Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:53–62.

KONSTANTIN NIKIFOROV

The Balkan Policy of Russia in the 1990s

In order to understand Russia’s Balkan policy in the most recent times, a few words should be said also about the entire Russian foreign policy of the period. It is well known that the new and independent foreign policy of Russia unfolded in the 1990s and was embodied by the person of Boris Yeltsin. It is also known that Yeltsin came to power as the opposite of Gorbachev in many respects. At the same time the paradox situation emerged that it happened just the other way round in foreign policy. Yeltsin and Kozyrev essentially continued the course of Gorbachev and Sevardnadze on the international scene. In addition there was a kind of competition between the two groups in so far as who could acquire bigger support from the West.

Yeltsin was so-to-say ‘victorious’. Pragmatic Western leaders who yesterday gave their oath of love to ‘Gorbi’ started to orient themselves all of a sudden towards his greatest adversary to the surprise of all. It is true, however, that this took a different shape in the understanding of the broader Western public opinion. Relationship with Yeltsin continued to be cautious. If Gorbachev was regarded outside the borders of Russia as a civilised and intelligent politician, Yeltsin as the President of Russia fully embodied the ‘mysterious Russian soul’. He resembled the real, unpredictable and impulsive and at times even aggressive ‘Russian bear’, particularly in the latest phase when, differing from the always amenable Gorbachev, he once again used a hard tone and then just as suddenly changed to be ‘diplomatic’.

Other differences also appeared and were increasingly obvious. For instance, foreign policy did not shift into Yeltsin’s focus of attention even when he acceded to power while Gorbachev attributed outstanding significance to it. And the worse things changed for at home, Gorbachev fell all the more into the arms of Western leaders and was all the more attracted by the applause of Western public opinion. Later on that tune, though to a lesser extent, could be observed in Yeltsin’s case too.

There is another important circumstance. At the time of Gorbachev’s perestroika there was an attempt to grasp changes in progress in the world and to find the place of the Soviet Union in it. The book of the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union entitled Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World is well-known. Nothing similar is found in Yeltsin’s earlier or later books either. Even the few thoughts that Yeltsin wrote about the sphere of foreign policy seem to be rather superficial.

At the same time it cannot be said that Russia’s foreign policy had no ideological foundation whatsoever. On the contrary, instead of making foreign policy free of ideology, one ideology was replaced by another. Instead of communist ideology and the country’s endeavour to play the role of the supreme leading power of the world, the complexes of a country capitulating to the victors of the Cold War and resigning itself to everything were increasingly apparent. All this happened in spite of the fact that originally something entirely different dominated in Russian mentality after the collapse of communism, namely the sense of the possibility of victory and return to a normal way of development.

There is yet another interesting factor. Kozyrev did not only avoid trying to elaborate an all-national foreign policy by cooperating with other power and social structures but he joined with great élan the domestic political struggles shaking Russia at that time. The phrase ‘the party of war’ is partly attributed to him branding his political adversaries without giving a thought to it. Naturally, this stand excluded the possibility of the development of at least some kind of cooperation with legislature, with social organisations and with the cadre of experts.

Let me mention a classic example: Russia’s joining the anti-Serb sanctions at the time of the Yugoslav crisis. This step was influenced by ideological motivations first and foremost. In the eyes of Kozyrev the Serb leadership was only a ‘national Communist’ leadership and he was not inclined to be lenient towards it. In this case he was not interested in the complicated geopolitical processes and Russia’s national interests.

Kozyrev even allowed himself to mildly criticise the United States for acknowledging the independent Yugoslav republics too late. “Initially – he wrote – before the disintegration of Yugoslavia the United States did not want to accept the demand of Bosnia and other federal republics for sovereignty and stood for the preservation of a united state to the utmost, despite its being Communist. Is the heat against Yugoslavia so strong in Washington because they have a bad conscience?”¹

In order to get better acquainted with the then stand of the Russian Foreign Ministry an episode is to be mentioned. The former President of the United States, Richard Nixon once asked Kozyrev to outline the interests of the new Russia. The Russian Foreign Minister answered: “[…] one of the problems of the Soviet Union was that it paid too much attention to national interests. Now we pay more attention to general human values. But if you have any idea and can tell us how to define our national interests I would be very thankful to you.”

Later on Nixon commented on the Russian Foreign Minister’s answer as follows: “When I was Vice President and later on President I wanted all to know that I was a ‘rascal’ and would struggle with all my might in the name of American interests. Kissinger was just the same ‘rascal’ but for the time being I cannot imitate him in this respect. And he, when the Soviet Union just disintegrated, when the new Russia should be protected and strengthened he wanted to prove to all what a remarkable and pleasant man he was.”²

With the passage of time the lack of conceptual and theoretical approach became more and more apparent. Not being able and willing to understand the realistic situation had led to nurturing naive faith in the altruism of Western democracies for a long time who were supposed to forget about their national interests, embrace and welcome Russia “in the family of leading democratic states” and share the burden of transformation in a friendly way. When allowances were demanded of Russia they were willingly made. Russia even made allowances that were not demanded of it. What was most important to it was to consolidate its relations with the leading Western states at any cost, first of all with the United States. Russian diplomacy followed the United States step by step like a guide, trying to purchase its entry to the ‘civilised world’ by leniency.

It is widely assumed that the time of ‘disappointments’ set in from early 1991 up to the end of 1993 in the foreign policy of Russia, the ‘honeymoon weeks’ or rather ‘honeymoon years’ were lengthened. But that did not end by anything else but the decision about the eastern enlargement of NATO in the same year, in 1993. It was exactly the eastern enlargement of NATO and the Yugoslav conflict that influenced the real strategic aims of the North-Atlantic alliance significantly.

It was exactly in that conflict that NATO transgressed out of its own competence for the first time. And it was not of a defensive but of an offensive nature, deploying the full arsenal of military might. It became clear that it was not only the expansion of the zone of democracy but also that of the democratic values, human rights, etc.

After a brief hesitation the United States declared itself the sole victor of the Cold War claiming the right to ‘booty’, i.e. the visible expansion of its influence and hegemony in the modern world. This was mentioned recently in Vladimir Putin’s speech given in Munich provoking great hue and cry. That speech indeed provoked rather lively reactions. It was a public rejection of the leniency of the 1990s, began an open dialogue on what was earlier concealed, and it caused a real shock that Russia could also say ‘no’.

Further on, certain things such as the Yugoslav crisis appeared to be differently viewed by Russia and the West. The Scottish researcher Sarah MacArthur quotes several examples of this in her book.³ In Russia, for instance they clearly assessed the existence of the independent Croat state during World War II negatively, and the noted ‘Islamic Declaration’ of Alija Izetbegović, leader of the Muslim community of Bosnia was regarded as an example of fundamentalism and one of the causes of the Bosnian war; whereas the West, surely not justifying Croat Fascists, was of the view that the autonomous Croat state expressed the desire of the population for independence. The approach to the ‘Islamic Declaration’ is even more conspicuous. In the West it is being taught even in classes of political science as an example of democracy. The examples could be quoted further on.

