Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:43–50.

ANDRÁS INOTAI

The Dilemmas of the Southeast European (West Balkan) Policy of the EU

In 2003 the European Union gave green light to all the West Balkans countries to accession. In Thessaloniki the road was opened, at least on paper, towards full membership. If it is examined, however, where the different countries stand along that road now, various grades have to be distinguished. If Romania and Bulgaria are also included in the Balkans and we do not only speak about the Western Balkans, moreover, if we also include Greece and Slovenia under this heading, we will see that this process started with the accession of Greece a quarter of a century ago, in 1981. This chain continued after more than two decades with the accession of Slovenia in 2004, and of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Those (currently) outside represent various grades of the process of integration. Croatia began talks in 2005. There are various hopes and ideas about when those processes can be completed. Macedonia has actually completed the phase prior to accession but it is still not given a date up to now for the beginning of accession talks. When the European Union elaborated its Balkan policy it practically launched a stabilisation and association process, as a result of which the so-called stabilisation and association agreements may be concluded. Such an agreement was already signed with Albania, and as a result of rapid talks it is waiting for ratification with Montenegro. Bosnia and Herzegovina could have also reached this stage, if the internal reform concerning the police was accomplished up to the deadline of March 2007. Since it is missing that ‘entity’ of the Western Balkans remains on the waiting list. Talks have begun with Serbia too in several phases. Since the Serbs did not extradite all war criminals, though it was one of the basic preconditions of the above accord, the European Union terminated negotiations in May 2006. Now they have been reopened but the conditions did not change. Further on, there is one area, namely Kosovo, with which the Union has no institutional relationship whatsoever for the time being.¹ Thus an extremely broad and colourful fabric unfolds, the management of which simultaneously requires the assessment of merits and individual progress and the maintenance of a certain extent of critical mass of regional stability. No doubt that any diversion from it could cause serious problems of balance, either in the form of social tension in countries producing better results or between countries on a regional level.

In my introduction I wish to mention that these countries, and now I only refer to the West Balkans, practically cannot be treated by the analogy of Central and Eastern European development. There are several areas that draw different paths of development; consequently they require different sets of tools and occasionally even different aims.

One basic question is whether there are any states capable of functioning in the Western Balkans, whether such states have emerged. Croatia can be regarded as a state capable of functioning. There are, however, weak countries next to it, like Macedonia and Montenegro. There are international protectorates such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. And there is a fragmentary country, Serbia which has been experiencing its own Trianon in these years. Its consequences, as it is known from Hungarian history and from the development of social consciousness, usually do not disappear within half a generation.

All in all, it is not developed nation-states that wish to accede to the European Union, but countries just building their state and experiencing successful or failing processes during that process. At the same time the economic and social transformation is not taking place along the Eastern and Central European pattern either because all those countries live in the captivity of the ex-Yugoslav economic mechanism even today, which is one of the highly dangerous traps of further development, either with regard to trade policy, the reception of foreign direct capital, or several legal regulations. All this is the legacy of the successful Yugoslavia of the seventies, which was said to be a success in the then divided Europe. This, however, and this is the trap situation, has become an element expressly pulling back, a retrograde factor hindering development in a unifying Europe. This situation (should) be overcome by all the West Balkan states. The differences are obvious if one views the Czech Republic, Hungary or Slovakia, not mentioning the others. The differences are clear in respect of the volume and structure of exports, in the balance of foreign trade, in the role of foreign capital, but also in the structural transformation of domestic economy (or rather in the lack of it), in the philosophy and practice of privatisation, in the size of unemployment, in migration, etc.

Finally, the question emerges how far it is possible to build the state and meet those criteria of the European Union simultaneously that would require a modern, functioning institutional structure of the West European type. It is a question whether the building of the state, i.e. the building of a successfully functioning state, would be accelerated by the promise of membership, namely, would it be speeded up in the right structure, or would it rather create an institutional vacuum because those countries are unable to meet the requirements due to their internal conditions and shortcomings, at least for the time being?

The dilemmas of the Union can be practically grouped around two major sets of questions. One is the regatta principle, and the other one is the principle of conditionality. The regatta principle is based on the fact that there are several countries at different levels of development among which differentiation is to be made on the basis of merits. This kind of differentiation, however, may contradict the requirement of regional stability. Therefore, if one country steps forward the other country is also given some kind of bonus irrespective of whether it has accomplished some result or not. A typical case was the opening of talks with Croatia, which was strongly linked to the ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Albania, with a country that had by far not fulfilled the requirements that are supposed to be met before the conclusion of the agreement only three months earlier, as the documents of the Commission of the European Union showed.

Remaining still with the regatta principle, a further question is how far the European Union approach can be applied that had functioned so well in Central and Eastern Europe, in the case of which the European Union as an anchor of external modernisation, stabilisation and development played a highly important role in achieving that those economic, social and institutional changes had taken place rapidly, as a result of which full membership became possible. It is not sure that this process would function in the same way in the Balkans. It is not sure that rewarding and punishing would always have the same effect as in Central Europe. In case someone is excessively punished or someone who should be rewarded cannot receive reward because of the priority of regional stability, the credibility of the European Union will be endangered. European integration may even become captive of its own Balkan policy in a pitched situation. A classic example of it was the erosion and even reversal of the principle, which is associated with the name of Michael Steiner, the former High Representative in Kosovo. He was quite clear when he stated that the countries of the region had to fulfil standards and observe certain rules at first. One could only talk about the issue of status, i.e. the institutional status of relations with the European Union if those preconditions were met. In reality, however, this order (standards before status) was not realised and not even its reverse (status before standards) was accomplished, but a condition of ‘status without standards’ was achieved.

It is commonly known that the enlargement policy of the EU was linked to certain conditions right from the outset. There were two of them in the Treaty of Rome. One condition was that the country had to be a European one, and the other one was that only a democratic country could accede.

These criteria were extended already before the accession talks with Central and Eastern European countries in Copenhagen in 1993. There were many more requirements to be met, as it is reflected by the Copenhagen criteria well known by all. Further on, the opening of talks with Bulgaria and Romania in early 2000 were made a precondition of whether Romanian and Bulgarian politics were ready to meet the requirements of the European Union in some specific areas. In Bulgaria it was the closing down of the nuclear power station, a highly debated issue to this day, and in Romania it was the issue of the orphanages.

