Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 27:57–64.

LÁSZLÓ SOMLYÓDY

The Danube, Water Management and Navigation¹

The Danube is the second largest river of Europe. It is the connecting link between Western Europe, Central Europe, Central Eastern Europe, South East Europe and the Balkans, or this is what one would like to believe. Everything in this region has a Janus-face. The Danube is a bridge but at the same time it is also a barrier, it is once a melting pot as often said at other times it is not. Thus the problem of the region is not simple at all.

The Danube flows along a territory of 800 thousand km², linking more than 80 million people and 13² countries (before the separation of Serbia and Montenegro). It is the most international river of huge catchment area, struggling against a number of problems and conflicts.

Problems and Opportunities

The past of the river is characterised by stability as well as by many unique features. In addition, the region has naturally undergone a lot of changes. Prior to the political change eight countries belonged to the Danube basin, by now their number has almost doubled: EU-15 countries, accession countries most of which now belong to the EU and non-accession countries. Due to the enlargement of the European Union the handling of the existing water management and environment issues has been undergoing continuous modification and co-operation has been naturally improving.

The level of development determined by the past is fundamentally influencing the management of the problems indicated above by each country and the formation of a somewhat integrated Danube basin strategy. This latter is one of the major tasks of the Danube River Protection Convention (DPRC). The unequal economic situation represents the main difficulty. In Germany, for instance, the per capita GDP is about thirty times as much as that of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Figure 1). As far as the development of the water infrastructure is concerned, Figure 2 shows the level of the development of drinking water supply and sewerage . If the columns showing the per capita GDP characteristic for the economic situation are placed next to this Figure, it becomes evident that the conspicuous problems appear in the south-eastern downstream territories, in the Balkans, precisely where the economy is backward.

If one wished to develop the region’s drinking water supply, drainage and sewage purification to the present level of Germany and Austria the necessary investment costs could be roughly estimated (Figure 3). If the investments were going to be realised in one year –– exclusively to indicate the dimensions –– then an irrationally high ratio of the annual GDP, 20––40% should be spent in Romania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, etc. If the annual investment is to be limited to 1% of the GDP that is the development is phased in time then its implementation, varying by countries, may take even several decades. If the total required cost is considered in all of these countries it would be approximating one fifty to hundred thousand million Euros suggesting also that a gigantic market has been unfolding for Hungary, too. Unfortunately, however, Hungary’s environmental industry hardly exists and competition is enormous among the Western companies of a long history, and for the time being nobody in Hungary is dealing with the issue of how and to what extent the future potentials could be exploited.

Conflicts and Problems

The central issue of the water quality of the Danube basin is constituted by high nutrient levels, nitrate contamination, the eutrophication of the river, the Danube delta and the Black Sea and the related ecological changes. The only possible means for control would be the significant reduction of nitrogen and phosphor load. Due to the current circumstances more than half of the emission comes from non-point sources mostly of agricultural origin. Its control is rather difficult: here the well-defined, end-of-pipe measures applied in sewage treatment cannot be applied, and rather the good practice of the agro-environmental management should be followed. Agriculture, however, of the particular countries has been undergoing enormous transformation. Since the changes of the European Union’s agricultural policy can hardly be foreseen the transitional countries along the Danube have difficulty in formulating a clear-cut strategy. Theoretically the possibility has been available to link the transition of agriculture with environmental management and present changes in the EU regulation try to handle this objective. It is one of the questions of the future whether practice is able to handle this task.

In the second half of the 1990s the countries along the Danube ratified the so-called Danube Convention (collaboration is going on under the auspices of the International Cooperation for the Protection of the Danube River, ICPDR), and as a result a much more promising international co-operation was established for the protection of the River Danube than the previous one. There has been a serious and comprehensive professional work in progress, one of the results of which is a recommendation to decrease the nutrient emission of the individual countries. The emission is the highest in Romania being the largest country of the Danube Basin. Figure 4 indicates the cost of eliminating one kilogram of nutrient (nitrogen and phosphorus). A wise man would design interventions where it is the cheapest. Where is it cheap? As it can be seen it is significantly cheaper in Romania than either in Austria or in Germany. Therefore trade with the rights to nutrient emission was proposed following the so-called bubble principle. This is a call on Germans and Austrians not to invest either in Germany or in Austria but rather in Romania and Bulgaria. The realisation of this principle would be a highly positive development from the aspect of environmental management.

Almost half of the worlds’ population lives in catchment areas belonging to at least two countries. Hence the rise of conflicts is inevitable concerning these catchment areas. All of us remember the cyanide pollution that occurred in January 2000. In Romania almost one hundred tons of cyanide got to the River Tisza via the River Szamos and from there on to the Danube. The ratio of the peak cyanide concentration was several hundred times higher than any international standard. The consequence of this pollution was that in the Hungarian reach of the Tisza one thousand tons of fish perished. What may be even more important is that zinc and copper also arrived together with other heavy metals which are inclined to sedimentation and accumulate in the sediment and in the flora and fauna. It is still not known what its long-term impact could be. This issue has not been settled legally despite the existing international and bilateral agreements which, unfortunately, have very weak enforcement power.

Due to tremendous developments in information technology, monitoring and remote sensing various means have been provided by which sophisticated strategies could be elaborated. For instance land use patterns can be obtained from the satellites irrespective of the location of the borders. Information is accessible about the vegetation and its changes, or about the alterations of precipitation pattern with the help of a radar. As contrasted to the empirical approaches of the past, the surface and subsurface runoff, soil moisture etc. can be computed on the basis of models and decision support systems (DSS) built on the morphological model and on the principles of mass and energy conservation. We can automatically generate on the computer the river system and the propagation of the flood waves induced by precipitation. Sub-basins can be optionally selected and changes of water levels and streamflow rates of flood events can be calculated, independently of whether we are considering a historical or a potential future event. Measures of sustainable flood control can be analyzed: adjusting dykes, increasing the carrying capacity of the floodplain, application of reservoirs and emergency reservoirs are mentioned here. These are major features of the DSS developed by us which has been used to re-think the flood control system of the Tisza River, the major tributary of the Danube, in itself an international river covering five countries.

