Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:23–28.

ISTVÁN SZENT-IVÁNYI*

The Southeastern Enlargement of the European Union as Seen from Strasbourg

First of all, let me give a short definition of what I mean by Western Balkans. Under the ambiguous European Union terminology it means the states of the former Yugoslavia with the exception of Slovenia, and Albania added to it. Naturally, the issue of enlargement extends over a far broader space, including Turkey and the admission of Turkey. I do not wish to dwell upon the latter issue this time.

The crisis in the Balkans is as old as the history of the European Union and it is one of the most important and gravest of challenges. When in the summer of 1991 hectic conciliation talks were in progress for the finalisation of the Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union, arms were already rattling in Yugoslavia. The conflict was not fully without antecedents, yet seemingly the Member States of the European Community and of the European Union later on were surprised and were unprepared for it. The Balkan crisis had a very clear moulding effect on the foreign and security policy and later on the defence policy of the European Union, as well.

It was an obvious challenge, encouraging the Union to strengthen its joint appearance. At the same time it failed right at the first test of power, at the acknowledgement of Croatia. It is known that two Member States, Germany and Italy acknowledged Croatia ahead of the others, which caused some uncertainty. The Bosnian and afterwards the Kosovo crises in their turn pointed out that the European Union was unable to guarantee or maintain order and stability even in its own immediate environment.

It was a great punch to the self-consciousness and respectability of the newly born Union that the Bosnian accord was not reached in Europe but in Dayton in the United States and basically it was not forced out by Europeans but by the Americans. This is also true of the solution of the Kosovo crisis for, though negotiations were held in Rambouillet, the decisive part of the military action was executed by the Americans. Without them the Member States of the European Union would have been unable to do so not only in a military but also in a political sense.

The first and unambiguous turn in the Balkan policy of the European Union took place at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003. The decisive changes in Croatia and Serbia, the two dominant countries of the region had certainly contributed to this turn. With the death of Tudjman and with the fall of Milošević all the decisive countries of the region took to a clearly European orientation and manifested their intention for co-operation. This was awarded by the European Council, topmost institution of the European Union in Thessaloniki in 2003. This was the first such stand stating that the future of the Western Balkans was in the European Union and potentially qualified all the countries of the region as candidate countries. By offering a real European perspective from then on the European Union regarded the states of the region as future Member States.

Accession, however, cannot in any way be realised, with the exception of the special case of Croatia, as long as we are unable to solve the basic and grave problems of the region. The first and most important of them is the settlement of the Kosovo crisis without which true regional stability is unimaginable. Though we are already past the deadline the solution cannot be postponed any longer. The position is generally accepted by the international community that it was a mistake to postpone the settlement of the issue in 1999, when everybody would have accepted what they do not want to accept today. At that time the international community was facing a defeated Milošević regime that had lost its legitimacy but today Serbia has a democratically elected government. Today the strange situation has emerged that Milošević could retain Kosovo whereas the democratising Serbia is losing it. This is obviously difficult to digest for Serbia. If Kosovo gains its independence, it may stabilise the currently rather uncertain conditions of Kosovo but may destabilise Serbia. There is no realistic chance for an agreement between the two parties. Surely, we may beguile ourselves and we do so up to 10 December 2007 for the representatives of Serbia and the Albanians of Kosovo may carry on negotiations up to that date, but antagonistically different positions are confronting each other. Serbia is ready to give anything that is less than independence, whereas the Albanians of Kosovo do not want to accept anything that is less than independence. It is extremely difficult to bridge over these two divergent stands.

Theoretically there may be three solutions: one is to preserve the present status quo. This is only wanted by Serbia and perhaps by Russia. The European Union has officially taken a stand in favour of the supervised independence defined by the Ahtisaari plan. This position can hardly be regarded as a fully united and enthusiastic rallying point. It was also revealed at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Portugal recently that there are Member States that do not unconditionally agree with it: Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia have a different opinion. The position of the European Union is further weakened and its sphere of mobility is greatly narrowed by constantly stressing the importance of the UN Security Council decision. The EU makes the impression that it only accepts the decision of the Security Council. This revaluates the role of Russia incredibly and practically ensures its right to veto in the quest for solution. In my view this is an unnecessary self-restraint and in addition it will not lead to any result.

The possibility of the division of Kosovo also emerges on the level of experts but the European Union is largely averse to it. The Union fears that it would lead to destabilisation in certain parts of the region and to secession in others. Serbia has never officially rejected this option. On 12 September 2007 the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica was in Brussels and had talks with José Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission. As the minutes of the negotiations show this solution did not even occur in the form of a question.

What can be expected after all this? After 10 December the Albanians of Kosovo will, in all probability decide for the declaration of their independence. This will, once again place the European Union for a serious test of power for there is no uniform view in its Member States about how one should react upon the unilateral declaration of independence. Some Member States are of the view, together with the United States that independence should be acknowledged. Other Member States abstain from it. We are facing yet another embarrassing failure of the foreign policy of the European Union with a disruption and uncertainty similar to the Iraqi war. Unfortunately, I am not at all optimistic in this respect.

I am convinced that the separation of Kosovo from Serbia is mostly in the interest of Serbia. I am convinced that nothing worse could be done to Serbia than simply leaving Kosovo at their care. One could then, give up the European perspective for Serbia. The European Union does not wish to receive by any means the mass of crisis that Kosovo would mean within Serbia with the renewed civil war situation. The Kosovo situation is a huge burden for Serbia. It can only set out on the way of catching-up if it gets rid of that. There are some people in Serbia who share this view, and privately quite a few politicians admit it. Openly only the Liberal Democratic Party has so far undertaken to give up the illusion of Kosovo. This is a very painful and traumatic process, which we, Hungarians understand and sense well. Yet, it is eminently in their interest. The European Union would also like to convince Serbia about it. It is not accidental that the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi even promised recently that they may join the European Union along a ‘rapid track’ if they get appeased with the independence of Kosovo.

Since October 2000 we have been conducting negotiations with Serbia on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. This year at least we have reached a technical accord, but it is not yet known how it would operate in practice. Until cooperation is not restored with the International Court of Justice in The Hague the agreement cannot be concluded. We are expecting Carla Del Ponte’s new report that would make a statement about it.

Today political instability can be sensed in Serbia, and the usual problems, characteristic mostly of the states of the region are present such as corruption, organised crime, the problem of the administration of justice, a weak public administration, high rates of unemployment and a relatively low absorption capacity for Union subsidies. Incidentally Serbia is in an exceptional position concerning Union supports because, in addition to the 100 million euros allocated to Kosovo last year it received 196 million euros of assistance, which is per capita almost as much as the one received by Croatia. The latter one is a candidate member country and Serbia is only a potential one, therefore in theory there should be tangible difference between the allocations received by the two countries. There, however, seems to be political agreement that in case Serbia showed co-operative behaviour in the Kosovo issue, the European Union wishes to help its integration into Europe financially also.

