Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 28:95–101.

FRIGYES NAGY

The Impact of the South-Eastern Enlargement of the EU on the Hungarian Agriculture

The socio-economic development of the European Union is characterised by enlargement and deepening. The extent of these tendencies is subject to continuous debate. It is a significant point of consideration that the member states should possess a stable economy. This is prescribed by macro-economic indicators (convergence criteria). Meeting these criteria is demanded of the acceding countries, too, and even set as a precondition to accession. This is particularly true for membership in the European Monetary Union. Presently Hungary has been making efforts to achieve those conditions.

Enlargement, however, is not only the desire of those intending to accede but it is increasingly in the interest of the member states, too. In the period of globalisation enlargement is a historical necessity because the competitiveness of the EU depends significantly on the size of its internal market. As contrasted to earlier ideas, the EU was suddenly and almost surprisingly enlarged by ten new members in 2004. Obviously differences between the various member states have increased. It seems plausible that the Union would prefer market expansion to convergence. In the case of Turkey it is obviously an important factor that this country has the second largest army of the NATO and it is a significant factor of security policy in this region.

Accession negotiations have been carried on in this spirit with the Southeast European countries: Romania and Bulgaria became members on 1 January 2007, Turkey and Croatia figure among the candidates, and there is a valid Association Agreement with Albania; and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia should not be forgotten either. The budgetary deficit of the newly independent Montenegro is only 1.8%, its rate of inflation is 1.9%, no wonder that it strives to obtain Union membership. Serbia’s budget has surpluses. Negotiations have not begun because the country is not co-operating with the International Tribunal of The Hague in extraditing war criminals.

The Significance of Agriculture in the Different Countries

These prospective member states represent free markets for Hungary, but inside the country they have to be seen as competitors. Would the level of their agricultural development endanger the interests of Hungarian agriculture? In what branches are we competitive and how should we adjust to the increasingly keen competition? Answering these questions is difficult because statistical data are available only with great lacunae. Professional literature currently deals primarily with political issues. Reference to problems of branches is made only in exceptional cases. The time has come to put professional questions into the foreground. Though topical antecedents are missing from the literature some macro-economic indicators provide opportunity for the study of the economic development of the given countries and to draw some conclusions. The EU statistics primarily deal with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

The territory of the Balkans is 150 million hectares where 140 million people live. The internal market would be extended by a large number of consumers with the expected accessions thus enlarging its markets. The number of inhabitants in the given countries is taken account of in this context. The 2004 enlargement has brought along 70 million new consumers ’to the market’. The accession of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey would altogether increase that figure by 100 million. As far as the per capita GDP is concerned, it can be seen that these are poorer countries. If the GDP of the EU–15 is taken for 100% the one in Bulgaria is only 24%, in Romania only 27%, and in Turkey only 23%. The consequence is that the per capita GDP average would drop on EU level, and even its 75% would fall, therefore several regions cannot obtain rural development funds since this index in their case would be above 75%. The proportion of those employed in agriculture is 26% in Bulgaria, 32% in Romania, 33% in Turkey, and 59% in Albania. This figure is around 5% in the EU as well as in Hungary.

The EU has also been the largest consumer potential up to now and new perspectives would emerge in the future with further enlargement. It is worth producing for the community of five hundred million consumers of the future EU, and prices can be formed for the large-series goods that may be competitive even if they approximate the lower world market prices and would not require export subsidy. In fact this is of vital interest for the agriculture of the EU and coincides with the ’rules of the game’ of world trade.

Studying the significance of agriculture it can be seen that this branch plays an important role in South-Eastern Europe: its share in the GDP is above 10%. In Bulgaria it is 16%, in Romania and Turkey it is 11%, in Albania it is over 25%. It is only a few per cent in the EU, but it cannot by far mean the devaluation of the agrarian world.

Issues of the Holding Structure

The structure of holdings and competitiveness are interrelated. Unfortunately the individual countries perform statistical groupings in entirely different ways; in addition, data supply is extremely deficient. The following data had to be collected from the internet. Their exactitude cannot be proved, and even then a rather rough image can be drafted on the basis of these figures. Yet they provide some help for orientation. Currently no meaningful data can be found about Croatia and the other candidate countries of the Balkans even on the homepage of the EU.

A fragmented structure of holdings is characteristic of every country. While the average size of holdings is 20 ha in the EU–15, it is 7.5 ha in Hungary, 15 ha in Turkey, but usually two thirds of the land is owned by farms of very small plots. The average size of holdings in the countries not listed here is below 4 ha, and in Croatia and Slovenia it is below 1 ha. As no information could be obtained about rented lands, unfortunately no conclusions could be drawn from the concentration of holdings about the concentration of land use, whereas this would be the more important indicator of competitiveness.

In Bulgaria there are about 760 thousand farms. One per cent of them is economic associations that are the successors of production co-operatives and state farms cultivating 80% of the arable land and produce on 536 hectares on average. Visibly we are facing here a rather high concentration of land ownership which may be a potentially serious competitor, particularly if they are able to introduce modern technologies by expediently exploiting EU resources. Seven hundred thousand farms, constituting 94% of all farms are smaller than 1 ha and are using 14% of the total land. They primarily produce for subsistence, but it should not be forgotten that many of them grow vegetables and fruits, and may be significant producers of goods even on smaller plots of land. The remaining 6% of land is cultivated by private farms with an average of 6.2 ha holding, and among them there are also numerous farms producing vegetables, fruits and grapes.

In the restitution process after the system change Romania restored the conditions following World War II. As a family could get maximum 5 ha of land at the time of the land reform, it could get back the same size of holding after the system change. This has its imprint on the current structure of holdings. There are altogether 3.9 million farms. Of this figure 1.2 million farms above the size of 3 ha own 74% of the land. There are 2.7 million farms of less than 3 ha, owning 26% of the land. But that figure includes 1.6 million farms with less than 1 ha, owning 6% of the total land. Thus farms of more than 3 ha, capable of commercial production represent 30%. The concentration of holdings has been vigorously in progress. The economic associations play a role in it which can purchase land even if they are in 100% foreign ownership. It should be remembered that 60% of the territory of Romania is suited for cultivation; it has ports at the Danube and at the sea which mean comparative advantage.

There are 3 million farms in Turkey. There are 180 thousand among them possessing more than 20 ha of land, totalling 6% of all. There are 2 million and 820 thousand farms of less than 20 ha, using 96% of the total cultivable land, and there are about 1 million and 590 thousand of them having less than 5 ha disposing over 6% of the total. Production has been dynamically growing on this huge area; hence it is a serious competitor for Hungary in several fields.

The Degree of Self-sufficiency

The member countries try to sell their surpluses in the single internal market. Therefore it is not pointless to find out whether Hungary as a net exporter would find itself facing the products of the new members? It should be noted that in certain cases the growth of the products of some branches shows dynamic increases in these countries while data reflect a static situation. Therefore they should be handled with reservations.

In Bulgaria there is a significant surplus production of vegetal goods. The degree of self-sufficiency in wheat is 159%, and 154% in maize, it is 224% in sunflower and 221% in oilseeds. Soybean is the only one of which they can produce only 60% of their needs. In the case of the products of animal husbandry the degree of self-sufficiency is 101% in pork and 110% in mutton, but it is only 77% in beef and 91% in poultry meat. Annually they export 20 thousand tons of mutton. Milk production is 3200 kg per lactation. No figures are available about surpluses of vegetables and fruits, but it is commonly known that Bulgaria is capable of significant exports in these fields.

Self-sufficiency in the case of Romania is 124% of wheat, 130% of maize, and 100% of sunflower. The figure about oilseeds is 98% and 86% of soybean. The level of self-sufficiency is 95% of beef, 99% of pork, 100% of mutton, and 99% of pigs. In this case data were available about milk too, saying that self-sufficiency is 100%. Currently Romania was given quota only for 60% of its milk production, presumably because of the low proportion of extra quality. As fodder can be produced cheap in Romania their production of pork and poultry meat may represent a strong competition for Hungary.

No indices of self-sufficiency could be found for Turkey. Yet some data allow for certain inferences. For instance, they grow wheat on ten million hectares, which means 20 million tons even if the average yield is only 2 t/ha. This may mean surpluses even if supplies have to be allocated to 70 million inhabitants.

The land-based subsidies start from 25% here too, but the reference yields are extremely low. As contrasted to the Dutch 6.7 t, to the Austrian 5.0 t, and the Hungarian 4.43 t it is 2.7 t in Bulgaria as well as in Romania. It means that if we set out from full subsidies, Romania would be entitled to receive 170 euros/ha as contrasted to the Hungarian 300 euros/ha.

