potentiellen Spannungen, die sich in Folge der Niederdrückung und der auf der Oberfläche unschuldig erscheinender Gleichmut gegenüber den Minderheiten aufsammeln, am ehesten reibungslos und Kosten sparend auflösen.

Es liegt auch deshalb im Interesse der Mehrheit – besonders im Karpatenbecken -, weil das von Sankt Stephan deklarierte, und noch heute als unglaublich modern geltende Prinzip über die Kraftlosigkeit der einsprachigen Nation, und die Stärke der mehrsprachigen Nation mit verschiedenen Traditionen bis heute nichts von seiner Gültigkeit verloren hat.

Auch deshalb, weil sich der Alltag und die Kultur der gesellschaftlichen Mehrheit durch diese Vielfältigkeit weit interessanter gestaltet.

Die Rolle der Kulturpolitik des Staates liegt hierbei darin, keine Kulturpolitik zu haben! Er soll mit Hilfe seines von verschiedenen Interessen unantastbaren Schutzschirmes, und seiner finanziellen Mitteln die Selbstverwaltung gewährleisten. Die Minderheit soll eine kulturelle Autonomie genießen und sich, umgeben von der Mehrheit, wohlfühlen.

Ein wichtiges Element ist hierbei, dass die Kultur der Minderheiten auf eine natürliche Weise präsent ist, und als Teil des kulturellen Spektrums des Landes erkannt und anerkannt wird. Ein kulturelles Ghetto, gleich wie frei und von Außen unbeeinflusst es auch erscheinen mag, bleibt ein Fremdkörper für die Mehrheit.

Welche Verfügungen haben Sie während Ihrer kulturpolitischen Tätigkeit zur Aufrechterhaltung der nationalen Minderheiten gefördert? Welche kulturpolitischen Aktionen wurden während Ihrer Amtszeit durchgeführt mit dem Ziel die Kultur der kleinen Nationen oder das Identitätsbewusstsein der nationalen Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen zu stärken?

Ich habe während meiner Amtszeit als Minister versucht, diese Prinzipien in die Praxis umzusetzen. Meine Amtszeit dauerte nicht lang genug, und so kann ich keine besonderen Erfolge verbuchen. Doch versuchte ich alles, was in meiner Kraft stand, dieser wegweisenden Richtung, dieser Tendenz Geltung zu verschaffen. Vor allem mit uneingeschränkter Toleranz gegenüber den kulturellen Bestrebungen der Minderheiten. (Wobei ich seit 1990 ratlos mit ansehe, dass die angemessene Repräsentation der Minderheiten im Parlament nicht gelöst ist.)

Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach einen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen der Anwendung von kulturpolitischen Strategien bei großen, bzw. kleinen Nationen?

Die Kulturpolitik der großen Nationen ist im Allgemeinen geduldiger und großzügiger, als die der kleinen Nationen. Dies ist aber eine Regel mit zahlreichen Ausnahmen. Und daraus ist klar ersichtlich, dass eigentlich keine allgemeine Regel aufgestellt werden kann.

Hat die politische Wende aus strategischer Sicht positiv auf die Aufrechterhaltung der kleinen Nationen eingewirkt?

Diese Frage richtet sich natürlich auf unsere Region, und so muss ich sagen, dass der Systemwechsel eher zum Chaos führte. Auf den internationalen Druck zur Anerkennung der Grenzen von Trianon, und den „brüderlichen” Zwangsfrieden innerhalb des sowjetischen Lagers folgend setzt nun bei den Nachfolgestaaten der Vorgang an, den wir mit dem Trauma von Trianon bereits erlebten und auf unserer Weise aufarbeiteten. Die Tschechoslowakei hat jetzt ihr Trianon erlebt, Jugoslawien geht es ebenso. Rumänien stöhnt unfähig unter seinem Übergewicht. Und wir – die neu errichteten Demokratien – kämpfen mit den Missständen der politischen Pubertät. Im Lichte von all dem, wie kann man ernsthaft und mit Weitsicht über die Strategien des kleinstaatlichen Daseins diskutieren?

In der Zeit der Integration der Verwaltungsgebiete kamen nach 1990 sehr oft Interessensgemeinschaften zwischen den ostmitteleuropäischen kleinen Nationen zustande. Worauf ist es Ihrer Meinung nach zurückzuführen, dass die kleinen Nationen der Regionen die zwischenstaatlichen Kontakte nicht verstärkt zur Bewahrung der kleinen Nationen nutzen, und daran anknüpfend nicht enger im Interesse der auf dem Gebiet der Nachbarstaaten lebenden Minderheiten zusammenarbeiten?

Die mitteleuropäischen Nationen haben fast ausschließlich gemeinsame Interessen! Nur haben sie nicht die Zeit dies zu erkennen, weil sie weiterhin mit ihren diluvialen nationalstaatlichen Komplexen beschäftigt sind. Diese Erkenntnis, und davon ausgehend das Ausbauen von vernünftigen, krampflosen zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, und die Anerkennung der Vielfalt des kleinstaatlichen Daseins werden allein von den anachronistisch-nationalistischen Überbleibseln des 19. Jahrhunderts gestört und getrübt. Die Teilnehmer der Wirtschaft sind hierüber bereits hinweg.

Was halten Sie über die oben angesprochenen Themenbereiche hinaus wichtig für die Förderung der kleinen Nationen?

Die Stärke des kleinstaatlichen Daseins liegt in der kulturellen Selbstverwaltung, und in der Möglichkeit sich ungestört, frei von jeglichem politischen Einfluss kennen zu lernen.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:53–65.

FERENC GAZDAG

Looking for a Place of Small States: Hungarian Security Policy 1989–2004

Security policy constitutes an internal stratum of the existence of states and of their political activity. It has two major areas. Concepts of internal security relate to the state based on the rule of law (constitution, institutions, legal order, public security) and to the society as a whole, whereas the categories of external security are elated to the broader and narrower international environment, to challenges and threats coming from outside the country, to the international system and to the strategic aspects of foreign policy. Security policy is directly related to the concept of state sovereignty, and all foreign-policy activity may be somehow associated with the categories of independence, the preservation of the territory of a country and with the assertion of national interests. Striving to achieve the possible broadest security is a permanent characteristic of every foreign policy, despite the fact that there are few such categories that have been repeatedly discussed so much like security policy. In critical times the impression may be created that foreign policy is nothing but security policy.

Another cornerstone of foreign and security policy is the assertion of national interests. To this, first of all national interests have to be defined in their extent as well as content. Next the process of interest maximisation may come along political rationality, utilising the means available to the state. During the course of its 20th-century history Hungary may be mostly characterised by the concepts of adjustment, following another along a forced track, and of external openness as an object of great power politics. As a small state it could hope for the assertion of its interests in co-operation with the bigger powers, or as an indirect result of the assertion of great-power interests. After World War II the country was shifted to the Soviet sphere of interest as a result of great-power decisions the institutions of which (CMEA, Warsaw Pact) overwhelmingly served the state interests of the Soviet Union. In the accession euphoria after the change of the system there was also the historically well-founded realisation besides the emotional elements (Hungary belonged to the West!) that one of the most efficient means for the preservation of independence of small states was to belong to an alliance system, whereas the most effective channel for the assertion of national interests was membership in institutions. In case of remaining aloof one may only adjust to decisions made, whereas as members their content may be influenced. After the change of the system Hungary’s embeddedness in institutions has radically grown and the process may be regarded as completed by accession to the European Union in May 2004.