Croatia is considered as a success country in the region. Despite the fact that it is still at the beginning of the accession talks, in addition it fares rather badly in comparison to its own ambitions, because it wishes to accede to the Union already in 2009. So far only 14 of the 35 chapters have been opened and only two have been concluded. In addition those two are the chapters easiest to conclude, namely science and research, and education and culture, which is largely a national competency and involves very few European Union obligations. Yet I wish if Croatia at least concluded negotiations by 2009, which would practically mean membership from 2011 on, because the period of ratification starting in 2009 should also be considered. This is not an unrealistic scenario at all. The European Union also has problems with Croatia. Corruption is often mentioned, if not at the same level as in the case of Serbia. There are also lots of problems in the field of environmental protection, mostly in respect of the draining and purification of sewage water. The reform of public administration and of the administration of justice has begun but it is progressing haltingly as yet. In addition, elections are to be held in November in Croatia after the protracted campaign that began in January, which significantly slows down preparations. Due to the circumstances mentioned here a kind of deceleration can be sensed in the process, but it is only partly the fault of Croatia. The positions for negotiation of the European Union are also prepared slowly. The missed deadlines are explained by technical causes and by translation, but I think there is something else behind it. Hungary does everything so that we may find solutions for all the issues still open (such as border problems with Slovenia, a conflict in marine law with Italy) by 2009. There is still a lot to do, yet I can say that Croatia has been progressing well in preparation and will fit into the Union without any particular difficulty.

Macedonia has been another candidate country of the region since December 2005. It is a question, however, whether this really means more than potential candidate status as Macedonia was not even given a target date for the opening of negotiations. Earlier December 2007 was regarded as a probable date for setting the target date, but now every piece of information suggests that setting the beginning of negotiations would be further postponed. In Macedonia there are problems even with the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Ohrid Accord which was supposed to settle problems between the Albanian and the Macedonian communities. The relationship between the opposition and the government is pitched as the Albanian opposition is once again boycotting the work of the parliament after a short break. It is characteristic of the region that the recurrent problems (corruption, organised crime, weak public administration, etc.) are enhanced here.

Montenegro may, perhaps be the next success country. It has closed the negotiations for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement but it has not entered into force to this day due to the lengthy ratification process. It is a very positive fact that the European and western orientation of Montenegro is beyond doubt. We also have to remember that they very bravely co-operated with the West in March-April 1999, in the most difficult times. It was not at all easy, because at that time they used to live in a common state with Serbia. The European integration of Montenegro enjoys political support, but they also have serious problems such as a weak state organisation, drug trafficking, smuggling of people and cigarettes, corruption, etc.

As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned not even the desire can emerge that they should constitute a united nation and there is no realistic chance for it. A step forward would be if there was a common will to operate the state. It is not only common identity but also this will that is missing. In its history of 12 years Bosnia and Herzegovina has not accomplished any step forward in the operation of the state. It started as a protectorate and though today it is not entirely the case, one cannot see that state-forming factors feel their shared responsibility for the future of the country. The text of the technically completely negotiated Stabilisation and Association Agreement has been ready for long but it will not be signed by the European Union as long as the police and public administration reform is not implemented, the problem of public service media is not solved, the issues of refugees and minorities are not settled, with special regard to the rights of the Roma minority. Next to Kosovo I see the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the second most burning issue of the region.

Albania is also among the potential candidate countries. The domestic political situation is characterised by instability and a vigorous tension between government and opposition, which is naturally a phenomenon present not only in the Balkan countries. Further problems that can be identified in the country are the protection of minorities, particularly the condition of Roma issues, weak legal security, the strong influence of the mafia, corruption and organised crime.

Consequently, a not too encouraging image of the region may unfold. But we should be realistic and face the questions: what are the problems that we wish to solve and how valuable is the region for us. The stability and peace of the Balkans is of basic interest for the European Union. It has tried to ignore the region but failed. It tried to keep the events taking place in the Balkans far from its borders, which again failed because their impact percolated through by refugees, crime and general instability. Now we are experimenting with integrating the Balkans and exercising influence on the internal processes through the perspective of EU-membership. This is the so-called ‘soft power’ that the Union effectively possesses and could use very well, far more effectively than hitherto. We may influence most of these countries if we link the realisation of objectives important to them to strictly specified and controlled conditions.

There is, however, a problem with the EU perspective and we cannot hide it even from people living in the Balkans, namely that the perspective is weakening. It has reasons lying within the European Union and being independent of them. There is a kind of enlargement fatigue that can be sensed in the public opinion of the European Union. It is rather frustration than enthusiasm that can be observed in this respect and disillusionment can also be sensed in politicians.

Of the annual budget of generally 120 billion euros one billion is spent on enlargement policy. This sum will be somewhat higher in 2008 because an additional sum of 180 million euros is earmarked for Kosovo as a function of settlement. More, however, should be spent on the other West Balkan states too. This does not only means bigger sums but a different support scheme, as well.

One of the basic problems is weak civil society therefore much more should be spent on building and supporting civil society. The support of the independent media should be made more vigorous because there is a great deficit in this field in the countries of the region. The situation is similar also in the field of institution-building and education. Currently the EU is concentrating rather on the building of bridges, roads and similar projects. They are spectacular, they can be inaugurated and they are obviously needed, but contribute less to the real democratisation and stability of the region.

If the European Union takes its own opportunities of influence seriously and makes the European perspective once again authentic, it can shape the internal conditions of the region far more positively. In this respect I wish to flash optimism even if I do not think that enlargement, with the exception of Croatia, would take place in respect of the other countries in the very near future.

* Member of the European Parliament

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:79–86.

GÁBOR SZENTIVÁNYI*

The Balkan Region and Hungarian Foreign Policy

I. The basic principles of our Balkan Policy

The recently approved Hungarian Strategy for External Relations considers the maintenance of lasting stability, security, democratic and market economic development of and ever deepening cooperation with the Western Balkan region as of primary interest to Hungary. In the long run it can be ensured most effectively by the Euro-Atlantic integration of all the countries of the region. During the course of that process we have to pay attention to making sure that the accession of the well prepared countries for Euro-Atlantic integration does not suffer disadvantages because of the weaker achievements of other countries in the region but should rather mean encouragement to countries lagging behind, proving that efficient preparations would bring about the desirable outcome.

II. Means of exercising our interests

Our EU and NATO membership

One of the basic aims of the European Union as well as of NATO is to integrate all the West Balkan countries into the Euro-Atlantic structure. The European Union made a political commitment about this at the June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. NATO, in addition to maintaining the ”open door policy” stated in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, and also stressed in the communiqué of the Riga Summit held in 2006 that it considered the Euro-Atlantic integration of the West Balkan region necessary. Consequently, Hungary has taken every opportunity to help the integration of the region into the two organisations and stands prepared to play this role in the European Union, as well as in NATO.