We still have to learn to listen to and to respect each other. And the so-called ‘new Europeans’ can play an important role in that difficult process. In fact, the mentality of the residents of Central and Southeastern Europe is far closer to the East European one than to that of the West Europeans. Unfortunately mutual attention and respect have not been apparent for the time being. Some new members of NATO and the EU even make all-European dialogue more difficult.

Anyhow, NATO cannot make decisions about a number of problems without Russia, e.g. about the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan or in the Balkans. Under the current conditions Russia has to cooperate with NATO. The relations, however, should not merely be displayed as a showcase, but should be based on regular and real cooperation. What is most important is that this cooperation has to be sincere on both sides.

Now let us return to the 1990s. Essentially the weakening of Russia’s positions on the international scene was inevitable because of the transitory economic difficulties after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The only question is how far that retreat should go? For the West did not spell out its aims immediately either. Those aims also depended on Russia’s stand. The constant allowances made by Russia only enhanced the demands of the other party. It, however, did not mean disregarding Russia’s opinion. In fact Russia often did not have any opinion. Suffice it to mention that despite several promises the Russian Foreign Ministry never elaborated its own action programme for the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

By the mid-1990s the foreign political failures of Russia were becoming increasingly obvious. Now it was not only the opposition that stood up against the policy of the Foreign Ministry, but almost the entire political elite and almost all the experts. They expressed their view that Russia had to possess its own image and place in world politics. Naturally they did not at all want Russia to argue by all means or to confront the West. But it was not necessary at all to nod continuously, sometimes to the detriment of its own interests.

In fact, not only the Foreign Ministry was responsible for failures in foreign policy but also the leadership of the country that had created the basis of the system in which the Foreign Ministry enjoyed almost full monopoly and its activities were not controlled by anybody. The major shortcoming of that system was the lack of a collegial mechanism for preparing and making decisions. The old structures like the Central Committee of the CPSU were wound up but new ones had not yet been established. The impression was created that Yeltsin who did not dwell on details signed everything that was ‘put in front of him’ by Kozyrev without any consultation with experts.

In other words it was impossible to expect any foreign political concept from the Foreign Ministry or from any other state institution and it was not because the leadership of the Ministry had wicked intentions. It had fully objective reasons as well. Traditionally diplomats do not create ideas and act rather as implementers of ideas. In this respect diplomats curiously resemble soldiers. They implement directives they receive with more or less success depending on their ability. At that time, however, there was hardly any strategic guidance coming from above.

This trend was noticed by many. During Yeltsin’s presidency an attempt was made to create a special mechanism of the inter-ministerial coordination of foreign policy. It was not successful, mostly due to the vigorous resistance of the leadership of the Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev succeeded in passing two presidential orders approving the coordinating role of the Foreign Ministry in issues of foreign policy. The third such order was signed by the next Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov under Yeltsin. The Foreign Ministry gave tasks to itself; it carried out coordination work and exercised control.

All this happened in the 1990s, a transitory period for Europe as well as for the entire world. The old bipolar system of European security collapsed and a new one emerged. Its development was actually greatly influenced by the Yugoslav crisis. Unfortunately the Russian Foreign Ministry did not understand this for a long time.

In early 1996 Kozyrev was dismissed. Characteristically Yeltsin accused him of two things, namely with the eastern enlargement of NATO and with the lack of ‘precision’ in the policy concerning Yugoslavia. He established the diagnosis rightly but late. Primakov was no more ashamed of talking about Russian national interests. The relations of Russia became stronger not only with the West but also with the East. Foreign policy was being increasingly defined as a policy of several factors. People began to talk about a multi-polar world. Yet Russian diplomacy did not succeed in halting negative trends and failed to achieve the equality of relations with the West.

Consequently, one has to focus on two faulty traits of Russian foreign policy of those days: excessive enthusiasm towards the new ideology instead of fully getting rid of ideology, and the monopoly of the state diplomatic organ in decision making.

Let us now turn to the Balkans. One should understand what the Balkans is today and what happened there in the 1990s.

One should not only understand the Balkans out of mere curiosity, because one could only speak about the Balkan policy of Russia if the Balkans remained a united region. Our doubts are well-founded because Eastern Europe, as it used to be, also disappeared simultaneously with the fall of socialism. More specifically only Russia, Ukraine and Belarus remained parts of Eastern Europe. The other part split up into Central and Southeastern Europe (Balkans). Not speaking about the GDR which has become part of Western Europe.

Now even the Balkans begins to disintegrate into two parts. Slovenia and Croatia are ashamed of their Balkan roots, and try to position themselves as parts of Central Europe. At the same time the not quite proper term ‘Western Balkans’ has become accepted in the West and even in the whole world under which the post-Yugoslav states are meant without Slovenia and with Albania. Yet, for us the Balkans still seems to be an autonomous region despite all these developments. It has its own history, geography, culture and mentality, etc. The fact that the majority of the Balkan states used to belong to the ‘eastern camp’ and now they have joined or would join the European Union and NATO has no decisive significance. The classic example is Greece. Despite the fact that Greece has been developing inside the NATO and the EU framework for almost half a century, typologically it remains a Balkan country and there is no sign to indicate that it would be different in the case of other Balkan countries in the near future.

Now just a few words about what happened in the Balkans in the 1990s. Apparently there were at least three processes in progress, which, intertwined, have created a complicated situation.

The first process had unfolded in front of us. This was the Yugoslav crisis which was also related to events taking place in Eastern Europe, to perestroika in the Soviet Union, to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and to the so-called ‘velvet revolutions’ of the East European socialist countries in 1989, (though it is true that those revolutions cannot be called ‘velvet’ everywhere). This process was the bloodiest in Yugoslavia and lasted for a full decade, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the multi-national federation wedged from inside by innumerable serious internal problems. Yugoslavia disintegrated without the interested parties previously concluding agreements, which offered a pretext in many respects for war. More exactly to a series of wars which spread from the northwestern part of Yugoslavia towards the southeastern one.

The second process that took place in the Balkans was the internationalisation of the Yugoslav conflict, or the intervention of the so-called ‘international community’ into the conflict. This intervention, the hurried acknowledgement of the new states, supporting certain participants of the conflict to the detriment of others, etc. in a sense even provoked the wars of the decade.

We would rather call the international intervention into the Yugoslav crisis the process of ‘NATO-isation’ of the Balkans. It was only part of the eastern enlargement of NATO. In some places this enlargement process went on peacefully when the former socialist countries voluntarily acceded to the bloc, elsewhere, like in Yugoslavia it happened by military force. But it filled up the vacuum everywhere that had emerged after the disintegration of the bipolar world.

The eastern enlargement of NATO, as it was mentioned above, was closely related to another more general process, to the emergence of a new model of European and international security. In principle this is the factor that distinguished the Yugoslav crisis from other European conflicts of the recent past, like the events in Northern Ireland or in Cyprus. And it was just in the years of the Yugoslav crisis when NATO was consolidated on the basis of the new system of European security.