In 2000 the European Union decided on the introduction of a uniform water strategy called Water Framework Directive (WFD). The main objective is to reach a good ecological state of the waters up to 2015. This is not a dream, the goal is achieved by the preparation and implementation of detailed river basin management plans including scheduling. Beside the ecological aspect the law has another important pillar, too, it is the principle of full cost recovery by the water users. It has never happened before that in the field of water resources management a unified strategy has been simultaneously implemented in any continent. The successful solution would imply an evident control of the transboundary pollutions, too. The challenge is enormous, particularly in the Danube basin where, as it was mentioned above, there are countries of highly different levels of development.

Navigation: Past, Present and Future

In general it is said that shipping on the river is cheap and environment friendly and this applies to the Danube, too. It is continuously added though, that it unfortunately represents a rather small capacity ratio only. I would also like to add that the trend is negative. This is proved by an EU survey analysed by the Central European University (CEU), too, which shows what the share of the different options within transportation is (Figures 5 and 6). The Figures show the aggregate data of the Central European countries in comparison to the EU-15 between 1990 and 2002. In 1990 road transportation was remarkably high within the EU. In contrast to it in Central Europe railway transportation was decisive, and navigation had a low proportion everywhere. Since then some ten years have passed and by now it is road transport that has become dominant in Central Europe, as well. No matter how environment friendly and cheap the transportation by water is, it is practically negligible. Transportation by rail and water has been decreasing all over Europe. The future, in all probability will be different from the present and the past, since other sources of transportation are being exhausted.

The disadvantage of shipping along the Danube is that it is slow and uncertain. There are three narrow stretches and cross-sections of the river; one of them is between Vienna and Budapest. A decade ago it was estimated that it would be necessary to invest nearly seventy thousand million HUF in order to make this segment navigable with higher safety. There is a similar narrow section also in Bavaria, and the third one is at the lower Danube. As the future is considered development options on the European scale are rather clear. It would seem obvious to develop Constanţa because of the congestion of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Hamburg and other large European harbours. Constanţa could not only be a gateway to the Black Sea but also to the Mediterranean. In addition Constanţa could become another gateway toward Russia and Asia, and towards Thessalonica by using railway transportation. In the last twenty years the economy of China has been showing an average annual growth of over 10%. The Danube could also represent a gateway toward this country of continental size with a dynamic development of its economy and trade. Hence the navigation of the future would be different from what it used to be in the past. In addition in all probability there is definitely going to be a change in the field of transportation methods: it would mean the linking and intelligent use of container, road and railway transport.

Navigation is also a test of concentration of forces and of cooperation. It is the test of whether this large and mixed region, the Danube region, the Balkans and Central Europe, the Balkan, Western Europe and the European Union are capable of intelligently co-operating or not. It has a lot of potential for Hungary which would be related to logistics, transportation, tourism, and to the potential of becoming a regional centre. From the point of view of the countries in the Danube basin and the Balkans the enlarging European Union is going to be a key factor. Globalisation –– whether we like it or not –– is going to play an extremely important role. Whether the Danube will become a melting pot is to be seen. Whether it is to be a corridor, or the artery of Europe, as many people call it, is also a question for the future. But the river once seen as blue currently is by all means a repository of yet unexplored opportunities.

1

The present chapter is a short summary of a presentation of the author held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. For details the reader is referred to Somlyódy, L. (2002) Water in the Danube Basin: An Overview, In: Wilderer, P. A., Huba, B. and Kötzle, T., eds. Water in Europe. The Danube River: Life Line in Greater Europe. Annals of the European Sciences and Arts. Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim.

2

Small territories of 5 additional countries also belong to the Danube Basin.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 27:81–94.

JÁNOS RECHNITZER

The Balkan Space within the European Regional Policy

The need to eliminate regional differences together with reinforcing the Community’s internal cohesion have been present among the basic principles of the European Community since its formation and are still present today to an even greater extent. Regional policy and its related system of tools and institutions is a prioritised dimension of Community policy. A whole series of analyses examined the shaping of this policy, parallel with taking the effects and consequences of the spatial expansion of the Community into consideration, and the arguments and the results of evaluations have been published in policy documents.

The European Spatial Structure

Analyses of the European spatial structure as a whole appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. Their aim was to demonstrate the characteristics of spatial development within the Community; to highlight, to bring to light regional differences and at the same time to define those directions of development upon which emphasis must be placed in the course of planning periods.

The French Spatial Development Centre, DATAR, was the first to examine the Geographical Features of the European Community, and described those regions where the economic activities were essentially concentrated.¹ It has become increasingly clear that Europe’s traditional centre may be found within the Paris-London-Amsterdam triangle to which the Ruhr area may be added and it may be called the ’blue banana’. Naturally, there are differences in development in this zone, too, which may be regarded as uniform. After World War II, besides the big urban economic agglomerations of the northern zone the Munich-Stuttgart-Milan triangle evolved which – like a new centre of gravity – comprised the modern branches of industry, primarily car manufacturing and the electronics industries. The ’north of the south’, or the ’European sunbelt-area’ belongs to this zone as a new focal point of development which contains precisely the previously underdeveloped regions of the South European countries next to the Mediterranean Sea, expanding westward from the richer region of North Italy. It is penetrating ever deeper into the southern regions of France, reaching Barcelona and oriented towards Valencia. The ’sunbelt-area’ is based on the service sector, but the high tech branches of industry and the areas of small- and medium-sized enterprises based on quality work can also be found here, namely the belt of developing towns and cities of the ’third Italy’.

Within the European regional structure further centres and development areas are linked to the ’blue banana’. Thus, Paris and its Ile-de-France region, and Lyon expanding in a western direction, while the eastern expansion of Hamburg, Berlin and Vienna created economic agglomerations, a several hundred kilometres wide halo, which basically consists of new growth zones induced by means of development centres.

We may consider the ’blue banana’ and its induced development zone, and the ’European sunbelt’, with Venice, Marseilles and Bordeaux in the south and Copenhagen and Glasgow in the north as parts of a ring regarded as the European high tech area. It is in these large urban economic agglomerations having cheap and trained labour force, R&D background and putting-out systems where the green-field investments of big Japanese, American and West European companies were established.

Neither Central nor Southeast Europe appears in the first significant model of European spatial structure. As such, European regional organisation and planning was only considered within the European Community, although some connecting points may be discovered. They may be interpreted in terms of individual cities, such as Prague and Vienna, thus the planners hint at a Europe that had and still exists outside the Community, too. These concepts have no bearing on the Balkan region and no mention is made of it.