Hungary's participation in regional cooperation formats targeting integration

The Visegrad Group: One of the particularly important areas of interest to the V4 cooperation is the West Balkan region. The International Visegrad Fund supports the students and researchers of the Western Balkans and their researches through several programmes and scholarship systems. The Visegrad+ programme, established in 2008 with the aim of creating a tool for supporting democracy by the V4 considers Serbia as a particularly important partner country.

Quadrilaterale: it is a loose consultation mechanism of Hungary, Italy, Croatia and Slovenia. Its original aim was to promote Slovenia‘s Euro-Atlantic integration, now it supports Croatia, and next it will help other West Balkan countries wishing to accede. It is a useful (informal) foreign political tool for the participants to get thoroughly acquainted with and to adjust the positions of participants in respect of the Western Balkans.

Regional partnership: the aim of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Austria and Slovenia is to support and assist the European aspirations of the West Balkan region in fulfilling the requirements of membership.

Central European Initiative: this loose grouping of 9 EU members and 9 non-EU members aims at promoting the efforts of the latter countries, thus of the Western Balkans towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Hungary, as one of the founders has been playing an active role in that organisation.

Regional Cooperation Council: set up in February 2008 as a successor to the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the RCC aims at making the countries of the region capable of smooth cooperation and collective as well as individual assertion of interests, thus preparing them for cooperation as potential EU member states. Hungary is a member of the governing board of the Council.

Our geographic/infrastructural assets, our trustworthiness

According to the statement of the Strategy for External Relations ”the geographical position of Hungary at the intersection of East-West and North-South corridors offers an opportunity for the development of the road, railway and river infrastructure and transit routes and for the diversification of energy supply.” To this statement we can add that Hungary is in a position to promote the integration of the Balkan countries due to its geographical position and infrastructural connections.

One branch of the Pan-European transport corridor No. 10 goes through our country which lies in the Northwest–Southeast axis of transport. Its southern end is at the Aegean Sea where it joins the Pan-European transport region of the Black Sea and the Adriatic-Ionian Seas. That corridor is more or less identical with one of the best known transport routes in history known under the name ”Silk Road”.

MALEV, the Hungarian national airline operates regular flights to all the capitals of the region with the exception of Belgrade. Restarting flights to the Serbian capital depends on Serbia‘s ratification of the European Air Transport Agreement.

The ‘coverage‘ of the countries of the region by Hungarian diplomatic and consular representations is complete: we have embassies in every West Balkan capital city.

Thus it can be stated that the road to the European Union “leads through Hungary” in many respects for the countries of the region. Politically sensitive and unsettled issues do not burden our relations with them. We have not given them any reason to lose their trust in us. All this advances the success of our regional activities and facilitates the appreciation and acceptance of our position by our partners.

Economic relations

It becomes obvious from the above that the Western Balkans is a natural direction for Hungary to build economic contacts. The economic significance of the region is also supported by growing Hungarian investments there, in addition to the continuously expanding trade in goods and services (currently about 3 billion euros per year). During the past years Hungary has become the largest capital exporter country of Central-Eastern Europe and the Balkans has become a prominent area for capital investment for Hungary. Some multinational companies with seats in Hungary are leading capital exporters to the region. OTP Bank has invested in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, MOL in Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dunapack and Zalakerámia in Croatia, Matáv in FYROM and Montenegro, Hunguest Hotels in Montenegro, and MAL (Hungarian Aluminium Production and Trade Ltd.) in Bosnia. The total value of Hungarian capital export to the region has so far exceeded 2 billion euros.

III. What have we done so far
and what are we planning to do?

The External Relations Strategy states that ”Hungary supports and assists the countries of the region in their Euro-Atlantic rapprochement and integration. Together with its EU and NATO partners it participates in the stabilisation of the region, in crisis management operations, in establishing arms control and non-proliferation regimes, in building democratic institutions and in strengthening the rule of law. It takes on an active role in assessing and averting risks in the field of justice and home affairs in the region, in helping the EU-conformity of institutions of countries aiming at European integration, thereby assisting the EU in its endeavours as well.”

The various fields of our activity:

1. Hungary‘s role in the stabilisation of the West Balkan region – peacekeeping

Currently we participate with a contingent of 1073 persons in international crisis management and peace support operations, 615 persons of which are deployed in the Western Balkans. Initially we took up this role in the period prior to our NATO membership: already in 1995 we played a complex role in the first NATO operation outside its territory, in setting up and operating the IFOR mission in Bosnia. NATO‘s IFOR operation was followed by SFOR, which – after a successful mission – was in turn succeeded by the European Union‘s EUFOR/ALTHEA mission in 2004. Currently 157 Hungarian soldiers and 5 Hungarian police officers serve in the mission.

We have been participating from the beginning in the operations of NATO aiming at the stabilisation of Kosovo. It is worth mentioning in particular that the defence and protection of KFOR headquarters in Pristina has been provided by the Protection and Security Battalion in 18 tours of duty with a total number of about 280 troops for almost nine years. From 1 September 2008 we have taken over the lead nation role of the multinational NATO battalion stationed in Western Kosovo, Task Force Nimrod with headquarters at Pec where 425 troops are Hungarians out of a total of 700. Another important aspect of our role taken up in Kosovo is our participation in the EU rule of law mission, EULEX to which we may send maximum 50 experts on the basis of a government resolution. We have participated in shorter but all the more important stabilisation operations of NATO in Albania and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We also participate in the work of the military command of NATO at Sarajevo with staff officers and liaison officers as well as in the work of its liaison office in Belgrade.

2. The Szeged Process

The Szeged Process started by the conference held on 7–8 October, 1999 in Szeged at the margin of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe upon the initiative of the Hungarian government. From 2001 the sphere of activity, beyond supporting the democratisation process of Serbia, was further enlarged both thematically and geographically, and has been extended to all the states of the region. In the wake of changes that have taken place in the international environment and particularly in the situation of the countries of the region the Hungarian government reconsidered the set of targets of the Szeged Process in 2004. The promotion of European integration, assistance in implementing the integration perspective, as well as the promotion of European democratic values were put into the focus of activities. The knowledge and experiences of Hungary in the integration process can render significant assistance to the democratic governments, parliaments and local governments, to educational institutions, civil organisations and representatives of the media of the region. Because of our relationship as neighbours we continue to lay emphasis on supporting the integration efforts of Serbia by the activities of the Szeged Process. To this date we have supported the region by about 1.2 billion forints within the framework of the Szeged Process through the Chance for Stability Public Foundation, the Szeged Centre of Security Policy and through Hungarian international development assistance.