One more significant element should be mentioned. The Balkans has always been rather the object than the subject of international relations. And the process of ‘NATO-isation’ of the Balkans only justifies this statement. There is nothing extraordinary in it from the perspective of the history of the Balkans.

Moreover, this is even justified by the recent decades of the history of the Balkans. Earlier too, events took place there in exactly the same way. For instance, the 1940s were characterised by the Balkan states turning Fascist. Then a period of almost half a century followed that could be called the Sovietisation of the Balkans. And finally, the most recent period is that of ‘NATO-isation’.

It is worth noting that the strongest resistance to all three processes was demonstrated by Yugoslavia and primarily by the Serb population in the Balkans. The explanation of this phenomenon, i.e. why the Serbs have always been so disobedient, could be a separate topic of research. Here I wish to note only that the Serbs are a small nation with a great soul, and that explains a great deal.

Common destiny with the other Balkan countries could only be avoided to some extent by Greece. At the same time one could witness similar processes even there: such as the period of occupation and Fascism, with the aftermath of the seven-year rule of the ‘black generals’ (1967–1974), an attempt at Sovietisation in the civil war between 1946 and 1949, and finally the accession of Greece to NATO as early as 1952, being the first among Balkan states.

We are of the view that instead of all this the return to the old slogan of ‘The Balkans belongs to the peoples of the Balkans!’ would be the most optimal for the region. It, however, admittedly seems to be utopian for the time being.

Finally, one of the consequences of western intervention was that the fragile balance of the Balkans was upset. In order to break Serb resistance the western mediators started to support the Albanian minority in Serbia. At the same time it was the Serbs who represented the only force in the Balkans that was capable of halting Albanian expansion. As a result, as the events in Kosovo in March 2004 showed, the West totally lost control over the Albanians in Kosovo. I would just recall that at that time 35 partly or fully Christian churches were demolished in only three months. And then no word was said about human victims. If real independence is to be given to Kosovo on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan it would not solve the problem of confrontation between Serbs and Albanians.

The third process is the growing strength of Albanian expansion that is in progress nowadays in the Balkans. And this is an objective process. Currently the Albanians are the ethnic group that is undoubtedly the most active, striving and aiming at unity. They are the most ‘awakening’ ones as the Russian ethnographer, Lev Gumilov would say. Considering that Albanians live also in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and even in Greece outside Albania, this threatens with yet another new disintegration in the Balkans. In this respect, however, more general processes can also be observed. The expansion of Albanians fits well into that ‘southern range’ of the processes of instability that is currently surging ahead from the Balkans through Albania towards Europe.

Even if the ‘NATO-isation’ of the Balkans may be considered a fait accompli and the bloodiest phase of the Yugoslav crisis is over, the Albanian factor may make itself heard about.

I wished to present how complex and multilayered the Yugoslav crisis has been and how significant it proved to be for the destiny of the entire globe. And it should be immediately noted that in the early 1990s in Russia people did not even get close to understanding the essence of the events taking place in the Balkans. As a result, Russia’s Balkan policy could not be adequate.

The Yugoslav crisis, which extremely vigorously influenced international relations and the emergence of a new geopolitical constellation initially meant an irritating obstacle for the Russian government in its way towards the ‘civilised world’.

This is also the reason why Russia was among the first to acknowledge the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina even before any internal agreement was reached among the Yugoslav republics. This is why Russia willingly accepted the Western rules of the game in the Yugoslav settlement: namely that the great powers forced their will on the Yugoslav peoples who had to obey without a word against it. Russia, building on its special relationship with Serbia forced the will of the so-called ‘international community’ on Serbs. Initially the Russian means of mass communication also mediated the Western view of the conflict, which influenced Russian public opinion as well.

Nevertheless, Russian public opinion fell to the opposite side a few years later. It was revealed how big the price of reforms was and that Western democracies did not wish to give serious support to Russia. It became increasingly clear that the difficulties Russia had undergone were, on the contrary, intended to be used for further weakening and for pushing it out of the Balkans and of the whole of Europe. The most convincing example of it was the beginning of the eastern expansion of NATO. As a result Russia’s efforts to establish a new all-European security system within the framework of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were a total failure. It was also the failure of OSCE. In our view today it is almost a marginal but definitely not an autonomous organisation.

From about 1994 Russian diplomacy tried to meet the expectations of public opinion better; all the more so because the Yugoslav crisis was beginning to become not only an external but also an internal problem. True, the activity of the Foreign Ministry was manifest only in the changing phraseology and style of official statements for the time being. They began to repeat phrases like one should equally relate to all participants of the conflict, one should acknowledge that the Balkans was a Russian zone of interest, etc. Some observers hurried to assess this as Russia’s transfer to a pro-Serb stand. In reality it was not the case at all. Russia, for instance continued the policy of anti-Serb sanctions, repeatedly voting for their change for stricter ones.

In the final phase of the inter-ethnic civil war of Bosnia, NATO openly intervened into the war on an anti-Serb basis, for the first time in its history. Russia was pushed into the background, because its services were not needed anymore. It was needed as a tool of settlement in order to give broader legitimacy to arrangements and exercise bigger pressure on the Serbs. Russia merely played such a secondary role at the Dayton peace talks too, as well as in peace-making in the post-war ‘Bosnia of Dayton’.

What was least understandable was the fact that Russian diplomacy publicly declared its policy as incredibly successful and reported ever new victories claiming that Russia’s influence on the Yugoslav events was continuously getting stronger. In reality everything happened just the other way round.

The Kosovo crisis changed hardly anything as far as external intervention and Russia’s stand is concerned. The events again led to NATO aggression against the Serbian-Montenegrin Yugoslavia in March 1999. And in many respects it was due to the efforts of the Russian special delegate Victor Chernomirgyn that the West succeeded in halting the Serbs and breaking their resistance.

From then on and almost to the most recent times Russia, having acquired several wounds by the Yugoslav settlement, was practically squeezed out of the Balkans, and almost demonstratively did not interfere into issues concerning the Balkans. Nowadays no one speaks about victories in Russian diplomatic circles. The attitude of Russia to the Balkans is well shown by the fact that it has pulled out its small peace-keeping units from the Balkans and Kosovo.

In the existing relations with the Balkan countries the so-called course of ‘portioned political dialogue’ was realised depending on what relations the Balkan states maintained with Russia. It is understandable that this position is not at all that of taking the initiative.

The only Russian initiative of the past years was the organisation of a regional Balkans conference where issues related to the inviolability of borders and to human rights were to be discussed. But this initiative gained no response whatsoever.

During the past years, however, Russian Balkan policy started once again to be active in relation to Kosovo’s status. Usually the intention of Russia of converting its economic successes accomplished during the past years into political weight is mentioned as the reason of this trend, and also the fact that there are declared but unacknowledged pro-Russian states in the post-Soviet space. But in our view what matters is that Russia is not willing to permit a repeated violation of international law. This is the root of all those declarations that press for the elaboration of ‘universal principles’ for the solution of similar conflicts that are to be applied in every situation and not only in the case of Kosovo.

