Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:212–214.

DUŠAN KOVÁČ

Generalsekretär der Slowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
(ab 1999), Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirates des Europa Instituts

In wie weit betrachteten, bzw. betrachten Sie die Bewahrung der Minderheiten als Aufgabe der staatlichen Kulturpolitik, und welche Mittel standen, bzw. stehen Ihnen zu diesem Zweck zur Verfügung?

Viele Nationen, einschließlich die nationale Minderheiten – das ist der Reichtum Europas. Die ethnische, sprachliche und nationale Vielfalt bedeutet nicht nur kulturelle Bereicherung, es ist auch im politischen Sinne eine wichtige Schule der Toleranz, des Dialogs und der Kommunikation. Was für Europa gilt, das gilt ebenso auch für die einzelnen Staaten Europas. Die ethnischen und nationalen Minderheiten sollten nicht mehr als eine Last oder als etwas Unangenehmes betrachtet werden, sondern umgekehrt, als eine Chance das Reichtum und die Vielfalt der Gesellschaft beizubehalten. Diese Haltung, bereits von Fachleuten und Intellektuellen anerkannt, bedeutet eine grundsätzliche Änderung der Philosophie den nationalen Minderheiten und den kleinen Nationen gegenüber. Die Bewahrung dieser Vielfalt im Staate – das ist eine der Hauptaufgaben der staatlichen Kulturpolitik (und der Politik überhaupt!). Die Politik hat viele Mittel (organisatorische, finanzielle) in der Hand. Ihre Anwendung hängt von der konkreten Situation im konkreten Lande ab. Sollte die nationale Minderheit nicht mehr imstande sein sich selbst als eine autonome Kultureinheit aufrechtzuerhalten, muss der Staat seine Bereitwilligkeit zur Hilfeleistung zum Ausdruck bringen, wenn es sich als nötig erweist, auch in der Form einer „positiven Diskriminierung”.

Welche Verfügungen haben Sie während Ihrer kulturpolitischen Tätigkeit zur Aufrechterhaltung der nationalen Minderheiten gefördert? Welche kulturpolitischen Aktionen wurden während Ihrer Amtszeit durchgeführt mit dem Ziel die Kultur der kleinen Nationen oder das Identitätsbewusstsein der nationalen Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen zu stärken?

Ich selber hatte nur die Möglichkeit als Berater des Staatspräsidenten an (Rundtisch-) Gesprächen teilzunehmen. Meine Erfahrung ist, dass die wichtigste Aufgabe der Minderheiten darin besteht selber die Forderungen und Wünsche zu formulieren und selber aktiv präsent zu sein. Die Wissenschaft (die Ethnographie, die Geschichtsschreibung, die Soziologie, die Psychologie, usw.) kann auch vieles zu diesem Thema beitragen. Es darf aber auf keinen Fall außer Acht gelassen werden, dass jede Minderheit als lebendige Einheit erhalten werden muss, sonst besteht die Bedrohung, dass aus der Minderheit eine Folkloregruppe wird.

Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach einen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen der Anwendung von kulturpolitischen Strategien bei großen, bzw. kleinen Nationen?

Ich bin der Meinung, dass die Empfindlichkeit und die Empathie gegenüber den nationalen Minderheiten bei kleinen Nationen viel größer sind als bei den Großen. Das Verhalten der großen Nationen gegenüber den nationalen Minderheiten ist sehr oft zu egozentristisch, und das Interesse an der kulturellen Erhaltung der Minderheiten wird somit an den Rand ihrer Kulturpolitik gedrängt.

Hat die politische Wende aus strategischer Sicht positiv auf die Aufrechterhaltung der kleinen Nationen eingewirkt?

Ganz entschieden ja. Es ist zwar richtig, dass auch die kommunistischen Regime hier und da den nationalen Minderheiten Aufmerksamkeit widmeten und öfters auch reichliche finanzielle Mittel zur Unterstützung bereitstellten. Für die Minderheiten (und das gilt nicht nur für die ethnische und nationale Minderheiten) ist es aber auf langer Sicht unerlässlich einen demokratischen Dialog und das, was wir eine demokratische Lebensweise nennen zu entwickeln. Jede Diktatur bedeutet eine Gefahr für die Minderheiten. In der Demokratie (und darunter verstehe ich nicht nur die demokratischen Institutionen, sondern auch eine Bereitschaft der Gesellschaft einen permanenten Dialog zu führen) aber bekommen auch die Minderheiten eine Chance sich an der Regelung der öffentlichen Angelegenheiten zu beteiligen.

In der Zeit der Integration der Verwaltungsgebiete kamen nach 1990 sehr oft Interessensgemeinschaften zwischen den ostmitteleuropäischen kleinen Nationen zustande. Worauf ist es Ihrer Meinung nach zurückzuführen, dass die kleinen Nationen der Regionen die zwischenstaatlichen Kontakte nicht verstärkt zur Bewahrung der kleinen Nationen nutzen, und daran anknüpfend nicht enger im Interesse der auf dem Gebiet der Nachbarstaaten lebenden Minderheiten zusammenarbeiten?

Das alles ist ja ein langer Prozess. Ich bin der Meinung, dass mit Bezug auf die regionale Zusammenarbeit es bereits Zeichen der Änderung gibt, und sogar Erfolge verbucht werden können. Um etwas mehr in diese Richtung tun zu können, muss man sich von langjährigen festgeschanzten Stereotypen und der nationalistischen Denk- und Betrachtungsweise (Dichotomie des „wir” und „die anderen”) lösen. Und das braucht Zeit.

Was halten Sie über die oben angesprochenen Themenbereiche hinaus wichtig für die Förderung der kleinen Nationen?

Um die Prozesse zu beschleunigen und positive Ergebnisse zu erzielen ist es meiner Meinung nach notwendig die vererbten, nationalistischen Denk- und Betrachtungsweisen zu bekämpfen unter dem Motto: „Nicht die nationale Homogenisierung, sonder die nationale Vielfalt ist unser Reichtum und unsere Zukunft” – in den einzelnen Staaten und auch in Europa. Das ist die Aufgabe des Staates (der Kulturpolitik), der Medien und der Intellektuellen in allen Ländern.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:111–125.

KEREKES, SÁNDOR

Environmental Protection in Hungary and Union Expectations

Domestic environmental policy as reflected by the Union requirements

Environmental protection is a Janus-faced chapter of our accession to the European Union. This area is characterised by positive features (small extent of per capita environmental burdening, good indices in the areas of the protection of nature and biodiversity, etc.) besides grave problems (wastewater treatment, urban air pollution, the lack of solution for waste management, etc.).

Differences are seen in the social assessment and support of environmental protection as well. In the developed countries demand for a neat and healthy environment became a basic need already in the 80s, and despite the change of the set of values the condition of the environment continues to be one of the most important components of the quality of life. The acceding countries are more characterised by economic and social problems such as the lagging behind of some regions and social strata, poverty becoming massive and unemployment, therefore environmental protection does not belong to the problems that are socially causing most anxiety. This difference by itself provokes some reservations in the citizens of the Member States towards the newly acceding ones.

The Essen White Paper of 1995, discussing conditions of accession laid emphasis on the “product related” (that is related to trade) tasks and to the creation of the conditions of adjustments in the area of environmental policy. This is logical, for the Member States of the EU are primarily interested in two issues of the environmental policy of the acceding countries: (1) their loose environmental policy should not mean a competitive advantage in the single market; (2) the East-Central European export goods should not endanger their citizens’ health.

A clean and healthy environment is one of the most important components of the citizens’ well-being and at the same time it is a precondition to economic growth. A good environmental policy for the present-day Hungary does not mean a pushing back and restriction of growth and consumption, but an economical and efficient handling of natural resources first and foremost. It can be achieved by the utilisation of the set of means of environmental protection, of economic incentives, legal regulation and the strength of social pressure groups that the economy may grow by a radically decreasing specific use of materials and energy and by an absolute decrease of the emission of the particularly dangerous variants of environmentally harmful substances. At present Hungary is at that stage of economic development that may result in a very rapid change of structure in the productive sphere, favourable in the sense of the environment as well. There is possibility primarily for the pushing back of the outdated technologies of the industry and their replacement by new, environmentally found ones, thus one may enjoy the environmental gift of economic modernisation. Prevention is the cheapest and best way of environmental protection. Environmental harms that are currently regarded as the gravest ones, representing immediate threat to human health, can be eliminated exclusively by modernisation. Therefore environmental strategy should not be treated separately but as an organic part of the programme of economic development.

Changes of adverse direction may be sensed in consumption and lifestyle concerning the environment. Such changes are primarily public transport squeezed to the background, a further expansion of road transport to the reduction of rail carriers, the growth of the per capita municipal solid waste and the use of energy by the population, all endangering the environment as a whole. Therefore it is important to have a comprehensive strategy for pushing back the adverse environmental effects of consumption and for spreading systems of environment-friendly, energy and water-saving and selective collection of wastes in the households.

A consistent assertion of the principles of sustainable development requires a coordinated and comprehensive strategy of economic development. It has to be promoted by the economic regulatory activities of the government. In this sense the tax system and other means of regulation have to serve the spread of material and energy-saving solutions in productive use as well as in terminal consumption and in the broadest possible employment. Incomes from taxation and social security should be ensured by a relative reduction of contributions related to employment. It does not mean cuts in personal income tax but the reduction of taxes and contributions related to income tax. An environment-friendly taxation taxes the consumption of exhaustible natural resources but it does not slow down the employment of labour.