The lack of identity between the state and national borders of Hungary since the Trianon Peace Treaty practically the country has had to follow a path it was forced to take in its neighbourhood as well as regional policies. Due to its geopolitical conditions (geographic location, size, limited resources, borders difficult to defend) Hungary had very rarely got into a position of a country launching significant initiatives in world politics: during the period after World War II the 1956 revolt against the Soviets and the opening up of the borders towards Austria in the autumn of 1989 may be regarded as such. While the experiment of ceding from the socialist world system was doomed to fail right from the outset in the process of the consolidating bipolar international system, by letting the East German refugees cross the Austrian border Budapest supported the mainstream of the transformation of that international system, and directly contributed to the geopolitical rearrangement leading to German unification.

All that took place in relation to the change of the system in 1989–1990 can be interpreted along the specification and assertion of national interests. The Hungarian political elite had to rapidly elaborate answers to the basic issues related to the position of the country, such as:

– How the independence of the country can be regained?

– What country strategies should be developed for issues directly deriving from the geopolitical and historical conditions of the country after independence regained? The most difficult of these issues was the lack of identity of the borders of the nation and state since World War I, and hence the definition of minority and neighbourhood policies.

– In what direction should the country seek the safeguards of its security after the disintegration of the socialist bloc?

– What challenges has the country to face after an East-West confrontation, and what answers does it wish to give to them?

Hungary, similarly to its neighbours without exception, when freed from the embrace of the Soviet empire, turned towards the successful institutions of the West (Council of Europe, European Union, NATO) (parliamentary democracy, market economy, the rule of law). Hungary was among the first to begin this process during the course of which one may equally find successful and less successful elements, but the aggregate result of which has been a strategy of adjustment to the Western world in respect of a new value and interest orientation. The basic directions of security policy may be found in three parliamentary documents laying down the principles of security and defence policy (1993 and 1998).

Concepts of security policy

After the four decades spent in the Soviet imperial system (Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Aid) theoretically almost half a dozen possibilities opened up for the Hungarian foreign and security policies with the change of the system. In practice the possibilities of those options were widely different; nevertheless, surveying them is not without lessons:

1. The maintenance of an alliance with the Soviet Union, albeit in a modified form and content could be regarded as an option. Though when the government, changing the system and headed by József Antall entered into office (June 1990), the Warsaw Pact as well as the CMEA did exist, yet it was only a theoretical possibility, for it was getting freed from the Soviet sphere of interest that was in the focus of the process of system change. By the summer of 1991 both socialist organisations disintegrated, more over, the Soviet Union itself fell into pieces by the end of the year and it was revealed that the national interests of the Soviet successor states were essentially different from those of Moscow, therefore an option in the nature of restoration could be regarded as excluded from the internal as well as external sides.

2. Autonomy and reliance on the country’s own resources was a forced and transitory alternative. It was the elaboration of national strategy that proved to be one of the first tasks after independence was regained, and decisions had to be made after a survey of the geopolitical conditions of the country (size, resources, means, etc.) and of its capabilities. During the course of the elaboration of an independent Hungarian foreign policy this alternative was not even seriously discussed though the expression of “all-round defence”, hallmarked by the name of the then minister of defence (Lajos Fűr) became the synonym for a serious misunderstanding of the issue. Looking back, however, it should be mentioned that a precise fixing of national strategy was an elemental requirement after the country was freed from the bonds of the Socialist camp, and that there was very little exact information on the future international embeddedness of the nation in 1991.

3. The alternative of building a Central European regional security structure was accorded greater attention. The three Visegrád countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) successfully coordinated their steps during 1990 and 1991; they took up a joint position in the interest of dismantling the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. Experiences gained at that time, common interest in the withdrawal of Soviet troops and in avoiding a security-policy vacuum projected this regional solution as a temporarily viable alternative with a large amount of Western encouragement. As a result Hungary was a founder member of the Pentagonal (Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Italy), and subsequently of the Hexagonal (the former ones + Poland), the Central European Initiative, and finally also of the Central European Free Trade Association, though it was revealed very soon that regional co-operation could in no way substitute for, and at the most it could supplement integration into the Western institutions.

4. The option of neutrality obtained an even greater attention. One of its reasons was part of the circumstances of the system change. The new parties changing the system naturally went back to the heritage of the 1956 revolution, including Imre Nagy’s demand for neutrality. It was, however, soon revealed that this thesis had little practical sense under the new conditions: partly the Eastern and the Western camps did not exist any more after the disappearance of bipolarity between which the country could be neutral, on the other hand no great powers came forward that were to be needed to guaranteeing the status of neutrality. In addition, the vast majority of the political elite, now in a decision-making position, wished to see the country as part of the Western bloc, therefore this trend had been soon removed from the agenda.

5. Pressing for a pan-European (collective) security system fed on the ‘happy excitement’ following the change of the system on the one hand, and on the exceptional historical possibility offered by overcoming European bipolar confrontation on the other. This idea was primarily inspired by the disintegrating main power of the Socialist bloc (the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia after 1991) which wished to see the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the European (and broader: an Eurasian) organisational framework in the field of international security. It was reflected by the document of the Paris meeting of the organisation held in November 1990 (Charter of Paris for a New Europe), in which the end of Europe’s division was solemnly declared. More over, a breakthrough could be achieved at the talks on conventional arms prior to that conference. As a result of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, planning the reduction of armed forces and weapons and with the approved Confidence and Security-Building Measures the quantity of barracks and arsenals of the European continent was significantly reduced. Consequently it could be justly assumed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be the comprehensive framework institution of politics and security, capable of offering adequate safeguards to the new democracies as well. It was not to be. The CSCE failed as early as in 1991–1992, tested by the Yugoslav crisis, and as a result of subsequent transformations it became a framework for preventive diplomacy.

6. Ideas of Euro-Atlantic integration. Catching up economically and socially to the developed countries was one of the central aims of the system change in Hungary too; therefore issues of content and institution were accorded outstanding attention. As a result the strategic choice of the Antall government, taking up office in the summer of 1990, fell on Euro-Atlantic integration and it could rely on the agreement of all the parliamentary parties in this decision. The new strategy was not only about security. Partly Hungary, similarly to the other Visegrád countries, regarded itself as a country that had always belonged to European civilisation, and partly the targeted West European space represented an economically far more developed level. Consequently the slogan of “Return to Europe” promised economic development by leaps to Hungary too. Hence it is understandable that all participants of the evolving multi-party system somehow linked the idea of integration with the promise of democracy and a welfare society. Third, ever since World War II the Western world has been built into one unit by a network of operational institutions, occupying the victor’s position after Cold War including the United States of America, currently the strongest power of the world. Each of these factors was present in shaping Western orientation. Thus the basic motivation of moving towards NATO was not meant to avert some kind of imminent threat. During the course of the 90s Hungary never felt itself threatened by any of its neighbours, excepting the short period when the South-Slav war was raging immediately next to the country’s borders. NATO proved to be one of the important though not the sole institution of Euro-Atlantic integration for Hungarian foreign policy, as it was always accompanied by the desire for membership of the European Union and other organisations. Hungarian politics regarded the admission of the country to the Council of Europe (1990), to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1996), and finally to NATO (1999) as steps of one and the same strategy of integration. In this sense accession to the European Union in the spring of 2004 is the completion of the process.

It was the background described above in front of which the three main strategic directions of the Hungarian foreign and security policy were shaped and reflected practically the agreement of all the parliamentary parties, such as:

– Accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions and integration into the institutions representing them;

– Good neighbourly and close regional relations;

– Supporting the Hungarian minorities living across the borders.