Foreign Trade

It is commonly known about Bulgaria that similarly to Hungary it is a net exporter. Ten per cent of its total exports and 6% of its imports are agricultural and food industry products. Their annual grain export is 2 million tons.

Romania’s agricultural foreign trade is in deficit. Its exports are 0.337 billion and imports are 1.010 billion euros. The deficit of the foreign trade balance is enhanced by 0.337 billion euros by the agrarian sector. They need annually 2–3 million tons of wheat to be imported. Obviously they would strive to increase production and export.

Turkey is also a net exporter country. Its agricultural foreign trade shows a positive balance of 1.3 billion euros. The value of its exports is 4.2 billion, and of its imports is 2.9 billion euros. They import annually 4 million tons of maize and 1.2 million tons of sunflower seed. Their positive balance is 400 million USD in vegetables and export fruits to the value of USD 1.5 million. Dynamic growth can be observed in the export of vegetables, fruits, tobacco and seeds.

Accession from the perspective of the market may be regarded as advanced for Bulgaria and Romania, for they have a significant space of mobility towards the EU member countries customs-free duties or at low customs tariffs by their Association Agreements.

Twenty per cent of Hungary’s export is oriented to the Balkans and 6–8% of our imports come from there. It is primarily Croatia, Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina that purchase mostly grain, meat products and sunflower seed, whereas Romania, Croatia and Serbia are remarkable in Hungary’s imports of fruits and of sweets industry products.

It should be pointed out that there is a significant inflow of foreign capital to Bulgaria and Romania, and the multinational companies can be found there almost without an exception.

Some Findings

Production as well as consumption has significantly decreased in Bulgaria and also in Romania after the system change, similarly to the other former socialist countries. A low level of consumption can be observed in the case of all the Balkan aspirants. Experience shows that significant growth can be expected in this field in the medium-term. The per capita consumption is also low in Turkey and the purchasing power is not strong. Therefore it would not be easy to acquire market positions, particularly if it is remembered that the other EU countries would also want to assert their offensive for gaining markets without which their calculations related to enlargement would not materialise.

There are 81 million hectares of arable land in the Balkans as against the 140 million hectares of the EU–15, which is a huge agrarian potential. Restitution for land was done by re-privatisation in Bulgaria and Romania, thus the land ownership conditions created by the land reform after World War II were preserved and are characterised by fragmentation and de-concentration. Dwarf holdings and farms settled for subsistence are in excess, which do not participate in commodity production and are not market actors. The competition of concentration as the motive force of success can be found in the background of market competition. In Hungary the concentration of land use shows an accelerating trend, which means competitive advantage in issuing larger quantities of homogeneous and lower-priced goods.

Unfortunately, no data are available about tenancy, though it could offer an image of the concentration of land use.

The agriculture of the countries under survey is characterised by the lack of capital. It is not indifferent how one can utilise the resources becoming available by EU membership. This also influences the changes of competitiveness. At the same time those countries have comparative advantages due to their river and maritime ports. Cheaper labour also means temporary advantage, particularly in vegetable and fruit production.

Agrarian policy is simple in these countries; the forms of subsidy are primarily manifest in subsidies accorded to prices and exports. The information systems are extremely deficient and unreliable. The latest data refer to the years 2002 and 2003. They hinder the clear vision of governments and their possibilities of movement. These countries set out at 25% for the land-based subsidies, thus they may reach the then 100% level of the EU by 2006.

The natural indices of animal husbandry also leave much to be desired, particularly in the field of plant health, animal health and the protection and welfare of animals. For this reason their possibilities in export markets may remain unutilised, whereas it would provide opportunity for us to push forward. The building of Union border posts also causes difficulty.

References

Avar László: Oldalpillantás a Balkánra (A Side View of the Balkans). Magyar Mezőgazdaság, 10 May 2006.

Glatz Ferenc: A Balkán-kutatás reneszánsza, 2005. (The Renaissance of Balkan Studies, 2005). Ezredforduló, 2006/1.

Juhász Imre: Törökország az EU-ba készül. (Turkey Prepares Itself for the EU). Magyar Mezőgazdaság, 23 August 2006.

Kádár Béla: Az EU külgazdasága. Délkelet-Európa és Magyarország. (The External Economy of the European Union, South-Eastern Europe and Hungary). Ezredforduló, 2006/1.

Somogyi Ferenc: Az EU keleti kiterjesztése és Magyarország (The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union and Hungary). Ezredforduló, 2006/1.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 28:43–58.

JÁNOS MIKA – ÁKOS NÉMETH

Climatic Characteristics and Tendencies of Climate in Bulgaria and Romania

The European Union is to be enlarged soon by two new South-Eastern European countries, Bulgaria and Romania. The climate of these two countries has certain characteristics, the knowledge of which may promote their integration, and also the preparation of other countries, including our own, for being able to develop advantageous and prosperous relations with these states after their accession.

Both countries are characterised by a highly variegated topography, asserting not only the specificities of mountainous climate, or dividing it from a given area. The semicircle of the Carpathian Mountains in Romania and the longitudinal range of the Rodope in the case of Bulgaria have a clear dividing role in slowing down the air masses coming from behind the mountains, from north and west respectively, and forcing them to rise. In other words, these two mountain ranges strongly modify the image otherwise shaped by the general circulation of air in the region, which is manifest in several components of the climate.

Annual Cycle of the Climate and Its Regional Specificities

At first the characteristic annual schedule of temperature and precipitation is presented (Figures 1–2). In both cases the results are restricted to the capital cities, both of which represent the climate of flatlands. In the next two Figures we would return to the territorial differences. On Figures 1 and 2 the data of Budapest are also given besides those of Bucharest and Sofia, thus offering possibilities of comparison concerning the annual progress of the two climatic elements.

The annual schedule of temperature and precipitation carries in itself rather quantitative than qualitative differences in the three capitals. They can be traced back to astronomical conditions, to the location occupied in the general system of air circulation as well as to geographical conditions influencing the content of vapour.

The annual mean temperature is the highest in Bucharest, whereas it is almost identical in Sofia and Budapest (Figure 1). The difference is more significant in the warm half of the year, whereas in winter the stronger irradiation related to continental conditions counterbalances the warming effect of the more favourable latitude.

Comparing the conditions of precipitation in the three capitals (Figure 2) it is conspicuous that the autumn secondary maximum is present only in Budapest, but it is not manifest in the data of the Romanian and Bulgarian capitals. The difference is not surprising, as frequent Mediterranean cyclones also contribute to the phenomenon in our country, which usually do not reach the two other countries.

Next we turn to the presentation of the territorial distribution of the main climatic elements in the two countries.

Bulgaria is located in the continental climatic zone of long and hot summers. Two thirds of the country is mountainous. Due to the highly structured terrain the climate of Bulgaria is rather variegated.

The annual quantity of precipitation (Figure 3a) is between 700 and 1200 mm in the higher mountainous region (the Balkan Mountains, Rila, Pirin and Rodope), whereas it is between 400 and 700 mm in lower mountains and basins, and it is only between 450 and 500 mm in Dobruja. A large part of the country is dominated by maximum precipitation in early summer and minimum precipitation in winter, both being characteristic features of the continental climate. The late autumn secondary maximum precipitation can be observed along the seaside. To the southwest, in the valley of the Struma River the Mediterranean precipitation is characteristic. Figure 3a shows the speed of the vertical upward current, also influencing precipitation. Its territorial distribution resembles the image of the topography, which is also manifest in the annual distribution of precipitation. At the same time, air arriving from various directions in the region of mountains, where it is forced to move upward, would be arranged in cells moving upward and downward in the annual average.

In Bulgaria the mean temperature of the coldest month is below –6 °C in the mountainous area, it is usually between 0 and –2 °C in the region of mid-high mountains, whereas it is above the freezing-point, around 1–2 °C at the seacoast. In the south-western part of the country winters are as mild as along the seacoast in the valley of the Sturma, surrounded by high mountains. The absolute minimum temperatures in winter are between –25 and –35 °C all over the country, but rarely, one may expect frost of –20–25 °C even at the seacoast. The mean temperature of the warmest month has been generally between 20–24 °C, but it could even reach 25 °C in the valleys of the Sturma and Maritsa. In summer the absolute maximum temperatures may reach 40–43 °C. The water temperature of the Black Sea near the coast would be 22–23 °C in the summer months, and it is ideal for bathing.