The Hungarian economy (disregarding agriculture) generally pollutes the environment more than the economy of developed countries because of its relatively still backward structure and technical level¹. At the same time the volume of economic activities, per capita consumption and the level of motorisation is much lower in our country than in the developed industrial ones, therefore the situation is more favourable here in most cases of emission calculated per capita. This fact had to be particularly stressed during the accession talks.

The 1997 assessment of the EU Commission acknowledged our achievements in environmental legislation and stated that full equalisation can be accomplished in the medium term in the field of environmental law. On the other hand, according to the Commission’s opinion the observance of environmental requirements can be hoped for only by lasting and significant investments and administrative efforts in a series of areas (urban wastewater treatment, quality of drinking water, waste management and certain areas of air pollution), that can be solved in the “long”, or “very long run” for Hungary.

The initial difference between the opinion of the Commission and Hungarian experts was presumably explained by the fact that the condition of the environment projected by the answers of the Hungarian government was less favourable than reality in several dimensions. The examples quoted by the EU Commission originated from the unjustly negative and partly distorted self-assessment (condition of the soil, wastewater management, wastes, quality of air) to a large extent. The Hungarian answer, for instance, mentioned intensive agriculture, or the nitrogen and phosphor load of waters originating from agriculture as significant problems.

A similarly negative picture was drawn about waste production and management when we ourselves stated that the specific and absolute values of production and municipal solid wastes were equally high in international comparison. Data used for assessment were mostly distorted, because neither construction debris nor the decommissioned machinery is considered by waste cadastres made for environmental protection in international practice. International comparison calls attention to the unreliability and contradictory nature of our domestic data, in other words, the above statement would clearly require improvement. Therefore the domestic waste cadastre has to be improved, yet the problems of waste management still await solution.

Our lagging behind in the area of the implementation of laws and regulations is partly of the nature of thinking and partly of finances. The shortage of finances is primarily related to our low level of economic development. Domestic companies (or of domestic owners) do not have sufficient financial resources to the development of an environment-friendly technology, and the budget to adequately finance organisations and networks enforcing the observance of rules and norms. Often there is a mistaken decision of legal policy, the lack of intention, a postponed organisational transformation, or the lack of information that are behind the low level of implementation.

The conditions of accession affect the set of institutions in several respects. As it is commonly known, subsidies from the Cohesion and Structural Funds of the EU could be drawn primarily for regional development, agriculture and environmental protection. Though the scale of those Funds, and the size of subsidies that are to open up has been uncertain (more over, even the long-term existence of those Funds was uncertain) the system of subsidies for regional development and agriculture had to be made “EU-conform” by all means in order to become suited for those resources. Regional development has been an environmental and landscape-utilising question right from the outset and as far as agriculture is concerned subsidies are being increasingly related to eco-farming and to the preservation and development of biodiversity as the recent trends in EU suggest.

The introduction of subsidiarity, the principle of optimising the work of the different decision-making levels in the Hungarian practice also affects the set of institutions.

To the extent Hungarian answers to the Commission’s questions painted an unjustly negative picture about the condition of the environment, to the same extent an unjustly positive picture was suggested about the legal practice and the development of the set of institutions. The discrepancy found in the answers given to questions about the condition of the environment and of the set of institutions may be easily explained: for the expert staff of the Ministry of the Environment the condition of the environment is an external one influenced by other branches and “polluters”, whereas the creation and development of the set of institutions, including legal norms, is an internal task and competency of the Ministry. And it is natural that one is more critical about others’ work and more lenient about one’s own.

The negative picture painted about the condition of the environment provoked doubts of an economic nature in the officials of the EU: how could the development of the infrastructure and the environmental rehabilitation programmes be financed? A more favourable view projected about the set of institutions raises the issue of the efficiency of the institutional system: if the set of institutions is adequate then why is the condition of the environment so poor?

Based on the Guidelines it is clear that the condition of the environment should have been presented more accurately and the achievements in the area of the development of institutions should have been presented little more critically. Without it the doubts of the EU-bureaucracy may not be dispersed, because the EU has gone beyond the grade of development in the protection of the environment when the dogmas declared in legislation were regarded as achievements in themselves. Environmental safety is guaranteed by respecting norms and by enforcing them. If any condition is missing (social attitude, or money), environmental safety is out of the question. The most important message of the Guidelines is that there may be unsettled problems but there cannot be problems we do not know about and have no programme for their solution.

When discussing the specificities of environmental policy of accession, it should be stressed that the protection of the environment has been acquiring an increasingly important role in EU policy. Priority is accorded to the operation of the single market and currency in the EU. Compared to it the environment is only of secondary importance; the main task of environmental regulation, together with social provision and the protection of consumers is a disturbance-free operation of the single market. It is a key issue for Hungary that the environmental and health parameters of our products should not mean a technical obstacle in trade, for it may affect the competitiveness of companies and exports, the production of different goods and hence employment.

The environmental infrastructure (wastewater drainage and treatment, waste management) of Hungary is deficient as yet, and its building requires huge sums. In contrast the integration of environmental aims into the policy of branches is already on the agenda in the developed industrial countries, including the wide implementation of recycling and the development of the environmental management of companies. The EU Directives do not always consider the different condition of the environment and the possible burdening of environmental elements in the various countries. In a significant number of cases Hungary has to implement costly developments of environmental protection in certain aspects when the condition of its environment is better than in several developed West European countries. Obviously there are business considerations also behind these efforts: there are the intentions of West European companies wishing to acquire markets for their and of pipe technologies and the products of the environmental industry.

The development of environmental infrastructure is rather costly, it significantly burdens the budget and the benefits are only indirect, manifest in a better quality of the environment and in improving health status as their consequence. In the developed industrial countries on the other hand, environmental protection is realised on company level, the introduction of environmental taxes and other elements of environmental policy, though they mean a burden for the companies, at the same time they improve their competitiveness (by saving resources as well as enhancing the environment-friendly nature of products), hence they are accompanied by direct economic advantages, too.

Those tasks of environmental policy have come to the foreground with accession that would rather serve the mitigation of global and European, and less the local and domestic problems. (The natural gas programme, the rapid limitation of the carbon-dioxide and sulphur-dioxide emission of power plants, as well as programmes related to wastewater treatment served largely the regional aim of reducing cross-border pollution.) Environmental policy enjoys greater support in environmental problems directly affecting the quality of life of the population than in global issues, whereas EU accession has pushed the latter ones to the foreground.

After the 1997 assessment of the questionnaires filled in as part of our application for accession by the Commission it is worth surveying its 2000 assessment. It begins with the following sentence: “So far, only limited progress was achieved in this area.” The Report states that “Hungary did not address the short-term Accession Partnership priorities related to the alignment with the Integrated Prevention Control Directive, the safety standards for radiation protection and the enforcement of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive. However, a wide range of environmental laws are scheduled for the end of 2000.” (2000 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession, p. 66.)

Areas where, according to the Commission, further efforts were needed were: access to environmental information, orders of implementation of waste management, water quality standards, wastewater management, prevention and reduction of industrial pollution, noise emission by outdoor equipment of building industry and by household appliances. The administrative capacity was to be further strengthened, too.

The profession of environmental protection is inclined to explain the post-1997 slowing down of talks by the change of government in 1998 and organisational and personal problems within the Ministry of Environment. In our view the slowdown of talks was caused by a change of outlook in the EU. We succeeded in emerging from the low ebb of negotiations only by late 2001, when we closed the environmental chapter of the EU-talks with success.

The country report of the year 2001 of the Commission stated that: “Hungary has achieved a very high level of alignment with the environmental acquis. Previous delays in the ambitious transposition schedule were made up over the last year.” (2001 Regular Report on Hungary’s Progress towards Accession, p. 78.) The details of the Report discuss the need for the development of the set of environmental institutions and that of their supply with personnel. The Report does not justify sceptics who thought that our environmental situation could be one of the possible obstacles for our accession to the EU.

The state of our environment and changes of the environmental load

The state of Hungary’s natural environment may be regarded as mediocre in international comparison, and it is more or less more favourable than in the rest of the other East European countries. During the past fifteen years the set of conditions of domestic environmental policy experienced two breakages of trends. The first one was caused by economic recession and the subsequent structural change, and the second one by preparations for accession to the EU.

In Hungary economic recession following the 1990s primarily affected branches of heavy industry significantly polluting the environment, as a result of which significant improvement was reached in the so-called traditional forms of load on the environment (sulphur-dioxide, nitrogenous oxides, dust, heavy metals, etc.). The change of structure implemented in the Hungarian economy resulted in a favourable breakage of the earlier trend in the age, material and energy efficiency of the technology employed.

Structural change and the moderation of personal consumption that have set in since the change of the system, as well as a reduction in the energy consumption of the country have had a favourable influence on the environment². It was particularly the crisis of iron and aluminium metallurgy and heavy chemical industries that could be felt in the improvement of the quality of air, and facilitated meeting the requirements of some international agreements (primarily the first one on sulphur-dioxide).

The quantity of sulphur-dioxide emitted to the air was already reduced by almost 30% between 1986 and 1990 (Table 1), mostly because of restricting the use of coal. Sulphur-dioxide emission was further reduced by another 30% between 1990 and 1995, partly due to economic recession (emission of industry and agriculture), and partly as a result of the continuation of the natural gas programme (emission by the population). The favourable effect of the power station reconstructions began to be felt only during the past years (1999). Changes of the power-station emission of sulphur-dioxide were insignificant because of technological limitations between 1990 and 1999.