Though the alternating governments changed emphasis, the Antall and Orbán governments laid stress rather on issues related to the minorities, whereas the Horn government unambiguously focused on integration, yet the main directions of foreign policy priorities remained unchanged. A meaningful demand for change emerged first as a result of accession to the NATO in 1999 and subsequently to the Union in 2004, in view of the fact that with these steps of integration Hungary has become the eastern border of NATO and of the EU. The changed geopolitical position induces radical rearrangements along all the three strategic axes.

A rapid transformation of the nature of challenges

The set of external conditions of Hungarian foreign and security policy and its immediate environment have also undergone radical transformation. The arrival of the post-bipolar era was accompanied by the disintegration of the Eastern alliance system (1991), the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the realisation of German unification (1990), and by the transformations of the entire international system painful for all the European states. The multiethnic state formations hewn out after World War I disintegrated in our narrower region. In the wake of the Soviet disintegration the newly emerging Ukraine (1991) of those states has become the biggest new neighbour of Hungary, and the partition of Czechoslovakia (1993) was also accomplished peacefully. Whereas the disintegration of Yugoslavia ended up in bloody internal conflicts and became the major armed conflict of Europe since World War II. It was a particular challenge for Hungary that it was the neighbour of all the three disintegrated states and as a result of change the number of Hungary’s neighbours grew from five to seven. Some of those nations did not have statehood traditions at all, and it continues to make their fitting into the international and European structures difficult to this day. Hungary concluded bilateral agreements with its new neighbours one after the other, and open disputes ensued only with Slovakia (on the minority issue and the dam of Bős) and with Romania (in principle no agreement was needed for there was no change in Romania’s position). Ultimately the bilateral agreements with these two states could be concluded in 1995 and 1996 respectively.

During the Yugoslav wars Hungary conducted a cautious and responsible policy and generally adjusted to the policy of the Western states. It strove to keep away from the conflict and to support the international efforts trying to hinder the escalation of the conflict as far as its possibilities went.

The implementation of the Paris Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 19 November 1990 was highly significant in the regional power relations. The aim of the Treaty was to reduce the extent of military confrontation in the field of conventional arms. The agreement between military blocs established a balance between NATO and the entire Warsaw Pact, but since the latter one disintegrated the quotas based on the balance of the two military blocs had to be distributed among the member states and in order to avoid the emergence of major disproportions rather complicated constructs were born in respect of the various territorial zones as well as control and implementation. In Hungary and in its environment significant reductions had to be executed in the five most important categories of conventional arms according to the Treaty. (See Table 1.)

Data of Hungary and its neighbours prior to the beginning of reduction ruled by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1 January 1993–upper row) and after (16 November 1995–lower row)

It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the CFE for the countries changing their system that had been maintaining oversized armies in keeping with the strategies of the Warsaw Pact and packed full with weapons. As far as Hungary is concerned, three (one general and two national) components are worth mentioning. The first, general element is that it was for the first time in the history of the country that favourable conditions emerged in the field of military power relations. According to the teachings of military science attackers have to have at least three times superior strength to the success of a non-surprise attack. Hence a balancing of power relations and the lowering of the levels of armament would reduce the very probability of aggression. At the moment of signing the Treaty (November 1990) one of the five neighbours of Hungary (the Soviet Union) possessed the theoretically necessary superior strength in all the five categories, and three (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) had it in some categories. After the implementation of the stipulations of the CFE only Ukraine falls in this category, in other words, the security position of Hungary has radically improved.

The CFE does not extend over the South-Slav states, neither over Austria. The latter one, however, declared that it would voluntarily comply with the stipulations of the Treaty. The bloody internal war of Bosnia, reaching the borders of Hungary as well, was ended by the Dayton Peace Agreement (21 November 1995), and as a result those involved in it (Smaller Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia) had to start negotiations on arms reduction following the logic of the CFE. The talks resulted in an accord on sub-regional arms control signed on 14 June 1996, in Florence that established dismantling and control mechanisms similar to those of the CFE along our southern borders as well.

Hungary has become party to most of the international agreements dealing with weapons of mass destruction, their carriers and international trade. Without claiming for totality mention should be made of the Comprehensive Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1996), Chemical Weapons Treaty (1997), Biological and Toxin Weapons Treaty (1975), Missile Technology Control Regime (1993), or the Wassenaar Arrangement (1995) that regulates trade in conventional weapons and dual-use goods replacing the infamous COCOM regime.

Road to NATO

When the Antall government entered into office, Hungary was officially still a member of the Warsaw Pact, thus a practical transformation of the new strategy had to be solved accordingly. As a first step the Warsaw Pact had to be dismantled. The Hungarian side took the initiative in this process. In June 1990 parliament asked the government to open talks on quitting the Warsaw Pact and the parliamentary decision also stated that Hungary should suspend its activities in the military operation of the organisation. Prague and Warsaw joined the Hungarian effort only from early 1991 onwards, when the Soviet home affairs units hit the forces demanding independence for Lithuania. From then on the three countries acted in co-ordination and jointly urged an early call for the meeting of the Political Consulting Body of the Warsaw Pact (25 February 1991). An agreement on the dissolution of the military organisation was reached at that meeting (1 July 1991).

What was still ahead was the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The main difficulty was caused by the fact that the agreement on withdrawal did not settle the issue of finances between the parties; more over they had diametrically opposed stands in this respect. The Soviet party wanted to settle accounts by objects, and presented a claim of about a total of HUF 50 thousand million for its investments in the various military facilities. The Hungarian side on the other hand put the direct and indirect damages caused by the Soviet troops in the foreground and specified a claim of similar scale. Finally, the withdrawal of troops was completed on 19 June 1991, without settling the financial issues. The country, however, became again independent after 47 years, and no foreign troops were stationed on its territory.

Meanwhile Western relations had been developing rapidly: in October 1991 Prime Minister József Antall visited Brussels as the leader of an independent state and gave a talk at the North-Atlantic Council. He expounded in his speech that the Hungarian government was aware of the fact that it was not yet realistic to talk about Hungarian NATO membership, but as a small country that had chosen the path of democracy it expected NATO to take action against aggression, or in case the sovereignty, independence and the borders of any country were violated. He was of the view that the Visegrád three deserved special treatment.

The failed attempt of a coup in Moscow in August 1991 may be regarded as a landmark in the relationship between NATO and Hungary in several respects. The possibility of a reverse caused serious concern all over Europe including the Hungarian leadership that was assured of the support of that Alliance personally by M. Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO. At that time, however, the dominant concept was that the democratisation of the Central European region and of the Soviet Union would be a general medication for the problems of that area. Soon it was revealed that it was an illusion to expect a general and rapid democratisation of the countries relieved of communist rule, of the successor states of the disintegrated Soviet Union and of Russia among them, and the speech of the Russian Foreign Minister Kozhiryev made in Stockholm in December 1992, recalling the tone of the Cold War, significantly motivated the Hungarian leadership to seek security safeguards. The developments of the South-Slav crisis similarly inspired Hungarian politics to declare the country’s claim for NATO-membership, together with the experiences gained in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, operational from December 1991 onwards. Finally, efforts towards NATO were also promoted by the fact that after December 1991, when the Association Agreement between the European Community and Hungary was signed, it was being recognised in Hungary too that the accession of the Central European countries to European Union would be far more lengthy and complicated than it was thought after the change of the system.