It is natural that the criteria of admission to the European Union have been constantly changing. They are changing because the European Union itself is developing. The so-called acquis communautaire has been expanding and the later a country accedes, the more community legal regulations it has to accept. This was experienced also by Hungary during the accession talks. We had to negotiate about a community law of 90 thousand pages while Spain and Portugal had to wade through ‘only’ 40 thousand pages (of which issues related to agriculture alone constituted 36 thousand pages). Today the collection of legal norms extends over 120 thousand pages and it would only grow further in the coming years.

Another reason of the requirements becoming more rigorous and extensive is that the more states are members of the European Union the more autonomous, specific interests can be formulated, which have to be fitted somehow into the set of community criteria. In addition, and naturally not the least, the experiences of the latest enlargement are also incorporated in the set of criteria that countries wishing to accede in the future will have to face. In this context I wish to stress that Hungary, but also Bulgaria and Romania having acceded in 2007 have a major responsibility in how the set of criteria of the European Union and its absorption capacity would change in the coming years towards the countries of the Western Balkans. Thus the process of admission is not only the problem of the Western Balkans, because we are all in the same boat.

No doubt the specific Western Balkan situation has itself created a series of additional criteria that did not figure in our case, in the case of Central Europe. Political criteria have become far more rigorous with regard to the wars, the ethnic issues and the weak states in respect of corruption and organised crime. The conditions of the re-admittance of refugees also had to be fulfilled, not to mention the International Court of Justice of The Hague. Moreover, regional free trade among the countries of the region also figured as a precondition. The realisation of free trade among CEFTA countries was a recommendation in the official documents of the European Union, but it was not a precondition for the opening of negotiations or for their successful conclusion. In this respect (too) the changes of admission criteria are significant.

The so-called questions of detail are added to this, i.e. seemingly technical issues yet fundamentally influencing the process of negotiations. It is worth having a look at the current matrix of the accession talks with Croatia. Those negotiations have 12 phases. They include things like the benchmarks that a chapter can only be opened if prior to that the Croats have met certain requirements. And they can only be closed if the country complies with further conditions. In the Hungarian, Polish, Czech, etc. cases the deadline for the realisation of some of the conditions was the moment of accession, and in some cases even the transitory period after the acquisition of membership.

Last, but not the least an inevitable factor of the accession of the West Balkan countries to the EU is the constant change of European public opinion. Currently a rather widespread basis of reference against further enlargement is the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’. It is a difficult task to explain to and make understood by a significant part of West European public opinion that here it is not so much enlargement fatigue what is involved but rather West European inability to reform. Naturally, it is always easier to find external scapegoats instead of facing one’s own problems and to cast the blame on enlargement for the reform difficulties. The experiences of the years after 2004 do not at all support the view (or feeling) according to which the ‘fatigue’ of the European Union was provoked by problems and bottlenecks of European processes caused directly by enlargement.

One could devote more attention to the possibility of complying with requirements and the right proportions among the various preconditions but I cannot go into further details due to the lack of time. Yet I wish to stress a few points. One dilemma arises from the mutual relationship and order of stabilisation and the readiness for integration. Is this relationship based on the fact that European integration would ensure the necessary stability? Or is it only possible to move forward significantly towards integration after the achievement of adequate stability? According to the present rules of the European Union, protectorates, in other words not fully authorised states cannot be members of the Union. Could, then, this status of protectorate be wound up without the risk of grave instability in the case of Bosnia, and particularly, of Kosovo in the foreseeable future?

A further dilemma and a basic issue of contention for long years between the World Bank and the European Commission is the sequencing of catching-up. The starting point of the World Bank is that at first a country has to reach a certain level of economic development which would allow for the establishment of modern institutions. The European Union practically gives far reaching priority to the establishment of proper Union-conform institutions on its list of requirements. In reality a course of institutional development may create a significant economic vacuum in the case of a rather backward country. In other words, institutions can be set up but they cannot be filled with meaningful economic and social content. Another difference which holds true for us as well as for several other EU member countries is the contradiction between nominal and real convergence. A large proportion of the West Balkan countries do meet nominal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, but they will hardly be able to develop a competitive production and export structure in the foreseeable future (with the exception of tourism in some cases). Real convergence does not function at all while nominal convergence may function much better than, say, in the case of Hungary (where, as it is commonly known, between 2004 and 2007 did not function at all).

Is it true that regional free trade would eliminate problems and would heal the wounds of war, would moderate ethnic tensions and bring together the countries of the region? Money is known to be a great power and available money is capable of integrating markets as well as people and ideas. But it functions only if regional trade represents a decisively large proportion in the economic growth and social product of the various countries. This is not the case there. The countries of the Western Balkans are basically interested in free trade with the European Union because they carry out the vast majority of their export (of modest volume compared to Hungary) and import (of somewhat bigger volume) with the Union. The question is not only whether a framework agreement can be filled by goods and services. Sometimes goods and services are available but what happens to their flow if physical permeability among the countries is not ensured? In the disintegrated ex-Yugoslavia there are hardly any border crossing points. Customs officers play their little tricks against each other. Occasionally difficulties of visas crop up in the way of the very conclusion of a business contract. Here I do not refer to the national protectionist obstacles that we could also list in large numbers from the period of ‘free trade’ experienced in CEFTA. A true free trade came into existence only after our accession to the EU in May 2004. As a result, trade among the new member countries has grown by leaps and bounds during the past three years. The exports of Hungary to the countries that had acceded together with us in 2004 (without Bulgaria and Romania as yet) grew from 7.5 to 13% within the total of exports. Meanwhile the balance of trade with the given region turned from a deficit of 500 million euros to 1.2 billion surpluses. (This is a minor contribution to domestic debates about Hungarian competitiveness.)