A similar change has taken place in respect of solid substance emission. The first radical decrease took place between 1985 and 1990 (from 491 kt./year to 205 kt./year), and subsequently a continuous improvement may be observed. Between 1990 and 1999 emission by the population was about halved (34.4 kt./year) as a consequence of the natural gas programme, but emission deriving from transport grew here too.

The annual changes of the emission of nitrogenous-oxides were characterised by a rapid fall between 1985 and 1992 (Table 2.), and a slow growth after 1992. The moderation of nitrogenous gas emission by industry and the population played a significant role in the rapid reduction up to 1992. Growth after that date is clearly related to the growth of emission by transport and power stations. As far as the nitrogenous-oxides are concerned, the “gift effects” of economic transformation can hardly be identified on the basis of the aggregate data, because nitrogenous-oxide emission grew more as a result of motorisation and the growth of electrical energy generation than its reduction was in the productive branches.

All in all, the emission data of nitrogenous-oxides may be regarded as favourable ones because the growth of output in the productive branches has been achieved with decreasing emission. Transport emission, however, is a cause to anxiety in so far as the result of the population-household ahead of road transport and of the deteriorating output of public transport result in the growth of nitrogenous-oxide emission.

There was no significant change in methane emission playing a significant role in greenhouse effect between 1985 and 1997. As a result of decreasing animal husbandry and coal mining methane emission was 100, and 42 kilotons less respectively in 1996 than in 1985. At the same time methane emission deriving from the transportation of natural gas grew by 85, and from municipal solid waste by 87 kilotons during the same period.

The EU has been making significant efforts to regulate the emission of carbon-dioxide, the most important gas of greenhouse effect. It may be considered an achievement that our international obligations are respected in this regard too. Carbon-dioxide emission was decreasing up to 1995, and began to grow again, parallel to economic upturn. The carbon-dioxide emission of the industrial branch mostly producing economic growth and showing a significant improvement of output has been evenly decreasing and the same applies to the carbon-dioxide emission of the population as well (Table 3). In the latter case it is clearly the growth of energy prices that encourage an economical behaviour.

Favourable changes are broken in this case too by a structural transformation of transport damaging environmental output. The growth of goods transport is taking place increasingly along the roads and its environmental consequences are alarming not only in view of the carbon-dioxide emission. Contradictory processes are taking place in the environmental impact in the transport branch: the reduction of the goods transport output and the improvement of the quality of fuels as a result of economic set-back and of pushing back economic activities utilising large volumes of material, whereas the surging ahead of motorisation and the decline of railway and public transport enhance environmental damages.

Prior to the change of the system and subsequently as well the most significant social and environmental conflicts were caused by dangerous wastes. (Table 4) In addition to real problems it is also the uncertainty of information and the “blessed activities of political adventurers” also contribute to the chaos experienced in that area.

Data of Table 4 are more suited to deter than to help elaborate some kind of environmental strategy. Accordingly the quantity of dangerous wastes hardly changed despite all efforts between 1993 and 1997, which is, of course, not true. The quantity of red sludge (the waste of the processing of bauxite), for instance, dropped to less than its third. The dangerous wastes of food processing industry were reduced by more than half. Here it is worth noting that a large part of it at least does not cause irreversible changes in the environment. The quantity of the really highly hazardous wastes of chemical transformation was one-sixth in 1997 of the quantity in 1993. And one should welcome the quantitative growth of municipal and institutional hazardous wastes because it means that hazardous wastes (batteries, dry batteries, paints, solvents, etc.) that had been earlier put into municipal wastes have been successfully collected separately in growing quantities.

The distortion of the aggregate data is caused by the radical growth of the quantity of mining wastes in 1996 and 1997. “Recently” it is power station flue-ash and mining dead rock that qualify as wastes of Class III danger (growth is found on the territory of a single county). This ‘item’, however, totally hides all those achievements that have been ‘accomplished’ in the prevention of the development of hazardous wastes. The inverted commas are justified because a large part of the achievements is due to the change of the economic structure, but the result of those efforts is also significant that have caused a radical increase of the cost of making wastes harmless in the productive sphere as well as the problems that have been provoked by administrative measures for the conversion of hazardous wastes into harmless substances and by social resistance. Aggregate data cover up these favourable trends and as a result we paint a more negative image than necessary not only about the condition of our environment but also of our industry in the wake of acceding to the EU. According to the National Plan for Waste Management³ the investment demand of the management of wastes produced by economic activity would be HUF 202.7 thousand million between 2001 and 2008. It means an annual average investment of HUF 30 thousand million in economic organisations. Experts estimate almost half of this huge amount that is HUF 86 thousand million to be spent on the establishment of a National Network for the Management of Dangerous Wastes.

As a result of the transformation of agriculture the fertilizer use per hectare dropped below 50 kilos, which is one-tenth of the fertilizer utilisation per hectare in Holland or Denmark. The use of other chemicals by agriculture, hence the environmental load originating from chemicals has radically dropped. The reduction of the volume of production as well as the solvency of big farms has pushed back the utilisation of fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture. The stock of animals has also been radically reduced; particularly pig-keeping that produces the most polluting liquid manure. On the other hand, the favourable environmental impact is partly damaged by the lack of control over the use of chemicals by small producers.

Environmental trends of transition: the two breakages of trends

In the early 90s the condition of our environment was much better than assumed by the makers of domestic environmental policy and by the environmental experts of the EU. As a result of a mistaken assessment of the situation the cost of catching up environmentally was overestimated by experts. Doubts emerged in the EU Member States regarding the financing of the cost of accession; Hungarian environmental policy wished to present results, when everything collapsed and it was revealed unexpectedly that the condition of the environment was better than hoped for, and no derogation was needed in that field, more over, the environmental cost of accession could even be found in domestic resources. Doubts emerged practically only about the success of the implementation of environmental policy and about the shortcomings of the set of institutions supposed to enforce implementation.

During the past ten years two breakages of trends could be experienced in the set of conditions of the Hungarian environmental policy.

1. The first breakage of trend was caused by the structural transformation of the Hungarian economy, as a result of which only a few units of heavy industries remained⁴. As a result of the structural change of the economy the specific utilisation of material and energy has also improved besides the productivity of labour. Harmful emission has been significantly reduced in its absolute and not only specific value.

The “environmental gift effect” of economic transformation may be summarised as follows:

– The ‘forced’ structural change of industry and of heavy industries first and foremost, as a result of which:

– The emission of sulphur-dioxide, dust, lead, carbon-dioxide, VOC and dangerous wastes has been reduced.

– The transformation of the ownership and production structure of agriculture and as a result the pushing back of intensive agricultural production (use of fertilizers and pesticides).

The improvement of environmental indices was mostly caused by the structural change of the economy, and the effect of environmental measures on the reduction of emission is insignificant. Unfortunately it is not only the environmental effect of environmental measures (catalyst programme, supporting the withdrawal of Trabant cars, etc.) that is negligible, but also their economic effectiveness is rather adverse. While structural change has unambiguously resulted in the spread of cleaner production processes that have a negative marginal cost for averting pollution, each of the environmentally targeted measures applied “end of pipe” solutions where the marginal cost for averting pollution is high.

2. The second breakage of trend was caused in environmental policy by preparations for accession to the EU and by a desire to meet the associated requirements. In keeping with the EU requirements the priorities of environmental protection were changed. Its most important signs are the following:

– We make efforts exceeding our level of development in the interest of meeting international obligations.

– Improvement is slower than it could be expected in the case of pollutions hazardous to health.

– There are no resources for averting diffuse pollutions.

– Forced building of infrastructure.

– Environmental developments mostly in the nature of “end of pipe”.

Hungarian environmental protection is not developing ‘organically’ but under ‘EU demand pressure’. In case of an organic development environmental policy would primarily strive to solve environmental problems affecting the population, and the solution of global problems and meeting obligations based on international agreements would be classified behind it. As a result of accession international obligations have been put to a place further ahead on the ranking list of other tasks to be solved. Accession to the EU has put them in the frontline, and this is one of the explanations of less social support accorded to environmental policy.

The two breakages of trends were accompanied by a number of advantageous consequences but resulted in imbalanced development. The framework Act on environmental protection, passed in 1995, and the emission limit values meet the EU requirements, but the set of institutions has had an uneven development. The necessary conditions to the operation of several institutions possessing decisive authorisation in environmental protection are missing. The self-governments of communities have several environmental authorisations to which they have inadequate personal or objective conditions. A problem difficult to solve is presumably not caused by eliminating the conspicuous shortcomings of the infrastructure in environmental policy but by the elimination of mistrust in the existing set of institutions. The adverse consequences of that mistrust are manifest most in waste management, and particularly in relation to the management of hazardous wastes. The development of the set of institutions in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity is more time-consuming than it was originally assumed by the time-span of EU-enlargement. No adequate attention was accorded to the development of the institutional system; therefore we could hardly cut from lags in this field.