3. Regional partnership

On 10–11 October 2005 six countries of the Regional Partnership and the West Balkan states, i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Serbia and Montenegro agreed within the framework of a conference of foreign ministers held in Budapest that they would develop cooperation in six important fields with the aim of promoting the European integration of the region. According to the distribution of tasks laid down in the approved Joint Communiqué Hungary coordinates the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. In the framework of the „Budapest Forum” Hungary organised seminars of experts in several areas from early 2006 on (border management, fight against corruption, visa policy). In April 2007 Hungary, as representative of the states of Regional Partnership, and the interior ministers of the West Balkan states laid down the specific areas and forms of cooperation in a Statement of Agreement with special regard to guarding borders and to the fight against illegal migration and organised crime. Further on, the project with Hungarian participation, supporting the fight against illegal migration has been implemented in the entire West Balkan region. The organisation of a seminar dealing with twinning cooperation as well as issues of visa administration is among our plans within the framework of the Budapest Forum.

4. Our actual support given to the countries

Hungary‘s role in the development of relations between NATO and the countries of the region

An outstanding aspect of our continuous efforts towards the lasting Euro-Atlantic integration of the West Balkan region is the consistent political and practical support of the objectives of the countries of the region to become NATO members and to participate in the Partnership for Peace programme. Both in bilateral frameworks and with regard to the Membership Action Plan established in 1999 by NATO with the aim of promoting the preparation of countries aspiring for membership, we have supported the participation of the three countries, Albania, Croatia and FYROM in the programme. In our bilateral programmes of consultations and cooperation we devote particular attention to transferring our experiences of integration. We have consistently stood for issuing an invitation to the opening of talks on NATO accession without unjustified delay to countries that were prepared for it. At the Bucharest Summit of NATO in April 2008 we pressed for the invitation of the three West Balkan aspirants and welcomed the favourable decision made in the case of Albania and Croatia. We stressed that in the interest of lasting stability in the Western Balkans it was important to invite Skopje, too. We have joined a letter initiated by Italy pressing for an early invitation which was also signed by the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Norway, Turkey, Romania and the United Kingdom. It is our consistently represented stand that the accession of Albania and Croatia has to take place without disruption so that they may participate as full members in the April 2009 jubilee Summit of the Alliance. In order to promote this, Hungarian foreign policy urges the completion of the ratification process by early 2009. As a support of that policy Hungary was the first to confirm the accession minutes of Albania and Croatia by an unanimous parliamentary vote on 15 September 2008.

The strengthening of the NATO connections of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia is an important issue. We have been pressing for an early invitation of all three countries to the Partnership for Peace programme of NATO right from the outset. We regard it as our own foreign political success that this endeavour was materialised at the Riga Summit of November 2006. We resolutely stood for filling the Partnership for Peace cooperation with meaningful content as early as possible. We are pleased to see that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have achieved significant progress in this area, and therefore we have urged their invitation at the Bucharest Summit to start the Individual Intensified Dialogue on enlargement, which meant raising the relations to a qualitatively higher level. The Alliance keeps this perspective open to Serbia too, as soon as Belgrade is ready for it. The respective positive decision of the Bucharest Summit was also assessed as a step strengthening the stability of the Western Balkans. After the favourable change in the domestic policy of Serbia we consider it important to make the cooperation between NATO and Serbia more meaningful and substantial. For this purpose we have formulated a joint package of proposals, a ‘non-paper‘ together with Norway and Italy and had it circulated among our allies.

As a token of Hungary‘s commitment to the integration efforts of the West Balkan we have, for several years, filled the post of NATO Contact Point Embassy in the region. We have been performing this task in Croatia since 2005, initially for a two-year period, which was extended by NATO up to the accession of Croatia. Next we have applied for the liaison role in Montenegro for 2009–2010. In case of a favourable decision we plan to enlarge the staff of our representation there.

Hungary‘s role in the development of relations between the European Union and the West Balkan region

Recent developments in the region have proven that the prospect for EU

membership is an important but not sufficient instrument to extend stability and advance reforms in the region. Therefore Hungary strives for an early conclusion of the ratification process of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements signed between the EU and the countries of the region, and aims to achieve that those countries, in line with the pace of individual achievements, may become candidates and subsequently EU members in the coming years. Hungarian diplomacy lays a special emphasis on supporting the dialogue on visa liberalisation launched with countries of the region. Each country was given a tailored road map with the definition of tasks to be accomplished in different fields. The road maps link the achievement of visa liberalisation to comprehensive reforms in the field of justice and home affairs. We treat the advancement of relations between the EU and Serbia with particular attention. We consider it an important event of 2008 that, partly as a result of efforts by Hungarian diplomacy, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed prior to the May elections, which contributed to the victory of the pro-Europe forces. Our aim is that the Interim Agreement should enter into force as soon as possible, and that the Stabilisation and Association Agreement should be ratified early on by the Member States. In order to reach this goal Serbia’s good cooperation with the ICTY would be necessary. Serbia’s approximation to the European Union cannot be totally separated from the issue of Kosovo either, and particularly from the situation of the EULEX mission and Belgrade’s stand related to the deployment of the mission. It is one of the achievements of Hungarian foreign policy that the Serbian-Hungarian relations have not substantially deteriorated despite our recognition of Kosovo, the timing of which (co-ordinated with Bulgaria and Croatia) also served the minimisation of the possible disadvantages. The visit of Kinga Göncz to Belgrade on 2 September and the talks of Ferenc Gyurcsány on 21 November in Serbia resulted in some positive feedback to our efforts. In September the Hungarian Foreign Minister handed over a draft protocol on cooperation between the two Foreign Ministries with a specific list of projects and programmes to strengthen bilateral relations and promote the integration efforts of Serbia.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina our most important task is to keep the EU integration process on the political agenda, and to maintain the commitment of society to integration, in the interest of which we try to bring the Union perspective into tangible proximity. A more active and vigorous presence of the Union is needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungary considers it as a task of particular importance to pass on our experience on integration, and plans to increase its activity in this respect in the future, by continuing to pursue cooperation with the other V4 countries, or any other possible formations.

We hope that the two-thirds parliamentary majority of the government in FYROM will ensure a proper basis for the elimination of still existing shortcomings in the process of integration and for the practical implementation of reforms. It is our aim to promote the solution of political debates that hinder the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country for the time being (such as the name dispute), by constructive dialogue. Hungary is also ready to support the preparations of the country and the adoption of the acquis within the framework of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).

5. The EU presidency period of 2009–2011

In the period of 2009-2011 at least four of the countries to hold the rotating EU presidency will treat the region‘s integration as a priority. Among them the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are members of the Visegrad Group, which offers an opportunity for the consistent representation of the issue at different European fora. From the summer of 2009 Hungary will assume the presidency of the Visegrad Group for one year, which makes it possible for the country to keep the issue of the West Balkan region on the agenda.

* Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Director

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:75–76.

ÁRPÁD SZÉKELY*

Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy

It is important to take account of the events of the 1990s to be able to understand the motions of Russian foreign policy. In the 1990s the Russian political elite were experimenting with the development of a liberal economic model in the interest of modernising the country, but it ended up in chaos. The oligarchs constituting the core of the current economic elite gained strength during that period while tens of millions of people lived under the poverty line.