Spatial thinking has also expanded with the broadening of the European Union (with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1994), with the acceleration of changes in Eastern Europe and with preparation for the planning period (1994–1999); its context has gone beyond the borders of the then Member States and has given more spectacular signals of a future system of co-operation. Trans-national co-operations already appeared in the Union within the 1994–1999 planning period, the foundations of which were marked by a ’Community initiative’, the Interreg programme in the previous planning period of 1990–1993. It became clear that the borders posed an obstacle to the Community’s economic co-operation, and that along the individual country borders significant differences were to be observed in the state of economic development, in infrastructure, in institutional relations, but in a number of cases they could be connected and supplemented by one another, and that could give impetus to the development of connected yet separate regions. The cross-border co-operations, like the Interreg II A programme, were connected to the PHARE programme decided upon by the 1993 Copenhagen summit aimed at fostering the integration of the Central-East European countries, as it was decided to be financed by the member countries. Within the framework of the Interreg II the sub-programme “C” was launched in 1996, which was directed towards elaborating partly planning and partly development solutions for co-operation at trans-national level to help solve the common problems of co-operation of those countries and regions as a whole. The Interreg II C programme signified a breakthrough since it was not only thinking in terms of the Union, but involved candidate countries, too, in the shaping of major European spaces, more over, it even reckoned with countries and regions, and particularly their participation that were not considered for the next phase of enlargement. Within the framework of this programme the border involving the European Union and the neighbouring countries and regions that may be regarded as the space of the development programmes in the next planning period was defined (Figure 1).

With regard to the Balkan region, the announcement of the Interreg II C programme meant the first real breakthrough since the new countries that had come into existence now received an opportunity to join the common European spatial organisation and could start to get acquainted with its set of institutions.

The CADSES Space and Programme

In 1997, upon the initiative of Austria and Germany, the planning of a kind of greater spatial co-operation system commenced. The programme embraced the Central European, Adriatic, Danube and South-Eastern European states, hence the name referred to hereinafter as CADSES (Central Adriatic Danubian South-Eastern European Space). To start with there were four Union Member States (Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece) in the greater region comprising 18 countries and their almost 200 million people and 15 ethnic groups. Yet, nowadays, during the second phase of the programme (2000–2006) it has already expanded with the accession of further five Member States (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia) and now all the Balkan countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Romania) as well as Ukraine also belong to the programme.

It is shown by Table 1 that almost every country has joined the programme with its entire area, whereas Germany and Italy are only present with their southern and eastern territories, i.e. bordering on the Adriatic Sea, or areas forming some kind of lasting connection with the region, in addition to Ukraine where only the districts along the border are represented in the co-operation.

The ’first initiative’ pertaining to the space, as it was already indicated, was launched in 1997 and concluded in 1999. Essentially it was aimed at performing a thorough greater spatial exploration searching for the potential dimensions of co-operations, in addition to determining the political principles for the future developmental connections.

It was during this exploratory phase when the document entitled Vision Planet as the Strategies of Spatial Planning for the CADSES area² appeared. The analysis evaluates in detail the conditions of the space and systematises the most important problem areas, i.e. increasing regional inequality, transformation in the urban-rural relations, peripheral regions, diversification within the economic structure, accessibility to information and knowledge. Special mention was made of the characteristics of urban development, such as its network nature, the transformation of inner city areas, and urban housing situation. It deals with the characteristics of rural areas, the transport and communication situation, with environmental factors, and with the natural and cultural heritage. Finally, it outlines the institutional framework for spatial development, the potential tools and measures to promote spatial integration.

The analysis prepared with the involvement and experts of the 12 countries was suitable to constitute the basis of the elaboration of the Interreg III B programme relating the Community initiative for the Central Adriatic Danubian South-Eastern European Space (CADSES) 2000–2006, which was approved at the end of 2001.

The development programme accepted by the European Commission sets out from the following fundamental principles of integration within the CADSES region:

– To reduce the different conceptions of spatial policy to a common denominator

– To create the basic principles necessary for shaping the regulations and principles of spatial planning accepted by everyone

– The creation of the most dynamic conditions possible in the interest of ensuring sustainable growth

– The protection of natural heritage and prevention of hazardous effects including flood control and protection against natural disasters

– Surveying the cultural and historical heritage, together with moulding a common system of regulation and its implementation as a strategic element in the field of economic development.

Accordingly the programme defined the following priorities of development and co-operation:

1. The promotion of different spatial development concepts and actions in the spirit of strengthening socio-economic cohesion:

– Supporting strategies and activities that may be realised jointly

– Shaping the development of urban regions, and the development of urban networks and co-operations

– Shaping the development of rural regions

– Analysis of the spatial effects of immigration.

2. Supporting an efficient and sustainable transport network, along with access to the achievements of the information society:

– Development of an efficient transport network in the spirit of sustainable growth

– Improvement of access to knowledge and the achievements of the information society.

3. Supporting landscape conservation, in addition to the protection and proper management of the natural and cultural heritage:

– Protection and development of the cultural heritage

– Protection and development of the natural heritage

– Protection and development of the natural landscape.

4. Environmental protection, resources management and risk management:

– Environmental protection and supporting a proper management of resources

– Supporting risk management and disaster prevention

– Supporting integrated water management and flood control.

A specific feature of the CADSES II programme is that every country is delegated – irrespective of whether they are of a Member State – to participate with full member rights. Efforts should be made to the greatest possible integration of programmes financed by the European Union and implemented in the region such as TACIS, PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, TINA and CARDS, but exclusively in accordance with the given conditions.

Special mention should be made of the CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programme, which is giving assistance to reconstruction, development and stabilisation, based on the Stability Pact pertaining to the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

The Stability Pact is an initiative of the European Community, the aim of which is strengthening the stability and economic development of regions, in addition to outlining the attainable EU membership in the further future. Three working groups were made responsible for the realisation of the Pact signed on 10 June 1999 in Cologne. The tasks of working group two (transformation of the economic structure, economic development and co-operation) are linked closest to the aims of the CADSES Interreg III B programme. The most important themes for this working group comprised regional infrastructure, private-sector development, inter-regional trade, vocational education and training, human resource development and environmental protection.

The World Bank drew up a regional development strategy for the geographical areas affected by the Stability Pact in relation to the above issues. The conference on the subject of regional assistance held in Brussels in March 2000 achieved significant results with regard to the realisation of the infrastructural development projects, in so far as it accepted a development package comprising 208 separate projects with a total value of 384 million Euros. In addition mention should be made of the support to be granted by the EU in the future in various forms and programmes to the Southeast European countries participating in CADSES, primary amongst which are the CARDS subsidies.