NATO however, did not respond to repeated claims with an offer of enlargement but at first with the elaboration of the programme called “Partnership for Peace”. At that time Budapest assessed the offer as less than a rapidly gained membership it had hoped for yet as something that may well serve preparations for membership. Therefore it was among the first (8 February 1994) to join the programme (later on the number of participants grew to 27); it presented its Document of Offer in June and approved the first individual partnership programme in November.

In the early autumn of 1995 NATO published the conditions of accession long awaited by the applicant states (NATO Enlargement Study). Accordingly the applicants had to meet political (democratic political setup, parliamentary system, market economy, guaranteeing civilian control over the armed forces) as well as military conditions (a minimum of compatibility). The most significant condition was that they had to demonstrate their readiness and capability to contributing to the realisation of the aims of the Alliance. As NATO did not wish to import the unsettled problems of the newly acceding countries, one of the preconditions for Hungary was the settlement of neighbourhood relations. Thus the prospects of accession had indirectly contributed also to the conclusions of a Hungarian-Slovakian basic treaty (spring, 1995), and of a Hungarian-Romanian one (September 1996), and further on to the decision that Hungary was to take part in the activities of IFOR in Bosnia (December 1995).

Participation in the settlement of the Bosnian situation was extremely important to Hungary. The country proved that it was capable of contributing to the management of a European crisis. It also showed that Hungary had political responsibility for the peace of the continent and was ready to co-operate with other states for its sake. Technically and from a military point of view the Hungarian Armed Forces could be part of a ground operation led by NATO that was implemented in reality. The soldiers as well as the politicians acquired lot of experiences during the course of practical co-operation. Parallel to those events, the internal institutional framework of approaching to NATO and preparing for membership were also built (Atlantic Liaison Office, Integration Strategy Working Group).

The decision was made at the Madrid conference of the NATO heads of state and government, held on 8–9 July 1997 that the three states, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary would be admitted as a first step of enlargement. The Hungarian parliament greeted the decision in a declaration (15 July). In keeping with the government’s programme a referendum was held on NATO membership on 16 November 1997. Before the referendum a heated debate flared up again, not so much about accession to NATO but rather about issues of procedure and domestic politics. Finally, every parliamentary party called upon the population to support accession and to participate in the referendum.

The referendum was successful. Participation was 49.2 per cent, of whom 85.3 per cent voted for, and 14.6 per cent voted against membership. The large-scale support surprised the participants of political life, though every forecast and survey had indicated a majority of supporters, but no one expected that proportion. The referendum unambiguously legitimated Hungary’s intention to accede to NATO, and justified the efforts of the freely elected governments.

What does NATO membership mean for Hungary?

A fundamental change has taken place in Hungary’s geo-strategic position with NATO membership: the country joined also institutionally the community of the democratic, developed and stable countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. It be came part of the military and political Alliance that has proved to be the most successful one in the preservation of peace and in guaranteeing the security of its member states during the past half century. The period of the Cold War was formally closed with the first extension of the Alliance towards the East and the stability of the Central European region has significantly grown.

NATO membership means external security first and foremost to Hungary, safeguarded by the strongest military alliance of the world. It also means an organisational framework through which our national interests of security policy can be realised. It may be a good cause for satisfaction that the anxieties forecasting the deterioration of bilateral relations between Hungary and some of its neighbours were not justified. The sole critical set of relations was that with Yugoslavia, but the internal political change after the Kosovo war created conditions for the normalisation of relations. Hungary’s international space of mobility and interest-asserting ability has grown. In its decisions NATO utilised those pieces of information and experiences that had been accumulated by Hungarian politics in relation to the problems of our narrower and broader region, thus Hungarian interests were involved in the decision-making mechanism of the Organisation in a pre-decision phase. Hungarian support aiming at promoting the stability of Southeast European countries was appreciated. NATO membership means such norms, procedures and way of thinking on the direct military-professional side the learning of which is necessary to the Hungarian armed forces and may represent further justification to the radical transformations that are still ahead of it.

During the course of accession talks Hungary offered practically its entire armed force to the Alliance and promised to increase the defence budget up to 1.8 per cent of the GDP. The not too fortunate offer originated from the unsatisfactory assessment of burdens deriving from it and partly from the ‘enthusiasm’ of the new members. It was immediately revealed when the Defence Planning Questionnaire was filled in – an annually repeated NATO procedure – that the implementation of the Hungarian undertakings met significant difficulties. Though the Hungarian experts participated in the conciliations of the annual cycles of defence planning as full members, no meaningful corrections were made. The disadvantages of the Hungarian Armed Forces, possessing armament inherited from the Warsaw Pact, kept on growing in the field of the development of military capabilities. The problems continuously indicated by experts were not taken seriously by the political leadership, therefore they got under cross-firing of political discussions only after the elections held in the spring of 2002. The Defence Supervision ordered at that time stated among its supporting arguments that Hungary had realised practically very little of its undertakings made earlier, partly as a result of insufficient attention on the side of politics, and partly of low budgetary support as well as of the postponed reform of the armed forces. The latter one repeatedly ended up in the reduction of the personnel of the Hungarian Armed Forces and as a result and paradoxically it remained a “mini mass army” in its proportions and structure though of truly small numbers (about 40 thousand people) by as late as 2002. Promises made to NATO on specialisation and the evolution of special capabilities were not put into practice.

EU membership and the new challenges

The security-policy consequences of EU membership differ from those of the NATO. It is problems of crisis management that are in the foreground of attention first and foremost of the security and defence policy of the European Union unfolding with growing speed since 1998 and being developed as a common foreign and security policy to become its second pillar. Currently the EU is building its organisational and capability systems in this direction. Hungary stated right at the beginning of the accession talks that it was able and ready to realise tasks deriving from it. On the other hand, it has been continuously saying that the emerging European security and defence policy can only be an effective one if a close co-operation between the EU and NATO is retained, and this acquired special significance after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

In late 2002 and early 2003, however, the Hungarian security policy (together with the Czech Republic and Poland) had to face an extremely uncomfortable choice. The states of the EU regarded as decisive ones (France, Germany) did not agree with American foreign policy overthrowing Saddam Husein’s regime by military intervention and as a result the deepest crisis of the Atlantic Alliance ensued. The Central European states, forced to make their choice, stood on the side of the US in the dispute, thus provoking in turn the disapproval of Berlin and Paris. And all that took place a couple of months before our accession to the Union. For the Hungarian foreign policy it is not only uncomfortable that it is forced to make its choice in the Trans-Atlantic dispute (it would like to avoid) but also that the dispute raging between the EU and the US moves the entire international system towards a structure in which the role of the armed forces would grow, and the international institutions would lose some of their significance because of the unilateralism of the decisive actors. Both factors are counter-effective for the interest-asserting possibilities of the medium and small states. Therefore it is in the double interest of Hungarian foreign policy that development should not move in this direction.

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3

A honvédelem négy éve 1990–94. (Four Years of Defence 1990–94) Budapest, 1994.

4

A honvédelem négy éve 1994–98. (Four Years of Defence 1994–98) Budapest, 1998.

5

A honvédelem négy éve 1998–2002. (Four Years of Defence 1998–2002) Budapest, 2002.

6

Kiss, J. L.: A magyar külpolitika újragondolása: a kádárizmustól az EU tagságig. (Rethinking Hungarian Foreign Policy: from Kádárism to EU Membership) 2004. Manuscript.

7

Magyar biztonságpolitika 1990–2000. (Hungarian Security Policy 1990–2000) In: Biztonságpolitika. Ed.: Gazdag, F. Budapest, 2001. 293–323.