One cannot speak about a coherent Russian foreign political strategy in that both economically and politically chaotic period. It can be stated in general that Russia has been conducting a kind of ‘global foreign policy’ due to its great power status. While the primary direction of foreign political efforts is Europe and countries of the European Union, Moscow pays careful attention to the Russian-American relations. It is true that it has no serious economic foundations and one cannot even speak about a set of institutional relations, only about dialogues between individuals. It is also a decisive factor determining Russian foreign policy how the relations between NATO and Russia would change.

During the recent period there has been a changing tone in Russian foreign policy which can be explained by the growth of the country’s economic strength. The most important task of the coming years would be the modernisation of the infrastructure and the structural change of the economy from the angle of the development of Russian economy and of the solution of demographic problems. Currently a kind of capital concentration can be observed in Russia which is manifest in the setting up of state holdings and the concentration of the existing state-owned companies. In the background of this tendency there is the leading political elite wishing to build an economic basis opposing the oligarchs. In addition these branches, such as ordnance industry, aircraft industry, car manufacturing, are extremely capital- and research intensive ones, and they also represent a bigger added value. Russian leadership wishes to bring capital and technology to the country, an important condition of which is to become marketable partners.

A domestic quest for identity seen since the 1990s makes the development of a uniform Russian foreign policy difficult. The Russian Federation is a legal successor of the Soviet Union in every respect, at the same time it tries to build a capitalist kind of economic system. It means that it has to maintain continuity while experiencing a huge break and discontinuity. In such a period of quest for identity it is more difficult to formulate national interests and it is extremely difficult to formulate a coherent foreign policy broken down to regions. Though several background institutions try to assist the formulation of foreign political aims, there is still quite a lot of ‘improvisation’ in Russian foreign policy even today.

The Balkans does not play a strategic role in Russian foreign political thinking, the Black Sea region is far more important. Only the Kosovo issue is on the agenda as Russia repeatedly calls attention to the fact that a forced settlement may lead to serious tension. Moscow has again learned to say no, but apparently it has no proposals really pointing ahead. At the same time it is a fact beyond doubt that the means and basis of the growing strength of the Russian economy lies in the energy carriers and since the diversification of the energy resources and transport lines figures among the objectives of the European Union, the Balkans is expected to be revaluated in the eyes of Russia. Moscow is economically interested in transporting the energy carriers along as many routes as possible to the target countries because it is at least as much in need of the export income from Europe as Europe is dependent on the Russian energy carriers.

* Ambassador of Hungary in Moscow

Begegnungen
Schriftenreihe des Europa Institutes Budapest, Band 29:63–73.

ZOLTÁN SZ. BÍRÓ*

The Balkan Policy of Russia

In the present paper I intend to concentrate on three problems.

First of all, if one wishes to understand Russian behaviour in the Balkans, with special regard to the related efforts of the recent period, it may be worth considering the momentary conditions and possibilities of Russia first and foremost.

Next I try to survey the strategic directions of the foreign political behaviour of Moscow. I try to outline the broader foreign political context, but only of the Putin period not covering the time prior to 2000, in which the Balkans is not a strategic direction for Russia. It is not a strategic priority despite the fact that there are actors, groups and factors in Russian politics that have occasionally added emotional hues to politics due to confessional or ethnic proximity or historical relations. Yet, I am of the view that the Balkans cannot be considered a strategic target area of Russian foreign policy, it is much more a tool to the achievement of more important political goals.

The third problem area is the actual Balkan policy of Russia. A policy, as I have already mentioned, is primarily a tool and not a strategic target area.

Let us see the first topic of Russian capabilities. Several facts and circumstances are commonly known to the majority of those who are interested in foreign policy. The spectacular stabilisation process is also well-known, as a result of which Russia has significantly enlarged its resources from 2000 on, during Putin’s two presidential terms. Perhaps it is the continuous and vigorous growth of the GDP that is best known from among these facts. The 1990s were the decade of continuous decline in Russia with regard to the economy, and with the exception of 1997 there was not a single year when the GDP did not show signs of decline in respect of industrial output or any other important indicator. The fall of the GDP was a two-digit figure in some areas. In summary, it can be stated that the extent of the Russian economic decline in the 1990s is comparable to the decline of the Third Reich in World War II, i.e. the scale of decline was essentially as big as the one suffered by Hitler’s Germany between 1939 and 1945 with the not negligible difference that Russia experienced it in peace time. From 1990 on, however, following the financial collapse of the previous year continuous economic growth set in, producing an average 6.5-7% annual growth of the GDP. This growth is undoubtedly imposing. I wish to go into details about some of its limitations somewhat later. It is highly conspicuous that from the early 2000s on Russia could rapidly get rid of the financial dependence it got into in the middle of the 1980s, in the early years of Gorbachev. It should be recalled here that the late Soviet Union had rather significant additional incomes as a result of the first energy price explosion and these additional incomes were available until the summer of 1985. Between the summer of 1985 and the spring of 1986, however, the oil price dropped approximately to its third due to various reasons. It essentially sealed the programme of Gorbachev’s perestroika, primarily its social dimensions. The Soviet Union suffered highly significant losses due to those changes and in respect of energy prices a period of 17 years began when the price of oil per barrel stabilised roughly around 20 dollars. Here the year 1998, the year of Russian state bankruptcy meant some exception, when temporarily the price of oil dropped below 10 dollars. The repeated but initially slow growth of oil prices started to accelerate only from 1999 on. During the period from late 1999 to early 2004 Russia succeeded in accumulating gold and currency reserves worth more than 80 billion dollars. This is practically the sum the Soviet Union possessed in its heyday, in the second part of the 1970s. From early 2004 on, when oil prices went up above 40 dollars and stayed on that level, the sum of 80 billion was quadrupled by the spring of 2007. As a result the currency reserves of Russia today approximate 400 billion dollars. Moreover, they may even be larger because during that period, i.e. between 2004 and 2007 there were weeks when Moscow could increase its reserves weekly by 6-7 billion dollars. In addition, Russia also has a stabilisation fund based on the example of the Norwegian oil funds, the reserves of which are already significant, surpassing the 100 billion dollar level. At any rate, the gold and currency reserves of Russia are the third largest today, next only to China and Japan. It is more than obvious that the new-fangled self-assurance of Moscow, which could be sensed for the first time in the spring of 2003, is not independent of this financial stabilisation and of regaining financial independence and which has been enduring ever since to a growing extent. There are, however, certain limitations and doubts emerging in connection with this novel self-assurance.