Our eastern neighbour, Romania is located at the eastern wing of the Carpathian Mountains. The ranges of the Eastern and Southern Carpathians divide the country not only geographically, but also climatically. The territory inside the ring of the Carpathians, the Transylvanian Basin, together with the regions of the Partium and the Banat mostly belongs to the wet continental zone with a long warm season. The climate in Transylvania is highly variegated due to its articulated topography. The mean temperature of the warmest and coldest months varies depending on the altitudes. The absolute maximum temperature reaches 37–40 °C in areas below 500 m, whereas the absolute minimum temperature of the closed basins can even be as low as –35 °C. Variety is present in precipitation patterns, too. While the annual quantity of precipitation is around 500–600 mm in a large part of the Transylvanian Basin and in the Csík and Háromszék Basins, it may be as much as 800–1400 mm in the Bihar Forest and along the slopes of the Carpathian Mountain range. The variation of precipitation is characterised by a vigorous maximum in early summer and by a winter minimum.

The climate of the Trans-Carpathian regions (Oltenia, Muntenia, Moldva) is typically continental. The short and cold winter is followed by a warm but not too long summer. The absolute annual fluctuation of temperature is significant. In summer temperature may rise to 40–44 °C, whereas it is not rare to have –30 or even –35 °C in winter. The annual average quantity of precipitation is between 400 and 600 mm. The wettest period is early summer, and the least precipitation is to be observed in winter. A characteristic feature of this region is the transitory aridity developing in late summer or early autumn.

In the higher regions of the Carpathian Mountains it is the mountainous climate that clearly dominates. Basically two factors, namely altitude above the sea level and exposure define the climate in this region.

As it can be judged by the colouring of the maps of Figure 4, the presence of the Carpathian range and location related to it is much more important than the north–south differences. This is true despite the fact that the country is located in a strip that is almost twice as broad by latitude as our country or Bulgaria.

Figure 4b presents the calculated values of the horizontal wind speed. The territorial distribution of this value also recalls the picture of the topography, even if the zones of the maximum wind speed follow it with a slight shift. The relationship is simple and obvious: topography as a mechanical obstacle forces the air to circulate upwards, and next, in the new height at a faster speed. (It should be noted that these kinds of speed are not to be measured near the surface, or above forests, for such observations cannot be obtained in the required density, and there is no possibility for the representative modelling of layers a few metres above the many kinds of surface types. Values valid somewhere above the level of the top of trees may be regarded as more or less the same as the characteristic level ten metres above flat terrain, already independent of landmarks.)

Regional Tendencies and Forecasts

Before discussing regional changes, a brief illustration of the possible continuation of global warming is given (Figure 5), which also shows how reliably we can delineate the specificities of its local appearance and their extent.

Figure 5a demonstrates that the global climate models can assess the scope of change in global average temperature caused by the alteration given in time of the – presumably – known external factors governing the climate. The Figure verifies for the past one and a half centuries that the observed changes and those simulated by the model have been essentially parallel to each other.

Based on Figure 5b we may rest assured, that even if the ocean conveyor belt stopped at a certain point of warming (for the reasons see: Czelnai, R., 1999 among others): its consequence would not be an Ice Age, but a distribution of temperature largely different from the present one, in which the present image of the cyclone tracks would greatly change, but the sign of temperature changes would be positive everywhere. For the increasing greenhouse effect should also be taken into consideration in the process that would presumably make the conveyor belt stop.

The next two elements of Figure 5 prove that these models are not yet able to reliably assess the regional details of climate change. Figure 5c shows that even the reconstruction of the present zonal distribution of atmospheric pressure on sea level is done with great differences by the simulation of the models among themselves as well as in comparison with the observed distribution.

Figure 5d compares changes obtained in nine climate models. Two sets of 36–36 correlation coefficients can be obtained by pair-wise comparison of the changes of temperature and precipitation in corresponding grid points. The correlation of the fields of temperature changes between 0.2 and 0.8 is more or less acceptable, but the values of changes in precipitation below 0.4 (and even negative in two comparisons!) clearly indicate that the global climate models are not yet (in 2001) suitable in this respect to offer an ultimate specification about the regional features of change, among others to be able to develop the required adaptation strategies.

Despite the criticism spelt out we present the changes of temperature and precipitation by 2020 on the basis of the model calculations in keeping with the SRES A2 emission scenario (IPCC, 2001). This scenario postulates a heterogeneous economic development and demographic change, as a result of which the average temperature models of the Earth would exceed the values of 1961–1990 by 0.6 °C in 2020.

As shown by Figure 6, temperature would grow everywhere in Europe, and that too, generally more steeply than the average of the Earth. As the three models are arbitrarily taken out of the available results, and because their similarity even according to Figure 5d is only partial, it is not worth preparing a more comprehensive, numerical assessment for the two countries.

Precipitation would clearly be reduced in four maps out of six as shown by Figure 7, whereas change is of opposite direction indicated by the two winter figures in the two countries. Accordingly, a more limited access to water should be expected in the region by 2020, which would be particularly adverse given the growing temperature.

The question is whether the expected warming and decreasing precipitation estimated in calculations can be demonstrated by the observations of the past decades, when the Earth as a whole had been unambiguously warming (Figure 5a).

We answer to this question on the basis of the third assessment report of the IPCC (2001) indicated in Figure 8, as well as on the basis of our own calculations (Mika and Bálint, 2000) given in Figure 9.

It is clear in Figure 8 that the annual mean temperature had grown everywhere in Europe during the period between 1976 and 2000. This estimate shows almost redoubled warming (with minor differences it is 0.6–1.0 °C) in the territory of Romania and Bulgaria, but it has not considered every station of the two countries and has not applied homogenisation for the series of data, compared to the average of the Earth.

The sign of changes in precipitation is by far not so clear on the same Figure. One of the reasons is that the spatial resolution of the processing is rather limited and the number of precipitation-measuring stations is also far lower than one could obtain on the basis of all the national data bases united. The changes of precipitation having an opposite sign (showing a coherent spatial order) could just as well be real ones, for the changes of atmospheric circulation parallel to warming are not everywhere of the same sign. (We should consider that atmospheric pressure cannot change everywhere in the same direction, as the total mass of the atmosphere is constant.)

According to the right side of Figure 8 the sign of precipitation change would be positive in a larger proportion of the two countries. This figure indicates it particularly for the northern part of Romania, based on precipitation data observed between 1976 and 2000. The two grid points falling on the territory of Bulgaria show a change of opposite sign.

As far as Romania is concerned, we have reached an opposite result in our study on the basis of 76 precipitation time series from the 25 years between 1974 and 1998. In that study (Mika and Bálint, 2000) we estimated the b regression coefficient of the Y=a+bX linear relationship with the so-called method of instrumental variables (Körösi et al. 1990). In our procedure we regarded time as the instrumental variable in the given period of linear global temperature trend, which satisfies the conditions of the selection of instrumental variables. These criteria are: a) significant correlation with the values of the independent variable; b) no-correlation with the faults of the independent variable; c) no-correlation with the residual values of the dependent variable. With the help of Z instrumental variable the regression can be estimated as the quotient of co-variances: b=cov(Y,Z)/cov(X/Z). In the 25 years studied the linear trend of the hemispheric temperature is 0.026 K/year, the correlation is 0.825, in other words, condition a) is definitely met. (Condition c) derives from the strong correlation between hemispheric temperature and time, whereas we have to accept condition b) on the basis of professional outlook.)

The regression coefficients gained by this method in Figure 9 are given as percentage change related to 0.5 °C warming. Accordingly, the territory of our country, with the exception of the Small Plain and the Northern Central Mountains, is characterised by a few per-cent fall in the amount of precipitation. East of us the coefficients are negative, whereas they are positive to the west. The change in the winter half-year is clearly negative in Hungary, with characteristic values between –10 and –20 per cent. East of Hungary the reduction of precipitation would be vigorous, reaching even –30 per cent in some places. Growth may be found west of Hungary, in the Alps.

All in all an unambiguous decrease of precipitation in the Transylvanian regions relates to the present subject matter, in other words, it is a result contrary to the content of Figure 8, based on a rare network of stations.

In summary both the trends of temperature as well as precipitation trends accepted for a more comprehensive data base confirm the conditional forecasts derived from the models for the expected climate of Romania and Bulgaria in the current warming period.

Geographic Analogy: Links to Some Hungarian Scenarios

The present climate of several areas in the two countries corresponds in its broad outlines to the image one may assume for the territory of Hungary on the basis of certain statistical relationships and large-space model estimates in some future phases of global warming.

Not giving the details of the methodology of calculations for Hungary, and the results of scenarios, we present the expected changes of temperature and rainfall on the basis of our earlier papers (Mika, 1993, 1996, 2001) in Table 1, and also illustrate them on a map in Figure 10. The bottom line of the Table lists territories that are analogous with the climate, where today’s climate is like the one expected to prevail in Hungary as a result of 0.5–4 °C of global warming.