It is assumed that the acknowledgement of an independent Kosovo, even if it violates international law would end the conflicts in the Balkans. But those who know the Balkans are aware that nothing ends so simply there. All the more so because there would remain at least three unsettled national issues afterwards, namely the Serb, the Albanian and the Macedonian one.

We are of the view that we would completely break away from reality if idealistically we believed that all the problems would be solved almost automatically as soon as the so-called ‘Western Balkans’ becomes a member of the EU, or perhaps of NATO.

DSc History, Head of Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

1

A. V. Kozyrev, A. V. (1995): Preobrazsenyije. Moscow, 125.

2

Quoted by: Primakov, J. M. (1999): Godi v bolsoj polityike. Moscow. 210–211.

3

MacArthur, Sarah (2007): Kogda k stiku priravnyjali pero. Gyejatyelnoszty SZMI po oszvescsenyiju bosznyijszkovo krizisza. (1992–1995 gg.). Moscow.

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:87–91.

BÉLA KÁDÁR*

The Balkan Region and Hungarian Foreign Policy

Foreign policy has traditionally been playing a prominent role in shaping the scope of action and the external conditions of development of open small countries deeply embedded in international relations. A rich set of historical examples illustrates that small countries are often forced to carry on a drifting foreign policy due to their limited bargaining power and various constraints. Active foreign policy has become a precondition of successful competitiveness, catching-up and the improvement of positions as a result of globalisation and deepening international interrelationships.

Naturally, small countries cannot conduct a really influential foreign policy and cannot simply copy the foreign political behaviour of great powers, as it can be experienced in several spheres of politics. As contrasted to great powers, they cannot really manifest domestic political considerations in their foreign political behaviour, because it usually has a boomerang effect. Frequently they have no chances for a value-driven foreign policy due to international realities, and the posture of being a ‘moral great power’ and getting away from real political interests would again narrow their already modest scope of action.

Hungarian foreign policy restarting after World War I has always faced particularly difficult challenges due to its geo-strategic situation, special characteristics of its development history and the bargaining power related to its modest potential. Our mistaken historical tracks have often been rooted in the misinterpretation of international processes, power relations and the resulting national interests, in disregarding the possibilities and limitations of action, and the resultants of desirable and possible movements, even in retrospect to a millennium. In the spirit of “extra Hungariam non est vita”, characterising well the specificities of our mentality, the political class of the past as well as of the present, and even the society sense the significance of foreign relations in the shaping of the country’s destiny far less than several of our neighbours do.

The process of European integration and our European Union membership relieves several areas of traditional diplomacy of burden, and reshapes them in terms of negotiation, representation, the acquisition of information and formulating internal decisions. External conditions of development have acquired an enhanced significance, together with tasks shaping the image of the country and Hungary’s attractivity as a potential partner. Similarly, tasks related to awareness-raising about the external power field and interest relations, as well as to enlightening the society and in particular the decision-making sphere, also gained additional emphasis, just like the widening of our perspective.

Although four decades ago one could already emphasise publish the notion according to which the foreign political interests of small countries are primarily of economic nature, the possibilities of autonomous actions by Hungarian foreign policy remained limited in the once existing socialism and were determined by politics, to put it mildly. With the system change a doctrine of Hungarian foreign policy was born with a triad of aims including the return to the Euro-Atlantic community, a proper relationship with the neighbouring countries and the representation of the interests of all Hungarians. This doctrine, enjoying broad support in the medium term was not swept away by the wind, but greatly faded by the objectives of the prevailing policy wishing to put foreign policy in the service of domestic political aims. The December 2004 referendum gravely hurt the former unity of foreign political aims, the indirect consequences of which were also reflected by the changes of ‘good neighbourly relations’.

The tasks of Hungarian foreign policy, becoming particularly grave are hindered by the deficit of concept and consensus that has emerged in the country and the extent of which is conspicuous in our region as well as in Europe. Hungary has not elaborated strategic answers to political and economic development and to the changes in the power relations that have taken place during the past one and a half decades. The country has a large number of action programmes and projects, but it has no long-term development strategy, which undoubtedly makes the location of the international place of Hungary difficult, just like the clarification of the national interest in the Euro-Atlantic community as well as in relation to partner countries outside that community. Hence, Hungarian foreign policy is governed primarily by current issues and the requirement of adjusting tasks to the diplomatic timetable.

The topic is our relationship with the Balkans which offers a special field of study and action. It is worth setting out from the ‘evergreen’ requirement of diplomacy and from the theses of Prime Minister József Antall’s foreign political doctrine (functioning well for years in practice), in order to be able to provide an analysis of the situation and to clarify the tasks. One and a quarter of a century ago Bismarck, the Chancellor of the then upcoming imperial Germany stated that the two starting points of foreign policy were geography and economy. The changes and experiences of the time that have passed since then show that the impact of nationalisms emerging with historical delay on shaping relations cannot be disregarded. History also demands its place, though a more sublime social and political mind can tame historical heritage to a great extent, as it is indicated by French-German relations. The institutionalised alliance systems and processes of integration that have emerged after World War II have also an obvious impact on shaping foreign policy.

The Bismarckian foreign policy in the 1870s and 1880s, and subsequently József Antall’s doctrine in the postulates of the 1990s coincide in the Balkan policy of Hungary. A decisive foreign political interest of Hungary is to become as deeply and successfully embedded in the European processes of integration as possible. A decade ago the greatest ‘dowry value’ of Hungary’s accession for the European Union was its role in setting an example with regard to the process of transformation, catching-up and integration, which, according to the assumptions of the day, could exercise a benevolent radiating effect on the Central European region. The potential role of setting an example was blown away by the wind due to Hungary’s weak performance during the past half decade. Today Hungary is more of a liability than a potential asset in the process of European integration. Yet the value of the Hungarian dowry has not disappeared totally. The stability and modernisation of the Balkans is a priority target for the European Union, which was also reflected by the 1999 Union decision for enlargement towards Southeast Europe. This strategic aim is explained by interests related to the security of the ‘European backyard’ and the requirements of the former perspective of a ‘long march’ towards Byzantium. The participation of any country in the rapid and cost-effective stabilisation of the Balkan region, in its modernisation and integration is a value for the European Union.

Geographically Hungary has the most advantageous positions of the member countries of the Union for becoming a jumping board. The Brussels–Budapest–Belgrade–Byzantium route is obvious. Currently Hungary has the longest border with the Balkans among the Union member countries. Historically evolved knowledge of the region and experiences, as well as the potential role of Hungarians living there in building bridges may further increase the value of the dowry. The consequences of our integration into Europe can well be combined with the requirements of good neighbourhood and protecting Hungarians stipulated in the Hungarian foreign political doctrine formulated more than one and a half decades ago.