On 5 December 2000 the Council of the European Union passed its decree 2066/2000/EC, relating to the provision of support for Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia and Macedonia, by which CARDS was brought into being, as a new professional and financial instrument for the countries of the Stability Pact and of the associated countries.

CARDS support may be utilised for the following purposes:

– Supporting reconstruction, returning home of refugees and the dislocated, in addition to regional stabilisation

– Development of the institutional and legal framework strengthening the democratic setup, the rule of law as well as human and minority rights

– The creation and strengthening of the civil society, ensuring the independence of the media

– Strengthening the legal framework and measures for the struggle against organised crime

– Social measures, with particular regard to reducing poverty; ensuring the equality of opportunity for men and women; education, training and teaching, in addition to the rehabilitation of the environment

– Developing closer relations among the beneficiary countries, between the beneficiary countries and the European Union, as well as between the beneficiary countries and the EU candidate countries in harmony with the trans-national and regional co-operation programmes with the participation of non-candidate countries along borders

– Strengthening regional, trans-national, cross-border and inter-regional co-operations among beneficiary countries, between the beneficiary countries and the European Union, as well as between beneficiary countries and other countries in the region.

CARDS support, which belongs to the competency of the External Relations Directorate-General of the European Commission, became available once every single country prepared a strategic framework plan for the period between 2000 and 2006, in addition to a several years’ indicative programme and annual action programmes. The European Commission and different organisations of the beneficiary country jointly created projects on the basis of the programme documents.

When decisions are made regarding the programmes and financial support for the Southeast European countries and regions participating in CADSES, the Stability Pact of the Southeast European countries has to be kept in view by all means, as well as CARDS support and other financial instruments and programmes that are to be created and launched for the development of the Southeast European space in the future.

Figure 2 presents the results of the CADSES II programme accomplished this far, where it is indicated at settlement level what kind of activity has been experienced up to 1 August 2005 within the initiative of the programmes³.

The capital cities and regional centres played the most significant role in the initiation and reception of the programmes. Among them the Balkan region did not demonstrate outstanding values; there, too, the capital cities (Sofia, Bucharest, Zagreb, Belgrade, Tirana and Skopje) distinguished themselves with considerable activity.

Figure 3 shows the participation and activity of the Balkan countries, with participation systematised according to the individual priorities. They welcomed the first priority, namely regional development co-operation, including actions relating to the development of urban networks and rural development, with great activity, especially in Romania and Bulgaria pending accession, as well as in Croatia having gained associate membership. It is interesting that in a number of countries initiatives to protect the landscape and preserve the natural and cultural heritage have taken precedence over projects directed towards developing the transport network and the development of the information society. Similarly, it was rather in countries waiting for accession where projects for environmental protection were prominent. Participation in the CADSES II programme slowly getting in motion was conspicuous in those Balkan countries where the set of institutions for spatial development had already been developed due to the accession, where its central governing apparatus was already in place, and the decentralised organisations had emerged at some level in regional or territorial dimension. Thus presumably they possessed regional-level development concepts and could adjust the initiatives of the CADSES programme, and, naturally, regional management was operational, capable of functioning as a framework receiving support.

It is appropriate to review the direction that the project level co-operations have taken, i.e. how the Balkan region participates in the projects initiated by individual countries (Tables 2 and 3). Up to the end of the examined period (1 August 2005) Italy demonstrated the greatest activity in the 73 registered projects (80.8%), followed by Austria (64.3%), Germany (57.5%), Greece (54.7%); among the newly acceded ones Hungary’s activity stood at 42.4%, followed by Romania (34.2%) and Slovenia (34.2%), next the Czech Republic (32.8%), the associate member Croatia (30.1%) and Bulgaria awaiting accession (26.1%). Project activity among the remaining Balkan countries was extremely low with only Albania (12.3%) and Serbia and Montenegro (10.9%) worth mentioning, the others only being present in a few projects.⁴

The CADSES programme Managing Authority and Paying Authority is located in Rome (Ministry of Infrastructures); the Joint Secretariat with the task of implementing the operational programmes is in Dresden. The work of the Joint Technical Secretariat is assisted in the interest of the successful realisation of the programme by CADSES Contact Points (CCPs) located in the partner countries. The Hungarian CCP operates within the framework of the Interreg Directorate of the VÁTI Kht. organisation. The programme’s Steering and Monitoring Committees consist of members delegated by the partner countries. The duties of the programme President are performed within a rotation system by each individual partner country on a six-month basis.

Up to 2004 the Structural Funds lost close to € 12 million on the basis of the n+2 regulation, as a consequence of the slow and inefficient implementation of the CADSES programme operated with the participation of four ’old’ EU Member States. The European Commission and the majority of the Member States first and foremost attributed the losses to the bad operation of the management organisations at programme level (the Italian Managing Authority, as well as Joint Secretariat in Germany). The real root cause of the problem, however, may be traced back primarily to the programming phase. As a result of the ’political’ and institutional compromise a complex and not clearly defined management system was formed and the programme was launched with considerable delay.

In contrast to the plans, the Italian Central Monitoring System of the Structural Fund did not succeed either in meeting the special standpoints of the CADSES programme; therefore the programme has no really operating monitoring and information system. The physical and institutional division of the Managing Authority and the Joint Technical Secretariat causes serious coordination problems. Likewise, the Member States’ national authentication system does not work smoothly either, in many cases partly due to the contradictory national regulations and practices and partly due to the inadequate programme-level coordination.

Preparations have begun for the 2007–2013 programming period. Experience to date demonstrates that the current CADSES space is too big, with relatively one-way relations, as indicated above, between member countries. Thus the idea was born according to which the CADSES space would break up into two in the following structure:

1. Central European programme space: the eastern provinces of Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, the northern provinces of Italy, and one county of the Ukraine.

2. South-Eastern European programme space: Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, the northern and eastern provinces of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Albania, and Macedonia.