Even though geographic analogies produce tangible opportunities for linking the Balkan region and our country, moreover, even for the future adaptation of experiences in cultivation, way of life, etc., this possibility should be handled with caution for two reasons. One is that the methodology of the Hungarian climatic scenarios is not fully developed, primarily because of the limitations of direct physical modelling. Practical procedures based on the above rough-dissolution climatic models and on projecting into the future diagnostic relationships valid in the past, even though they yield consonant results, can be regarded as first approximations for lack of adequate explanation of dynamics. The other reason of the necessary caution is that there can be differences in many details between the present climate of the Balkans and the future climate of Hungary even if two conditions of the analogy are met, namely the temperature of extreme seasons and the realisation of the annual quantity of rainfall. Obviously nothing guarantees that there is a climate presently anywhere on Earth that could be expected in the various regions of the future Hungary.

In summary the geographic position of the two countries under survey differs only slightly from that of Hungary. As a result the annual course of the climate of the three capital cities located on flatland is similar. But the mountain ranges of the two other countries divide the territorial distribution of temperature and precipitation into segments. In addition to indicating it we have also devoted particular attention to how the climate of the two countries may change if global warming continues. Despite a broad belt of uncertainty it is probable that the amount of summer precipitation of the region would fall while warming would be faster than the average of the Earth, but the sign of this change in winter is ambiguous. Linking the present climate of the two countries to Hungarian scenarios we have risked the methodological possibility of looking for analogous regions from the present climate of the two countries for our future climate to the environmental and economic impact studies.

References

Bartholy J.–Mika J.: Időjárás és éghajlat – cseppben a tenger? (Weather and Climate – a Sea in a Drop?) Magyar Tudomány, 2005. No. 7. 789–796.

Czelnai R.: Világóceán. Modern fizikai oceanográfia. (World Ocean. Modern Physical Oceanography). Vince Kiadó, Budapest, 1999. p. 182.

IPCC, 2001: Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. (Eds. Houghton J. T. et al.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, N. Y. USA, 881 p. http//:www.ipcc.ch

Körösi G.–Mátyás L.–Székely I.: Gyakorlati ökonometria (Practical Econometry). KJK, Budapest, 1990. p. 481.

Mika J.: Az Alföld éghajlatának megváltozása a globális klímaváltozással összefüggésben. (Changes of the Climate of the Great Plain in Relation to Global Climate Change). Alföldi Tanulmányok XV. 1993. 11–30.

Mika J.: Éghajlati forgatókönyvek. In: Változások a légkörben és az éghajlatban. (Climatic Scenarios. In: Changes in the Atmosphere and in the Climate). (Ed. Mika, J.) Természet Világa Különszám, 1996. 69–74.

Mika J.–Bálint G.: Rainfall scenarios for the Upper-Danube catchment. Proc. XXth Conf. Danubian Countries, Bratislava, Slovakia, 4–8 Sept., 2000. CD-ROM, 990–995.

Mika J.: Új kutatások a globális klímaváltozás, valamint ezek regionális sajátosságai és hatásai terén. In: Berényi Dénes jubileumi ünnepsége előadásai (New Researches in the Field of Global Climate Changes, and its Regional Specificities and Effects. In: Presentations at the Jubilee Celebrations of Dénes Berényi). Debrecen, 2001. 185–202.

Mika J.: Globális klímamodellek. Klímaváltozás – hazai hatások. (Global Climate Models. Climatic Change – Domestic Effects.) Természet Világa Különszám. 2004. 33–36.

Mika J.: Globális éghajlatváltozás – két IPCC jelentés között. In: Éghajlatváltozás a világban és Magyarországon. (Global Climate Change – between Two IPCC Reports. In: Climate Change in the World and in Hungary). (Ed. Takács Sánta). Alinea Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 83–103.

Wood, R. A.–Vellinga, M.–Thorpe, R.: Global Warming and THC stability. Phil. Trans Roy. Soc. A, 361, 2003. 1961–1976.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 28:81–88.

GYÖRGY MAKAY

The Opportunities and Risks of the Hungarian Grain Economy and Romania’s Accession to the Union

I have not elaborated the topic indicated in the title as a scientific researcher but as an expert who has spent several years in the field of grain economy. I express my opinion on the basis of market data and other relevant sources of information and I do not think that I am in possession of the philosophers’ stone.

At the beginning we should see what kind of market Romania represented for us during the past three years. I would begin the series with the Hungarian export of processed products (Table 1), and later on I would also discuss unprocessed grain.

Processed Grain-based Products

The year 2003 was unique for both Hungary and Romania. Grain crop was extremely weak, greatly influencing export possibilities. If we look at Hungarian exports in the lines of wheat flour, wheat bran, maize flour and compound feed (Table 1) it can be seen that wheat flour achieved a very good output in 2003, but from then on I can report on rather modest figures. Export dropped to 22 thousand, and even to 14 thousand tons/year, and unfortunately it would not grow in 2006 either. In fact, Romania happens to be our main export market for flour. The bad situation of the Hungarian flour milling industry is shown by the fact that it cannot even calculate with exports reaching twenty thousand tons, which is only a rounded figure compared to more than a million tons of grain usage. The 2003 export which may be regarded as a significant one was generated by the Romanian shortage. The same applies to bran, the export possibilities of which have become rather marginal by now. The export of maize flour and grist was not high even in 2003, but unfortunately a 100 per cent fall could be experienced in these products last year. As far as the compound feeds are concerned, there is a slight increase. Dog and cat foods were contributed to it, as there has been a growing demand for pet food.

Slow growth can be experienced in the case of other processed products that include everything from muesli bars to the most diverse grain-based goods, but unfortunately not even the total quantity is significant.

A slight tendency of growth is to be observed in the case of compound feeds and other processed products, it is a consequence of wider choice, but as far as the main products are concerned, such as wheat flour and maize flour, the figures are expressly modest at present. It should be added to the assessment of the turnover and the possibilities that currently there are contingents and customs duties limiting import. The elimination of customs barriers may be of beneficial effect in this respect too.

Differences in Market Prices

Obviously, the market opportunities are fundamentally influenced by the prices that have evolved in the two countries. In the first week of April 2006 the so-called transfer, wholesale price without VAT of flour calculated in Hungarian forints was 7–8% higher in the case of lower quality, and 18–20% higher in the case of better quality in Romania. At that time the flour type 550 had a price within HUF 43–48. The price of the so-called lower quality flours (bread flour) was between 37 and 42 HUF/kg.

It should be noted here, that, unfortunately, the transfer price of the good quality flour was between 37 and 42 HUF/kg in Hungary, in the domestic market. It means that flour prices were higher in Romania in April 2006. It is supported also by the price of wheat in Romania, where that of the lower quality wheat was between 27–28 thousand HUF/t. Better quality wheat should be mixed to it in order to produce goods corresponding to the Hungarian standards and the quality requirements of bakery products, but import restrictions and solvent demand create barriers.

The difference between the Hungarian and the Romanian prices of compound feed is astounding. The Hungarian reality today is that the producers sell maize for HUF twenty-five thousand, because they are busy with intervention (even storage is given to the offered maize supplied hence good rental is also earned), and they are not interested in the market at all. At the same time the price of maize is between 12 and 17 thousand HUF/ton in Romania, which is a significant advantage to Romanian livestock breeders. This price would encourage imports from Romania to Hungary, but turnover is moderate because of trade barriers.

Export of Unprocessed Grain

The year 2003 had a weak crop, particularly in Romania, which promoted Hungarian export. In addition this was our last year outside the European Union. Membership influences the entire Hungarian grain market significantly, the situation of prices, and the high intervention price hinders export.

The export of wheat from Hungary to Romania plays primarily the role of quality improvement, excepting 2003, a year of extraordinary shortage, when an absolute shortage evolved in Romania (Table 2). I am sure that Hungarian wheat may primarily have a so-called quality-improving role in Romania in the future, too.

At the same time it should be added that since our accession to the EU no one is encouraged by the market situation and by the economic environment to make significant efforts for exports in a year of a so-called normal crop (or even in a year of good crop like in 2005), because the intervention price determines the market prices. Logistics costs are significant. The intervention price-level together with the logistics costs approximate and even reach the price levels obtainable in Romania. I estimate export possibilities at 140–150 thousand tons annually, which is the aggregate of the so-called margin transactions. A ’margin transaction’ is when the businessman finds the price margin of 500 or 1000 HUF/ton for which he produces something. There is no opportunity for major contracts, instead the partners are seeking out each other, they are looking for the ’margin’ and watch out to find a small price margin, hence the above quantity is built up by lots of small transactions. Not like earlier when this trade could be carried on by contracting for big transactions.

Average Yields, the Intervention System

Table 3 shows that the average yields of wheat and maize of Romania are extremely low: it is 2.5–2.6 t/ha for wheat (half of the Hungarian one), and 2.8–3.25 t/ha of maize, but it is less fluctuating than in the case of wheat. Why is it important to pay attention to the average yields?