However, the most important present element of the interests governing Hungarian foreign policy is economic interest. The Balkan region represents a region of world economy where Hungarian economy has relative competitive advantages due to its geographical position, historical experiences and heritage as well as its relative level of development. Losses deriving from differences of bargaining power and asymmetries of interests cannot ever be totally eliminated in the relationships of small countries and great powers. Of the Balkan states the economic potential of Romania is 30% bigger expressed in GDP terms than that of Hungary, but as far as foreign economic relations, foreign trade and capital flows are concerned, Hungary is undoubtedly the first in the Southeast European region. Thus, asymmetries in bargaining power do not cause any problem, and the endeavour of small countries to develop closer economic cooperation with other small countries of similar potential can be realised.

The opportunities of cooperation are well illustrated by the fact that 12-15% of Hungarian exports were oriented to states belonging to the Balkan region seven decades ago, in the tense and hostile atmosphere of the 1930s. At the threshold of the system change this proportion dropped by half, to 6% after four decades of ”friendly cooperation” that had evolved in the framework of the CMEA. As a result of the system change and the process of European integration the return to natural partnership relations is perceivable. The Balkan region means the fastest developing major sector of Hungarian foreign trade. In the first half of 2008 Romania became, with Austria in tie, the third-fourth most important trading partner of Hungary with a share of 5%. The proportion of Croatia is 1.8%, of Serbia 1.6%, of Slovenia 1.3%, and of Bulgaria 1.1%. Altogether the countries of the Balkans have almost reached their relative importance prior to World War II. More than half of the stock of capital invested abroad from Hungary (the largest by scale among the former socialist countries) can be found in the Balkan countries. The Balkan region, short of efficiently functioning small companies is a more favourable territory of cooperation for the Hungarian small and medium enterprises participating otherwise with little weight in our external economic relations. The ‘upgrading’ and preparation of this area is also an interest of external economics.

The dynamics and structure of economic relations clearly indicate that the foreign political activities in the Balkans are of particular importance. Foreign policy can rely on economic interests and presence; at the same time its task is to serve the deepening of economic cooperation in several ways.

There are significant reserves for the development of relations in the exploitation of new channels and fields of foreign policy. The strengthening of our foreign political presence is a primary national interest. In addition to inter-state relations, the significance of building contacts with local and provincial governments, as well as big companies in the Balkan region is growing rapidly. Companies with a seat in Hungary but operating in the region, i.e. the leaders of these companies concentrate on immediate profit and do not always pay attention to the possibilities of modernising Hungarian structures, improving competitiveness and promoting supply, which are all hidden in the direct business contacts. The set of tools of ‘small diplomacy’ is also upgraded, such as the potential for developing contacts between cultural institutes, universities, sport relations and chambers. The success of our foreign policy in the Balkans largely depends on the skills of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a ‘conductor’ co-ordinating Hungarian presence and forms of action, orienting, informing and encouraging Hungarian actors active in the region.

Cooperation in the solution of the specific problems of the Balkan region requires special preparedness in foreign policy. Local knowledge about the Balkans is a competitive advantage. Here it is not enough to know the common European roots and cultural heritage to be successful in foreign affairs. There is a demand for Balkan experts who know the local conditions well, have an extensive education; there is need for training in Balkan Studies, and also for fora monitoring the situation. In a difficult world economic situation the requirements of competitiveness and of improving performances grow particularly. Today the opportunity is still available for exploiting the real and potential competitive advantages of Hungary in the cooperation with the region.

* Regular Member of the HAS

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:151–156.

JÓZSEF JUHÁSZ*

Hungarian Aspects of the Kosovo Conflict

I wish to survey the Hungarian aspects of the Kosovo conflict. I do not intend to give a historical overview but rather concentrate on the recently emerged and truly decisive situation which is basically the outcome of the failure of the so-called troika talks. I wish to outline what is to be expected now, what kind of scenarios may be elaborated and on which factors Hungarian foreign policy should concentrate in reaction to the events.

The 10 December report of the mediating troika may be regarded as the end of attempts aimed at finding a solution (more or less) acceptable to all the parties. As a result the best scenarios related to Kosovo have failed (one was a Serb-Albanian agreement on the future of the province, or in the lack of such an agreement, at least the passing of a UN SC resolution that would specify and legitimate the tasks by international law). There is no sense in continuing talks, which is pressed for by Belgrade and Moscow, because there is no hope whatsoever for success (they are also pressing for them with the purpose of stalling for time). Progress towards independence, however, is not only an inevitable must and a new international burden (because the international community has to stay there by all means in the interest of building a state and protecting the Serbs) but it is the sole possible practical solution which would be better for Serbia in the long run (because it would be relieved of an insoluble problem and at last could care about itself and about its catching-up) and would open the way to the future Western exit strategy as well. Luckily it can also be stated that the chance for the worst scenario is also minimal because despite the sabre-rattling statements of some advisers, prelates and organisers of guards there is no real danger of war. Local skirmishes and terrorist acts, however, are to be expected by all means and KFOR has to be prepared for them.

From now on it is possible in theory that Kosovo may declare its independence in any moment, but a prolonged scenario is more likely. The European Council would discuss the issue today (14 December 2007) and the UN Security Council on 19 December (and naturally both bodies repeatedly in the coming months) but no meaningful decision is expected as yet. It should also be remembered that the new parliament and government based on the 17 November elections have not yet been set up and it is unlikely that independence would be declared by the present caretaker government. The events may also be slowed down by the announcement of the Serbian presidential elections for 20 January. It is in the interest of all (including the Albanians of Kosovo) that the Serbian presidency should be occupied by the candidate of the democratic side (by the reelection of President Boris Tadić), therefore the US and the EU can obviously persuade Albanians to wait for the outcome of the presidential elections that would be finally decided only in the second round on 3 February. It means that at the moment the most possible date for the declaration of independence would be the middle or end of February. According to Albanian promises the parliament of Kosovo would also request the continued maintenance of international presence in the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan. It may also mean that the de facto timetable of the Ahtisaari plan would prevail envisaging a 120-day transitory period, consequently independence would enter into force sometime around June.

After the declaration the United States would presumably acknowledge the independence of Kosovo fast and among the first ones, to be followed by the Islamic countries and the leading European states. Breaking up the unity of the EU is not in the interest of Member States not favouring independence, therefore they would also acknowledge Kosovo after some shorter or longer period of time. Thus the EU may implement its plans, it can co-ordinate the steps to be taken by the international community in relation to Kosovo, the creation of stability, a state based on the rule of law and a functioning economy, and also the approximation of Serbia to the EU by way of compensation.

Serbia and Russia will not acknowledge the separation of Kosovo and China would bide its time. The Serb majority districts of northern Kosovo will declare its intention to “stay in Serbia”, a new tension would emerge in the relations of the West and Russia, and Belgrade would carry out its threats: it will put Kosovo under blockade, will close down the borders, would ‘call over’ Serbs living in diasporas to the northern districts, there would be a power demonstration in the region of Presevo, and it will limit or even break economic and diplomatic relations with states acknowledging Kosovo. If it does not go beyond these measures (almost surely not towards war but perhaps in the direction of destabilising Bosnia) these reactions will be tolerable and Serbia will not be able to maintain them indefinitely. In fact the problem with the blockade is that if it is a total one it would also hit the northern districts, and freezing foreign relations would mean such an extent of self-isolation by Serbia which cannot be counterbalanced by the Russian contacts.