Possibilities for Hungary’s Participation

Hungary’s role could in the future significantly increase in the European regional policy related to the Balkan region. It is clear that the country has strong cultural and historical links with the Balkan countries that may offer a favourable basis to undertaking a greater role. At the same time regional development co-operations are already in operation along the borders, partly within the framework of the extended PHARE programme, and partly in bilateral relations. The Ukraine Neighbourhood Programme; the Hungary-Romania, Hungary-Serbia and Montenegro Cross-border Co-operation Programme, and the Slovenia-Hungary-Croatia Neighbourhood Programme are all in operation although without significant resources. The programmes offer a potential framework for spatial development co-operations; they are directed towards the development of transport connections, environmental protection, as well as regional planning, which means the harmonisation of development concepts and the consideration of future opportunities.

The cross-border co-operation programmes fit well into the network of Euro-regions, which already covers the full length of the Hungarian border. The Euro-regions are such multi-regional co-operation systems that attempt to coordinate the development of cross-border regions along a broad scale within institutional frameworks, decisively in the dimension of the state territorial organisations. These Euro-regions operate with variable intensity, since the countries are different, and there is a diversity of the significance, competency and methods of financing of the individual medium-level territorial units, but the activity, contacting and maintaining capabilities of the political actors are also different. It may be verified just on the basis of 15 years of Austrian-Hungarian cross-border co-operations that an extremely large quantity of experience, developmental idea and their implementation can be passed on in these co-operations. A veritable repository of regional development experiences may be shared, and as a consequence of the system of institutions and instruments operating for close to ten years Hungary can offer these to its neighbouring countries and through them to the whole Balkan space.

The National Spatial Development Conception (2005) has included into its future directions of development co-operation on the level of the Carpathian Basin, an element of which is the development of cross-border connections and the other dimension is real participation in multiregional and trans-national co-operations.

Hungary is present in both of the split CADSES spaces, thus the Central European system of relations may be strengthened, but, according to the plans, we would be present in the South-Eastern Europe programme, too. It was even suggested, that one of the centres of the practical organisation of the programme of the latter greater region shall be located in our country.

Therefore the conditions are given that in the next planning period Hungary may acquire one of the leading positions – Austria is tendering for the other – of the CADSES space expected to be split. It would mean that the role of Hungarian experts would be enhanced in the organisation, implementation and control of the programmes to be evolved, and the country may be the location for collecting and processing all information that would systematise future development and co-operation activities pertaining in the region. Furthermore, opportunities for the Hungarian development institutions, including regional and local self-governments, civil organisations, as well as economic enterprises, and not in the last research and analytical institutions will also increase for getting acquainted with the Balkan region and also to asserting Hungarian presence, as well as influence in certain respects.

Notes

1

Prospective et Territoires. DATAR, Paris, 1991.

2

Strategy of Integrated Spatial Development of the Central European, Danube and Adriatic Regions (A közép-európai, a Duna menti és az adriai térség integrált területfejlesztési stratégiája) Policy Option Paper. Tér és Társadalom. 1999. 1–2. 195–251.

3

F. Dosch, W. Görmar, V. Hachmann, A. Müller, N. Schafer: Transnationale Zusammenarbeit zur Raumentwicklung - Fünf Programme auf dem Weg. Ein vergleichender Überblick. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 2005. 11–12. 657–674 (Transnational Co-operation in Spatial Development – Five Programmes on the Way. A Comparative Overview. Information on Spatial Development); Wer kooperiert mit wem in transnationalen Projekten? Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 2005. 11–12. 675–681 (Who is co-operating with whom in trans-national projects? Information on Spatial Development).

4

Görmar: op.cit.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 27:159–164.

ANDREI PLESU

Die Problematik der Werte im vereinten Europa

Die Erweiterung und die Vereinigung Europas sind weit davon entfernt, eine vollendete Tatsache zu sein. Die Dinge befinden sich voll in Bewegung. Wir könnten zwar die eine oder andere Prognose riskieren, doch ist es unmöglich, Perspektiven, Rhythmus und Details der künftigen Entwicklung vorauszusehen. Wir wissen nicht, ab wann wir über einen abgeschlossenen Prozess sprechen können und wie letztendlich das Vereinte Europa aussehen wird.

Dessen ungeachtet, schlage ich Ihnen ein Denkexperiment vor. Stellen wir uns vor, wir sind am Ende dieses Projekts angelangt. Stellen wir uns weiter vor, unsere kühnsten Hoffnungen seien erfüllt worden: In allen Mitgliedsstaaten wurde ein hohes und homogenes Niveau des Wohlstands erreicht, überall sind Menschenrechte die Regel des Alltags, die Marktwirtschaft hat einen funktionellen Stand auf dem gesamten Kontinent erreicht, und Gesetzgebung, Administration und Finanzen unterliegen einer perfekten Koordinierung. Mit anderen Worten, stellen wir uns vor, wir sind bereits die Bewohner unserer eigenen Utopie.

Nun gut, wenn wir uns von der süßen Benommenheit und Entspannung des erreichten Zieles nicht überwältigen lassen, wenn wir uns nicht damit begnügen, selbstgefällig und überheblich die Nutzen und Annehmlichkeiten eines gemütlichen Lebens zu genießen, müssen wir uns neue Fragen stellen: „Was folgt nun?”, „Was werden wir von jetzt an tun?”, „Wir haben uns um die Erreichung dieses Ziels bemüht – wofür aber?”. Denn schließlich sind all die eingangs aufgezählten Annehmlichkeiten nichts Anderes als optimale Bedingungen für die Subsistenz, Voraussetzungen für ein zivilisiertes Leben. Sie können aber nicht Substanz und Inhalt unseres Lebens sein. Denn auch das gute Leben, auch das Respektieren des Anderen, auch die Akzeptanz der Differenz, auch die Effizienz der Institutionen bilden zusammen letztendlich nur das Ambiente der Normalität, den legitimen und notwendigen Dekor eines jeden existentiellen Projekts. Anders formuliert, sie sind die „Rohstoffe”, die Elemente des Kontextes.

Die Frage aber, die sich nun stellt, ist, mit welchem Text füllen wir diesen Kontext? Wie verarbeiten wir auf individueller und gemeinschaftlicher Ebene die Vorteile einer günstigen Organisation? Und damit kommen wir zur Problematik der Werte. Die Frage der Werte wird meistens dann akut, wenn man zwar alles Nötige hat, dennoch aber empfindet, als fehle etwas – oder im Gegenteil dann, wenn man nichts mehr hat, aber spürt, das Wesentliche noch nicht verloren zu haben: eine Orientierung, die Anhaltspunkte, einen Sinn.