The visa policy of the European Union is yet another dilemma. There are countries the citizens of which can freely go to the Member States of the European Union. Not only the newly acceded Romania and Bulgaria belong to this circle but Croatia as well, being the only one among the Western Balkan countries. At the same time there are highly different visa policies within the region itself. For instance, visa is compulsory for Albanians wherever they want to go, even within the region. It is a problem of equal importance with respect to the future, and it is often stated, primarily by Serbs, that 80% of the younger generations have not been in Western Europe. If we wish to create the generation of the future and its European contacts and European consciousness, this is not necessarily an ideal letter of reference. Generally speaking the view in relation to visa politics is that visas are needed because of corruption, international crime, etc. General experience, on the other hand, is that international crime usually has access to visas while the vast majority of ordinary citizens have not (or only with the help of corruption). With this logic, therefore, we practically punish honest citizens, an overwhelming proportion of the population of those countries, and in reality we are unable to screen the drug and arms trade and human trafficking which does not only have a supply side (see the West Balkan or Middle Eastern smuggling flowing through the Western Balkans) but also a demand side in various EU Member States. Without effective demand these flows in fact could not develop. Therefore I wish to see that the general policy of the European Union and its specific Balkan policy considered analysing and controlling not only the supply but also the demand side. For instance, on what grounds do Albanian networks of prostitution operate in London? Is the British police unable to intervene? Is that only an Albanian task?

It is a highly significant issue with respect the future how the various West Balkan countries interpret national sovereignty and the transfer of some of its segments to the European Union just because of the different experiences of building the state, of reasons of social psychology and others? This went on relatively smoothly in the new Member States, because a large part of the countries, including the political leaders and a large part of the population comprehended that they would not simply pass over certain national competencies, but in reality a shared sovereignty would be realised as a result of which the new Member States and citizens of the European Union would have access to several new opportunities they did not have earlier. This process, however, has not been completed in Central Europe either, as it is shown by the Polish example up to November 2007 or as the related manifestations of the Czech President Vaclav Klaus indicates. In Hungary too, one can hear undertones and louder ones as well that are not Europe-friendly and ‘Europe-conform’.

Finally, I am convinced that it is a basic issue with respect to the future how the European Union envisages its own future and its role in the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans and the policy of the European Union in this respect have both reached a crossroads. Will the Union create stability as a neo-colonialist power, for instance by protectorates for a long time to come, because it is forced to do so by the current instability of the Western Balkans? What kind of a European Union is projected by the recently emerging and strengthening processes – from economic patriotism to challenging the various community policies – as the stabiliser or anchor of the Western Balkans? It is also basically unknown what the future of the Western Balkans would be after the ‘settlement’ of the issue of Kosovo? For no matter what kind of ‘settlement’ would ensue, it will have consequences. There is no realistic plan of settlement, should Kosovo remain autonomous, split up, or should something else be invented, that would not have an essential impact on the entire region, but first of all on Serbia and Albania (and naturally on the Republika Srpska).

Despite all problems, uncertainties and rightful question marks, the Union should offer clear conditions and a timetable. The Balkan strategy cannot be separated from the Community strategy as a whole. It might be the first years of the presence of the EU in the Balkans as a power of settlement and stabilisation that would create what is so very much missing from the road leading to a common European foreign and security policy. The positive scenario is based on the fact that it would be precisely the handling (and the possibility of the management) of the Balkan problems by the Union that would help deepening the processes of integration in the key area of common foreign and security policy. Naturally, there are worse perspectives as well. The ‘prophecy’ of the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato (who heads the International Commission on the Balkans and annually issues a report) in the spring of 2006 is still valid. According to him the future of the European Union was not determined by the failed French and Dutch referenda. The future of the European Union will be decided primarily in the Balkans and depends on what role the European Union can play there in the coming period.

* Director, Institute for World Economics, HAS

1

After the September 2007 conference the accord between the EU and Montenegro was ratified in October, and the document between the EU and Serbia was brought into a preratification stage.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:143–149.

ISTVÁN GYARMATI*

Kosovo and the European Security Policy

Kosovo has developed into a significant problem of world politics not the least as a result of mistakes that had emerged during the management of the conflict around it. The problem of Kosovo is also an important issue for Hungary shaded by our European Union membership, by neighbourhood policy as well as the situation of the Hungarian minority in Serbia. This is a very important issue for the Hungarian public opinion as well as for the government.

I intend to shed light on two problems. On the one hand the question of democracy in Kosovo may deserve attention, which is quite a difficult task, for one may only speak about an evolving democracy. The other issue I wish to refer to is the way the international community has managed or ‘mismanaged’, if I may say so, the Kosovo crisis during the past ten years.

The Kosovo crisis has a very positive outcome, namely that the Croat-Serb conflict, determining the problems of the Balkans for a long time and leading to several clashes, has apparently been cooling down. It is the Albanian-Serb conflict that has become the conflict number one instead. This conflict has been mostly generated by the acceleration of the process of Kosovo Albanians becoming a nation, because what is involved here is an ethnic group that has still been significantly lagging behind its environment in the process of developing into a nation. Naturally, it does not mean that the development of nationhood of other nationalities has been completed in the Balkans, but the Kosovo Albanian community has been more backward and currently it tries to find its place, which would determine the framework of development and the future character of the Kosovo Albanian nation or nation-state.

It is well-known that the process has always been highly problematic in Europe and elsewhere, too. Practically it has always been accompanied by wars and it is hardly surprising if this process is taking place under these circumstances in the Balkans as well. The problem, however, is extended by the issues of the ‘Kosovo democracy’ since in the process of becoming a nation Albania and the Albanian community are faced with the task, mostly because of external expectations, of simultaneously going through the process of becoming a nation and of democratisation. It is rarely successful elsewhere too: the process of achieving nationhood usually does not take place within a democratic framework. Simply because when the classic processes of nation-building took place, democracy in its present form did not even exist in Europe, consequently there were no expectations for it to take place in the current democratic forms.