The worst year of Romania for the total of grain production was 2003, when ten million tons could hardly be harvested. In a good year Romania has crop of about 14 million tons which is above the domestic needs. The fluctuations of crops are about the same as in Hungary, as unfortunately we are also far from the practice of optimal input.

Studying the impact of EU-membership on Romanian grain production, the role of direct payments and the price stability based on intervention should be considered. In my opinion the input would grow as a result of better and safer incomes. In case the additional input brought about half a ton of crop growth in the coming years (as presumably the 50 kg of fertilizer input would be increased to 60 or 70 kilos) then more than two million tons of additional crop would be achieved. Romania has been a net wheat exporter in mediocre and good years. Market stability and the possibility of higher incomes would, by all means, create an opportunity for improving the conditions of production.

(The Hungarian experience, though, is different: the Hungarian producer does not use the money received for the causal and optimal expansion of production, but would immediately realise and extract that money. In our country neither quality improvement nor quantitative growth has resulted from surplus receipts.)

Let us assume that we are not identical and it is not unlikely to expect growth in Romania in view of the low levels of production.

The accession of Romania and its increasing production would, therefore increase grain surplus in the EU.

The situation can be assessed widely differently in the case of wheat and maize. The author of this article expects that quantitative growth would not be accompanied by a quality breakthrough in the case of wheat. Here once again the Hungarian example should be quoted. The system of intervention for wheat, which is presumably to stay on for long in the Union, is expressly against quality. If a Hungarian producer does not think about caring for quality why should a Romanian one think differently when he can also have access to the same possibility of intervention? In addition their ecological conditions are less favourable for the quality production of wheat. Consequently, I do not expect major changes in the field of quality wheat production in Romania at least not as long as the present system of intervention remains in operation.

In fact this could offer us market opportunities in Romania provided our production of quality wheat would not decline and we would at least preserve the standard we have had so far. Hopefully, Hungarian quality wheat production would rather expand.

In the case of maize I am of the view that Romania has a big production potential, it possesses sizeable territory, and if Romania improves its average yield in no time it can become a very serious competitor for us in the Greek market, for it is in a more advantageous position due to its geographical location. Greece happens to be an extremely important maize market for us and its loss would be a highly sensitive one.

Maize production would be extremely promoted by the 47-100% higher intervention price (depending on whether we compare it to the current twelve thousand or seventeen thousand HUF/t prices). And the level of intervention price would hinder the Romanian maize export less than the Hungarian one due to their lower logistics costs.

I think that due to higher maize prices livestock breeding is facing serious difficulties in Romania, too. The present HUF twenty-five thousand intervention price of maize places Hungarian animal husbandry into a major disadvantage. In my understanding a lower Hungarian price of maize supported animal husbandry in the earlier years (prior to the EU accession). The `support’, however, should be put in inverted commas. The price of maize, which was lower than the European prize, was able to compensate for the additional cost of protein import, which was not due to the clumsiness of Hungarian importers but to the fact that Hungary is farther away from the seaports. This difference was more or less compensated by a lower price of maize.

In Romania, seeing what ’support’ is given to livestock breeding by cheap maize this ’support’ would disappear in no time if intervention is introduced there, too, and they would lose the advantage they have at present.

Intervention, however, can only have a price-increasing effect if the countries concerned can prepare their set of institutions for it. Presumably there is a chance for Romania not to close a year of intervention we had in 2004, but only if they produce something that is by itself enough to ’prop up’ the market.

Studying the achievement of the intervention season of 2005–2006, today it is in full play in practice that the intervention price and system prop up the market, and this determines the prices. And this is going to happen in Romania, too.

Romanian Livestock Breeding and Meat Consumption

In the following there are some pieces of information on Romanian livestock breeding and meat consumption, expressly from the angle of the fact that a larger part of grain is used in animal husbandry. First of all, as contrasted to the daily Hungarian realities, today the integrated production in percentage as in its totality is far more characteristic of the Romanian economy, of animal products than in Hungary. There are 78 integrations in the broiler branch, of which 33 are of significant size. 40–42% of the domestic consumption of chicken and pork originate from import.

The import of chicken meat is 158 thousand tons/year, of which 92 thousand tons come from the USA and 42 thousand tons from Brazil. The Romanian import of poultry is decreasing parallel to the growth of domestic production but it is still significant. Parallel to EU-membership it is impossible to ’rewrite’ these imports. It is not realistic to expect that their imports would be replaced by shipments from member states, and that the efficient Hungarian poultry industry would penetrate the Romanian economy. The customs protection of the EU, as reflected by the WTO negotiations, would get increasingly unable to keep away competitive goods coming from outside the Union.

There have been extraordinary developments in the pig industry of Romania and the continuation of this trend is expected in the future, too. This is something one should definitely pay attention to. Currently the purchase price of pig is 300–400 HUF/kg, to which 70 HUF/kg of animal welfare support is ensured. If somebody is somewhat familiar with pork production he/she would presumably agree with me when I say that a price income of 370–410 HUF/kg is quite attractive for the producer. Romanian poultry production is also heavily subsidized, and the extent of support reaches 104 HUF/kg.

The Hungarian firms working also in Romania find that the entire system of preparation is far more concentrated, better considered and more flexible than the Hungarian practice was. It is said by Hungarian companies, market actors who had gone through preparation for the EU as it happened, and now experience what happens there through their Romanian firms. These market actors say that the SAPARD programme has been functioning in an organised way. The very same people had strongly criticised it, therefore their attitude is well known, and they are not at all conditioned for praising anything unilaterally.

Summing up the situation of animal husbandry, it can be said that a support system promoting Romanian preparation is in operation in animal husbandry, in sectors that are large concentrate consumers. It can be inferred that this would significantly reduce their import-dependency, and their livestock would move in a tolerable or acceptable direction of competitiveness. The sweeping impetus by which presumably “cheap import would flood Romania” may somewhat hamper this development. It should not be forgotten that if exporter countries regard the Romanian market as draining surpluses, even market distortion may occur.

If the Hungarian milling industry is going to regard the Romanian market as a drain for surpluses or a promoter of the better utilisation of its capacity after the accession, for there would be no customs protection anymore, then I believe that the flour mills near the border in a distance of 100–150 km would have possibilities in the Romanian market, but that could also cause serious disturbances there.

*

The elimination of customs borders would only promote significant turnover of grain from a market aspect if there emerges an absolute shortage in the Romanian market due to the weather. Thus, the opening of the market cannot be expected neither that large quantities of Hungarian grain and its products could be dumped there. As intervention does not encourage quality, it cannot be assumed that a qualitative improvement of wheat would take place in Romania. Presumably the continuous and slow growth of the demanding Romanian purchasing power will have to be served with eminently processed goods slowly and with enduring work, possibly with the help of wheat or flour imported for quality improvement.

In the case of further processed products and their sale the spread of chains of department stores should be kept in mind. The so-called listings may not only cover a country, but often entire regions (Central Europe) and even the whole of Europe.

The spread of the chains of department stores in Romania also enhances the opportunities of the sale of products listed in Hungary. At any rate, mass products and less processed ones are highly sensitive to logistics costs, hence in this case it is more realistic to formulate short-term goals.

The growing Romanian maize production may cause problems for us in the Greek market. In relation to pig rising and slaughtering many people may have read about the giant slaughterhouse of Timişoara, etc. Apparently the ‘game’ is not over. It may bring about the growth of the export of live pigs from Hungary, which we already have, but it is also possible that their production would grow slower than the demand.

I have mentioned that the Hungarian flour mills may even appear in the Romanian market with aggressive prices in order to utilise their surplus capacity. Our domestic investors of the grain industry would become more interested if the administrative barriers disappear, and they may also produce at favourable costs. We must also take into consideration that they may be active in a market where, at least in an area of significant-size they do not have to wrestle with basic language obstacles.

The accession of Romania does not automatically yield the enlargement of the market, but modest results can be achieved with tenacious work. With its accession, however, the grain surplus of the EU would grow and it would press for the reform of grain policy as well.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 28:7–21.

FERENC GLATZ

Balkan Policy and the Renaissance of Balkan Studies 2005

I. Changes in Foreign Political Thinking

1. The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Beyond the Two Millennia-Old Borders

The Europe policy of the coming decade will be about two issues of world historical and one of continental dimensions. The first one is about the new world economic and power political positioning of the continent (the US, Middle East, China). The second one would be continental and about the internal administrative, social and cultural structure of the Union. The third one is about South-Eastern Europe and the Balkan region within it. Now we would speak about the third one, about the scene of the Southeast European enlargement of the Union, and about the region called the Balkans.