In addition to the two breakages of trends mentioned above the Hungarian economy could target a third one too: namely an environmental policy representing a far more advanced level of care for the environment and its adequate implementation by environmental technology. We would have relatively better chances for it because the Hungarian economy is just beginning to have an upturn. There are good chances for doubling the size of the economy within 15 years. It is not indifferent, however, in what structure this doubling would take place. Unfortunately a rapid economic growth demands the development of such branches of industry first and foremost that function as accelerators, in other words, that have a growth-incentive effect spreading in rings. Such areas are, for instance, road construction and housing, or the development of vehicle industry. These industries, however, function as accelerators also in the direction of burdening the environment. In case we developed local supply systems by strengthening regionalisation along a more differentiated economic policy these local economies could produce a higher quality of life even with less growth.

As the end-of-pipe solutions are mostly the products of conventional environmental industry, the excessive development of this branch generates pressure of supply and may become an obstacle to the spread of cleaner production. It would be therefore feasible to suppress the developmental phase of a ‘recycling economy’ to the minimum, despite the fact that recycling industry also generates growth, but mostly to the detriment of environmental capital. It encourages growth in the short run, but it is of limiting effect in the longer run.

Trends of change of the condition of Hungarian environment after 2000

Hungary became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, and we have good chances to meet the requirements of the EU Directives within five or six years. In this context it should be remembered that even the EU Member States were accorded postponement for the often mentioned Directive for integrated prevention and control of pollution up to 2007. The Directive is being implemented by us too for new investments and the requirements can be met in the case of the already existing facilities up to 2007.

Interestingly several of our environmental indices demanded by EU membership would also improve. Under the impact of building sewages the gap of public utilities is becoming narrower, but the demand for building materials related to construction investments, the demand of those facilities of space and the ‘big industry’ nature of investments induce huge over-use of natural resources. The protection of the waters in layers could be solved differently too that would be more effective economically as well as environmentally. In case not only the environmental effects study would be done about these facilities under construction or planned but also the so-called ecological lifecycle analysis as well, and presumably we would have to look for other solutions. The situation is similar in the case of motorway construction, supported by several arguments of economic development, but by which we cut the natural eco-systems into ‘islands’ thus causing a further reduction of biodiversity. The demand of materials as well as the environmental balance of road traffic generated by the future motorways is unambiguously negative.

These developments significantly improve the indices monitored by EU officials. Building sewages and environmental investments related to motorways (noise walls, passages built for animals, etc.) increase the share of environmental expenses in the GDP. More over, a further spread of motorisation may have the same effect as the value of catalysts accounted for as an environmental cost. Currently domestic statistics is not yet registering these expenditures under the heading of environmental costs, but they are already regarded as such in the West, or in the Czech Republic.

Literature

1. Bándi, Gula: Az Európai Unió környezetvédelmi szabályozása. (Environmental Regulation of the European Union). KJK, Budapest, 1999.

2. Enyedi, György: Fenntartható fejlődés – Mit kell fenntartani? (Sustainable Development – What Is to Be Sustained?) Magyar Tudomány, 1994. 10. 1151–1160.

3. Fodor, István: Környezetvédelem és regionalitás Magyarországon. (Environmental Protection and Regionality in Hungary). Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest, Pécs, 2001. 488.

4. Hargitai, Árpádné – Izikné Hedri, Gabriella – Palánkai, Tibor: Európa zsebkönyv: Az Európai Unió és Magyarország. (Europe Pocketbook: The European Union and Hungary). Euration /etc./ 1995. 274.

5. Horváth, Gyula – Illés, Iván: Regionális fejlődés és politika – A gazdasági és szociális kohézió erősítésének feladatai Magyarországon az Európai Unióhoz való csatlakozás időszakában. (Regional Development and Policy – Tasks of Strengthening Economic and Social Cohesion in Hungary during the Period of Accession to the European Union) Európai Tükör, Műhelytanulmányok 16., ISM, Budapest, 1997.

6. Kiss, Károly: Az uniós csatlakozás környezetvédelmi feltételeinek hatásvizsgálata. (Impact Assessment of the Environmental Conditions of Accession to the Union) Gazdaság, vállalkozás, vezetés, 1999/1.

7. Magyarország környezeti mutatói (Environmental Indices of Hungary): KöM Környezeti Információs Tanulmányok. Szerk.: Szabó Elemér, Pomázi Sitván, Budapest, 2002.

8. Török, Ádám: Ipar- és versenypolitika az Európai Unióban és Magyarországon. (Industrial and Competition Policy in the European Union and in Hungary) Európai Tükör, Műhelytanulmányok 2. Budapest, 1997.

Notes

1

This statement covers extremes set far apart, because direct foreign investment usually represents the most advanced technical level.

2

From PJ 1316 of the year 1989 to 1043 PJ in 1994, and even after a new beginning of economic growth the 1998 value was only 1046 PJ.

3

See the homepage of the Ministry of Environment/Ministry of Environment and Water Management. The data quoted are taken from Table 11 of the Draft. The National Plan for Waste Management is far more modern than the earlier one criticised here as well, yet it did not succeed in fully breaking away from the early conditioning that assumes growth in almost every field. In my view, despite the extension of the sphere of waste collection, the stabilisation of emission may be expected in the field of dangerous wastes, but the actual reduction of the volume produced is even more probable.

4

In his paper Ádám Török (1997) quoted Dunaferr and Borsodchem as positive examples. Perhaps it is not accidental that these big firms have been making significant efforts in the interest of improving their environmental output as well right from the outset, the environmental management system of Borsodchem is testified according to the ISO 14 001, and the monitoring system of Dunaferr is exemplary.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:19–30.

INOTAI, ANDRÁS

The Hungarian Economy and Accession to the European Union

The success of economic modernization in Hungary as well as the gradual reduction of the backlog accumulated for decades (and to some extent for centuries) was very closely linked and depended greatly on West-European integration, as was very clear not only from the moment the system was changed, but it was evident already then for those who were preparing the economic reforms launched at the end of the sixties, but naturally then they were – consciously or not – hiding this fact. In the 1980’s getting involved in international monetary organizations seemed to be the possible way to go, while the institutionalization of the relations with the Community depended on the official contacts between the EC and the COMECON.

It is a long way out of “the cold”

The breakthrough came in the summer of 1988, and the well prepared Hungarian negotiating positions yielded their results in only two months: besides the legal recognition by the EC, we managed to sign the first trade and cooperation agreement. A funny twist in history was that practically without any effort, just following the Hungarian example, almost all of the Central and East European countries had a similar agreement within six months. Another one of such turns was that the accelerated speed of events threw almost everything into the waste bin in weeks, for which a highly qualified expert team had been preparing for 15 years. The PHARE programme, at the time developed exclusively for Hungary and Poland, was set up in May, 1989, and starting in 1990, a great number of our products could enter the West-European market duty free, or with significant duty allowances (using the GSP principle); in December, 1991 we could sign – accompanied by Poland and Czechoslovakia – the first (European) Association Agreement with Brussels, this time without any debate and counter-interests.

This Agreement was a milestone for many reasons. First of all, it determined the direction for Hungarian politics and economic policy for a decade since it defined the membership in the Union as the primary objective. Secondly, it made reference to the differences in opinion, for Brussels was not willing to commit itself to membership at a later date, even though the associated countries certainly considered the Agreement as the first indispensable step on the road leading to it.

Just as so many times in European history, the pan-European processes themselves, which started after 1989, seemed to help in solving this dilemma. The so called Copenhagen Criteria were drafted in June, 1993 which defined the general conditions for membership. The specific handling of the region became clear by this time in many aspects. On the one hand, the EU had never ever prepared any similar criteria before related to any of the countries which acceded to the Union (those were all set out in the Treaty of Rome, that is to be a European country and a democracy). On the other hand, one of the criteria specifically applied to the enlargement capacity of the EU, which no candidate country, even the most prepared ones, could influence at all. And thirdly, promises stayed at the general political level, without any schedule or road map, without setting any dates. This should have been the moment, at the latest, for everyone to realise that the EU had no idea whatsoever – except for political support – how to go about these relations with Eastern Europe, which they wished for and ideologically supported for decades, but which, after 1989, suddenly overwhelmed them, and most of all, there was no clear vision at all about the future of Europe, not only in terms of the “threatening” enlargement, but also in an environment of increasing global challenges.

However, the very fact that the Community had no clear vision and concept, and even more so the fact that it was very busy to implement objectives still defined in a divided Europe, goals which were mostly “inward-looking” (single market, monetary union, common currency), could not halt the dynamism breaking out from the new European realities. This process included extending to and ratifying the association agreements with practically all the countries, as much as the submission of the applications for membership (this too, was started by Hungary on 1 April, 1994), furthermore, the acceleration of economic and political transformation with all the tensions and social costs involved, and also the possible consequences of the civil war in Yugoslavia which was a deterrent to all. In December, 1995, they had to announce the expected date when the accession negotiations would start, and in the summer of 1997, the Commission finally presented its first strategic document on an enlarged Europe, naturally without a clear road map. Nevertheless, one thing became certain: accession talks with the first group of applicants who were considered to be mature enough – Hungary being one of these countries – could start in April, 1998. Later the „Luxembourg group” was joined by the „Helsinki group” in 2000, and this fact made it very clear that the EU had no political courage to separate these countries with very different levels and ways of preparedness, with different transformation experiences, with different competitiveness and social flexibility, and to implement a gradual, step-by-step enlargement in several groups. Though the Community Budget for 2000-2006 adopted in 1999 was building upon small group enlargements, as a matter of fact designated the year 2002 as a possible date for enlargement, already in 2000 it was clear that the political will opted for a different scenario. By this time the priority was not the correct and fair handling of the countries with different levels of preparedness and development, but rather the foremost priority for many countries was to prolong the enlargement process for as many years as possible. But this was not made possible by the inertia of the talks that were already under way, by the clear and firm direction the Swedish Presidency took, and last but not least by the recognition that delay might possibly incur serious economic and social-political costs. Thus for the first time the desirable date to close and finish the accession talks was set, and one could derive the possible date for actual accession from it, including the necessary ratification process in the 15 Member States of the European Union and in the European Parliament, as well as the referendum in the accession countries, except in Cyprus.