Albania and the Albanian community is a very interesting formation here, in Europe. Not only because it is the only major Muslim community, apart from Turkey and the Muslim communities that have settled down in Germany or in France, but also because it is a community basically still living in the system of clans, strongly bearing on itself the influence of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of which vendetta, corruption, etc. constitute part of customary law. (And here corruption is not necessarily imported by criminal groups.) Hence there are several problems that Europe expects to be solved but the Albanians do not consider these problems so urgently pressing. Let me mention a personal example. A couple of months ago I went to Kosovo. I had the opportunity to talk to the international Police Commissioner there who said that they would wind up the programme of protecting witnesses in Kosovo. It sounded rather strange, since the witness protection programme in a small country, where people know each other, may be rather difficult to implement. The Commissioner explained that the US insisted on having a witness protection programme at the establishment of the Kosovo judicial system. The coup de grace, i.e. the point at which the Americans themselves realised that their concept was inoperative was when they tried to involve the first Albanian in the witness protection programme. He appeared in the police to receive his new identity and place of residence and he brought along 31 family members to the surprise of policemen (naturally not the Albanian but the international ones). He explained that he had brought with him those 31 male members of his family who would be killed according to the rules of vendetta if he disappeared. Therefore, if he was placed under the witness protection programme, it is logical that the other 31 people should also be involved in it. On that occasion even the Americans admitted that their concept would not work. One has to face such problems when we try to accomplish the emergence of nationhood and democratisation in Kosovo.

The international community has a tremendous responsibility in managing this crisis. Not only because it has quasi volunteered for the task, but also because it has made a vast array of mistakes in its implementation during the past ten years. The international community as such is hard to define but basically it means the European Union and the United States of America. In this context Russia should also be included which has recently been playing a significant role in the management of the crisis, or rather, to be exact, in not managing the problem and enhancing the deterioration of the situation.

In 1999 Serbia was forced to pull out of Kosovo. The respective UN resolution was also passed and everybody understood that Kosovo could not be part of Serbia, as it is also stated by the UN Security Council resolution, but the international community pretended to believe that this was only a transitory condition and Kosovo would reintegrate into Serbia sometime in the future. This was a consensus, because the Serbs pretended to believe that this was truly the intention of the international community. The Albanians did not believe in it, to some extent neither the Americans, and events did not progress in that direction either. The Serbs were perfectly aware, not Milošević but rather the democratic opposition, that the problem of Kosovo cannot be settled by making the province again a part of Serbia. Yet the international community froze the problem from 1999 to 2004, and invented all sorts of silly things to gain time. Among others they said that Kosovo should become democratic at first and only then may one speak about its status. An even bigger mistake was that standards were set in this respect, about which Karl Bildt, at that time not yet Foreign Minister, said that Sweden would need about fifty years to reach the standards set for Kosovo to achieve within one or two years.

Next came March 2004, when the Albanians thought that they should do something that would shake up the international community. The latter one only reacted, in keeping with the old bad reflexes, when someone took up arms. In addition it was generally agreed that no decision should be made under those circumstances but negotiations should be initiated between Serbs and Albanians. It was once again incredibly hypocritical because everyone knew that it was totally in vain to start talks because it was absolutely impossible to reach any compromise whatsoever. Everybody was waiting for a decision without any further procrastination and not only the Albanian politicians said at that time, under the late President Rugova, that we should at last decide what we wanted, but even the leading Serb politicians as private individuals urged the enforcement of a solution, even at the cost of Kosovo becoming autonomous. “Give us a week, they said, to satisfy Serbian nationalism, and then we would walk on towards Europe.” The community, however, did not understand anything of this. It started to conduct ‘negotiations’. It provoked a particularly negative reaction when the Special Representative declared that the Serbs are quilty as a nation, which Serbia condemned by stating that not even the Tribunal of Nuremberg went so far in relation to the German nation.

Unfortunately the imitation of talks had a number of negative consequences. One was President Putin’s intervention. Three years earlier Russia stated in the contact group that naturally they would vote for the Security Council resolution on the independence of Kosovo. It is quite obvious now (2007) that they are not going to do so. Formerly politicians of Serbia asked the international community to help them to get beyond the crisis. At that time Serbian polls showed that Kosovo was the seventh most important issue for public opinion is Serbia. By 2007 it became the first. Further on, the result of those slowly proceeding talks was a far tougher Serb stand, driving themselves increasingly into their own nationalist rhetoric. The international community on its side presented artificial compromises after much cudgelling of their brains, which were unacceptable to the Serbian party, and made them confident about achieving some of their objectives. Several people started to speak about the limitations of independence emerging not only in case of international supervision but also in a confederation-like state – instead of making it clear to the Serbs and to the people of Kosovo that Kosovo would become independent but it had to create democratic order, primarily in respect of the Serb and other minorities, and also instead of offering several advantages and support to Serbia and the Serbs of Kosovo.

Naturally the Albanians, with the Americans in the background, did not accept those compromises. The Serbs also began to believe that their rhetoric was effective as they felt the obvious support of Russians behind themselves. Studying the motivation of Russia it can be seen that they wanted to take revenge for the humiliation they suffered in 1999, since it was extremely important for Putin as well as to the psychological recovery of the Russian people. It is worth observing Koštunica’s rhetoric after becoming aware of Russian support: the already weak commitment to Europe was greatly reduced.

The economic relations between Russia and Serbia are further strengthened as Moscow shows interest in the Serbian strategic areas and other branches that are to be privatised (see the Serbian national oil company, the gas storage to be built, the Serbian airlines company, etc.).

The Serbian nationalists have also mustered up courage and gained strength under the influence of developments. Koštunica succeeded in overriding Tadić within the democratic coalition. He was assisted in this process by the tactical mistakes made by the international community, in addition, Tadić also miscalculated by thinking that the integration of a set of extremist views into his own would also enable him to pacify it, but this is usually the other way round. The Weimar Republic of Germany is a good example of that. Today Tadić says exactly the same about Kosovo what Koštunica says and the greatest problem is that even if one talks to him in private one cannot hear what he used to say three years ago.

What can be expected in Kosovo in this situation? I think that the independence of Kosovo is inevitable. The Serbs will hinder everything they can, so presumably it is not going to be a member of the UN or of OSCE, etc. But the independence of Kosovo is inevitable.

It is another question whether this state is going to fail or not. It would be difficult to forecast, but many people think the answer for this question is yes. I see a greater chance of not failing. Two years ago everyone thought that Montenegro would fail. It did not fail at all. It is not sure that Kosovo would be a success story, but it is not sure either whether it would be a failure as a state. It also depends on the way we treat it. All this reflects the double-dealing of Serbian as well as of Russian politics leading to a hostile attitude towards the OSCE mission in Kosovo, and to the fact that the Ahtissari plan is not obligatory for the Albanians for the time being. They actually have a contrary effect from the angle of the protection of the Serb minority. They are not really interested in the Serb minority of Kosovo and it is not their primary problem.