Up to 2004 the enlargement of the European Union covered areas that have been linked to major West European integrative political entities by closer or looser political organisations (and cultural and religious ones) for two thousand years. (The map of the archaeological sites of the so-called Halstatt culture, beginning in about 800 B.C. almost perfectly covers the map of the present European Union. And cultures of common roots, such as Western Christianity, and even organisations of territorial administration, states based on similar principles have been alive to this day.) From 2004 on the European Union went beyond the borders of the former Holy Roman Empire, but included as yet only territories of Western Christian culture and traditional political institutions.

From 2007 on, however, the European Union has accepted the accession of societies of different political culture, different religion and customs. The years 2004 and 2007 are key dates in the history of the European continent and European culture. The new territories are going to influence the future of Europe as a whole. They will affect even the structure of the Union.

With the eastern enlargement of the European Union the peoples of the Carpathian basin and of the Danube valley have been included into a new world economic and cultural sphere of interest.

On 1 May 2004 ten states of Eastern Europe joined the European Union, including two states of the Carpathian basin, namely Slovakia and Hungary. In April 2005 the European Union signed Accession Treaties with Bulgaria and Romania, and put their accession to the Union in the perspective of the year 2007. On 3 October 2005 negotiations were opened with Croatia and Turkey, and preparations were begun for stabilisation and accession pacts with Serbia-Montenegro. The analysis and assessment of the south-eastern space (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo) is under progress to find out how far they meet the Union criteria fixed in 1993 (in Copenhagen). It is clear from the statements of Union leaders that the Union is not planning to include further states in the negotiations preparing for admission beside the states of the region.*

Now already 25 states are participating in the enlargement of the Union. As experience gathered so far shows the admission of the new countries means an active role for states located in the region neighbouring the candidates. (This is called ’new neighbourhood policy’.) It also offers new opportunities to individuals, to citizens living in the neighbourhood of the region of candidate countries. Enlargement is also a challenge for the entrepreneurial strata as well as for intellectuals. Hungary and the other states contiguous with the Balkan region have to reconsider their foreign political directions, including those of economic, transport and cultural policy. It is recommended to widen their radius of movement that became one-sided after 1990 and oriented to Western Europe, to include the Southeast European (Balkan) space in order to utilise opportunities and because of the new competitive situation.

2. Economic-Military Interests and Research

Presumably with the enlargement of the European Union the Southeast European space would attract not only the researchers of international politics and investors, but also those interested in the society and culture.

During the past one thousand years the region was a field of military and strategic conflicts. It was the region of conflicts at first between Roman and Byzantine Christianity and the power alliances built on them (1054–1453), next between the Ottoman and the Western and Orthodox Christian world (1453–1878), and, finally, between the Soviet and the Western spheres of interest (1945–1992).

World interest in the region naturally followed military and political interests.

1878–1920. After the withdrawal of the Turkish Empire (1878) the region attracted the attention of British, French and German (also Austrian and Hungarian) researchers. In addition to the traditional British interest (in Greece) this led to German, Austrian and Hungarian scholarly activities in South-Eastern Europe (1878–1920). (History, archaeology, ethnography, geography.)

1920–1992. At the time of the expansion of the Soviet zone and the existence of Yugoslavia attention shown toward the region (1920–1992) was determined and nourished by interest in the Soviet Union. It resulted in a general attention towards Slav peoples, and Balkan studies in particular, in the development of institutes, conferences, etc., all over the world. (Mention should be made particularly of research into South-Eastern Europe with its centre in Munich which was originally launched with a programme of research into the German minorities in South-Eastern Europe, but became much broader and complex, which has produced the most fundamental historical manuals from 1934 to this date.) We regard the Austrian researches into Southeast Europe equally important: the activities of the institutes of the Universities of Vienna and Graz and of the Österreichische Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut (OSI) in Vienna.

1992–2007. After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1992) these researches slumped all over the world, research workshops disintegrated, because the states did not find it a ’strategic aim’ to ’support’ experts, their periodicals and institutes dealing with the space with the money of the state. (An exception is Munich.) It is true that a lot of political analyses were produced about the Balkan crisis of 1992–1999, but it could not keep the earlier institutions of ’East European Research’ alive. General interest in the Russians and in the peoples of the Balkans decreased in the US as well as in Western Europe, not speaking about the small occupied states of the former Soviet zone (such as Hungary). The rearrangement of the global power system has also contributed to it: international investors and military-political state strategists alike have been focusing on the growing strength of the Far Eastern space, and mostly of China.

Now, or after 2007 the situation may change. South-Eastern Europe would still remain a field of direct conflict between Russian interests and the NATO. This factor would undeniably influence and even promote the admission of the states of this region to the EU and NATO. Yet the main characteristic of the region would be its attachment to the Union. This fact would revaluate South-Eastern Europe for the market of goods and capital and for world economy. Just as with progress in consolidation Russia would also attract more the attention of Far Eastern as well as EU entrepreneurs than today.

No matter what the economic, military and political future would bring about, surely enlargement and integration would once again provoke attention towards the region, and would create research institutes, chairs and projects monitoring and analysing the region.

3. Promoting Interest of Eastern Europe

There is a need for change in Hungarian foreign political thinking today. Preserving the linkages to Western Europe of three hundred years, we have to help the birth of a new, general interest of Eastern Europe in South-Eastern Europe. Our assumption is that the eastern enlargement of the Union and the new Southeast European processes of integration will change not only the political environment of the Hungarian state but also the daily life of the country’s inhabitants.

In the next decade the ’main route’ of European politics would go through Hungary. New challenges, competition and opportunities would be opening up for citizens of states located in the region as well as of contiguous states (Germans, Austrians, Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, Italians, etc.). Therefore it has to be explored what competitive situation and mutual investments would be made possible in the next decade. We have to build new institutions for the dissemination of knowledge. We repeat: in the next decade European policy will be partly about rivalries between continents and partly about the relationship between Western Europe and South-Eastern as well as Eastern Europe. It will be forced out by considerations of the environment, energy, gaining markets and investments. (It is already visible.) Hungary is one of the gateways to the Russian as well as the Balkan region. It is in the interest of everybody that we perform this gateway function intelligently and in a cultured manner.

II. The Promotion of Research into South-Eastern Europe

1. Hungary’s Interest and the Possibilities of Hungarian Researchers

The history of Hungarians and of the Hungarian state has been closely intertwined with the history of the peoples and states of the Balkan region.

Several such peoples (Romanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, etc.) lived inside the Hungarian state the majority of whom were located southeast of the state. Yet, after the expulsion of the Turks (1690) Hungarian foreign policy and political thinking took a one-sided West European direction. It had understandable reasons, for it lived in a common body politic with Austria. It was also attracted by a more developed technical and economic standard: in the 18th and 19th centuries Western Europe was the centre of the modernisation of the world. It was also linked to that orientation by Christian ideology and its institutions, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, determining one thousand years of intellectual and political thinking. Yet, after the liberation of the Balkans (1878) the Hungarian state, a constituent of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, began an active Balkan-policy which was part of the Southeast European interest-sphere policy of the Monarchy. This political activation had also led to laying the foundations of learning about the Balkans in Hungary. It is commonly known that the ’Hungarian lobby’ represented the position of national and religious tolerance in the foreign policy of the Monarchy. The reason was that the Carpathian basin itself was also a multinational and multilingual area. Similar views were represented by the politician Benjámin Kállay as well as by Lajos Thallóczy, who pressed for regular Balkan studies and himself understood the region well. Between 1900 and 1914 little was realised of these research plans conceived at the beginning of the century. It was due to the fact that only a tiny group of the political elite knew the ethnic, religious specificities and customs of the Southeast European space that the Slav peoples of the Hungarian state and of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Romanians wanted to quit the common state.

The thinking of Hungarian intellectuals was attracted to Western Europe after 1920 by the fact that the thousand-year-old Hungarian state disintegrated in 1918–1920. The historical body politic lost two thirds of its territory. The intellectuals of the age thought that it disintegrated mostly as a consequence of the policy of the Western Great Powers. (They did not want to consider that the causes of disintegration were to be looked for in local ethnic and social as well as political problems.) The stratum of Hungarian politicians and the intellectuals wanted to regain lost territories with the help of the Western Great Powers. This trend of foreign policy and public thinking did not favour researches into the Balkans, and the spread of learning about the Balkans in general. Moreover, the new southern (Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom) and the south-eastern neighbours (Romania) became important enemies of Hungary. (The ’modest’ institute organised in the University of Pécs was an exception.)