8

A magyar diplomácia európaiságának gyökerei. Bede Rita interjúja Balogh Andrással. (The Roots of the Europeanness of Hungarian Diplomacy. Interview made by Rita Bede with András Balogh) Társadalmi Szemle, 1995. 8–9.

9

Magyar biztonság- és védelempolitikai dokumentumok 1989–1998. (Documents of Hungarian Security and Defence Policy 1989–1998) Vols. I–II. 1998.

10

Non-proliferációs ABC. Multilaterális fegyverzetellenőrzési megállapodások és exportellenőrzési rendszerek. (ABC of Non-Proliferation. Multilateral Agreements on Arms Control and Control Systems of Exports) Ed.: Zimonyi, A. 2000.

11

A NATO-tag Magyarország. (The NATO-member Hungary) 1999.

12

Pirityi, S.: Az ország biztonsága és a katonai erő. (The Security of the Country and Military Force) Hadtudomány, 1995, 4.

13

Szabó, J.–Szenes, Z.: A magyar haderő és a civil kontroll a brit átvilágítás tükrében. (The Hungarian Armed Forces and Civilian Control as Reflected by the British Survey) 1997.

14

Ujj, A.: A hagyományos fegyverek Európában a CFE után. (Conventional Arms in Europe after the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Védelmi Tanulmányok, 1996. 12.

15

Valki, L. (Ed.): A NATO. (NATO). 1999.

16

Válaszok a terrorizmusra, avagy van-e út az afganisztáni vadászattól a fenntartható globalizációig. (Answers to Terrorism, or Is there a Road from the Afghanistan Hunt to a Sustainable Globalisation?) 2002.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:193–194.

DR. ERHARD BUSEK

österreichischer Bildungsminister (1990-94),
danach Vizekanzler, Begründungsmitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirates des Europa Instituts Budapest

In wie weit betrachteten, bzw. betrachten Sie die Bewahrung der Minderheiten als Aufgabe der staatlichen Kulturpolitik, und welche Mittel standen, bzw. stehen Ihnen zu diesem Zweck zur Verfügung?

Dass die Minderheiten in Ostmitteleuropa ganz entscheidend zur Identität der Region beitragen, steht außer Frage. Der österreichische Autor Heimito von Doderer sprach einmal davon, dass die Erhaltung von Minderheiten in Österreich eine Auskunft über die europäische Mission des Landes gibt. Es stehen natürlich nie genügend finanzielle Mittel zur Verfügung, aber sie waren im Großen und Ganzen ausreichend um einen Standard zu pflegen. Dies wurde auch dadurch erleichtert, dass einzelne Bundesländer von sich aus sehr viel dazu taten.

Welche Verfügungen haben Sie während Ihrer kulturpolitischen Tätigkeit zur Aufrechterhaltung der nationalen Minderheiten gefördert? Welche kulturpolitischen Aktionen wurden während Ihrer Amtszeit durchgeführt mit dem Ziel die Kultur der kleinen Nationen oder das Identitätsbewusstsein der nationalen Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen zu stärken?

In der Zeit meiner kulturpolitischen Tätigkeit waren wir vor allem auf die Sprachenfrage konzentriert, weil der Fall des eisernen Vorhangs neue Möglichkeiten ergeben hatte. Wir boten zusätzliche Mittel an um die Sprachen der Nachbarländer zu fördern, die in den meisten Fällen durchaus auch Sprachen der Minderheiten sind. Ebenso ist es gelungen, eine Vielzahl an Ausstellungen, Publikationen, aber auch Sendungen im Rundfunk und Fernsehen durchzusetzen. Einen besonderen Platz hat das Museum Moderne Kunst – Stiftung Ludwig eingenommen, da durch einen aus Ungarn stammenden Direktor (Lorand Hegyi) auch die Ankäufe aus dieser Region vorgenommen wurden, so dass die Sammlung in dieser Richtung beachtlich ist.

Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach einen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen der Anwendung von kulturpolitischen Strategien bei großen, bzw. kleinen Nationen?

Es gibt einen bedeutenden Unterschied in der Bewältigung des Problems, so haben aus der Geschichte heraus große Nationen manchmal die Tendenz kulturpolitische Strategien eher zu einer Vereinheitlichung des Landes einzusetzen. In der derzeitigen europäischen Situation ist diese Strategie noch von Aktualität (Frankreich, Spanien).

Hat die politische Wende aus strategischer Sicht positiv auf die Aufrechterhaltung der kleinen Nationen eingewirkt?

Die politische Wende von 1989 und die folgenden Jahre haben sich sehr positiv ausgewirkt. Der Beitritt zur Europäischen Union ist ein weiterer Beitrag in diese Richtung und von heute noch nicht abschätzbarer Bedeutung.

In der Zeit der Integration der Verwaltungsgebiete kamen nach 1990 sehr oft Interessensgemeinschaften zwischen den ostmitteleuropäischen kleinen Nationen zustande. Worauf ist es Ihrer Meinung nach zurückzuführen, dass die kleinen Nationen der Regionen die zwischenstaatlichen Kontakte nicht verstärkt zur Bewahrung der kleinen Nationen nutzen, und daran anknüpfend nicht enger im Interesse der auf dem Gebiet der Nachbarstaaten lebenden Minderheiten zusammenarbeiten?

Persönlich bin ich überhaupt nicht pessimistisch, dass es zwischen den kleinen Nationen eine Vielzahl an zwischenstaatlichen Kontakten und Kooperationen geben wird. Österreich hat versucht mit der regionalen Partnerschaft hier einen Vorschlag zu machen, der immer mehr genutzt wird und in Folge dessen das Interesse an den in den Nachbarstaaten lebenden Minderheiten steigen wird. Das Engagement in Südosteuropa hat auch dazu beigetragen, dass sich ein erhöhtes Bewusstsein mit Bezug auf diese Frage entwickelt hat.

Was halten Sie über die oben angesprochenen Themenbereiche hinaus wichtig für die Förderung der kleinen Nationen?

Wichtig ist für die Förderung der kleinen Nationen, dass sie sich selbst auf geeignete Weise zur Sprache bringen. Der kulturelle Beitrag wie auch die friedensstiftende Rolle muss mehr herausgearbeitet werden. Es wird die Zukunft der europäischen Regionen bestimmen, ob sie in der Lage sind, gerade bei der gegebenen Unterschiedlichkeit die Gemeinsamkeit ihrer Aufgabenstellung und ihrer Bewusstseinslage stärker herauszuarbeiten. Die eigentliche Fragestellung besteht nicht zwischen großen und kleinen Nationen, sondern in der Weiterentwicklung einer Identität angesichts einer globalen Zivilisation.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:41–52.

JÓZSEF BAYER

Hungary: State, Political System and EU-Accession

On 1 May 2004, Hungary became a full member of the European Union. This meant a fundamental change compared to the previous periods of the history of the country, and opened new perspectives to its further development. Accession to the Union was prepared by a change of the political system and a series of social and economic transformations connected to it.

Statehood and sovereignty

Hungary achieved its full sovereignty after its defeat in World War I, with the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy. Simultaneously, however, the historical Hungarian Kingdom lost two-thirds of its previous territory and one half of its population due to the Trianon Peace Treaty. This was a major trauma for the entire Hungarian nation. The birth of new, sovereign states on the ruins of the empire was a natural consequence of the policy of earlier years and it conformed to the direction of the mainstream of social development. The subject of grievance was that the borders of the new nation-states were arbitrarily drawn by the victorious powers, without asking the population, totally disregarding the principle of national self-determination (with the exception of Burgenland). As a result, significant areas, completely inhabited by Hungarians, were allocated to the new states, condemning the Hungarian population, earlier belonging to the majority nation, to minority existence.