The historical significance of accession

1 May, 2004 was a historical date to all the accession countries, therefore for Hungary as well. It was not simply a return to Europe, from where we never really were separated in the geographical and cultural sense. It was much more about integration into the European value system, into the European institutional structure, it was about the dialogue, the behaviour standards, and last but not least, making Hungarian positions in the economic circulation of the Continent firm and stable. Most of all, however, it was a unique opportunity to enrich Europe, which, in the 21^st century, had to find its voice and place amongst growing global pressures, risks and opportunities, and promote its comparative advantages in the widest international competition.

But ever since we have known when we would become legally a Member State in the EU, that is since the beginning of 2003 at the latest, the most fundamental task was to define the requirements and comply with them, which were needed so that Hungary could become a successful Member State in the European Union in a short period of time. Success is measured in two ways: first, the majority of Hungarian society must feel in a very short time span that EU membership brings us tangible prosperity and accelerated catching up. This does not appear all the time in an immediate increase in our personal incomes, but it must be seen in the transformation of the environment, including the modernization investment projects visible to all, in the creation of new jobs, in social and economic security, in the enhancement of predictability, in the spreading of European values in Hungarian public life such as the will to compromise, to carry on a dialogue, to tolerance, to respect for the values of others, and above all, to working and acting together in determining, defending and promoting the interests of the country. We think it is a success if Hungary can pursue an active, future oriented policy promoting and enhancing European competitiveness, if she can advocate interests and make compromises in a European way, and if she does not see in such action the giving up and betrayal of the hardly definable “national interests”, but rather the defence of strategic interests. Learning Community behavioural patterns is vital, and so is understanding the interests of others (even if our own interests clash with those), and making strategic and tactic alliances. But all this is possibly only if the country has a clear strategic vision covering the present and future areas of Community policy. Working these out has been an urgent responsibility for years, and the backlog in this field is much more than in case of any economic area or institution building; this latter one – as a short term task for public administration and economic activities – has been in the limelight all the time as a measuring gauge for the level of development.

Hungary’s maturity for integration – an economic perspective

Ever since 1997, the European Commission’s annual country reports have been considering Hungary as one of the most prepared in the group of candidate countries. The first of the economic issues of the Copenhagen Criteria, the condition of having a “functioning market economy”, has been complied with from the beginning, and the second one, on competitiveness, we met a few years ago.

However, it is worth looking at integration maturity from different aspects as well. Such as, for example, (a) real economic processes, (b) comparison with the level of preparation of the neighbouring countries or other candidate countries (c) successful action in an enlarged Europe in connection with present and expected Community economic policy priorities, and finally (d) in connection with global competition requirements set against the European economy as a whole.

(a) As a result of nearly a decade and a half of “institutionalised” adaptation, the Hungarian economy is one of the most integrated economies of the EU as compared to the other accession countries as well as to the old Member States. 75 percent of Hungarian export is directed to the Community, and after Portugal and the Netherlands this is the largest intra-regional export proportion, and it is well above these indices of all the other countries acceding to the Union together with us. After accession this will go well over 80 percent since trade with countries acceding with us will become intra-regional, too. But more important than that is that Hungarian trade with the EU clearly bears the signs of the developed countries. Even if Hungarian production relies significantly on import (technology), it is evident that structurally our division of labour is more developed than in the other accession countries, mostly due to the market compliant privatization process and the early and tight cooperation with foreign capital. Nearly two thirds of Hungarian export to the Union is made up of modern, high or medium technology products (machines, facilities, electronic and telecommunication goods, vehicles, optical products, medication, etc.). This proportion is 55 percent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 45 percent in Slovenia, 35 percent in Poland, and under 20 percent in each of the Baltic States in their EU oriented export. Another important point is that nearly 10.000 euros are paid for one ton of Hungarian export to the most important industrial product market for Hungary, while for the same amount of export, the Slovenians and the Slovaks get less than 6000, the Czech hardly more than 4000, and the Polish less than 3000 euros. The above mentioned structural differences do not develop overnight, just as you cannot eliminate them overnight. Economic policy naturally has a great impact on comparative advantages, whether we look at foreign trade or the choice of international capital to settle, but the deep lying micro-economic differences will prevail for a long time either as an advantage or as a disadvantage. Economic policy has a determining role in preserving the advantages accumulated with a lot of effort and cost (for example indebtedness, social sacrifices) throughout the decades, and in turning them to “yield their fruits”. Hungary was not very successful in this in the past few years. We used to be the only potential candidate that could accede to the Union in a way that she could separate (to tear away) economic transformation burdens from the burdens of adopting as a new Member State. Hungary had all the opportunity for this in 1998, however, she could not turn it to her advantage, unfortunately. No comprehensive, future oriented reform was born even with stable macro-economic conditions and fast growth (but we managed to step back into the past, we “managed” to turn around or at least to question the reforms that had been started, to get stuck at the higher level of the first stage of cooperation with international money, etc.) On the contrary, a populist-patriotic economic policy was started (especially after 2000), whose basic objectives cannot be questioned, but the ways of implementation and timing were very questionable. It was evident that increase in wages was “part of” European Union membership, the more so because in the first years of the 1990’s a significant restructuring of incomes took place to the advantage of capital (and investments). Thus evidently there was a productivity reserve to increase consumer demand. It was also clear that the exchange rate policy typical after the 1995 economic successes needed to be changed and that the successful modernization path of the Hungarian economy was very well indicated, among others, by the gradual revaluation (appreciation) of the Hungarian Forint linked to an increasing productivity. Unfortunately, however, both steps fell victims of short term political power policies, with all the related consequences. The increase in wages (started by a one and a half fold increase in minimum wages, then followed by a warm welcome in the civil service sector) reduced Hungarian competitiveness significantly just at a time when our delayed neighbours opened their gates wide to international capital (direct foreign investment) and learning from their earlier similar experiences, started to implement a restrained wage policy. A huge revaluation of the Hungarian Forint occurred at the same time, which also increased the cost level in Hungarian economy. Nevertheless, both could have been compensated for since most of the micro-economy was prepared for this (except the national “entrepreneurs” supported by “patriotic economic policy”, most of whom remained uncompetitive exactly because of such economic policy) if the two steps had not been taken by the government(s) on power at the time simultaneously, and especially not when the European economic growth rate was dropping, or particularly stagnating. The strength of Hungarian micro-economy is indicated very well by the fact that in spite of a number of detrimental economic political steps, it has been gaining strength since around the middle of 2003, the production structure got re-valued and appreciated, and could enter the Union with good chances. Assuming, of course, that the monetary (anti-inflationary) and budgetary policies will be well coordinated in the coming period, and the desirable harmony will be found between growth opportunities and balance requirements.

(b) Some of the international surveys comparing the economies of those countries which acceded to the Union together with Hungary warn us that Hungary was not in the leading group. This categorization could be expected based on the economic policy followed in the past few years, however, the question is to what extent you can compare countries with different levels of structural development using the same criteria. Because the latter ones – assuming the necessary adjustments – could very quickly deny the above, or similar “judgements”. Such is, for example, the ability to attract international capital or direct foreign investment. It is only natural that Hungary cannot get as much “fresh”, or new direct foreign investment as the Czech Republic or Slovakia, where real privatization evolved with several years of delay. At the same time Hungarian statistics until 2004 did not include the most important investment source in our country, namely the re-investment of the profit produced in Hungary by international companies working here. (This question is not really important in Slovakia, for example, because they hardly have any profits from the newly launched investment projects.) The capital balance is very much influenced by the fact that Hungary – as compared to her level of economic development – switched very early to capital export, that is to say to the otherwise positive balance of incoming and outgoing capital is far not enough to cover the deficit of the current account, meaning that external indebtedness is growing.

As for the countries which had acceded to the Union earlier, all comparison is a mistake and “unhistorical”. First of all, the global and European environment in which we accede is totally different than that when Greece was actually “adopted” and Spain and Portugal became Member States. Community policy is much more wide-spread, the pressure to adapt is much stronger (see: single market, monetary union, etc.), and the globalisation impacts are felt much more. Nevertheless we could say that Hungary is much better prepared with regard to almost all the economic indices to accede and get integrated successfully into a much more developed integration than any of the South-European countries were in the eighties. There are facts supporting and proving this statement, such as free trade with the Union before membership, the extent of trade relations, the commodity structure of export, the level of privatization of the economy, the competitiveness of the micro sphere, and the depth and quality of cooperation with international capital. The South-European countries needed derogation in all these areas, and it took them a long time to ease the (relatively) closed nature of their economies, and a huge Community subsidy was given to their budgets to overcome these problems from the very first moment of their membership (which cannot be said of us at all). The truth is, however, that the big advantage of those countries – especially of Spain – was the practically untouched institutional structure still preserving the experiences of a colonization history, which was not knocked down and torn to pieces after the collapse of the Franco regime, on the contrary, it was renewed and thus built into the European Union decision making process, naturally making Spanish “national” (or rather strategic) interests prevail.