It is difficult to assess the effect of separation as a precedent. In 1991– 1992 half the world was worried that the secessions would serve as precedents but we could see that nothing happened after the already disintegrating Central and East European socialist federations fell apart and nothing happened either when Montenegro seceded in 2006. All this suggests that fears related to the domino effect are not necessarily well-founded, are often motivated by domestic political aims as in the case of Slovakia and Romania, or it is exactly Serb nationalism that provokes those kinds of threats as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this respect it has to be stated that the compensation of Serbia cannot in any way mean the transfer of Republika Srpska. In Bosnia the dominant atmosphere recalls the early 1990s after High Representative Miroslav Lajčák’s decisions of 17 October were rejected by Belgrade as well as by Banja Luka.¹ Big rallies are held in the Serbian part of the country and Vojislav Koštunica has been promoting tension by an open contempt of the Dayton Accord and often referring to a direct attack against the existence of Republika Srpska.

Separation will have a nationalistic impact on the internal condition of Serbia, this is to be expected (and the campaign for presidential elections would further polarise the political scene). This growing nationalism can only be mitigated but not avoided. In addition today it is almost impossible to help Serbian politics: they entrench themselves and repeat almost like people suffering from autism that “We won’t give up Kosovo, Kosovo is our own.” Practically they do not even notice intentions of help if these intentions do not begin by stating that Kosovo is part of Serbia and should remain so. Yet the process of separation is to be conducted in a way least humiliating for Serbia. One of the most important preconditions of mitigating the experience of defeat is to keep up the so-called European perspective but not only as an abstract and long-term promise but as something that grants rapid and socially tangible ‘common advantages’ (liberalisation of visas, enactment of the Association Agreement).

The drifting of Serbia to the Russian side may continue. Russian–Serbian relations are already close because Belgrade is thankful for political support and economic cooperation is intensive (the Russian share in the Serbian foreign trade is 11%, surpassing all EU states, and Russian interest groups are also expanding in privatisation). As Moscow will not be able to retain Kosovo for Serbia (and because of the fact that Serbia economically also depends on the West), Belgrade will not be its full vassal and a permanent wedge forward for Russian policy in the Balkans. With the passage of time the (nowadays totally forgotten) element of Serb historical memory would awake that remembers that the Russians have many times let them down… Perhaps they will not repeat the ‘Hungarian mistake’, namely that Hungary, in despair because of Trianon, had linked its destiny to a country that was confronted to the West, the result of which was yet another historical defeat in World War II. Now the Serbs have to think it over whether it is in the long-term interest of Belgrade to be totally committed to Russia in every respect.

Now I wish to turn to the other point mentioned in my introduction, namely to the issue of the Hungarian reaction. I am of the view that Hungarian policy related to the separation of Kosovo could have a general and a specific ‘pillar’. On the one hand, we are interested in the stability of the entire region due to neighbourhood, economic reasons, and our Balkan policy in general, and we are also interested in its consolidation laying the foundations of the ability to develop, as well as in its (not accidentally distant) Euro-Atlantic accession. On the other hand we have to see to it that the situation of Hungarians in the Vojvodina should not deteriorate.

Taking all this into consideration, I think that Hungary should acknowledge the independence of Kosovo. One should not go against what is already in progress and should not be opposed to a ‘game’ that is to be decided by great power players at any rate (I am convinced that even the currently so loud Slovak and Romanian governments would sooner or later also acknowledge Kosovo). We do not have to be among the first, but should not wait for the last ones either. It is worth doing it with the majority of EU Member States, with the mainstream of the Union, further on it should be linked to the intention of supporting the European integration of Serbia by all available means. For this purpose Hungary has to give clear indications to Belgrade as well as to the other Member States of the EU that (in the case of the availability of other conditions, such as proper cooperation with the International Court of Justice in The Hague) it would fully support the current Serbian governing coalition in the successful implementation of its timetable of Euro-integration (Serb aims set for 2008 are: the enactment of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement initialled on 7 November, visa liberalisation and the EU candidate status). We could be the front-line fighters of the objective ”visa liberalisation and candidate status for Serbia in 2008”; by which the harmful effects on Hungarian–Serbian relations of the acknowledgement of independence could be mitigated. In fact we have to be aware of the fact that good relations with Serbia are more important from the point of security policy, economic and minority issues than the benefit that the independence of Kosovo may bring about. Moreover, Serbia would remain a more important partner of Hungary even if the joint potential of future relations with the two Albanian states is considered (the issue of Greater Albania not being on the agenda). The acknowledgement of Kosovo, would, of course damage the Hungarian–Serbian relations but we would not be the primary targets of Serbian vengeance. Reprisals may be expected, even the suspension of diplomatic relations, but in the longer run it is not in the interest of Serbia either to make Hungary its enemy.

Hungary has to set certain expectations in accordance with the EU towards an independent Kosovo (such as the acceptance of international presence, building a democratic state based on the rule of law and a clear economic framework, the acknowledgement of minority rights) but it also has to press for the opening up of the European perspective for Kosovo too, in proportion to the fulfilment of those requirements.

Our responsibility for a common Europe is very important. Therefore Hungary should constructively participate in shaping the Kosovo policy of the EU and in the work of the Union mission replacing UNMIK. In the context of these questions one should see that it is not only the issue of Kosovo that is at stake here. The settlement of the situation of the province is going to be the hitherto greatest enterprise of the common European foreign and security policy, therefore failure would do much damage to the credibility of the Union, to the political dimensions of integration and to the perspectives of the CFSP, since Europe already failed in the management of the post-Yugoslav crisis in 1991.

The settlement of Kosovo is going to be a rather difficult process taking a very long time; but if it is successfully kept under control and guided in the proper direction it can have several important benefits for us as well, namely:

– With the emergence of a normal state structure in Kosovo one of the ‘black holes’ of security policy may disappear from the region within a foreseeable time and dangers of trafficking in drugs, arms and people may be reduced. Surely, many people are doubtful about the viability of an independent Kosovo, and not without reason, but by and large I think that in this respect Kosovo has by no means less chance than any other state of the region.

– The safeguards to be granted to the Serbs of Kosovo may, in a way, serve as a basis of reference to the improvement of the situation of Hungarians in the Vojvodina (and of Hungarians living beyond the borders in general) even if not entirely, and surely not now, because of the different position of Kosovo and the Vojvodina and their different assessment by the great powers. But under the pretext of the settlement in Kosovo the rather narrow minority norms of the present international law could be widened. Therefore the autonomy of Serbs in Kosovo and its international safeguarding is in our interest.

– If Hungary perceives the separation of Kosovo in a manner reflecting their understanding of the trauma, the image of Serb politics and public opinion about Hungary may improve. This is all the more important because no matter how things would change, it is only the (relatively) westernised-democratic actors of Serb politics that can be the most important allies of Hungary and of the Hungarian parties of Vojvodina in the improvement of the situation of Hungarians living there.