All this burdened the relationship of the Central European small states for decades and led to constant tension not only in foreign policy but also in the domestic one, further aggravated by nationalism and irredentism spurred also by the ruling circles. Though the Vienna Decision of 1940 somewhat corrected the original Peace Treaty, its price was that the country went to the sphere of power interests and under the total influence of Nazi Germany. The results of the Vienna Decisions were swept away by World War II. In the peace system after the war Hungary became part of the Soviet zone of influence in the divided Europe and its political and economic set-up was shaped accordingly. The status of the country became a semi-sovereign one (or a ‘satellite state’ in the usage of propaganda); it belonged to the alliance system of the Soviet power bloc for more than four decades. It possessed all criteria of autonomous statehood; at the same time it strongly depended on the Soviet power intentions in foreign policy as well as in the shaping of its domestic policy.

The partial modernization of the country during the state socialist period was carried out on the basis of a relatively homogenous Hungarian population – as one of the consequences of the newly-made borders –, with relatively less numerous, scattered national minorities, and without intensive contacts with Hungarians living beyond the borders. At the time of the system transformation in 1989, the case of the Hungarian national minorities across the borders came again to the fore, due to the Hungarian refugees fleeing from the Romanian Ceausescu regime and the Yugoslav crisis. At that time it re-emerged mostly as an issue of the rights of national minorities, and irredentist demands appeared mostly in extremist and marginal political circles that had no significant influence on public opinion or on official governmental policy. Nationalism, even if it is present as a political ideology, is not of the same penetrating force and it does not mean the same thing as before. The intention to preserve national identity may even grow stronger with our Union membership, but not against other nations, as something defined negatively, but dominantly as a positive program of the preservation of autonomous national statehood and culture.

Form of government

In 1989 the foundations of the new political system were laid down at the tripartite national roundtable talks, and the agreements were legislated by the last parliament of the state party, together with the new, basically amended Constitution of the country which suits the requirements of the democratic order and the rule of law. The new, democratic form of government, however, was fully developed only as a result of the parliament and government formed after the general elections of 1990.

According to the amended Constitution, Hungary is a republic, an independent democratic state based on the rule of law. The Constitution lays down the institutional order of the state, the rights and duties of citizens; it contains the legal foundation of the political institutions. The sovereignty of the people is worded in it, which is the legitimate basis of representative democracy. Further on, the division of power, the rule of law, citizens’ rights and the principles of human rights are stipulated in it. All the articles which had restricted people’s sovereignty and democratic freedoms were deleted from the amended Constitution. The earlier Constitution, passed in 1949, for instance, defined a one-party system whose leading force was the Communist party (under various names), and the form of the state was defined as a people’s republic. The Constitution followed the ideology of state socialism of Soviet type. The new, democratic Constitution, on the other hand, speaks about a republic without any attributive, and it is stipulates a multi-party democracy. In the spirit of the German Grundgesetz the parties, originally only social-political organizations, have been incorporated into the Constitution. They were defined as elements of the constitutional order, with the condition that no organization can claim exclusive power. Thus, political pluralism was given constitutional safeguards and the way to an attempt of returning to dictatorship was closed. An autonomous Constitutional Court, again along the German pattern, keeps watch over the spirit and letter of the Constitution, and the establishment of that Court was a significant achievement of the democratic change of the system.

Traditionally, Hungary is a centralized country of a unitary public administration. In addition to the special status capital city of two million inhabitants, there are nineteen counties that had been the depositories of local authority with major political weight up to the change of the system. The new Act on self-governance passed in 1990, however, significantly reduced the power of the county self-governments, and made the structure of local authority far more decentralized than before, without altering the centralized hierarchy of public administration. Its maintenance is guaranteed among others by the system of budgetary redistribution, as the local self-governments do not have sufficient resources to perform their extensive tasks.

During the past years the demand for evolving regional administrative units gradually gained ground. Territorial development policy and competition for the development resources of the Union make the shaping of autonomous regions plausible; however, heated conflicts of interests have been manifested in this issue. Finally, around the turn of the century a decision was made on the creation of 7 developmental regions, which are, for the time being, administrative developmental units and have no elected self-governments of their own. As the election of the self-governing organs of the regional territorial units would require the amendment of the Constitution, and thus, the two-thirds consensus of the decisive parties, the evolution of developmental regions towards having a real territorial self-government has been postponed for the time being.

The political system of the Third Republic

In Hungary it was the change of the political system in 1989–1990 that created the institutional basis of the constitutional, democratic state based on the rule of law. It was the semi-conscious, semi-spontaneous, unplanned process of the change of the system that opened the way to the restoration of the full sovereignty of the country and to the rearrangement of its international relations. During the past fifteen years the new democratic political system has been consolidated institutionally; its functioning is predictable, stable conditions for transformation into a market economy and to the structural transformation of the society have been created. As for the subjective acquirement of democratic achievements and of political culture the new democracy cannot yet be regarded as a consolidated one, as it is characterized by chronically weak legitimacy and fierce political struggles.

The new governmental system of Hungary is parliamentary democracy; the executive power is primarily in the hands of the government elected by the parliament. The head of state is the president of the republic, who is elected by parliament for a period of five years. His competencies are, however, very limited, and his power is rather symbolic; as opposed to the Prime Minister, whose position is strong, with a wide action radius. The institution of the constructive motion of censure makes the removal of government very difficult. In this sense the Hungarian governmental system is close to the German and Austrian type of “chancellor democracy”. The classical principle of the “separation of powers” is formally established: the legislation, the government responsible to parliament, and the judicial power (the Constitutional Court being the politically most important) operate autonomously and control each other. Further important constituents of democracy are the institutions of the free public and the system of decentralized self-governments.

The main actors of the democratic political process are the political parties. There is a multi-party system in operation in Hungary, though the concentration of the party system keeps on growing. Currently the representatives of only four parties have seats in the parliament, but the number of registered extra-parliamentary parties continues to be high. The forms of organized interest are in operation, and civil society has made serious development.

Some characteristic features of the change of system in Hungary

At the end of the eighties the official authorities in Hungary were searching a way out of the political blind alley. The lasting economic stagnation gradually eroded their social support, and there was a rising opposition movement challenging them. The opposition was to take on political shape due to a relatively liberal political atmosphere, and from 1988 on arranged itself into different political groupings that had evolved political pluralism already prior to the change of the system. The leading opposition parties and civic organizations formed the Opposition Roundtable, and its unified pressure forced the state party to begin with the national roundtable talks. As soon as an agreement could be reached on the cornerstones of the new political system, the unity of the opposition broke up–prior to the closing act of talks–, and a struggle for the occupation of the political space began, due to the approaching first free general elections.

The main purpose of the roundtable talks was bargaining about the conditions of a peaceful transition to democracy, together with shaping the outlines of the new political system in the spirit of constitutional engineering. Discussions on the amendment of the Constitution were in focus and some further important issues were the legalization of parties, the guarantees of peaceful transition and an act regulating free democratic elections. At the closing phase of the talks three parties did not sign the roundtable accord because of differences of opinion concerning the election of the president of the republic, but they did not use their veto power, either. The achievements of the accord that had entered into force were subsequently and continuously legislated upon by parliament. Upon the initiative of the four opposition parties a referendum was held on issues left open by the roundtable talks. The referendum brought the victory of the initiators, though with a margins only. The referendum, held in November, before the general elections, already indicated the changing mass mood, and justified the expectation that the majority of the electorate supported the change of system even if broad democratic mass movements were missing.