(c) But a successful economic performance in the enlarged Europe cannot be founded solely on the evident micro-economic advantages and on the competitive advantages resulting from the economic political adjustments implemented from the middle of 2003, which will hopefully materialise very soon.

First of all: the environment in which the Hungarian economy will act after membership will be shaped mostly by Community economic policies. A lot depends on how quickly and how comprehensively can those economies which have a determining impact on the future of the Community, renew themselves, that is to say what reforms will they be able to carry through (Germany, France, Italy). It would be nice if the positive shock of the enlargement could provide the minimum critical mass so necessary for such reforms, but it is also possible that contrary trends will gain momentum and support in the period after enlargement.

Second: one of the key issues of the sustainability of the modernization process is the budget of the Union, the amount and possible structure of use of the financial resources available to Hungary (and to the region). Unlike the financial resources defined for 2004-2006 based on the principle of “remnants”, which provided a total of 1.5 billion euros at net value to the Hungarian economy in the first, and always very critical years after accession, in 2007-2013 based on the recommendation of the Commission (February, 2004), Hungary could receive an amount over 3 billion euros a year, which, according to our calculations, seems to be enough for successful modernization. Assuming of course that these funds will support Hungarian development priorities, and Hungary will be prepared enough in all respects to absorb these funds quickly and efficiently. Well, in this regard we still have a lot to do in our own backyard. Yet it would be worthwhile to think about the EU using some of this Union money to cross border infrastructural developments because in May, 2004 – except for the two island countries – a geographically united, singe European region will be part of the Union. This kind of development strategy could significantly improve the efficiency of using such available funds, and it would also carry a positive political message towards the entire region (including countries which are neighbouring countries but which will accede later than us), and it would significantly stimulate domestic and international capital to come and settle in this region.

Third: in a number of areas the liberalization process of the internal market of the EU will accelerate just after enlargement (energy sector, railway transportation, perhaps fiscal policy). This will provide some advantages to the Hungarian economy in spite of the lower development and financing levels because we were stronger in our liberalization process in the past ten years than a number of West-European countries, and also partially based on the transformation experience we have had, we were more flexible in adapting to the new situations. But we can make good use of our potential advantages only if not only the economy, but also the entire society is prepared to absorb the new. That is to say if it does not start out of risks, possible losses and inexistent threats, but rather it makes efforts to hold on to the arising new opportunities, thinks and acts with a future oriented mentality.

Fourth: in the coming years we will have to live together with the fact that the West-European countries will open up their labour markets only gradually to the Hungarian labour force. But the Hungarian context is different in this than the Polish one for example. Hungary has the lowest official unemployment rate in the region (6 percent), labour force mobility is extremely low even within the country, which is rather a barrier to a quicker re-structuring. Besides, the free movement of labour has not only advantages, but also disadvantages, above all in the economies which are going through the most critical phases of modernization. On the whole, advantages outweigh disadvantages if – partially due to the restriction – direct foreign investment comes to Hungary and creates jobs here, instead of Hungarian labour leaving to find these investments. Therefore the consequences of the labour market restrictions in the coming years could be turned into a significant competitive edge with the right corresponding economic policy.

Fifth: we need a clear economic political road map in order to know when and with what kind of an economic competitiveness (and at what fixed exchange rate) can we join the monetary union. There are several views on this. Some people opt for joining as soon as possible (however, we do not comply with a number of basic economic requirements to do so), others support the gradual approach. On the one hand we need an economic policy that generates trust and confidence within the economic sphere towards the government and is clearly committed to compliance with the Maastricht Criteria (especially the reduction of the budgetary deficit and of the inflation rate). On the other hand, the instruments used to achieve the above objectives and the time span must not choke a healthy economic growth and permanent structural modernization. Working out a clear road map will enhance trust, but one must also consider that external factors may change the dates set by such road maps. The Hungarian road map could be influenced and changed by problems regarding the common currency of the Community (re-defining the requirements or interpreting them differently, problems of competitiveness among the Member States, the relationship between the euro and the dollar), or the euro related policies of the newly acceded countries (the demonstrational impacts of early or late joining of the euro-zone). In case of all scenarios and road maps, the implementation of an economic policy that promotes the quick and permanent increase in Hungarian competitiveness is imperative.

And finally sixth: the trade and capital relations with those countries that acceded to the Union together with Hungary will have a significant impact on Hungarian competitiveness and economic performance in the coming years. As of 1 May, 2004, all the trade barriers that we had been witnessing so often – the short term beneficiaries being the producers and the evident losers being the consumers – will be terminated once and for all within the frameworks of CEFTA. The dynamic development of regional trade will most probably follow from this. International and Central and East European capital movements will support it, too because a number of translational companies will transform their strategies as corresponds to the requirements of an enlarged Union. It is worth mentioning that the amount of working capital export of Hungarian companies (or those working in Hungary) was over 5.5 billion euros at the end of 2003, which is well over the “performance” of the other countries of the region in this field (the next in line Czech Republic and Slovenia Article are under 2 billion euros, each). One can also expect a significant interest in the site advantages for the head office in the new Member States coming from the smaller and medium size West-European companies. In the past, these companies decided not to have international production or services due to legal and institutional uncertainties, in the future, however, partially due to the wish to meet the challenges of increased global competition and partially because of the negative impact of the domestic environment on competition, probably will enter the markets of the new Member States in great numbers.

(d) It is a vital interest for Hungary to be a full fledged and active member in a globally competitive integration which is not lagging behind in international competition. Hungary can play this role in several areas better than a number of current Member States. True enough, our level of development measured in per capita GDP is at around 55-60 percent of the European Union average. Yet our growth rate is well above the Union average, and no income gap separates us from the less developed Member States. As a matter of fact, if we adjust the official Hungarian statistical data with the performance of the “grey economy” not included in statistics, and we add the EU funds that the Greek and the Portuguese for that matter enjoy every year, then most of the statistically significant difference will simply disappear in the next few years. More important that that, however, is the inclusion of longer term and sustainable economic development factors into all kinds of comparison. Taking the eight factors determining international competitiveness in the Lisbon Agenda (especially as compared to the US) into account we can state that Hungary – together with Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia – is better in a number of areas than the EU average, and is not one of the weakest economies of the EU. The above group of countries are better prepared for the future than the EU average in building an information technology based society, in providing the conditions for free enterprise, in telecommunication and in the modernization of their social services, and in most cases Hungary is among such countries. Therefore when judging the future it is more appropriate to take the above dynamic indices as starting points rather than sticking to the over-mentioned per capita GDP as a yardstick. This is the only way for the Hungarian economy to take an active part in promoting and enhancing European competitiveness, to oppose the closing of the European market against any competitors, and to actively contribute to such a reform of the European Union budget that can link solidarity and regional cohesion with technological renewal and with global enhancement of competitiveness.

Beyond the economy: some other conditions for successful membership

Actually, no country that had acceded to the European Union earlier was prepared fully for membership. They could not be prepared because adaptation in certain areas is a learning process that one cannot “simulate” from the outside. For these one would have to be full fledged member, above all in areas such as agriculture, or the use of European Union funds, but also participation in the decision making process. Furthermore, the changes in Community policy cannot be predicted and planned in all of their aspects, and one cannot always foresee and prepare for such changes. Naturally one can and must prepare to meet the requirements in a lot of aspects and make good use of the opportunities arising from membership. The Hungarian economy, save most of the uncompetitive tiny smallholders, could be considered as prepared at the micro-economic level, and will be able to perform as necessary using own efforts in the Union (a part of the small enterprises sector). The latest macro-economic steps certainly contribute and help for us to be successful members on the medium run. Union funds also help towards this, above all the much larger amounts than those of today to be transferred after 2007, assuming that the corresponding Hungarian absorption environment and users of such funds will be well established in the near future. The positive world economic competitive environment, as well as the implementation of urgent internal reforms in the Member States, which are so vital for the Hungarian economy, above all Germany, can also improve the conditions for successful integration.

However, successful economic integration has non-economic components to it, too.

First: the significance of the non-economic factors of competitiveness will clearly increase all over the world in the first decades of the 21^st century. This will be especially evident in two areas. On the one hand, the quality of public administration will become a determining success factor at all levels, not only at the central one, but also at regional and local administrative levels. On the other hand, the role of social flexibility, and even more of social cohesion will gain more value, especially in case of smaller countries. One hardly has any chance to survive on the world market with a fragmented, atomised or consciously split society, no matter if within or outside regional integration.

Second: successful integration into the Community decision making process and the increase in the Hungarian scope for action could be important preconditions for successful economic integration. However, a very patient, ready to compromise Hungarian policy is needed which takes the interests of others also into consideration. Hungary has two historical advantages regarding Community politics. First of all, the country was capable to prosper in history at times when she had a very narrow scope for action, and the job was to expand it step by step. The scope for action as provided by the Union based on the geographic-economic characteristics of the country could hardly be called wide. Hungary provides 2.2 percent of the population and more or less 1.2-1.3 percent of the GDP of the 25 strong Union. Yet she will have a more weighty role to play in the decision making process, for in the Council we will have a 4 percent representation, and in the European Parliament 3.3 percent with 24 MPs. And with the right kind of preparation and sense of multilateral diplomacy we could play an even larger role in shaping Community policies. The very fact that even though the Hungarian nation has been living closely together with other nations throughout the centuries and has developed in multi-national and multi-religious countries, nationalities and social communities with very different sets of values will be a special advantage as a Member State in the Union as well as in global competition. Assuming of course that our behaviour will not be determined by exclusion of others, on the contrary, by inclusion of all (just as in the other EU Member States).