Denkt die Europäische Union über ihre Werte von heute, vor allem aber über ihre Werte von morgen nach? Was mich betrifft, neige ich eher dazu, dies zu bezweifeln. Höchste Dringlichkeit war – und ist – die Schaffung einer je schnelleren und effizienteren institutionellen Vereinigung. Dringend waren die Erweiterung und deren Verwaltung, die Festlegung von Regeln, die Schaffung des Kontextes. Der „Text” selber, die vitale Substanz, die Hinterfragung und der Diskurs über die Werte sind in einer rhetorisch-ornamentaler Phase geblieben, oder aber wurden vorerst ausgeklammert.

Dies geschah nicht zuletzt weil – abgesehen von den europäischen Tribulationen – die Werte selber auf globaler Ebene eine Periode der Umstellung durchmachen. Herr Adolf Muschg erinnerte in seinem Referat an die drei „Potenzen”, die Jakob Burckhardt in den Weltgeschichtlichen Betrachtungen aufzählte: Religion, Staat und Kultur. Jede menschliche Gesellschaft ist durch eine bestimmte Mischung dieser drei öffentlichen „Kräfte” geformt, die jede ein bestimmtes Wertenetz voraussetzt. Die Autorität der drei Kräfte aber – die im 19. Jahrhundert noch sehr deutlich war – ist zur Zeit stark angeschlagen.

Sagt man „Religion”, wird das in der Regel mit „Fundamentalismus”, „Integrismus” und „Terrorismus” assoziiert, mit Intoleranz, veraltertem Pietismus, obskurantistischem und unwissenschaftlichem Geist, mit einer Verweigerung der Modernität. Eine enorme historische Ignoranz und das ideologische Prestige der Säkularisierung haben letztendlich eine Erosion jenes Wertesystems bewirkt, in dem in Europa mehr als anderthalb Jahrtausende gelebt wurde. Fakt ist, dass die Zahl jener, die Religionen nicht mehr als einen Wegweiser sehen, größer ist, denn je. Auch die Kultur verfügt nicht mehr über eine unantastbare Würde. „Der Terminus”, sagte Stephen Greenblatt Anfang der neunziger Jahre, „bedeutet nicht mehr viel”. „Culture is a deeply compromised idea” (Kultur ist eine zutiefst kompromittierte Idee), hat bereits James Clifford 1988 geschrieben. Das Buch, die Schule, die Bibliothek, der Lehrer – alles einst monumentale Institutionen – verändern konstant ihre Konturen und Statuten. Sollen wir noch die dritte „Potenz”, den Staat, beschwören? Doch was hat der Nationalstaat unserer Urgroßväter samt seinem Gefolge an Prinzipien und Loyalitäten mit unserer Welt überhaupt noch gemeinsam – einer Welt der multinationalen Konzerne, der Föderationen unterschiedlichster Art und der grenzübergreifenden Visionen? Klar ist, die traditionellen Quellen der Werte sind – für den Augenblick zumindest – unproduktiv, zweifelhaft, unzureichend. Wir müssen neue Ressourcen, neue Horizonte finden. Oder aber den alten neues Leben einhauchen.

In den vergangenen Jahren wurde ich immer wieder gefragt, mit welchem Beitrag denn der europäische Osten in die große kontinentale Familie kommen könnte. Meine Antwort lautet folgendermaßen: Wir kommen mit einer luziden Müdigkeit und einigen nützlichen Schwächen und Mängeln. Unsere Müdigkeit ist nicht zur Gänze harmlos, und auch nicht alle unsere Schwächen können positiv verwertet werden. Doch es gibt Müdigkeiten und Schwächen, die das Hinterfragen begünstigen und helfen, Antworten zu erkennen. Lassen Sie mich das erklären.

Die östliche Müdigkeit ist ein Ergebnis von 45 Jahren Diktatur, gefolgt von 18 „Transitions”-Jahren, beziehungsweise einem Hürdenrennen in Richtung Westen. Sie macht uns weniger empfindlich gegenüber ideologischen Moden und Utopien. Wir sind weniger anfällig für triumphalistische Projekte, für hölzerne Gewissheiten und für Propaganda. Ich würde sagen, wir lieben Europa ohne Illusionen, ohne Eurozentrismus, ohne paradehafte Euphorien. Wir lieben es mit der Melancholie der Marginalität und wir verlangen auch nicht, dass es dem Paradies ähnelt. Sicherlich hoffen wir – einmal im Klub aufgenommen – auf ein besseres Schicksal . Doch gleichzeitig wissen wir, dass sich unsere Probleme innerhalb der neuen Bürokratie nicht wie durch ein Wunder in Luft auflösen werden. Diese Einstellung bringt drei Werte ins Gespräch, die heute seltener sind, als wir uns das vorstellen: Diskretion, Realismus und Geduld. Für uns sind ihre Quellen, genau genommen, nicht europäisch. Fünf Jahrhunderte lang waren wir in unmittelbarem Kontakt mit dem Islam, wir sind noch im Wirkungskreis des Byzanz und wir haben lange mit der Weisheit des östlichen Judentums zusammen gelebt – eine bis vor kurzem noch massive Präsenz in unseren Städten und Gemeinden.

Das westliche Europa kann nur gewinnen durch das Wiedererlangen seiner östlichen und südöstlichen Horizonte, voller pontischer, kaspischer und mediterraner Gewürze. Was bringen wir in die Europäische Union ein? Die Himmelsrichtung, die ihr fehlte – den Osten. Und mit dem Mittelmeer könnten sich die Räume noch tiefer in Richtung Maghreb öffnen, der Heimat des Heiligen Augustinus und durch ihn des westlichen Christentums.