At the first free general elections (March 1990) twelve from among several dozens of registered parties were able to set up a national list and six of them could make their way into parliament. Such concentration of the party system was promoted by some specific traits of the election system. Firstly, there is the high threshold of entry – it was 4% at the first elections, and has been 5% since 1994 –, secondly, the parties had to collect supporting signatures in order to be included in the election list. Only those parties may set out for the parliamentary elections which can produce a national list. Finally, the election system is of a mixed nature, it is a combination of proportional and majority principles. Of the 386 mandates 176 MPs get elected from individual constituencies, and the rest from territorial and national party lists.

It was the emerging parties that were the main agents of political change, they participated in political programming and in the wording of alternatives right from the outset, and they encouraged and organized political life. The Hungarian party system reflects the moderate pluralism of the dominant parties. The emergence of the Hungarian parties was naturally influenced by the fact that political traditions were broken off during the four decades of communist rule. Initially they possessed neither the means of political mobilization, nor the organizational and financial conditions that usually characterize parties. The lack of articulation of the social structure did not favour the association of parties to the unambiguous representation of social groups either. Therefore the parties were not formed as mass parties but rather as elite or cadre parties with relatively small membership. Their level of organization is usually low, as it is a characteristic feature of all the multi-party systems emerging during transition from autocracy to democracy; the proportion of party membership of the electorate is not more than 2 to 3%. It is also true that social development has passed the phase of mass parties; in the age of mass media it is not party activists who are the main tools of political mobilization, but rather, it is the media through which politics reaches the electorate.

The big rival parties, capable of forming government, made efforts to become efficient electoral or popular parties. The Constitution states that “political parties may not exercise public power directly. Accordingly, no single party may exercise exclusive control of a government body”. As a consequence, a number of public authority positions have been declared incompatible with leading party offices. The judges and prosecutors cannot be members of any political party; public servants cannot take up party offices; parties cannot be organized in workplaces. The way of functioning and the economic affairs of parties are separately regulated by Act XXXIII of 1989.

In late 1991 the aggregate membership of parties was one quarter of a million, which is about 3% of the voting age population. Up to April 1990 65, and up to April 1998 221 parties had themselves registered, though meanwhile 36 parties were wound up or transformed into a civic organization. A party unable to set up candidates for two successive elections is automatically deleted from the register of parties.

The types of parties

The parties that have come into existence may be grouped various ways. The following grouping has emerged by affinity to ideological traditions:

– National Christian-conservative parties: Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP);

– Liberal parties: Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz);

– The former Hungarian Socialist Party is of socialist–social democratic orientation (the Social Democratic Party and the Workers’ Party (the new HSWP – MSZMP) may also be classified under this heading but they could not get into parliament).

Most of the extra-parliamentary parties, those that could not cross the threshold of entry, and parties that have emerged through splits from the parliamentary parties can be classified in one of these camps. There is, however, another kind of grouping by the origin of parties:

1. The historical parties that have significant historical traditions in Hungarian politics, such as the Independent Smallholders’ Party and the Christian Democratic People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party of Hungary and the Hungarian People’s Party. While these parties played a characteristic role at the time of the system change, they have all dropped out of parliament by now. In 1998 it was only the Independent Smallholders’ Party that could get into parliament, but by 2002 this party also sank into a grave crisis and could not repeat its earlier successes. It is an important feature of the development of Hungarian parties that the historical parties lost their weight with the passage of time.

2. The so-called “system-changing” parties constitute the second group. They were formed out of the intellectuals’ groups of “dissident thinking” in the late Kádár era. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Alliance of Young Democrats belong to this group. The 1990 elections brought along the success of the new parties: the three new parties together got more than 50% of votes cast for lists, and almost 40% in 1994. The Hungarian Democratic Forum among them experienced repeated splits, but it was only MIÉP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) of the splinter parties that could get into parliament in 1998 (however, it dropped out in 2002).

3. The third group consists of the successor parties. The former state party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) dissolved itself at its congress held in October 1989, and the reformers overcoming the conservatives founded the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). It was a legal successor to the MSZMP (HSWP), inheriting part of the institutions and assets of the latter one, but it had to give an account of all that was taken over. Politically and organizationally, however, it was a new party with a democratic constitution, and with a significantly reduced membership, now based on free choice. The MSZP squeezed out the conservative forces of the old order from power, thus contributing significantly to a peaceful change of the system. It became one of the competing parties and though apparently it still possessed governing authority, it was profoundly weakened. Being branded as a successor party meant that it was pushed into a political quarantine in the first years. But at the next parliamentary elections, when different conflicts emerged, it became the strongest party in parliament and could even form the government twice since then.

The communist conservative forces, squeezed out of power, formed their new party only in December 1989, and named it Workers’ Party. The Party acknowledged the need for economic and political reforms but it idealized the Kádár-system and was unable to get rid of old dogmas. The Workers’ Party has not been able to cross the parliamentary threshold at any election.

In 2002 only four parties could enter parliament, it was the MSZP, the SZDSZ, and a joint list of Fidesz-MPP and MDF. (After distribution of the parliamentary mandates, MDF could form its autonomous faction.) It characterizes the dynamics of the concentration of the Hungarian party system that while the first and second-comers could acquire 46.1% of votes and 66.3% of mandates in 1990, the MSZP and the joint list of Fidesz and MDF altogether acquired as much as 83.12% of votes and almost 95% of mandates in 2002.

The main reason of the concentration of the party system is the specific features of the electoral system, which favours parties that collect the largest number of votes when the mandates are distributed. It corresponds to the consideration of governability but does not support proportionate representation. As a result, a party system of two big blocs evolved, with a people’s party and a small party capable of forming a coalition on both sides. For the time being no new parties could enter parliament. Of the extra-parliamentary parties it was only the Workers’ Party, MIÉP and the Centrum Party that have got close to the threshold, and MIÉP even succeeded in entering parliament and forming a faction in 1998.

The major institutions of the political system

1. Legislature. In Hungary parliamentary elections are held in every fourth year, when 386 MPs are elected for parliament. Of them 176 MPs obtain their mandates in individual constituencies based on the traditional territorial (individual) representation, whereas 210 MPs are elected by an aggregate of votes cast for the national and territorial party lists, or get their mandate from the compensation list built by an aggregate of the surplus votes. As individual candidates are usually nominated with the support of parties this means the realization of modern representation based on the party principle.

The Hungarian legislation consists of a single chamber. Its work is organized by the Speaker, the parliamentary factions and committees. Initially the parliament resembled the type of “debating house” but it has been increasingly moving in the direction of a working parliament. The parliament elects the major office-holders of the country. The person of the Prime Minister, appointed to form the government by the president of the republic, is voted for in a single act together with the voting over of the program of the government. The Parliament elects the constitutional judges, the president of the Supreme Court, the General Prosecutor, the president of the State Audit Office and the ombudsmen, as well as members of the boards of the public media. The Parliament has passed a large number of new Acts serving the introduction of the new conditions of market economy and of the society and politics. The process of constitution-making was also completed by the first freely elected legislature through the amendments of the constitution implemented on the basis of the pact between the two biggest parties, the MDF and the SZDSZ. The amendments intended to enhance the stability of the executive. An important closing act of the political transformation process was the Act on self-governance passed in 1990. The legislative process constitutes the major part of parliamentary work, though disputes on controlling the government by the opposition attract broader publicity. With the increasing significance of becoming a working parliament the focus of gravity of parliamentary activity is increasingly shifting to committee work.