One of the justly emerging ‘doubts’ is related to the export structure of Russia. In fact, today it is more disadvantageous than it was during the time of the late Soviet Union. The proportion of the supply of raw materials and energy carriers is larger than it was in the years of the late Soviet Union. The budgetary policy also raises doubts in several respects. First of all I wish to recall that the budget is usually divided into ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ items. The traditional ones include costs related to the administration and the governance of the country, to the defence budget, further on to national security expenses, whereas under the heading of modern items we have health care, education and other social expenses. The proportion of these two budgetary groups is about four to six times as much in the ‘modern’ group in the developed countries today. Whereas in Russia the situation is just the opposite, the money spent on defence is three to four times as much as the resources allocated for education or health care. Forecasts for the coming years do not only indicate improvement, but on the contrary, they suggest further distancing from the developed world. I may add that when President Putin said regularly that the Russian defence expenditure did not reach 3% of the GDP, and it is true that during the recent years it has been around 2.7%, he was telling the truth, yet not the whole truth, because he did not say a word about the internal structure of the entire budget while, as we have seen, that structure particularly offers food to consideration.

Recently there has been talk with increased frequency about the fact that Russia has been living amidst increasingly deteriorating demographic trends, and I think it is worth talking about. Despite the fact that there was a significant return from the periphery to Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, yet in a Russia where there had been 149 million inhabitants in the late 1991, today the total population is only 143 million. In order to have a closer look at the trend it is worth remembering that in the early 20th century the Russian Empire was the third most populous country after China and India. At the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union the total population of all the federal states was close to 300 million. Russia has inherited roughly half of that population. At that time it was still considered as the sixth most populous country of the world. Today it is only the eighth. During the past years two countries have overtaken it, at first it was Pakistan and last year it was Bangladesh. In case these tendencies continue, by 2050 the total population of Russia would be less than one hundred million and as such it will not be among the 15 most populous countries. This is further aggravated by the problem that the Russian population has been traditionally distributed very unevenly on the territory of the country. In fact four fifths of the total population are located on the European territory, which is only one fourth of the total. Practically, with the exception of the narrow southern border area, the areas beyond the Urals are uninhabited. Innumerable problems derive from this but I cannot go into details now. At any rate, the trend is a cause for extreme anxiety. And if one adds that today the life expectancy of a man in Russia is significantly shorter than it was two or three decades ago, moreover, the chances of a man past thirty are even worse than they were in 1913, it becomes visible that it is an extremely important yet dramatic consequence of the political and economic transformation of the 1990s.

And then it may also become understandable why the majority of Russian society can accept the autocratic modernisation of Putin much more enthusiastically than it could identify with the 1990s that were apparently freer. Surely, the manipulations of the politically relevant electronic media also have a role in it, but that is hardly decisive. The fact is much more important that during the Putin period the still very low incomes (around 400 dollars at current exchange rate) have been regularly paid on time. And this undoubtedly still very low income is already double the one of the late 1990s. And if this is collated to the fact that in 1998, at the time of the memorable default almost half of the population, 70 million people languished on one dollar per day, thus belonging to the poorest one billion people of the world, the social appreciation of growth is understandable.

Finally, I wish to supply a final series of data about the economic and social conditions, namely that in 2008 the Russian political leadership made a very important statement. In February 2008 the first Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, Head of the Russian delegation to the World Economic Forum at Davos, announced that the GDP according to the Russian government’s figures and calculated at current exchange rate reached 1000 thousand million dollars. Wold Bank data somewhat differ stating that the Russian GDP was only 817 billion dollars. Nevertheless, no matter which figure one considers as authentic, surely even the achievement of 817 billion dollars means that the Russian economy is the tenth largest of the world. If the economic strength of 1000 billion is considered it means that the per capita GDP, once again calculated at current exchange rate, is seven thousand dollars. This is the level of today’s Mexico. But if we compare it to the 1998 level, when the per capita GDP has just reached 1000 dollars in Russia, and Russia was not among the first one hundred countries of the world in respect of this indicator, this is yet another serious reason why the Russian society, despite possible critical remarks accepts the authoritarian modernisation of Putin more willingly than the ‘chaotic freedom’ of the 1990s.

I wish to refer to yet another limitation of Putin’s policy, namely to the recruitment of the elite. This is a problem field again suited for drawing a diversity of conclusions. In this respect I wish to call attention to one thing, namely that at the time of transition from the Yeltsin era to that of Putin a truly bizarre coalition had emerged, and pro-West technocrats as well as actors coming from Yeltsin’s environment and the secret services entered into ‘alliance’ in order to execute the not easy task of handing over authority, while social peace and the territorial integrity of the country as well as the untouchability of elite groups was to be preserved. And I do not only wish to refer to the period when one important component, the oligarchs who had played an important role around Yeltsin dropped out of this bizarre tree-segment coalition in the wake of the Yukos case, but also to a newly unfolding trend deserving particular attention. A trend that even those who mostly regard Putin’s stabilisation with understanding express some concerns about. Namely that a combination of the administrative and business elite is emerging as a consequence of which there is practically no strategic area of Russian economy today, may it be the energy sector, industry, the sphere of the media or any other field of strategic importance where former secret service men do not appear in significant numbers. On the other hand, and this is even more important, an increasing number of people in high and important administrative positions are filling up supervisory committees of companies operating in strategic areas and sometimes even at the level of operative management. I think that while too much good cannot be said about the Russian oligarchic capitalism of the 1990s the bureaucratic capitalism of the Putin era does not appear to be more attractive either. Meanwhile, undoubtedly the living conditions of a significant part of the society have conspicuously improved and the stabilisation of the past years has been able to moderate to some extent the dramatic suffering that significant groups of the society underwent in the 1990s.

Now I wish to move on to the second field, to the strategic directions of Moscow’s foreign political behaviour. I would only shed light on the trends after 2000, i.e. the appearance of Putin on the scene. When writing about the Balkans I would go back to the 1990s as well, but I would exclusively deal with the Putin period in respect of strategic directions.