– Further on, one may assume (but only in the longer run) that Serbia, getting rid of the burden of Kosovo and having overcome its primary trauma could at last concentrate on itself and its catching-up.

As a primary effect in the short run (which is, unfortunately, only short in a historical sense and not politically) it can also be assumed that Serb nationalism may take revenge for its frustration because of the secession of Kosovo on the minorities ‘at hand’, like the Hungarians living in Vojvodina. It would not mean retaliation organised by the state or an open discrimination limiting rights, but rather that the ‘spontaneous outbreak of repressed anger’. The danger for this happening is enhanced by the possible wave of refugees from Kosovo (though not larger than ten or twenty thousand) and the agreement on the return of illegal immigrants (making it obligatory for Serbia to accept its citizens illegally staying in the EU from 1 January on, who, in order to get back to the territory of the Union as early as possible would mostly set Vojvodina as a target). Therefore Hungarian foreign policy has to prepare itself for an international action to counterbalance losses.

* Senior Researcher of the Institute of History, HAS

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:93–98.

JÓZSEF JUHÁSZ*

Regional Political Conditions of Building Hungarian Contacts

I wish to outline the general political situation of the Western Balkans, those trends that currently determine the condition of the region and may serve as a kind of background and starting point for examining the regional activities of Hungarian foreign policy. If one looks at the events of the year 2008, and particularly those of the first eight to nine months it can be seen that compared to the period between 2003 and 2007 it was rather the positive trends that had been dominant. In the past one or two months, however, the recent developments made everything seem relative. It is enough to mention the wave of attempts in Croatia or the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the political atmosphere is almost as bad as it was in 1991–1992, before the war, and where the relationship between Milorad Dodik and Haris Silajdžić recalls the relationship between Radovan Karadžić and Alija Izetbegović of those days. In respect of Kosovo there was a few months of quiet and a relative interval in conflicts but now, as a result of the deployment of EULEX (i.e. the question of whether EULEX should be status free or not), the heat of political confrontation has been once again rising. Most importantly, one has to take into account that the global financial crisis has recently reached the region. Serbia, for instance, had to apply for an IMF loan of 520 million dollars. Hardly any financial support goes to Bosnia and Kosovo despite the earlier promises such as the offers of the conference of donors in July. The next year’s budget is being prepared in Croatia now with serious discussions on whether they could go through the next year without a general freeze of wages (in the best economy of the region!).

Initially some were of the view that these countries may, perhaps, avoid a deeper crisis because their loan market was relatively underdeveloped and their economy relatively isolated. But soon it turned out that in reality they were rather sensitive because their economies are small, underdeveloped and dependent on foreign resources (aid, investments and the transfer of guest workers). It would become rather dangerous if the attention and supporting inclination of international institutions, great powers and organisations as well as states undertaking the role of financial donors supporting the crisis-management and consolidation processes in the Western Balkans radically decreased. These are challenges that would ‘knock out’ the economies and states of the region in no time if they got out of control. It could bring a series of conflicts into the world of politics that was unprecedented in the recent past (though it was not these issues that had generated the most serious tensions), in other words, there could be a series of political crises of social origin. And if the economic and political crisis gets out of control, the (already vulnerable) democratic regimes may be broken in states attempting to apply different sorts of conflict management methods, introverting or only looking for scapegoats, and the networks of regional cooperation (e.g. in the form of CEFTA) that have developed could be rapidly destroyed. All this should warn us to take any kind of forecast about the region with much caution because currently unpredictability and uncertainty are very big.

All this is rather sad because during the period since December 2007 (disregarding the recent few months) events have taken a truly promising direction. It is well known that the consolidation process had different phases with regard to their nature and success. It can be stated by and large that the period of conflict management in which one could really set to the elimination of the structural causes of the crisis and to the reorganisation of the region could only begin from 1999. Until then only ‘fire fighting’ interventions aiming at a rapid suppression of tension were dominant: such as stopping armed violence, deploying peacekeeping forces as well as international missions of administration and reconstruction. Next came the period between 2000 and 2002, which I regard as the most successful and productive period of crisis management and consolidation so far. In those days trends radically changed: everywhere pro-West governments came into power, all of which depended politically and financially from the Western centres of power. The macro-economic indicators of the region started to improve, regional inter-state relations began to be settled, and the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Then the trend once again broke in 2003. In March the Serb Head of Government Zoran Ðinđić was assassinated, and almost precisely a year later anti-Serb pogrom started in Kosovo; the issue of the status of Montenegro and Kosovo poisoned almost all those years, and the Kostunica Government of Belgrade was characterised by a policy of ‘one step forward and two steps back’. There were, of course, events even during that period that may qualify as success stories from the angle of the consolidation processes, such as the continuation of the Croatian catching-up to the Euro-Atlantic integration, the ‘velvet secession’ of Montenegro in 2006 (particularly if we remember the fears accompanying it!), and the (not too enthusiastic but finally successful) conduct of the separation of Montenegro from Serbia by the EU. Yet the period between 2003 and 2007 was rather ambiguous from the angle of the consolidation processes. In comparison we could rather see positive things in 2008 for a long time (though there were contradictory ones even then, such as the conflicts in Bosnia or the naming dispute between Macedonia and Greece). The process towards the independence of Kosovo could be kept under control though it did threaten with great dangers of escalation. At the April summit in Bucharest NATO passed decisions on enlargement. By June the network of Stabilisation and Association Agreements linking the European Union and the states of the region has become complete by signing the agreement with Bosnia. Despite the secession of Kosovo the ‘democratic’ side (qualified as such in the given field of political power) could win twice in succession in Serbia and a government was formed, the achievements of which may be regarded as acceptable despite its strange coalition composition (one should recall, for instance, the extradition of Karadžić). If these events are compared to 2003–2007, the hope may even emerge that we are once again witnessing a turn of trends. One may hope that from now on a better period, similar to the one between 2000 and 2002, may come from the perspective of consolidation and catching-up, which would ensure better circumstances and conditions for Hungarian foreign policy because it may increase the readiness and openness of these countries for cooperation with Hungary.

That kind of inclination and openness is definitely greatly needed. We often and willingly say how important the region is for us, and we are the protagonists of the Euro-Atlantic catching-up of the Balkans, etc. In fact Hungary has done a great deal for this process. Yet it is often not even noticed in the region. For instance, in 2005 Hungary was lobbying intensively to achieve the opening of talks of the European Union with Croatia at the same time with Turkey. Perhaps Austria was better in lobbying, but Hungary was also active, but if we look at the Croat press in October 2005, one hardly finds any article mentioning that Hungary was also participating in the so-called ‘Habsburg group’ while they were amazed how much Austria had helped them. In the other states of the region there is even less attention and empathy towards Hungary than in Croatia. All this shows that the foreign political preferences and efforts, their vision of the external world do not coincide to that extent with our own as we would often think or would like. Therefore we should also consider how these states see the place and role of Hungary in their own foreign relations and foreign political strategy… Let me quote here the example of Secretary of State Mr Szentiványi regarding the airlines connection between Budapest and Belgrade, which shows clearly that the Hungarian–Western Balkans relations are often not as intensive as they could be because there is no proper receptivity on their side. It would be good to change this situation but Budapest alone is obviously only able to do so to a limited extent. Nevertheless, to some extent it is indeed capable and that does not always depend on money (often it does, because the investor and donor capacity of Hungary is unfortunately finite). Yet, the question arises as to why there are no Hungarian cultural centres in Belgrade or Zagreb (and vice versa), while there are some in several countries that are less important to us?