Will there be a massive exodus of Serbs? It also depends on what the international community will do, how the Albanians are made to accept it. There will certainly be a Serb exodus. It cannot be stated that not a single Serb will leave Kosovo when it becomes independent. It cannot be stated either that the Albanians do not wish in secret that all the Serbs should go. The really endangered ones are those living in Serb enclaves, those who live outside Northern Mitrovica. That group of people constitute about half of the Serbs in Kosovo. Presumably Northern Mitrovica will ‘enjoy’ the same status in Kosovo that currently Kosovo has within Serbia, in other words, it will de facto not belong to Kosovo but to Serbia. It will not be widely acknowledged outside Serbia but we would get used to it in a few years and would accept it, as it is usually the case in fait accompli situations. We do not know yet what would happen to the other fifty thousand Serbs. There are several scenarios. One is that of a massive exodus. It is unlikely that great masses of people would arrive to Vojvodina though this possibility cannot be excluded. Nowadays the Serbs of Kosovo orient themselves towards South Serbia, buying houses there, and with their relatives living there, and the refugee camps located in the area, they would presumably settle down there. It cannot, however, be excluded that a large part of them would not move, provided they see proper safeguards. The various scenarios have a more or less equal possibility because it is impossible to tell what the ultimate solution would be.

Finally, it is worth devoting some attention to the policy applied so far and henceforth by the Hungarian side. Hungary has very strong interests in that crisis area and it has drawn a wrong conclusion from these interests for a long time. It was a mistake even from the angle of Hungarian interests to represent the stand for a very long time that the crisis could only be solved by the resolution of the Security Council, which was repeated half-heartedly even by the EU with the passage of time. Moscow could not be persuaded by Hungarian diplomacy (either) though it did not even come in the way of its economic penetration (the sale of MALÉV). Hungary was awakened to the need to change its policy not so much by the recognition of the wrong direction but rather by its allies (Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia) unwilling in the management of the crisis. The change of the direction was delayed by efforts to protect Hungarians in Vojvodina or fear from the flood of Serbs into Vojvodina once Kosovo became independent. Surely, Hungarians in Vojvodina should be protected but the probability of the immigration of Serbs in Kosovo into the territory is not high. In addition the influence of Hungary is minimal in that respect and it cannot modify the Russian stand either.

By now the course of Hungarian politics has found the right direction. After great difficulties we have realised that we try to force the implementation of the Security Council resolution in vain because it would not work. The question arises whether we should instead represent more vigorously and specifically the sentiment that Serbia should be compensated for Kosovo. That would be wrong because Serbia cannot be compensated for Kosovo. Then what kind of an offer should be made by the international community to Kosovo that would orient Belgrade towards Europe and not towards Russia? Hungary is basically interested in achieving that the entire Balkans and Serbia in particular, should move towards European integration. But then innovative ideas would be needed in this field. Ahtissari said for the first time, some five years ago, that a relaxation of the visa system towards Serbia was indispensable. Naturally it should be made easier even without the Kosovo problem, for the paradox situation has emerged that, although the perspective of EU membership was promised to Serbia in Thessaloniki, Russian citizens get visas to the EU easier than the Serbs. All this shows an irresponsible attitude which is difficult to explain. Targeted relaxations of visa regulations should be provided. One should focus on intellectuals and young people and let them travel without limitations just as the Austrians bring three hundred young people from Serbia annually to Europe. The example of Estonians is also excellent: they annually admit twenty students from Belarus to Estonian universities and grant them scholarships. Such solutions should be further expanded.

Further on, the EU should consider how to strengthen political cooperation with non-EU members and with Serbia in particular. They should examine what EU and PFP (Partnership for Peace) solutions could be found, how Serbia and the other countries (including Turkey) could be involved in a kind of political and military cooperation before they become members? Moreover, it should also be considered how Schengen cooperation could be extended to these countries which would ultimately solve lots of problems. Unfortunately currently the EU is not in a phase of voicing innovative ideas (it is already a major achievement if it can retain the old ones) though the direction to follow would certainly be that one. Hungary should also facilitate the European Union in that direction. Apparently, however, it can expect few allies as from among the directly affected member states Romania and Bulgaria would not necessarily support Hungary in this issue. The Poles and the Czechs are uninterested; the Slovaks seem to be difficult to be won over due to their own problems. Yet bringing together this alliance should be attempted despite the difficulties.

By now it can be stated in relation to Kosovo that there was a conflict but no armed conflict will ensue. There will be incidents, because both parties are ‘trained’ for it. That is an accepted custom over there, a huge quantity of arms is in private hands and they are always kept at reach for various occasions from acquiring money to festivities. Part of the secret services is openly in private hands and the secret services of Kosovo are party-owned services, though three years ago the head of the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo issued an order that they should be eliminated but no one took it seriously, including the UNMIK. Hence there will be incidents. The question is whether KFOR and the police force deployed there would be able to manage them. There is hope because the EU has appointed an eminent chief representative to lead the future mission in Kosovo. Similarly, an eminent expert was chosen to lead the police force, a Hungarian policeman who would be the ‘chief policeman’ in Kosovo. Today the prospects are more favourable than earlier. It is, however, a question whether there would be a political will behind all this on behalf of the European Union, and whether it would give enough money to back it up.

* Ambassador; President and CEO, International Centre for Democratic Transition

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:7–10.

Three Years of Balkan Research (2005–2008)

The Southeastern enlargement of the European Union is an inevitable process that cannot be halted. Therefore we have to be well-prepared in the Member States of the European Union in issues related to Balkan Studies. This refers to state officials, politicians, intellectuals and entrepreneurs alike – primarily in states neighbouring the Balkan region. Not to mention the bureaucracy of the EU and the Members and officials of the European Parliament. (In order to avoid a situation that evolved in 2004 on the morrow of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, in which neither Brussels, nor individual Members States acquitted themselves well with regard to their knowledge about Europe and their neighbours. The EU seemed to be lacking the necessary preparedness in East Central European Studies.) We set out from this underlying principle when we initiated the launching of the Balkan project in June 2004 and founded the Centre for Balkan Studies in October 2005 as a joint ’virtual institute’ of the Social Research Centre of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Europe Institute Budapest.