Third: economic success is an indispensable condition for Hungary to have a clear and flexible Community strategy in all areas where some level of Community policy is present or will evolve in the future. This is the only possible way we can play and active role in shaping and participating in the Union decision making processes, and “divert” Union policies towards Hungarian interests. A regional interest harmonisation process could be an organic part of this – naturally depending on the willingness of the other accession countries as well. But the range of our strategic and tactical allies will reach well over the boundaries of the Central and East European region from the very beginning.

Fourth: the very foundation of every sustainable economic success is of course the preparedness of society to absorb changes. Successful Hungarian integration into the EU as a Member States cannot be imagined without a society feeling and experiencing this success. However, this feeling of success takes some time, a rather long time to come, and it is not at all only economic and welfare success in the narrower sense. For it to be felt we need to have a sincere and sensible dialogue with society from the very beginning. Naturally attention must be called to the pressures to adapt and to the costs, and above all to the tasks everyone has to fulfil in this changed and changing environment (most of these changes, such as prices, labour market structure, production structure, institution building, legal harmonisation are already behind the Hungarian economy). The new opportunities need to be emphasised which rise from the very membership, and which we could access only with a lot of difficulties, or not at all, without such membership. Only a target oriented, well mobilised society can achieve and actually feel the success in integration. A society talked out of action or paralysed and demobilised by the false and unilaterally demonstrated fears and threats can only be a loser in this process. Therefore it is our joint responsibility to prepare our society well and to carry on a continuous dialogue above all in the most critical first years of membership, when breakthrough success stories are not yet felt, but the burdens of adaptation are already present in a number of areas in the economy.

The manuscript is closed in April 2004

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 25:204–209.

ANDOR HORVÁTH

Stellvertreter des rumänischen Kultusministers, A. Pleşu (1990–92)

In wie weit betrachteten, bzw. betrachten Sie die Bewahrung der Minderheiten als Aufgabe der staatlichen Kulturpolitik, und welche Mittel standen, bzw. stehen Ihnen zu diesem Zweck zur Verfügung?

In den letzten fünfzehn Jahren des Ceausescu-Regimes war die Kulturpolitik in Rumänien bewusst und konsequent minderheitenfeindlich. Der offizielle Diskurs änderte sich kaum, aber die kulturpolitische Praxis war oft eindeutig diskriminierend, und setzte sich zum Ziel, die kulturelle Identität der Minderheiten zu schwächen und zurückzudrängen. Das soll aber auch hinzugefügt werden, dass die staatliche Politik im Allgemeinen kulturfeindlich war, wodurch die staatlichen Förderungen der Bildungsinstitutionen drastisch verringert wurden. Die kulturelle Öffentlichkeit wurde streng geprüft, und der schöpferischen Freiheit wurden enge Schranken gesetzt.

Demzufolge war das erste und wichtigste Ergebnis des Systemwechsels die Abschaffung der Verbote und Beschränkungen, die die Freiheit der Kultur behinderten. Andrei Pleşu, der erste Kultusminister nach der Wende in 1989 konnte mit gutem Gewissen sagen, dass sein Ministerium die Kultur nicht leiten will, sondern ihr Rückkehr zur freien Wirkung und Autonomie fördert. Die Botschaft dieser Aussage war natürlich nicht, dass das Ministerium untätig bleibt, sondern dass es nicht anweist und verlangt, wie früher, und die Macht nicht zentralisiert, sondern verteilt. Das Ministerium darf ihre Befugnisse nicht zum Schaden der Kultur missbrauchen. (Nach einer Weile wurde es natürlich auch den Leitern des Ministeriums klar, dass die Administration ohne Planung, Richtlinien und durchdachte Konzeption nicht funktionieren kann.) Das erste Gesetz zur Regelung der Arbeit des Ministeriums kam in diesem Geist zustande, und genehmigte solche kulturpolitische Prinzipien, die in Rumänien fast schon vergessen waren. Das Ministeriumsbudget wurde von der Regierung in 1990 wesentlich erhöht, was einen größeren Spielraum bedeutete. Die finanziellen Ressourcen des Ministeriums nahmen auch in den folgenden Jahren zu.

Das Ministerium setzte sich zum Ziel, die gleiche Behandlung der Mehrheits- und Minderheitskulturen im Prinzip festzulegen, und in der Praxis zu verwirklichen. Das widerspiegelte sich sowohl in dem strukturellen Aufbau des Ministeriums, als auch in der Arbeit der Komitatskanzleien. Die Delegierten der Minderheiten machten das Personal der neuen Minderheitsabteilungen aus. Es war ihre Aufgabe, die Initiativen (Aktionen, Institutionen und Programme) zu fördern, die den kleineren Minderheiten (Slowaken, Ukrainern, Türken, Tataren und Lipowanen) den ersten Schritt zur Durchsetzung ihrer kulturellen Identität bedeuteten.

Ich möchte durch ein Beispiel zeigen, was der Übergang aus einem System in ein Anderes damals bedeutete. Die Einlieferung der in Ungarn veröffentlichten Bücher wurde früher in einem Abkommen geregelt, wodurch die Auflage weit unter dem Anspruch der in Rumänien lebenden Ungaren lag. Etwas übertrieben könnte ich auch sagen, dass der ungarische Buchimport in den Jahren vor 1989 völlig zum Stillstand kam. Mit dem Verschwinden der Hindernisse wurde die Einlieferung von ungarischen Büchern frei, aber dieses Prinzip war einfacher zu verkündigen, als zu verwirklichen. Das Verhältnis der zwei Länder wurde nämlich so schlecht, und von so vielen Vorurteilen negativ beeinflusst, – denken wir nur an das sogenannte Trianon-Syndrom und die angebliche Revisionsvorhaben der Ungaren – dass ich als Beamte des Ministeriums monatelang dafür kämpfen musste, dass die ungarischen Buchlieferungen ohne Hindernisse ans Ziel gelangen. Im Prinzip ist es schon entschieden, dass es keine Zensur mehr gibt, und die Staatsgrenzen den Buchlieferungen keine Schränke setzen können. Um das in der Praxis verwirklichen zu können, muss jedoch die Mentalität der Menschen und Institutionen grundsätzlich geändert werden. Heute ist es schon selbstverständlich, aber nach dem Systemwechsel war es gar nicht der Fall.

Welche Verfügungen haben Sie während Ihrer kulturpolitischen Tätigkeit zur Aufrechterhaltung der nationalen Minderheiten gefördert? Welche kulturpolitischen Aktionen wurden während Ihrer Amtszeit durchgeführt mit dem Ziel die Kultur der kleinen Nationen oder das Identitätsbewusstsein der nationalen Minderheiten innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen zu stärken?

Während meiner Amtszeit in dem Ministerium (zwischen Januar 1990 und September 1992) waren zwei parallele Tendenzen zu beobachten: einerseits der Abbau und Umformulierung der geerbten Zentralisierungsmentalität der Vergangenheit, andererseits das Erwachen und Aktivierung der Zivilgesellschaft. Die Befreiung der Kunstinstitutionen von den Fesseln der staatlichen Zentralisierung erfolgte also – paradoxerweise – durch staatliche Mittel. Diese Mittel trugen dazu bei, dass die Kultur ihre neuerworbenen Möglichkeiten ausnutzen konnte.

Die Leitung der Kunstinstitutionen wurde zum Beispiel völlig verändert, was leicht zu verstehen ist, wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, dass wir meist inkompetente, moralisch kompromittierte Leiter geerbt hatten, die in dem früheren Regime contraselektiv ausgewählt wurden. Die Überprüfung und Reform der Normen, die in der Kultur festgelegt worden waren, war ein wichtiger Prozess. Neue Gesetze mussten gegeben werden und das früher versteinerte und schon überholte System wurde auf neuen Grundlagen gesetzt. Das Ministerium förderte das Zustandebringen von neuen Kunstinstitutionen, und unterstützte die zivile Gesellschaft in ihrer Strebung, selbst Institutionen zu schaffen – auch solche die zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen eine wichtige Rolle gespielt hatten, aber in dem kommunistischen Regime verboten wurden. Das Ministerium beipflichtete und unterstütze z.B. die Initiative der ungarischen Historiker in Siebenbürgen, das Museumsverein – eine wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft der ungarischen Gemeinde in Rumänien – wieder ins Leben zu rufen. Hunderte von Vereinen und Stiftungen kamen zu dieser Zeit zustande, und ein Teil davon nahm auch an der Dynamisierung der Minderheitenkulturen teil.

In diesen Jahren hatten die Kulturen der Mehrheitsnation und der Minderheitsnation dieselben Probleme, und fanden oft ähnliche Lösungen. Die neue Kulturpolitik behandelte die Erneuerung der internationalen Kontakte als eine wichtige Priorität, wollte eine Offenheit für Europa und die Nachbarländer zeigen, und neue zwischenstaatliche Abkommen ausarbeiten. In diesem Prozess kam der Gedanke auch zur Geltung, dass die Minderheiten ihre kulturellen Beziehungen mit dem Vaterland ausbauen sollen. Damit sind Verbote und Hindernisse verschwunden, die die Minderheitskulturen jahrzehntelang behindert hatten. Dadurch verbesserten sich auch die zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen Rumäniens mit ihren Partnern – neben Ungarn und Jugoslawien auch mit der Tschechoslowakei, Polen und der Türkei – die die positiven Veränderungen in Rumäniens Einstellung zu den Minderheiten erkannten.