2. The executive. According to the Constitution the president of the republic “represents the unity of the nation and monitors the democratic operation of the state”. This wording itself indicates that his authority is rather symbolic, and his person represents a kind of “moral branch of power”. His role, however, may grow in the case of a political stalemate, a crisis, or power vacuum. He is elected by the parliament for a term of five years, in the first two rounds of vote by a two-thirds majority is needed, but afterwards simple majority of votes is sufficient. While the competency of the head of state is precisely circumscribed, his activities are indispensable, as they are linked to the daily operation of state organization at several points. He authenticates the Acts by his signature, which means he may even veto them politically or constitutionally. He has an important role in the procedure of forming the government, as he appoints the potential Prime Minister. His outstanding task is related to the appointment of chief executive officers and it is his co-operation that lends legitimacy to several decisions of the head of government. On the other hand, his own decisions are also bound to consent by the government.

The term of the election of the head of state, differing from that of parliament may also result in a kind of political balancing and mediating role. The first President of the Republic of Hungary was Árpád Göncz, who was in office for ten years. Currently the President of the Republic is Ferenc Mádl whose first mandate expires in 2005.

Real authority and executive power are in the hands of the Prime Minister and his government. The 1990 agreement between MDF and SZDSZ resulted in modifications of the governmental system that approximate it to “chancellor democracy”. The intention behind this was to avoid ‘Weimarisation’ in the period of transformation laden with lots of uncertainties. A tool for stabilization was the introduction of the constructive motion of non-confidence, making the removal of the government difficult. A vote of censure against the government can be initiated only by one-fifth of the MPs, together with the naming of the proposed new prime minister. The withdrawal of confidence would mean the resignation of the entire government and a simultaneous inauguration of a new government. Therefore no situation can emerge in which the country is left without government – not even temporarily.

The second element of the chancellor model is the limitation of the responsibility of ministers to parliament. Parliament cannot call back ministers individually. The Prime Minister can make sovereign decisions about the composition of government and the destiny of ministers, he can appoint or relieve them. Thus the Prime Minister has a government and not the government has a Prime Minister. This element also serves the stability of the government and stresses the role of the Prime Minister.

A third element that strengthens the position of the Prime Minister is his right to draw up the program and determine the political guidelines of the government. This is not constrained by the coalition nature of the government either, except when some compromise is built in the coalition contract. Parliament votes on the person of the Prime Minister and on his submitted governmental program in one act; members of the government can be appointed only afterwards by the head of state upon the Prime Minister’s recommendation. This constitutional construct has presumably contributed to the fact that so far every Hungarian government has served its full term.

All governments so far have been coalition governments. The economic conditions undergoing transformation after the change of the political system and the polarizing social structure have produced a number of conflicts that the political system has not yet been able to fully process. While the acceptance of democracy is general, public confidence towards the main institutions of the political system is relatively low. Hungarian democracy has weathered the political-science test of consolidation so far as there was a sequence of the change of government by parliamentary elections. Now a higher level of consolidation would presuppose a government in office that would be capable of holding on to governance at least for two terms. That would, however, require a lasting development of the economy, a qualitative improvement of living conditions and public services, and signs of a so-called societal consolidation. Political culture, if compared to the social shocks accompanying the change of the system, is of a surprisingly low level. There are extremist manifestations, and even the signs of populism are strong, but despite the vehemence of political disputes and the low level of citizens’ confidence, Hungary can nevertheless be said to be a politically stable country. The stabilizing effect of external relations has had a significant role in it.

The rearrangement of interstate relations

The small Central European states faced an entirely new situation by the East and Central European transformation and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet bloc disintegrated already in 1989–1990, the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact gradually fell apart, and radically new economic and security policy challenges emerged. While the Central European countries regained their sovereignty, they got into a precarious situation regarding their external economic relations, for they lost their East European markets. Hungary responded to the new challenges by a rapid change of orientation of its external economy and by the transformation of its external relations. As far as external economy goes, the country completed the change it had begun earlier, shifting its foreign trade relations towards the West. By 2001 almost three-fourths of Hungary’s exports were directed to the European Union. And the Central European free trade agreements strove to settle its external economic relations with the partner countries of the region.

In the early 90s, in an increasingly uncertain international environment, the country strove to assert its security policy interests by its partnership for peace with the NATO. It participated in the regional co-operation of the countries of so-called Visegrád Group, and settled its bilateral relations with its neighbours by a series of treaties, and whenever it was possible, the protection of the Hungarian national minorities living across the borders was also included in those agreements. By the end of the decade Hungary also became a member of the NATO, together with the Czech Republic and Poland. It had its share in the peace-keeping activities of IFOR and KFOR, promoting the settlement at the West Balkan. It has been playing a role in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and even in the Iraqi war of the United States, even if not by combatant units.

The country has been constantly striving to participate in the European process of integration ever since the change of the system. Hungary normalized its relations with the European Community already prior to the system transformation. The agreement on trade and co-operation, signed in 1988, envisaged a gradual dismantling of the quantitative limits on exports. The system transformation represented a qualitatively new phase in efforts towards integration. Hungary could participate in the PHARE program, which meant the restoration of trade free of discrimination, the removal of quantitative restrictions, and activities promoting the economy and the granting of loans.

In 1992 the European Union signed an association agreement with Hungary. It was the initial step of a closer integration. The European Commission raised the issue of a significant enlargement of the Union at the Maastricht Summit for the first time, and its criteria were worded at the 1993 Copenhagen Summit for countries of economies in transformation: the safeguards of democracy and the rule of law, the institutions of market economy and a relative competitiveness of the economy; further on the total adoption of Union legislation (acquis), representing the achievements of the EU so far accomplished. Hungary, knowing these preconditions, formally submitted its application for admission in 1994. After long preparations, including country reports and continuous monitoring, Agenda 2000 published a positive report on Hungary.

Thirty-one different Union negotiating Chapters were opened and gradually closed, the process lasting up to the end of 2002, to the next Copenhagen Summit. For Hungary the issues of free trade in arable land, the transformation of tax reductions granted to foreign investors into EU-conform regional support, the development of various agricultural quotas, and achieving proportionate representation in the bodies of the EU belonged to the delicate issues. Satisfactory compromises could be achieved in all of them, and in several other questions, such as environmental regulations. On a few issues the country was granted derogation, a transitory period for preparing a full implementation of Union legal regulations.

The Eastern enlargement of the European Union showed up several difficulties in comparison to the former enlargement waves, and it coincided with efforts aiming at deepening integration and evolving a political union. At the same time a special significance is accorded to the accession by the fact that enlargement eliminated the political division of Europe that existed since World War II. As the later Hungarian EU Commissioner, Péter Balázs put it: “at the moment of signing the Treaty the international status and assessment of the country were changed; the unavoidable state of exclusion and uncertainty we were kept in by the protracted process of EU negotiations for more than a decade came to an end.”

In 2003 the representatives of Hungary could participate in the discussions of the new European Convent, and could send observers to the European Parliament. After the accession a Hungarian commissioner could participate in the work of the Commission, and after the elections to the European Parliament on 13 June 2004, Hungary can delegate 24 representatives to the European Parliament. Hence the country’s full integration into the Union begins with 2004, which is a qualitatively new phase of Hungary’s return and adjustment to the Western world.