The next three or four most important issues one should pay attention to because of the present trends are the events in Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia (as sort of ‘eternal topics’), and the phenomenon recently mentioned with increasing frequency as the “European Monroe Doctrine”. I think today one of the most important goals in the region is that the present government should be successful in Serbia, the achievements of which have not been bad to this day and deserve an advance trust. This is in fact suggested by the country report of 5 November of the European Commission. There is yet another phenomenon in the political scene of the recent Serb politics that is worth paying attention to, because it may be highly significant in the long run, and this is the fragmentation of the Serb Radical Party, its split into three parts. Consequently, the Serbian political power field may be rearranged to a similar extent as in 2000: after a long time it happened once again that the strongest political formation is the Democratic Party, and the most important successor party of the SRP, the Progressive Party of Nikolić seems to set out from advocating extremist nationalism and social demagogy of the extreme right towards the centre, towards some kind of an acceptable centre-right party. We will see whether it can go that far, but for the time being the possibility cannot be excluded. The two phenomena together, namely the leading role of the Democratic Party and the transformation of the biggest radical successor party may create favourable domestic political developments hitherto unseen since 2000–2001 in the Serbian processes.

The other major question is that of Kosovo. I think that independence is irreversible, though Serbia has recently achieved one or two diplomatic successes (for instance that the UN and the EU do not reject the idea of the ‘status neutral’ operation of EULEX). This is not much but sufficient to dissolve Serbia’s sense of defeat and may serve as some kind of emotional and moral compensation which can be well communicated as diplomatic success in domestic policy. All this, however, will not reverse the independence of Kosovo. The real question is rather whether Kosovo would be a failure as a state. Would the process of building a state lead in the foreseeable period of time to the establishment of a political system capable of existing by its own, respecting certain minimum norms of democracy and providing for the protection of minorities, and to the creation of an economic system divested of its current criminal envelop? Many people are sceptical in this respect but I think that the chances of Kosovo for consolidation are not any worse than of all the other states of the region (provided the Western will to carry the process to the end and to ‘sponsor’ it remains). Another issue one should pay attention to is the question of North Mitrovica. Presumably Serbia will have a long-lasting interest in keeping up this focal point as a controlled, subdued conflict which can be cited ‘if necessary’ and the government of Pristina are not ready for compromise either. Therefore the integration of the area into the new state of Kosovo does not seem to be realisable for the time being, at the same time confrontation can be kept under control on the level of a low intensity crisis.

The place where, unfortunately, one has to fear most that the system would collapse together with the entire process of state building (due to domestic political reasons and not under the impact of the external financial crisis) is currently Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2006 the relationships among the three communities have been almost continuously deteriorating, and currently the atmosphere is almost like it was in 1992–1993. Luckily, however, the present situation differs from the one of that time in a very important aspect. Today neither Belgrade nor Zagreb can undertake the disintegration of Bosnia, and the actions of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats largely depend on what they are told by the two neighbouring capital cities. Today Belgrade and Zagreb would very much like to be European, in addition, Belgrade is also restricted by its own Kosovo rhetoric; therefore they can kindle threats of secession only moderately (in this respect it would be unjust to use an equal sign because the official Zagreb does not kindle any threats at present). It would, however, be also necessary to keep Milorad Dodik under control who started his career as an opposition and anti-war politician in the early 1990s, but today treats Republika Srpska (RS) almost as his own feudal estate, having built a practically absolutist power, therefore it is difficult to argue with him about anything. As opposed to him there is Haris Silajdžić, who did not belong to the extremist politicians earlier either, but who wrecked the inter-party agreement on constitutional reform in the spring of 2006, and who keeps on repeating even today that the RS is the product of ethnic cleansings of the war therefore it should be eliminated… It cannot be said that morally he is wrong but the RS is a fact today, even acknowledged by the Dayton Accord, and despite the events of the 1990s it cannot be stated that the Bosnian Serbs have no right to autonomy. The secession of Kosovo further enhanced the conflict because what had never been pronounced by the official Belgrade was said by Banja Luka, namely that “whatever is due to the Albanians in Serbia should be due to the Serbs of Bosnia too”. Interestingly, tension was also increased by the significant steps of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards consolidation and European integration in the period between 1997 and 2005. This, in fact, was inevitably accompanied by a certain concentration of power, so the central authority, defined rather vacantly in Dayton, has become stronger to some extent; moreover, European integration even demanded centralisation. Brussels would actually need one (and not more) governing partner to communicate with, which would operate Bosnia as a uniform economy, but that concept is rejected by Dodik defending the status quo of Dayton. I do not think that secession would be his actual and immediate aim, rather only the obstruction of the central authority, thinking that other opportunities would emerge in the future. All these factors taken together have made the Bosnian situation once again rather fragile.

Finally one or two sentences about the “European Monroe Doctrine”. During the past years the tendency was becoming increasingly visible that the Western Balkans belongs to the European Union, as a burden and responsibility for the time being, but perhaps also as a reward once the crisis zone of the Western Balkans calmed down and became tamed as Southeast Europe… This tendency remains as it is for the time being, because neither Washington nor Russia seem to be too active in the region. In my view the Obama administration (though his foreign political team would surely be full of people of the Clinton administration who had played a role in former crisis managements) will basically continue the Balkans policy of the Bush administration, namely the policy of getting rid of the burden, of keeping a distance and of transferring it to the EU. The US, however, will not fully pull out of the region, and this fact, let us admit, is rather positive. The (even symbolic) presence of the US and the NATO is also necessary because, unfortunately, it does good to the political class of each state of the Balkans to sense certain international limitations from time to time, namely what is permitted and what is not…

To drive this point home a powerful background is needed, a sanctioning capacity and it can only be lent by the American and NATO presence. It should be noted, that a key to the consolidation process continues to be the fact that the international community find the proper mix of rewarding and sanctioning. Surely it is better and more successful if the external political environment basically rests on rewarding (on opening the European perspective), but marking certain limitations continues to be necessary. Earlier in the year Russia was very active because of Kosovo and also in the Serbian energy economy, but I think that this does not endanger the assertion of the European Monroe Doctrine for the time being. The Serbian politicians are also aware of the fact that the opportunity of receiving financial support and catching up cannot be expected from Russia but from the West, and they also had to face the fact that Russia did not keep Kosovo for them. Therefore the danger of a radical pro-Russian change of orientation has significantly decreased in comparison to 2006–2007.

* Senior Researcher of the Institute of History, HAS