Die Müdigkeit und die langsamen Rhythmen des Orients sind ein gutes Gegengewicht für die abendländische Unermüdlichkeit. Wir schlagen Ihnen mehr Muße vor, mehr Beschaulichkeit und mehr Uneigennützlichkeit. Die zeitgenössische Zivilisation steht schlecht bei diesen Kapiteln. Die sich beschleunigende Zeit, die zielstrebige Arbeit, der unbarmherzige Karriere-Stress, die Konkurrenz, der Konsum – all das mag das Thema Werte unzeitgemäß erscheinen. Es bleibt kein Platz mehr übrig für Reflexion, für den überlegenden, einschätzenden Schritt zurück, für die Wiedererlangung des Gleichgewichts, der Besonnenheit. Wir sind viel zu beschäftigt, viel zu dynamisch. Ich möchte keineswegs dem „protestantischen” Aktivismus die „orthodoxe”, ost-kirchliche Immobilität gegenüberstellen. Sündigen kann man sowohl durch Faulheit wie auch durch Fleiß. Ich möchte nur auf die Notwendigkeit einer Harmonisierung der Rhythmen hinweisen. Bei der Behandlung der Hektik ist ein wenig Gelassenheit durchaus willkommen. Auch bei der Behandlung des Arbeitsrausches kann die wohltemperierte Erfahrung der Faulheit manchmal begrüßenswert sein. Unsere Kompetenz auf diesem Gebiet hat uralte Wurzeln. Ihr solltet sie nutzen, bevor unsere „Normalisierung” einsetzt. Denn zwangsläufig werden auch wir vom Fieber, von der Hektik der zivilisierten Welt angesteckt und werden ihr unsere traditionellen Ressourcen an Otium, an Beschaulichkeit und Muße, opfern müssen, ohne dabei auch nur im Entferntesten an Euere Effizienz heranzukommen...

Und damit sind wir bereits beim Kapitel „Schwächen” angelangt. Der europäische Südosten weist – zum Beispiel – eine zumindest fragliche konservative Tendenz auf. Die Vergangenheit hat für seine Bewohner feierliche, grundlegende Konnotationen. Wir rechtfertigen uns in weit höherem Maße, indem wir auf die Erinnerung zurückgreifen, als durch eine zukunftsorientierte Projektion. Ein gewisser Widerstand gegenüber Veränderungen und die eher naive Neigung, verblichene historische Perioden zu idealisieren, gehören zu unseren alltäglichen Fertigkeiten.

Im Gegenteil, das westliche Europa neigt dazu, äußerst drastisch oder zumindest misstrauisch mit der eigenen Vergangenheit umzugehen. Dafür gibt es einleuchtende Gründe. Sich aber auf seine Vergangenheit vorwiegend durch die leicht masochistische Ausübung einer strengen Vergangenheitsbewältigung zu beziehen, führt zu verarmenden Exzessen. Wegen einiger düsterer Episoden der europäischen Vergangenheit hat man im Westen die Tendenz, alles mit einem überaus scharfen, kritischen Geist zu betrachten, was zur Vergangenheit gehört – Gewohnheitsrecht, Kanons, Traditionen. Unser osteuropäischer passeistischer Missbrauch findet seine symmetrische Entsprechung in der „futurologischen” Euphorie des Westens. Und da wir uns nun begegnet sind, könnte der Osten lernen, dass nicht alles Vergangene auch gültig und lobenswert sein muss, der Westen hingegen, dass nicht alles Vergangene rein museal, überholt oder peinlich ist.

Wir verfügen auch über andere „konvertible” Schwächen. Wir sind in demselben Maße old fashioned, wie der Westen fashionable ist. Doch es gibt auch einen nur allzu menschlichen Zauber dieser Unzeitgemäßheit, eine Pittoreske des Konventionellen, einen Dekorativismus der veralterten Manieren – die allesamt der up to date-Juvenilität der entwickelten Länder und ihrem funktionellen, entspannten und matter of fact-Verhalten als farbenfroher Kontrapunkt dienen könnten.

Zu erwähnen wäre auch die Tatsache, dass wir Sprachen äußerst geringer Verbreitung sprechen, was uns zu einer Mehrsprachigkeit zwingt, die nicht aus doktrinären Gründen sondern aus der Praxis des täglichen Überlebens heraus erwächst. Der Multilinguismus – wie auch der Multikulturalismus – gehörten bei uns bereits zur Erfahrungspraxis, lange bevor sie kommunitäre Auflagen oder großzügige Ideen waren (In Klammern sei erwähnt, dass wir es amüsant finden, oftmals feststellen zu müssen, dass die meisten Plädoyers für die Mehrsprachigkeit monolinguistisch und zwar auf Englisch stattfinden).

Und eine letzte Bemerkung: im Osten steht es schlecht um die Forschung im Bereich Naturwissenschaften. Dafür haben wir eine weite Öffnung in Richtung Geisteswissenschaften beibehalten, deren Entwicklung weniger von materiellen Mitteln abhängig ist. Humanistische Kultur ist billig und kann ohne hochkomplizierten technologischen Beistand praktiziert werden. In Grenzsituationen kann sie auch im Verborgenen, in der eigenen Bibliothek praktiziert werden, so wie wir es manchmal in den Jahren der Diktatur gezwungen waren zu tun. Umso glücklicher sind wir, die zusätzlichen Akzente festzustellen, die die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft jüngst durch eine in Berlin, am 25. Januar gehaltene Rede von Frau Bundesminister für Forschung und Bildung, Dr. Annette Schavan, bezüglich der Notwendigkeit einer Neubewertung der humanistischen Studien setzt.

Ich möchte nicht falsch verstanden werden. Ich stelle Westeuropa keineswegs das künstliche „Paradies” eines Ostens „mit menschlichem Antlitz” gegenüber. Ich wollte nur den Triumphalismus abschwächen, von dem die Rhetorik der Europäischen Erweiterung und Vereinigung sich manchmal verformen lässt. Die nahe Zukunft ist weder rosarot, noch charmant. Wir werden Ihnen sicherlich Probleme schaffen. Mit unseren Qualitäten müssen Sie auch unsere Schwächen und Mängel übernehmen, und nur einige davon können zu Gunsten der Gemeinschaft „umgemodelt” werden. Wir werden eine gewisse Unordnung schaffen und zwangsläufig den Marsch der konsolidierten Demokratien in Richtung Horizonte verzögern. Ich hege jedoch die Illusion, dass in Zeiten der historischen Überhastung und in einer von Hektik und Standardisierung bedrohten Welt, eine Episode reflexiver Mußezeit sich durchaus als rettend erweisen könnte.

Die Länder Südosteuropas könnten in die Homogenität des Vereinten Europas eine fruchtbare Bresche an Ungenauigkeit und Neubestimmung schaffen. Wir könnten gemeinsam die Chancen der Rehabilitierung einiger schwächenden Richt- und Anhaltspunkte besprechen, die bei weitem noch nicht aufgebraucht oder erschöpft sind (Religion und Kultur zum Beispiel). Wir könnten die notwendigen und willkommenen „Verzögerer” sein, die zeitweiligen Bremser der Geschwindigkeitsexzesse und die „Saboteure” der Lawineneffekte. Es gibt, manchmal, legitime Kräfte, die die Geschichte aufhalten, wenn diese dazu neigt, zu schnell talabwärts zu rutschen.