I think at the time of Putin’s appearance on the scene it was a remarkable feature of Russian foreign political behaviour that the new President strove to harmonise the actual conditions of the country with achievable ambitions. In the early 2000s a new political course began with Putin which surveyed the actual capabilities of the country with fair consciousness and tried to measure and adjust the political aims and ambitions to these capabilities. An important expression of this was the obvious and clear turn towards Europe Putin implemented in the early 2000s. It was more than telling that Putin’s first travels abroad took him to Europe. The old continent was regarded as the site number one for building contacts. In the early 2000 the first travels of the new President took him to Madrid, Rome, Berlin and Paris. He made it clear relatively fast what an eminent significance Europe and the European key powers had for Moscow. This was obviously a rational decision and was closely related to the realistic survey of the country’s capabilities. I wish to note that the Russian elite of experts indicated it from the end of the 1990s that Russia has not and will not have means to take up a global role in the foreseeable time. If this circumstance is not accepted it would necessarily lead to a dangerous and hazardous policy. Therefore the year 2000 started in the spirit that Moscow should concentrate primarily on Europe, and not only on the European Union but also on the four or five countries of key importance in Europe. It has to bring about whatever is a value and opportunity for Russia out of this. I wish to note that this turn to Europe was highly welcome by a large part of the European capitals. In 2000 Putin met the British Prime Minister Tony Blair four times. Incidentally, all signs suggest that Tony Blair was given the task of fathoming what Putin was really like and what intentions he had. In fact this intensive European-Russian dialogue was to have its spectacular outcome. Those dealing with foreign policy might remember that the summer of 2001, the weeks before the 11 September attack against America brought about very interesting changes in the relationship of Moscow and the West. At first Berlusconi spoke, followed by Schroeder, and subsequently by Condoleezza Rice, at that time the National Security Advisor of the American President, all of them telling that the time might have come when the foreseeable perspective of winning NATO membership may seriously open up to Russia. All this happened in July and August 2001. The European leaders and even the American one somewhat hesitantly gave signs of the possibility of speeding up the inclusion and integration of Russia into important international organisations and institutions even before the dramatic events of September. And then came the period between 2001 and 2003, which I would call the ‘period of grace’ for the sake of simplicity, when the relations between Moscow and the West became the most intimate, closest and friendliest in the history of modern Russia. It was mostly and obviously the consequence of the swift and friendly reaction of Moscow upon the 9/11 attack that hit the United States. Thus Putin, who offered Russia’s support to the United States, perhaps surprising many actors in his environment, gauged the interests of his country highly rationally and stood unambiguously for Washington. This new situation opened up very important perspectives at the end of 2001. One new perspective was that the pro-West, liberal part of the still influential Russian elite sensed for the first time that it could openly advocate and put the programme of the full EU membership of Russia on the agenda. I may add that what is interesting here is not whether Russia would have possessed such conditions after 15-20 years but the political will and intention. Namely that the influential group of the elite assessed at that time that it could even publicly declare this strategic aim. But I wish to state that it has never become an official programme. Russia did not give any official sign in that period between 2001 and 2003 of wanting to become a full member of the EU. But it is also true that the Russian President did not suggest even in a single remark that he would reject it up to the autumn of 2003. From the autumn of 2003, however, a number of statements appeared in which Putin declared that it was not the aim of Russia even on medium term to become an EU member. Therefore the outside world rightly sensed that there were influential and significant Russian groups that wanted to give new impetus and different significance to the approximation of Moscow to Europe.

Besides the above declaration of EU membership as a strategic aim this was the period when yet another important element cropped up in the relations of Russia and the West. There was a realistic chance emerging that the relations between the West and Russia would, I may even say for good, be demilitarised. This would mean that conflicting interests and smaller or bigger conflicts may survive in the set of relations of the two parties, but it would never occur to anyone, to any of the sides even to remind the other of its military capability not even as a warning. Thus I would link two important developments to this ‘period of grace’, namely setting the acquisition of EU membership as a strategic aim, and the lasting demilitarisation of the relations between the West and Russia.

Now the question may justly emerge: where does the change begin and what leads to the present situation in which one may already hear about a new Cold War or at least the possibility of it? What leads to this turn? Surely it is not the Iraqi crisis of 2003. It is not the disapproval of Moscow of the intervention of the United States there. Russia occupied a highly consistent stand in respect of the Iraqi action: on the one hand it continuously repeated that the three arguments based on which the United States and its allies wished to gain the authorisation of the UN Security Council were shaky and were simply not proved. Russia, however, did not stop there and, going further, it stated that it was not wise to interfere by military means into the affairs of an unstable area where the consequences of intervention were practically unforeseeable. Moscow continuously stressed that an intervention could fatally shake the relative stability of the region, it may unpredictably activate certain groups while it may further radicalise others. Initially this message was present from the beginning of the war, and I must say that those warnings later on proved to be well founded. Yet, two weeks after the beginning of the military action Putin had a highly remarkable statement when he repeated the Russian stand about the intervention being a mistake, but he also added that Moscow was not interested in the failure of the United States. It should be also added that this particular intervention in Iraq has had a highly beneficial effect on the situation and incomes of Russia because the protracted Iraqi war was one of the reasons, besides uncertainty prolonged around Iraq, why energy prices shot up at the turn of 2003 and 2004 and have remained high. Thus, in the early 21st century Russia could be among those who made the largest profit of the energy boom. But once again I wish to stress that it was not Iraq, not the intervention in Iraq launched in March 2003 that had damaged and fatally burdened the relationships between Washington and Moscow.

There are two other elements that played a more important and significant role in this process. One was the Yukos case starting in the summer of 2003. I cannot evoke its details here. I wish to note only one thing. Namely that the Yukos case and its different phases such as the imprisonment of Platon Lebedev in July and of Mihail Hodorkovsky in October was presumably not unfounded in many respects and some of the counts of indictment could have stood their ground even in front of an independent and unbiased judiciary. The problem is that obviously a series of similar proceedings could have been commenced against a significant part of the Russian business elite. Yet, nothing similar happened. Clearly at this point the issue of political expediency emerges: if the authorities commenced proceedings against everybody, an unmanageable quantity of fronts would open up. Its political consequences would have been impossible to measure. The Yukos case, besides everything else, had a very important political consequence which became rapidly manifest in Moscow’s foreign political behaviour too. Actually, the Hodorkovsky case rearranged the internal power relations of the Russian elite in no time. Those groups of the elite dropped off in a minute that were interested in maintaining cooperation and continuous dialogue with the West. And those groups that remained in power position, including pro-West technocrats, even after the Yukos case were either uninterested in maintaining dialogue with the West, or were not strong enough. Therefore the Yukos case is an important turning point, as a result of which such influential pro-West political factors fell out of the power elite as Prime Minister Mihail Kasyanov of Putin’s first term, or Aleksandr Voloshin, the head of the presidential administration.

I am also of the view that the first ‘coloured revolution’ of the post-Soviet area, taking place in Georgia in the autumn of 2003 did not play a meaningful role in the cooling down of relations between the West and Russia. Russia calmly accepted that change. It is not sure that it properly assessed and interpreted the events. The events in Ukraine, however, in the autumn of 2004 created a radically new situation. It can be definitely stated that the erosion of trust was launched by the coloured revolutions of the Soviet internal periphery, and mostly the strategically most important and most significant Ukrainian one.

Summing up, I assume that there are four circumstances that have set out Russia in the direction of a very resolute, autonomous foreign policy, at times even ready for confrontation with the West. The first one is undoubtedly related to the difficulties of approximating Europe because it is one thing to set certain aims in rhetoric such as the development of a common economic space, but it is entirely different to adjust certain conditions and formulate them into norms. Obviously some disappointment also plays a role in the cooling down of relations between Moscow and the West even though the mutual goodwill and trust were obviously present in both parties. This is well indicated by the fact that the parties accepted the concept of the so-called “four common spaces” of the EU and Russia at the Saint Petersburg meeting (May 2003). The concept was meant to have alternative areas if the development of the common economic space did not progress fast enough and problems emerged that were difficult to solve, where other kinds of successes could be accomplished in times of temporary difficulties. Thus, compensation would be possible. Such a compensating function would be performed by the three new areas of ‘internal security and justice’, ‘external security’ and ‘scientific and cultural cooperation’. All this would serve to help and continuously maintain Russia–EU relations. From the moment on, however, when gaining EU membership is not a goal even in the medium term these four common spaces and the related internal legislation lose their function. If it is not one’s aim, as it is not Moscow’s aim anymore to gain membership of the EU then the expectations of the “common spaces” become totally unnecessary and their acceptance would mean unilateral allowances.