After 1945 Hungary found itself in ’forced friendship’ with its Southeast European neighbours in the Soviet zone. This friendship had a dual result: it partly helped the institutionalisation of Balkan studies, and partly, under pressure, intellectuals did not sense the real importance of knowledge related to the Balkans. ’Forced friendship’ encouraged reality: part of the intellectuals set up cultural and scientific societies linking our foreign political thinking with our Southeast European neighbours. East European and Slavic studies were pursued at the universities and through them we could get acquainted with our Southeast European neighbours and we could converse with them. Several experts found a livelihood in studying Balkan culture. At the same time this ’forced friendship’ had the disadvantage (just as the introduction of Russian language, too) that the knowledge about the Balkans and Eastern Europe in general was brought on us by political pressure. Society regarded this new culture as the product of the political system forced upon us. Thus after the collapse of the political system and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops research into Eastern and South-Eastern Europe became ’old-fashioned’. (The knowledge of the Slavic languages of the neighbouring countries also decreased in general.)

2. The Emancipation of Regional Researches

One can only remember with respect and gratitude those West European, British, German, French, and American as well as Russian scholars who wrote analytical papers and comprehensive works on the Southeast European space, and edited the relevant periodicals during the past one and a half centuries. At the same time researchers of the local states have produced an enormous quantity of historical, ethnographic, musicological, literary and economic analyses and detailed studies. Yet synthesising and comparative approach was left to be done by foreign colleagues. Researchers living in the region rarely found each other; they mostly supplied primary material to the summaries made in the West. This is a deficit of the local research organisations. (One of the causes of this deficit may be found in the local and nation-state animosities.)

As preparations for the eastern enlargement of the European Union, synthesising and comparative programmes may be launched, together with locally operating institutes and periodicals. A networking of researchers and their respective institutes active in the region is necessary. We have several networks in mind, evolving by themes. Several synthesising research programmes running parallel are needed in natural science, economics, historiography, ethnography, political science, etc.

The education of the new generations of researchers in every specialisation is considered as a primary objective. We expect the growth of a new generation of Balkan researchers. The new Centre for Balkan Studies in Budapest also wishes to promote the education of the rising generation. Its basic institutions are a private and an academic one. One is the Europe Institute Budapest (founded in 1990), which is based hundred per cent on private capital, and receives postgraduate researchers from all parts of the world. It has flats for visiting professors and a young researchers’ hostel of its own. The other basic institution is the Social Science Research Centre of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Strategic Research Programme of the HAS. Presumably there would be a large number of initiatives similar to ours in the coming decade in the states of the region, and the network of the institutions of Balkan studies would be built with specialised faculties, periodicals, institutes and learned societies.

III. A Research Hypothesis

1. On Our Concept of the Balkans

The concept of South-Eastern Europe comprises the Carpathian basin and the ’Balkans’ southeast of the Danube and the Carpathian mountains.

At first every research has to define its spatial and time frame. It has to be done even if those limits of time and space may be challenged. And even if we know that precisely during the course of research we are going to modify the time frame and the geographic borders. Our research target is the space stretching southeast from the Carpathian basin to the seas. We label the space as ’Balkans’, originating from a nineteenth-century European geographer. (He took the name of the Balkan mountain in Bulgaria and we adopt it now.) We use the category of physical geography which draws the northern border of the Balkan region at the line of the Rivers Drava and Sava, the Southern Carpathians and the Danube. Thus the territory of present-day Croatia as well as Greece is included in it, but Romania only tangentially (Figure 1). But the constricted, cultural and historical interpretation of our research target is also accepted. In that case the dividing line should be the four hundred years of Ottoman Turkish occupation. (It shut off the major Western intellectual trends, such as Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment from the region.) The separation of Western Christianity from the Eastern (Orthodox) one may just as well be a determinant of the cultural region. (Then, in this case Croatia would rather belong to Central Europe, Romania would belong partly to Central Europe and partly to the Balkans.)

Naturally we are aware of the heated scholarly and political debates of the past two hundred years about the concepts of ’Southeast Europe’, and the ’Balkans’. We know that the ’Balkan’ concept of intellectuals living in Western Europe was not simply a geographical connotation. This is how peoples living West of the region and regarding themselves as more advanced and located under well-ordered political conditions wished to distinguish themselves from their south-eastern neighbours. The term ’Balkan’ was used and in some circles of intellectuals is still used as a synonym of ’lack of culture’, ’corruption’, ’political anarchy’ and a ’powder keg’. The historiography and the politicians of peoples living in the space called Balkans on the other hand, wished to stress that they belonged (or wanted to belong) to the intellectually, technically and economically stronger Western peoples. Therefore they did not like to be called ’Balkan’ people.

We do not use by any means the name ’Balkan’ as a category indicating ’quality’. For us the Balkan region is a uniquely colourful geographic and social unit if its specificities of physical geography, the ethnic and religious composition of its population, or its settlement system is viewed.

2. Geographic and Cultural Diversity

The marked articulation of the surface plays a major role in the conservation of ethnic and religions diversity (Figure 2), which had an important function in the development of small and isolated communities. It lends a special feature to the location of the Balkans among the ’major spaces’ of the continent. Namely, it is a dividing as well as linking territory between Europe and Asia Minor. This is what determined and still determines its features within world economy.

It was the result of this location that the region was the western border area of the Turkish Empire for five hundred years, a territory in almost constant contact with the Holy Roman and the Turkish Empires. In addition to its geographic location it is this five hundred years of history which is the other factor that determined and still continues to determine the social articulation and ethnic-religious diversity of the space. It is inhabited by an ethnically uniquely mixed population of Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Muslim religion. (Just as the population along the borders of major economic and political empires has been mixed because of constant intercourse in all parts of the world.)

The tolerant nature of five hundred years of Turkish rule is the third factor that has caused the survival of ethnic and religious diversity (the unique cultural diversity of the region). The Turkish Empire was far more tolerant towards ethnic and religious differences than the West or East European Christian states were. It did not divest peoples living on its territory of their nationality as it was done by the major empires of Western Europe.

3. The Concept of 'Historical Osmosis’

The ethnic-religious diversity of peoples living at the border areas of different cultures, the differences in their customs as well as their mutual influence and mixing are well known social phenomena. The concept of ’historical osmosis’ is used to indicate them.

The phenomenon of osmosis is known from chemistry: the characteristics of two bodies mix and exist side by side at the outer rim (border areas) of the two bodies in constant touch. In case they mix (assimilate to each other: marry, or live together when moved to the same settlement) they produce a new quality. If not, they would live in constant tension. The whole of South-Eastern Europe is characterised by the co-existence and osmosis of the cultures and peoples representing Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and even Asia Minor.

The cultural diversity of the region is unique. Whatever was considered yesterday by our predecessors as ’backwardness’ we are today inclined to call ’specificity’, and ’a different kind of development’. We turn with distinguished interest towards the colourful culture of the region, and are also curious: would this miraculous diversity be tolerated by the technical modernisation of our age? Could the ethnic and religious diversity that resulted in constant warfare for six hundred years, now be one of the model areas of cultural diversity on the planet Earth in the 21st century?

Accession to the European Union would speed up technical and infrastructural development in the region, the mobility of the population would grow, and presumably the disintegration of traditional communities would also become faster. Traditions and religious linkages would disintegrate in daily life, ethnic mixing would be faster in the settlements and families, and as a result ethnic-religious tensions would dissolve. The question is what the outcome would be. Would it be the same that had taken place in the case of similarly mixed populations during the past two hundred years, for instance, in the Carpathian basin, as a result of which a uniquely mixed nation, the Hungarian emerged? The process that has resulted in a national culture of mixed ethnicity but singular language, namely Hungarian? Or, would the region be organised into cantons along the example of Switzerland, where the different linguistic and ethnic communities organise themselves into rigorously drawn territorial administrative units, but live side by side in an exemplary system of federal administration? Or, would there emerge a new kind of territorial organisation and administration that we still do not know?

IV. The Research Programme

1. The Centre for Balkan Studies (October 2005)

a. The aims of the Centre for Balkan Studies are:

– It wishes to promote the economic, social and political approximation of the Balkan region to the other regions of Central-Eastern Europe, to Hungary and to the European Union. It wishes to help Hungary and Hungarian researchers and entrepreneurs to take up roles in this process.

– It wishes to acquaint persons and institutions interested in the Balkan region with one another.

– It wishes to present the natural, economic, social and intellectual specificities of the Balkan region.

– The Centre would elaborate proposals for the political sphere concerning the mediating role of Hungary.

– The Centre as a virtual research institute offers a forum to researchers and entrepreneurs dealing with the Balkan region. It wishes to promote the regular co-operation of Hungarian and European researchers involved in the Balkan region.

– It wishes to promote the major cross-border projects of natural economy, production, commerce and infrastructure.

b. The means at the disposal of the Centre for Balkan Studies:

– It launches an internet periodical that would organise the co-operation of experts and those interested in the Balkans. It publishes papers together with the ’Observer’ updated monthly. (The periodical is launched in Hungarian but with summaries in English, German, and south Slavic languages).