Zu den Nutzen einer fruchtbaren Unordnung möchte ich die Worte von Michael Portillo zitieren, dem britischen Verteidigungsminister zwischen 1995 und 1997: „...I am very much in favour of an untidy Europe. I’m hoping that apart from being good for the new democraties, enlargement will create an untidier Europe”. (Ich selber bin sehr für ein unordentliches Europa. Ich hoffe, die Erweiterung wird – außer dass sie gut für die neuen Demokratien ist – ein unordentlicheres Europa schaffen).

Für die Erreichung solch eines Zieles – da können Sie vorbehaltlos auf uns zählen.

(Ins Deutsche übertragen von Malte Kessler)

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 27:51–55.

PÁL MICHELBERGER

European Transportation System and the Southeast European Space

A unified European transportation system is the basic condition for the economic development of the European Union. Up to now, however, only parts of the scheduled improvements have been realised. Just a typical example of it is the continued existence of five different electric systems of the European railways; in addition even the legal unification of railway transportation has not been completed. The regulations concerning road traffic are also different in the Member States. Navigation along the internal waters is periodically restricted by narrow cross sections making only short stretches navigable at times. Listing examples could go on as with the exception of flight regulations there are still a number of unsolved and rather costly tasks in the field of transportation. It is beyond doubt, however, that the economic integration of the EU and the resulting economic (and social) success can only be realised by the fulfilment of the already scheduled development of transportation. The integration of the transportation of the Balkans fits into this line of tasks, apart from the fact whether the Balkan countries possess full membership or are just associate members (perhaps not even members) of the Union.

The Geographical Situation of the Balkans

By reviewing Europe’s map it is obvious that the economically most developed western, north-western and central regions receive the major part of their most important raw materials through the ports of the Atlantic Ocean (and its seas) and of the Mediterranean Sea, and the shipping of export products is also done at the same locations. These ports and sea routes are overloaded similarly to the transalpine transportation routes. In comparison the shores of the Balkans are unexploited and its internal transportation system is underdeveloped. In order to relieve the strain on the overloaded western sea shores the transportation network must be transformed to become an integral part of the unified European transportation system.

It is particularly important to join Russia, the southern parts of Ukraine, the republics of the Caucasus and the region of the Caspian Sea into the commercial traffic. Considering the current traffic the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus already means a narrow cross section of naval transport, therefore it is the primary interest of the EU to develop the ports at the western coast of the Black Sea and the adjoining inland transportation network as well as the dissolution of the narrow cross sections of the inland water route of the Danube-Main-Rhine.

With the possible accession of Turkey the EU will have a direct contact with the countries of the Middle East. This will gradually upgrade the strategic role of the Balkans and would make the development of its road and railway network as well as its ports important even from a military point of view.

The seas of the Balkans and Turkey are warm and with the possible EU accession of these countries the length of the sea shores suitable for summer leisure will almost duplicate. The current standard of development of the beaches cannot be compared to the French, Italian and Spanish ones but knowing the dynamism of the tourism industry an explosive development can be expected. It is not the underdeveloped beaches that constitute a narrow cross section but rather the limited internal, continental transportation network.

The long-term EU pan-European transportation corridors are aware of these expected changes in traffic. The development of inland navigation as well as that of railways and highways is expected both from Member States and from those who are currently not Member States (Figure 1). The density of transportation corridors, however, has not even been approximating the density of the central and western part of the EU (Figure 2). By comparing both networks the transportation concept of the EU should be examined and redefined from time to time in the light of the changes in the actual transportation needs.

Considering the long-term plans the economy of the particular region has to be examined. The industry of the Balkans is less developed than of the western part of Europe; therefore this difference could only be balanced in a rather long term. Until a balanced situation is reached the migration of foreign workers that currently can be considered traditional must be taken into account.

The Main Factors Influencing the Transportation
(and the Vehicle Industry) of the Balkans

According to the geographical and economic situation outlined above, the main factors influencing the changes in transportation can be summarised as follows:

1. Seasonal targeted traffic to the Balkans with high peaks:

– Summer tourism toward the seashores of the Balkans;

– Holiday and vacation time traffic of foreign workers;

– Local trade.

2. Transit traffic through the Balkans (permanent trade and seasonal passenger traffic):

– Transportation of raw materials and products (the role of the Caucasus, Russia, Ukraine and the Danube);

– Holiday and vacation time traffic of foreign workers;

– Summer tourism to the Turkish beaches.

It was mentioned earlier that compared to the West the industry of the Balkans is underdeveloped, yet in some areas, such as the vehicle industry, a notable capacity has been building up within the ex-Yugoslavian republics. The Yugoslav vehicle industry was traditionally based on a strong Western European co-operation and licence policy. These Western industrial relations survived irrespective of the Balkan war. The local expertise is also available so it is expected that the Balkans’ vehicle industry is going to regenerate within a short time and will integrate into the European vehicle industry. In the future it could be an important element of the development of the Balkans’ transportation. The initial steps have been made by the companies concerned. Recently the export of the main units and fittings of vehicles to the Balkans has been vigorously increasing.

Tasks

By involving the experts of the Balkan countries and by utilising the EU – Hungarian experiences the harmonisation tasks must be elaborated in relation to the development of the transportation infrastructure and the operation of the traffic systems, including the issues of economic, and financial regulation, institutional development and legal regulation. The most important elements of this complex series of tasks are:

– The analysis and evaluation of the current network and appliances and the indication of strengths and weaknesses.

– Reviewing the planned pan-European corridors, ranking and possible additions to their development. Planning the links between the local networks to the pan-European one.

– The exploration and solution of the interoperability issues (e.g. contradictory regulations, different electrical traction systems).

– A prioritised development of combined transport and logistics (to downsize peak loads, to solve the massive transit trade).

While elaborating the outlined tasks in all cases a complex impact study must be presented, because these costly investments of long-term returns and developments will only be realised by the countries involved if they unambiguously beneficially influence the entire European region including the quality of life of local regions. The development of the Balkans’ transportation and a direct involvement in its expansion is a high priority task of the neighbouring countries and at the same time it is an opportunity not to be missed for normalising economic and political relations.