What was our actual objective?

First of all, we wanted to create a forum for researchers of the Balkan region, civil society, entrepreneurs, diplomats and politicians to be able to meet and exchange their views on issues related to the Balkans. We intended to organise conferences, publish printed and electronic publications, including periodicals and book series. (Because we believe that civil society, i.e. intellectuals and entrepreneurs, will have to be assigned a special role in European policy-making in the future. This is the legacy of classic European values, gradually sinking into oblivion, and this might be one of the fundamental pillars of Europe in the future. It is a distinctive feature of our culture that distinguishes us from other cultures of the same rank.)

Secondly, we wish to widen the world political perspective of the middle classes in Hungary. We share the view that during the Soviet occupation of the country the foreign political and world political perspective of middle classes was significantly narrowed and deformed: one could still observe a certain level of curiosity towards the West, but it was rather contingent in the lack of regular visits abroad. The world political perspective was deformed partly due to the fact that the Soviet system tried to force an artificial interest in East-Southeast European affairs, thus arousing a counteraction in Hungarian society. As the interest in issues related to East and Southeast Europe was in fact a forced curiosity, a kind of ’official’ and guided interest, it decreased significantly after the system change. Now that we are members of the European Union (since 2004) and it has become obvious that the enlargement of the EU would continue in a southeastern direction, we should raise awareness in domestic public thinking about the fact that our southeastern neighbours might be just as important as the western ones. Moreover, in certain respects they may be even more interesting and important for investors.

Thirdly, in our view it is of primary importance to use our ’civil-scientific’ power to turn the attention of the political elite to the significance of the Southeast European region. We must not forget that the governments of the day might contribute to the raising of economic and cultural interests to a great extent by using their tools provided by the budget and cultural-political demonstration.

What have we achieved in the past three years and in which direction do we wish to proceed?

1.) We have been organising a regular conference series. We organised 15 conferences in the period between October 2005 and April 2009. The topics that we dealt with in the framework of these conferences touched upon the geographical position of the Southeast European region, as well as the interrelatedness and differing interests of the peoples living in the Carpathian Basin and in the Balkans (e.g. their competing position in the global market). The conferences also shed light on political and power relations (e.g. the conflicting interest of Russia and great powers in the region) and the elements of development of the Balkan region that might arouse the attention of middle classes and political stakeholders in Hungary. (Including minority conflicts and cross-border programmes in the field of economics and nature history, e.g. issues related to the Danube.)

2.) The conference series has a steady audience of 120-160 people, the most acknowledged Balkan experts regularly participate in these events, as well as government officials of neighbouring countries and leading experts and representatives of the Hungarian state administration and the opposition (ministers, secretaries of state, ambassadors, heads of institutes and MPs).

3.) The homepage of the Centre for Balkan Studies was launched and has a solid editorial board of acknowledged experts. The homepage is regularly reloaded with news, topical articles and thematic studies, and operates as an electronic monthly periodical. (We could not organise and create the financial basis of the publication of the electronic periodical in English. This is one of the main tasks of the future and, hopefully, the periodical will be available in both languages by 2010.)

4.) We publish a book series entitled „The European Union, the Balkan Region and Hungary”, which has had two volumes so far (published in 2007 and 2008) and has the present volume as the third one in the row. These volumes include the edited version of lectures delivered at conferences organised in the framework of the Balkan project. The volumes have been published in the foreign language book series of the Europe Institute Budapest. (Begegnungen)

5.) We established the financial basis of the project: the fundamental financing is provided by the Europe Institute Budapest, the Research Group on European History of the Social Research Centre and the Balkan project included in the framework agreement on strategic research concluded between the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian government.

6.) The staff responsible for organising events and editing publications – the virtual institute – has been recruited. The conference organisers are employees of the Europe Institute Budapest and the Social Research Centre of HAS (headed by Ferenc Glatz, including Attila Pók, Beáta Kiltz and Andrea Antal), the editorial team comprises the staff of the Europe Institute Budapest, and members of the Research Group on European History (Ferenc Glatz, Kornélia Burucs and as foreign language proofreaders and translators Beáta Kiltz and Rita Besznyák). Editors of the homepage also include staff-members of the Europe Institute and researchers of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences led by Attila Pók, József Juhász and Andrea Antal, the head of project management being Attila Pók assisted by Andrea Antal as project secretary.

This is the current state of affairs, in the summer of 2009. The project schedule of the following two years was compiled by the leaders of the programme, the necessary financial means are available due to various tenders and applications. A foreseen continuation is the broadening of the thematic scope of research. This would involve putting the individual states on the agenda and examining the impact of the world economic crisis on the position of the region in world economy and world politics as well as its impact on the relationship of the Balkan countries and the East Central European region.

A further matter of discussion could be the survey of cross-border cooperation with special regard to the Danube and various ways of spatial development (including the rural development of border areas). Another step forward could be the publication of the homepage in English. We wish to generate a continuous dialogue between experts and politicians. We intend to maintain the institutions that have proved to be successful (conferences, book series and homepage), and expand the range of events by workshop conferences providing opportunity for Balkan researchers to discuss a specific topic. The results of these workshops would then be published on the homepage. A column entitled “History of the Balkans” would be launched in the historical periodical História and an issue of the periodical Ezredforduló would be devoted to the topic every year. In the recently launched periodical Párbeszéd a vidékért [Dialogue for the Countryside] we regularly publish articles on cross-border processes in the Southeast European region for the enhanced development of border regions

We sincerely hope that our readers would put the Balkan volumes of Begegnungen on their bookshelves and the included writings would figure on the list of their regular readings.

Budapest, July 2009

Ferenc Glatz

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:107–112.