This is one of the elements provoking mistrust. The other one is the issue of the ‘coloured revolutions’ mentioned above. The third one is the rearrangement of internal power relations, a factor I have also referred to. And finally, Russia’s rapidly acquired financial independence is an obvious element of this political change which has evoked a new-fangled and strong self-consciousness in Moscow in no time. And in this context Russian aims have also changed. One of the most important aims of Putin’s authoritarian modernisation was to avoid social catastrophe. I think that this aim was essentially achieved. But this authoritarian modernisation does have another important aim as well. Namely to moderate and, if possible, continuously regain the Russian strategic losses suffered during the 1990s. It seems that a new, utterly ambitious aim is also emerging, perhaps only in rhetoric for the time being, namely the increasing desire of Russia to take the role of an autonomous power pole and to work for its creation. A telling ideological form of all this is the so-called construct of a ‘sovereign democracy’. This term can be met with growing frequency. ‘Sovereign democracy’ is an ideologheme that has two parallel messages. On the one hand it implies that Moscow reserves the right to decide on its own in issues concerning and related to it and should be in a decision-making position. A significant part of the elite suffered the historical experience of the 1990s as veritable catastrophes, as an alleged foreign governance of the country. Perhaps this is exaggerated at times, yet, sensing all this as a tragedy is not unfounded. ‘Sovereign democracy’, however, does not only have this meaning but also the inclination that others should not determine what kind of democracy we are to build, as it is repeatedly stated in Moscow. I think that this may even be regarded as rational within certain limitations, at the same time driving it beyond a certain limit is clearly an abuse of the concept.

Finally, I wish to speak about the Balkans in brief, namely about the consequences of all this for the Balkans. As I mentioned here I would go back in time, to the 1990s, but only very briefly.

First of all Russia is one of the powers that were among the first to accept and acknowledge the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. It can be stated in general that Moscow was leading in that process of acknowledgement in the early 1990s and was not among those who got engaged in procrastination. At the same time it is conspicuous, and this is clearly the consequence of the internal transformation and the related internal uncertainties, that Russia was not at all active in the Balkan region in the early 1990s, as it was expressly passive also in the whole of East-Central Europe. This was due to the very resolute objective of Yeltsin’s policy not to create the impression or appearance for a moment either in our area or in the Balkans that a kind of revitalisation and renewal of the Brezhnev-doctrine was in progress. Not even in the form of the most well-intentioned activation. Surely at that time Russia had neither means nor intention for activation. There was neither strength, nor ability or intention to become once again active in the Balkans and in East-Central Europe in general in the early 1990s.

I also consider it rather important that when Russia reappeared in the region again as an active actor from 1993 and 1994 onwards, it did so primarily upon the initiative of the West. The West initiated it because they had the impression that Russia, following the policy of approximating the West, may be a benevolent mediator, primarily towards Belgrade. Russia could be the actor that can simultaneously threaten and promise; it can mediate praise as well as expectations authentically towards the leadership in Belgrade.

Up to 1994 and 1995 Moscow’s behaviour towards the European great powers and the United States was extremely cooperative. One should look at the resolutions of the UN Security Council to see that Moscow consistently voted together with the Western powers on issues related to the Balkans. There was a period at the turn of 1994 to 1995 when Russian leadership began to sense that the promises formerly made to persuade Belgrade to be more obedient were not being fulfilled. Next a curious transitory period emerged when they still did not want to turn against the SC majority but Western position was already unacceptable to them. Well, at that stage they bridged over the situation repeatedly by not participating in the vote, but still not in opposition. Then the change continuously unfolded from 1995 on. So much so that in 1999, at the time of the Kosovo crisis Moscow refused to take note of even the most obvious violations of rights by Belgrade. I must say that in 1999 it was rather sad to see that it had not been mentioned for long weeks, not even by a single sentence in the leading Russian television channel, in the main evening news programmes of ORT that any offence or reprisal had hit the Albanians of Kosovo.

All this showed that Russian politics, insisting on cooperation for a long time, was changing its direction after a while and became prejudiced. Now I would not dwell upon the convoy issue of April 1999, affecting Hungary too, though that case would deserve a few words. At the same time, with Putin’s turn to Europe in 2000 and with the sober foreign policy he conducted particularly during his first presidential term, the entire Balkan problem began to be pushed into the background once again temporarily by Moscow. After the 1999 crisis the Russian Balkan policy sets out on the way of sobering, retreat and consolidation as well as on the way of taking up dialogue once again with the West.

Finally, I wish to write about one more thing and it is Kosovo, the precedent of Kosovo and the dilemmas that preoccupy Moscow in that respect.

There are four areas of secession on the territory of the former Soviet Union that raise serious issues for Russia. Two of those territories belong to Georgia, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Transnistria, belonging to Moldova is also a state formation of secession and there is Nagorno-Karabakh, part of Azerbaijan but of Armenian majority population. In the case of Abkhazia presumably 90% of the inhabitants already have Russian citizenship and if there was a referendum, surely the vast majority of the population would gladly accede to the Russian Federation. A referendum on this issue would in all probability produce the same result in South Ossetia belonging to Georgia. If the independence of Kosovo is acknowledged, Moscow can obviously expect the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian leadership, as well as Transnistria belonging to Moldova to decide for the same. These secessionist state formations would put Moscow under very hard pressure to support their intention to become independent. At the same time it carries in itself the danger that these examples would generate risky processes of secession inside Russia itself. Hence this fact limits to some extent Moscow’s behaviour of supporting secession. There is, however, yet another barrier present, and that is the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. The problem of Karabakh leads one to the Armenian–Azeri conflict. In connection with that conflict a dilemma difficult to manage occurs for Russia, i.e. how one could keep up the friendship of Armenia and Azerbaijan while traditionally Yerevan is Moscow’s most important ally in the Trans-Caucasus. It may be necessary, because there might be situations when it comes expressly handy if Moscow offers the radio locators of Gabala on the territory of Azerbaijan for joint use to Washington.

And though the Chechen conflict could be suppressed at the cost of much blood and arms in the conflict zone of the Northern Caucasus, there still remain a lot of unsolved problems, therefore Russia would not at all like to provoke movements of secession inside its own territory. And that is a serious ‘disciplinary force’.

* Senior Researcher of the Institute of History, HAS