– It regularly organises conferences and gets papers done in these topics.

– It publishes a series of booklets on the Balkan region. (1. The Concept of the Balkans; 2. Dayton; 3. Regional Rearrangement.)

– Association: “Friends of the Balkans.”

– The Centre engages itself in the long-term economic, social and environmental alternatives of the region and also of Hungary. It wishes to deal with issues of current foreign and security policy only tangentially. It offers partnership to the active political administration and its background institutions of the day. Daily politics is only a partial factor in our interest, but its importance is rather great: for it is a means of realising long-term opportunities.

The Centre pays special attention to the study of the interest of Hungary in the new regional integration.

c. Programme Council and programmes

The Programme Council of the Centre includes several leading personalities of scientific life, among them representatives of agricultural sciences, settlement studies, economics, transportation science, protection of the environment, water management, law, geography, minority research, political science and historiography.

Members:

– Members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences József Bayer (political science), Zoltán Bedő (agricultural science), György Enyedi (spatial development), Ferenc Glatz (Chairman, historical sciences), Béla Kádár (economics), Pál Michelberger (transportation), István Láng (environment), László Somlyódy (water management).

– Directors of institutes at universities and of the HAS: Margit Balogh (Church), András Inotai (economics), Sándor Kerekes (environmental management), Vanda Lamm (law), János Rechnitzer (spatial development), Zsolt Rostoványi (Middle East, international relations), Tamás Sárközy (economic law), Ferenc Schweitzer (geography), László Szarka (minority policy), Zoltán Szász (history). Managers of the programme: Attila Pók and Andrea Antal.

– Members of the Programme Committee: Erhard Busek, former Vice-Chancellor of Austria, Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Andrei Pleşu, former Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director of the Europe College in Bucharest, Dušan Kovač, Vice-President of the Slovakian Academy of Sciences, Arnold Suppan, President of the Institute for East and Southeast Europe in Vienna and Members of the HAS: Ferenc Glatz, Béla Kádár, György Enyedi, István Láng, Ernő Marosi.

–    

2. Intellectual and financial resources of the research programme

a. The Europe Institute Budapest

Ferenc Glatz, Director of the Europe Institute Budapest (founded in 1990, see: www.europainstitut.hu) proposed on 10 June 2005, at the meeting of the academic council to set up a Centre for Balkan Studies in Budapest. During the preparatory talks the National Programme for Strategic Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences joined the initiative together with the Social Science Research Centre of HAS and several noted Members of the HAS, university professors and public personalities.

Ever since its foundation in 1990 the Europe Institute Budapest has been continuously engaged in the topic of the eastern enlargement of the European Union. It has participated in several all-European projects studying eastern enlargement since 1991. Since its foundation it has been devoting special attention to the research and organisation of Hungary’s scientific and cultural relations with the East European and Southeast European space. The Institute receives scholarship-holders and visiting professors, a significant proportion of whom come from that space. It organises conferences and publishes a series of books in foreign languages (Begegnungen – Crossroads) the topics of which are related to the space. The Institute provides premises and infrastructure necessary to the organisation of the new Centre for Balkan Studies, it also finances the post of director and secretary, and it offers annually a 12-month fee for professors and 24 months of scholarships to postgraduates (in a residential hostel) engaged in Balkan research.

b. National Programme of Strategic Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

The National Programme of Strategic Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was launched in 1996 with the aim that “the societies” of Central Eastern Europe ”have to define jointly their common local interests in the major continental and intercontinental rearrangement. And these local interests should be asserted, if possible, at the European forums”. In 1997 the Programme elaborated plans on the level of the space about a regional ecological monitoring system, about a strategy of transport and water management, about the spatial development prospects of the Danube valley and the Plain. (They were published in monographs.) The concepts elaborated were not implemented partly because of the so-called ’Balkan wars’ (1999), and partly because of the lack of funds. The Programme Council of Strategic Studies took its position at its session on 25 June 2005 to support the setting up of the Centre for Balkan Studies. It finances conferences, the invitation of scholarship-holders, and publications. At the same time it recommended to the President of HAS the inclusion of the development of researches into the Balkans in the ideas of science policy of the Academy (young researchers, supporting projects, etc.).

c. Social Science Research Centre of HAS

The Social Science Research Centre of HAS comprises nine social science research institutes and two research groups. The Centre was set up to organise long-term enterprises in social sciences. It is headed by a Scientific Council. The 24 October 2005 session of the Scientific Council decided for supporting the programme and the directors of eight institutes of the Social Science Research Centre of HAS were ready to take up some office in the Programme Council (political science, historiography, law, sociology, ethnography, economy, archaeology, minority research).

The initiative was supported by the then Foreign Minister Mr Ferenc Somogyi, too, who accepted to give the introductory speech at the opening conference held on 15 November. Several supporters have come forward outside the Social Science Research Centre, such as the Institutes of Agricultural Science and Geography, as well as Corvinus University, the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Szent István University, some departments of ELTE University. The Programme expects the agricultural and industrial sphere (chambers) as well as the national organisations of entrepreneurs and financial institutions and of individual entrepreneurs to join in.

Literature

In addition to comments by György Enyedi, Emil Niederhauser and Zoltán Szász I have used, among others, the following works and I also recommend them for reading.

Castellan, Georges: History of the Balkans. From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin. East European Monographs. Columbia University Press, New York, 1992.

Hösch, Edgar: Geschichte des Balkans. Verlag C.H. Beck oHG. München, 2004.

Hösch, Edgar–Nehring, Karl–Sundhaussen, Holm (Hgg.): Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas. Wien u.a., 2004.

Haupchik, Dennis P.: The Balkans. From Constantinople to Communism. Palgrave, New York, 2001.

Janković, Branimir M.: The Balkans in International Relations. St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1988.

Johnson, Lonnie R.: Central Europe. Enemies, Neighbors, Friends. Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.

Juhász József: A délszláv háborúk (The South Slav Wars). Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1997.

Kaser, Karl: Südosteuropäische Geschichte und Geisteswissenschaft. 2., völlig neu bearbeitete und aktualisierte Auflage. Böhlau Verlag, Wien, Köln, Weimar, 2002.

Kocsis Károly (ed.). Délkelet-Európa térképekben (Southeast Europe on Maps). Institute of Geography of HAS, Kossuth Kiadó Rt., Budapest, 2005.

Krausz Tamás (ed.): A Balkán-háborúk és a nagyhatalmak. Rigómezőtől Koszovóig. Történeti és politológiai előadások. (The Balkan Wars and the Great Powers. From Kosovo Pole to Kosovo. Historical and political science lectures.) Politikatörténeti Füzetek XIII. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1999.

Palotás Emil: A nemzetállamiság alternatívái a Balkánon a 19. század végén – 20. század elején (Alternatives of the Nation State in the Balkans in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries). História Könyvtár. Előadások a történettudomány műhelyeibõl 10. História–MTA Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest, 1999.

Plachka, Richard G.–Mack, Karlheinz (Hgg.): Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum. Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Instituts. Band 3., Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, München, 1970.

Romsics Ignác: Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam. Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században (Nation, Nationality and State. In East-Central and Southeast Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries.) Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1998.

Seewann, Gerhard–Dippold Péter (Hgg.): Bibliographisches Handbuch der ethnischen Gruppen Südosteuropas. 2 Bände. Südosteuropa-Bibliographie. Ergänzungsband 3. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1997.

Terzić, Slavenko (ed.): Europe at the Crossroads. New Walls or a United Europe. Collection of Works. Volume 17. The International Round Table, Belgrade, April 28–29 1999. Historical Institute, Belgrade, 1999.

Internet sources:

Szerződés az Európai Unió tagállamai, valamint a Bolgár Köztársaság és Románia között az Európai Unióhoz történő csatlakozásról. (Treaty between the Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria and Romaniaon Accession to the European Union) Az Európai Unió Hivatalos Lapja. 2005.06.21. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/hu/oj/2005/ l_157/ l_15720050621hu00110027.pdf

Monitoring report on the state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania. Brussels, 26.9.2006. http://ec.europa.hu/enlargement/pdf/ key_documents/2006/sept/report_bg_ro_2006_en.pdf.

May 2006 Monitoring Report on Bulgaria’s preparedness for EU accession. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_report_bg_en.pdf

May 2006 Monitoring Report on Romania. Preparations for EU accession. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/monitoring_ report_ro_en.pdf.

Bulgaria 2005. Comprehensive Monitoring Report. (2005.10.15) http://ec. europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/ sec1352_cmr_master_bg_college_en.pdf.

Romania 2005. Comprehensive Monitoring Report. (2005.10.15) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/sec1354_cmr_master_ro_college_en.pdf.