KINGA GÁL*

The Future of Kosovo and the Role of the EU

Reflecting on Kosovo’s future and the EU’s role in this respect I wish to refer to five issues. First of all, I would like to examine the factors that could make the international world accept and stand for the current settlement plan. Secondly, I wish to examine, how the European Union relates to it and reflect on the EU’s role in this process. Next I wish to talk about the role of the European Parliament in this context. I would also consider certain issues still left open, to which no unambiguous answers are available as yet. As it is said the devil is in the details. Much depends on minute details as to whether this settlement plan would be a success. And since I am a legal expert in the field of minorities allow me to share a few thoughts about certain elements of the present settlement plan that may be interesting from the angle of minorities in the future, too.

The text approved on 15 March by the European Parliament after long deliberations, closing down serious differences of opinion, contains the statement according to which the future of Kosovo is in close connection with the fact that both Serbia and Kosovo are waiting for Union membership. This issue is viewed from this angle by the Member States of the European Union and the European institutions including the European Parliament. After eight years of UN control it was a serious expectation towards the institutional systems of the international community to offer an acceptable and viable solution that would lead forward in these issues and ensure a long-term liveable vision. However, while all this appears to be the solution of a problem and a matter of financing on the table of international institutions (from the UN to OSCE through the Council of Europe and EU institution), it should not be forgotten that this is also about the daily life of people there, it is about continued existence and survival. No matter what solution is outlined and supported by the international community it will not be easy and unambiguous to get it accepted there, in that context. It has been appraised and understood by the international community that unless it can offer an alternative and some kind of compensation to that rather limited region, no progress can be expected from that deadlock in the long run. At the same time it was also realised that eight years of UN inspection cannot continue the same way and the moment has come to make this settlement plan accepted and to proceed along a new experiment. It was widely believed that if this plan was accepted by the UN Security Council as well as by Serbia (under pressure of the UN) and the European Union, finally an economic, financial, infrastructural and cultural development may begin that can ensure a secure future for the people living there.

What is necessary for making all this accepted by the international community, by the Western Balkans, Kosovo and not the least by Serbia? The institution of the UN and its Member States, and the European Union constitute the international community. They are clearly interested in stability, and it has become obvious that this can be the only way to stability. They are also interested in achieving that the proposed solution should be a unique one without precedent value because fears and reservations are still of significant dimensions. The solutions proposed in this plan with regard to minorities are feared in many places and even in some Union Member States. It has been stressed by the Member States of the Union and the European Parliament has repeatedly stated that it would be a unique solution that is not supposed to have any precedent value. This is the precondition of gaining the unanimous support of every Member State of the European Union and of the adoption of the resolution of the UN Security Council.

The resolution of the European Parliament as well as several decisions of the Member States of the European Union refer to the fact that the future role of the EU in Kosovo directly depends on the resolution of the Security Council. This condition by itself is a serious tool of pressure.

It has become clear in respect of Kosovo that the outlined settlement plan would only be the minimum for Albanian politics. A concept that would set the community back to the condition of 1990 is unacceptable to them. As the spokesperson of the UN also stated it is highly doubtful after all the events whether the Albanians of Kosovo could be persuaded to accept autonomy that had been taken away from them. Further on, and it is underlined by several analyses, the province has been pushed so far away from the earlier status quo by eight years of UN authority that it would not be able to integrate into Serbia. The only realistic opportunity and way of economic, financial and infrastructural viability is to make relations with the EU closer, including possible accession. If the current situation of Serbia is taken into consideration, it can be stated that the acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan is the only way to a rapid strengthening of ties with the Union and the releasement of finances and funds indispensable to development. In addition the Serbs of Kosovo would get an internationally safeguarded and controlled autonomy with the acceptance of the plan. It is only the Ahtisaari plan approved by the UN Security Council that could make it possible for Serbia to avoid the necessity of exercising pressure on Europe after a unilateral declaration of the independence of Kosovo without international guarantees, demanding that they should not acknowledge the independence of Kosovo. Since the United States would support an independent Kosovo, such an exercise of pressure would be ineffective in respect of the European Union too. It is still the controlled independence and a safeguarded and controlled autonomy that would be the most viable alternative for the Serbs leading to a long-term solution. A unanimous Security Council resolution is very important for Serbian politics which would thus take away the burden of decision-making from among the responsibilities of Serbian politics.

Surveying these different spheres of interest it is clear that issues of catching-up and accession to the European Union, e.g. the association agreement and the liberalisation of visas appear at every point. Hence no matter which sphere we are examining, the proximity of the European Union and a close circuit of contacts seem to offer the only possible way out in the region. Therefore it is not only the range of opportunities that is great for the Union but also its responsibilities. The question arises whether it is capable of acting and relating itself properly, whether it can undertake necessary guarantees and implement possible promises. In December 2006 the EU Member States made a clear statement though it was quite clear in the debate in the European Parliament which countries were the ones where fears were strong and where the common foreign and security policy of the EU faltered. It should be stated in respect of autonomy guaranteed for the Serb community of Kosovo and other community safeguards that the decisive issue would be whether the EU can take an unambiguous stand. The European Parliament heard Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner also responsible for the Western Balkans, before it passed its resolution and the Commissioner kept on stressing that the Ahtisaari plan was the realistic compromise that is regarded currently as acceptable in the European Union. It is acceptable, but, as he always stresses, it is not of precedent value, it cannot be compared to any other similar situation in Europe and it was the last issue of status still left open. At the same time he added that it is important to avoid the implementation of a policy of ‘divide and rule’ on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution. It is important to maintain a united stand above all. It should also be seen that the Slovakian parliament had passed a resolution by which it ultimately backed out of the line of EU Member States that had all stood for the Ahtisaari plan. The importance of maintaining a uniform stand is reflected by the text of the resolution passed by the European Parliament after serious discussions by 409 votes for, 80 votes against and 82 abstentions. The Slovak and the Spanish MEPs were among those abstaining for fearing the precedent value of autonomy in the light of their own domestic policy.

What does the EU offer? Practically the European Union would take over the role of the UN in Kosovo. In other words, control would remain but under the flag of the European Union. Surely the institutional arrangements would change, the ‘weight’ of control would also change but practically very close supervision would remain for a very long time.