Um die kulturpolitischen Prinzipien dieser Jahren kurz zu beschreiben, möchte ich besonders zwei Tendenzen hervorheben. Die eine ist die Strebung, sich wieder an den Strömungen, Bewegungen und Stilrichtungen der europäischen Kultur anzuschließen. Diese Verbindung verschwand in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten nicht ganz im Bereich der Literatur, Filmkunst, Musik oder der bildenden Künste, aber sie wurde begrenzt und verzerrt infolge der früheren dogmatischen Kulturpolitik. Die Kontakte mussten durch die Formulierung und Durchsetzung der Qualitätskriterien der Kunstwerke, bzw. durch die ausländische Verbreitung der rumänischen Kultur wiederhergestellt werden. Die alten und neuen Rumänischen Institute im Ausland dienten auch diesem Zweck.

Die zweite Tendenz – und das ist für die Kultur der Minderheiten von besonderer Bedeutung – setzt die Unterstützung und Bewahrung der authentischen Traditionen und Sitten zum Ziel. Die Pflege der traditionellen Kultur ist besonders wichtig für nationale Minderheiten, weil sie einer der bedeutendsten Garanten zur Bewahrung ihrer Identität ist. Es ist also gar nicht überraschend, dass die Volkstanzfestivale in den ersten Jahren nach dem Systemwechsel in Rumänien eine Renaissance erlebten, und die besten Tanzgruppen der Minderheiten oft in solchen Veranstaltungen auftraten.

Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach einen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen der Anwendung von kulturpolitischen Strategien bei großen, bzw. kleinen Nationen?

Große und kleine Nation – diese Begriffe sind überall benutzt, obwohl ihre Bedeutung bestreitbar und relativ ist. Wenn es große und kleine Nationen gibt, kann man auch über Nationen mittlerer Größe sprechen – die Rumänen halten sich, zum Beispiel, aufgrund der Bevölkerungszahl für so eine Nation. Was die Frage betrifft, sehe ich keinen bedeutenden Unterschied zwischen die Kulturpolitik von großen und kleinen Nationen. Beide haben die Zielsetzung, die Werte der nationalen Kultur zu bewahren, sie in der Welt bekannt zu machen, und dadurch der jeweiligen Nation Anerkennung zu gewinnen.

In der Praxis gibt es jedoch einen Unterschied zwischen diesen zwei Kategorien. Ein wichtiger Aspekt dieses Unterschieds ist die Tatsache, dass die größeren Nationen mehr Geld für die Verbreitung ihrer Kultur und die Bekanntmachung und Popularisierung ihrer kulturellen Werte verwenden können. Die Ausstrahlung und Anerkennung der englischen, französischen, italienischen, deutschen und spanischen Kultur ist dadurch viel größer, als die der schwedischen, portugiesischen oder ungarischen Kultur. Es ist aber auch wahr, dass sie nicht wegen ihrer Bevölkerungsgröße zu großen Kulturen zählen, sondern auch weil sie reicher an bedeutenden Künstlern und Werken sind – noch dazu benutzen sie eine Sprache, deren Anziehungskraft und Bekanntheit größer ist.

Zwei Ergänzungen möchte ich jedoch an dieser Stelle machen. Als Fundgrube geistiger Werte ist die Kultur gleichzeitig sehr selektiv und sehr demokratisch. Wenn Ungarn in dem 20. Jahrhundert nur Béla Bartók „aufzeigen” könnten, und Rumänien nur Brancusi hätte, wären sie als auch gleichwertige Partner für die anderen europäischen Kulturen – als Heimatländer zwei großartiger Künstler. Die nationalen Kulturen sind auf ein eigenartiges Ethos zurückzuführen, das seine eigene Werte schafft, und dadurch alle Nationen Europas zu gleichwertigen Partnern macht. Die zweite Ergänzung wäre, dass das Phänomen der Globalisierung die Unterschiede zwischen den Nationen Europas viel geringer und relativer macht. Ich bin überzeugt, dass die europäischen Länder in der Zukunft mehr Wert darauf legen werden, die kulturellen Werte anderer Nationen gegenseitig kennen zu lernen. Der gemeinsame Kulturmarkt wird genauso wichtig sein, wie die wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Vereinigung Europas. Der Schutz der nationalen Identitäten und die Bewahrung der gemeinsamen europäischen Werte sind eigentlich zwei Dimensionen der gleichen Strebung, und der europäische Geist, der diese Kulturen ins Leben gerufen hatte, soll hier wirklich zur Geltung kommen.

Hat die politische Wende aus strategischer Sicht positiv auf die Aufrechterhaltung der kleinen Nationen eingewirkt?

Die parlamentarische Demokratie ist günstiger für die menschliche Freiheit, den schöpferischen Geist, und die Kunst, als ein totalitäres System. In diesem Sinne hat der Systemwechsel eine positive Wirkung auf die Bewahrung der kulturellen Identität der kleineren Minderheiten. Als freie politische Gemeinden haben sie natürlich ein stärkeres Selbstbewusstsein und Identitätsgefühl, und können ihre eigene Geschichte erfolgreicher gestalten.

Andererseits sind in den Gesellschaften, die einen Systemwechsel durchgemacht haben, zwei Erscheinungen zu beobachten, die die Bewahrung der kulturellen Identität nicht begünstigen. Die eine ist die Marktwirtschaft, die andere das Phänomen der Massenkultur (die sich vor allem durch das Fernsehen verbreitet). Unabhängig von ihren wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen bedeutet die Marktwirtschaft eine Gefahr für die Kultur, sie unterstützt nämlich nicht die (künstlerische) Qualität, und strebt hauptsächlich nur finanziellen Profit an. Ihre negative Wirkung kann natürlich ausgeglichen werden, unseren Gesellschaften stehen aber dazu die nötigen Mittel nicht zur Verfügung. Was die zweite Erscheinung betrifft, veränderte die heutige Massenkultur die traditionelle Struktur der europäischen Gesellschaft grundsätzlich.

Die Kultur der europäischen Nationen hatte tausend Jahre lang zwei Grundpfeiler: die Volkskultur und die hohe Kultur (Literatur, Wissenschaft und Philosophie etc.), die beide in der Muttersprache gepflegt waren. In der westlichen Welt wurde die Zweite immer dominanter, im Osten ist jedoch diese Diskrepanz immer noch zu beobachten. Die Invasion der Massenkultur erschüttert jetzt alle beide, und bietet den Konsumenten eine „populär” genannte Kultur an, die mit ihrer eigenartigen Internationalität die Grenzen zwischen nationalen Kulturen abschafft. Die nationalen Kulturen werden natürlich auch unter diesen Umständen erhalten, aber es wäre schwer zu sagen, was die jetzige und die folgende Generationen daraus übernehmen, und als Erbe fortsetzen werden.

In der Zeit der Integration der Verwaltungsgebiete kamen nach 1990 sehr oft Interessensgemeinschaften zwischen den ostmitteleuropäischen kleinen Nationen zustande. Worauf ist es Ihrer Meinung nach zurückzuführen, dass die kleinen Nationen der Regionen die zwischenstaatlichen Kontakte nicht verstärkt zur Bewahrung der kleinen Nationen nutzen, und daran anknüpfend nicht enger im Interesse der auf dem Gebiet der Nachbarstaaten lebenden Minderheiten zusammenarbeiten?

Was die Beziehung zwischen Rumänien und Ungarn nach 1990 betrifft, muss es festgestellt werden, dass sowohl die Leitung der Ungarischen Demokratischen Verbund in Rumänien, als auch die Vertreter der ungarischen Zivilgesellschaft in Siebenbürgen, die politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit positiv beeinflussten. Eine der wahren Triebkräften der Zusammenarbeit der Nationen in dieser Region ist gerade die Existenz der nationalen Minderheiten (außer den Konflikten, die auf innere Spannungen zurückzuführen sind, wie z.B. in Jugoslawien). Ich bin der Meinung, dass die euro-atlantische Integration dieser Staaten auch zur Ausbildung dieser Tendenz beitrug, da ihre nationale Souveränität unter neuen Umständen versichert wurde, wodurch viele Sorgen und Vorurteile verschwunden sind. Diese Staaten führen in ihr politisches System und Rechtswesen ein gemeinsames europäisches Wertensystem ein, das auch in diese Richtung zeigt. Trotzdem bin ich der Meinung, dass die Staaten Ostmitteleuropas die Institutionen der politischen Zusammenarbeit noch nicht ausbauten, die zur Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen erforderlich wären. Die Voraussetzungen dieser Zusammenarbeit sind tief in den historischen Traditionen verankert.

Was halten Sie über die oben angesprochenen Themenbereiche hinaus wichtig für die Förderung der kleinen Nationen?

Was die kommenden Jahrzehnte anbelangt, die größte Herausforderung, die vor den Nationen Europas steht, ist die Idee der Solidarität in einem gemeinsamen Europa zu verwirklichen. Nach den Kriegen und politischen Spaltungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, können sich die Nationen nur durch die Vereinheitlichung Europas auf die großen, globalen Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts vorbereiten. Dazu ist viel Weisheit und ein starker politische Wille erforderlich – und der Dialog der Kulturen kann wesentlich zu diesem Prozess beitragen.