The resolution of the European Parliament clearly says that any further procrastination of the settlement of the status would have a negative impact on the tense situation. No other realistic chance is seen to find a solution. At the same time it is also becoming clear that the mutually mistrustful atmosphere between the ethnic communities requires continuous international presence in the future, definitely in the medium term, and in that period the international community, which may be substituted by the European Union, would have to invest continuously into education in Kosovo, and to find the basis of the development of a peaceful, multiethnic society and state in the young generations.

As it is also formulated in the resolution of the European Parliament, the European Union should play a central role in supporting, monitoring and safequarding the respect of the accord, and in the establishment of the democratic institutions of Kosovo. The settlement should be ‘compatible’ with the European Union, i.e. it should be in line with the European perspective of Kosovo and enable the EU to enforce the available measures in Kosovo. In other words the sets of institutions and relations should now be built in a way that makes them suitable for continuous contacts with the European Union which may, in the future, go as far as accession. The European Union is interested in it, and is ready to financially support international control for the purpose of reaching this goal and to participate financially in this solution. The resolution of the European Parliament calls attention to the fact that the Commission should enable Kosovo to have access to the Structural Funds of the European Union. All this is done with the purpose of helping the local small and medium sized companies to acquire strength, and to develop close ties already in this settlement period between the Union and the private sector of Kosovo. The European Union sees a direct correctional role for itself, and even the authority of substitution in limited cases. It also lists there cases, specifically in the field of the protection of minorities, the protection of vulnerable heritage sites, monuments and religious establishments, in the area of security and justice, primarily in connection with the fight against organised crime.

Some questions have been left open too. If such a settlement plan is approved by the Security Council where are the points to which one should pay attention, where are the details the devil may hide himself in? How would the shift be implemented from the UN mission in Kosovo to an international civilian office? How smoothly could competencies be transferred?

Another problem is the important issue of responsibility and the acceptance of tasks. There should be a clear and transparent division of tasks between the judiciary and justice authorities of Kosovo and the planned EU mission of law and order. The world could learn from the example of Bosnia where settlement was not at all simple. If the consequences are to be drawn from the case of Bosnia, particularly with regard to cooperation in the field of the judiciary and justice, it is not quite sure that the outcome is clearly a positive one.

It is also included in the resolution of the European Parliament and it was often said by officials of the EU that they expected of Kosovo to strengthen the concept of being a citizen of Kosovo. How can this be realised in practice, how would Kosovo become ‘Switzerland’? These are the questions those documents have not been able to answer clearly. But at least they have given some basis by the building or at least naming of the sets of institutions that figure, for instance, in the Ahtisaari settlement plan.

Certain questions set tasks to Hungarian diplomacy, too, in relation to this problematic issue because in some way the settlement of Kosovo would certainly affect us. We should definitely contribute to the possibility of the Serbs to actually stay in their place of birth in Kosovo. Possible Serb emigrants should not be settled in Vojvodina mainly populated by Hungarians. These are very important issues, for they may generate new tensions. It is an important objective that the multitude of Serb problems should not fall on the largest remaining minority, namely the Hungarians surviving in largest numbers in Vojvodina after the acceptance of the plan, of which there might be a realistic chance.

Hungarian interests are also clear in relation to the promises of support and accession made by the European Union to Serbia. It is very important in the case of the supported institutions that Hungarian diplomacy should be constantly present with specific recommendations. It should be made visible by our activities in the EU that as a Member State we can have a say in the shaping of relations between the EU and Serbia. This is particularly justified by the fact that we are Serbia’s immediate neighbours as well as a motherland of a populous minority living there. It is important that our enhanced sensitivity should receive proper attention.

Our policy towards Belgrade is of crucial importance, for at a certain point Hungary is projected towards Serbia as a representative of the European Union (one should only have the approaching 2011 presidency in mind) which can be used properly for the improvement of relations and continuously requesting safeguards and specific proposals as well as allocations serving the interests of Hungarians in Vojvodina.

Finally, I wish to dwell on the consequences of minority policy which are definitely remarkable from the angle of a legal expert specialised in minorities. I refer to the proposals that are regarded as desirable in the settlement plan and may be implemented in the case of the Serbian community and other non-Albanian ones. They may mean very serious steps forward for minority policy as a whole, unprecedented in the past. If these safeguards did not only remain on paper but were complied with by the European institutions as well as the parties concerned, mistakes not eliminated by the earlier settlement plans could be avoided this time. The settlement plan speaks about communities and the rights of communities in respect of minorities. It prescribes or considers a mechanism of representation and a special mechanism of presence desirable in public institutions. Certain legal regulations could only be implemented if the majority of the non-Albanian members of legislation consent to it. Decentralisation would go so far as to grant a high degree of control to the community in minority over its own affairs. Municipal self-governing autonomy is specifically outlined, which would cover health care through higher education to specified financial issues and the total acceptance of financial support granted by Serbia. These are serious steps, with which the international community has almost stepped over its own shadow. It was included in the resolution of the European Parliament that the Union welcomed the fact that the Ahtisaari proposal outlined broad autonomy for the Serb community and other communities, including significant autonomy for self-governance in line with the European principles of subsidiarity and self-governance. Applying the principles of subsidiarity and self-governance in the service of autonomy and the presentation of the entire issue this way also emerged earlier in the parliamentary debates at the time of Romania’s accession. It provoked unimaginable resistance in Romania’s case when the issue of minorities came up and one wanted to speak about self-governance and subsidiarity as European principles. This time the proposal could go through without major resistance. I wish to stress that I do not speak as a politician but as a legal expert of minorities who wants to give account of the solutions and principles that the international community has reached. The international community in fact has recognised that there cannot be any settlement without efficient guarantees for the protection of minorities and autonomy is precisely the form of settlement that may offer a solution for minorities living in one bloc. In fact it points further ahead towards the international and European acceptance of autonomy as a principle and tool. If it becomes widely accepted that all this autonomy is based on the principles of subsidiarity and self-governance appearing in the roots of the European Union, we can be optimistic about reaching a renaissance of autonomy, self-governance and subsidiarity as possibilities of solution in Europe with consistent reference to them. This, in turn, may significantly help Hungarian communities living in minority who have experienced a lot, suffered a lot but have never given up the use of peaceful means. And as far as we are concerned this can also be at stake when talking about the success of the Ahtisaari plan.

* Member of the European Parliament